THE TROBRIAND CASE
Cultural Inferences
by Hugh M. Lewis
University of Missouri, Columbia
1995
The Trobriand Ethnographic Context
Edwin Hutchin's work Culture and Inference (1980) deals centrally
with a land claims case in a traditional open moot setting in the Trobriand
Islands. Rights to individual garden plots are divided into the right to use and
the right to allocate the garden. While the right to use the garden may be
transferred back and forth between dalas, or clans, the right to allocate a
garden must be kept within the same dala and can be lost only to the village
headman upon the death of the owner. Such a complex set of rights and rules of
transference of gardens yields a complicated history of the "pathway"
any particular garden plot takes in the course of several generations.
There have been important ethnographic precedents in understanding this
Trobriand system of land rights--most notably B. Malinowski (1935) and Annette
Weiner (1976). Previous accounts failed to evaluate the functioning of the
system in an adequate manner because they did not analytically separate the
rights to use and to allocate garden plots.
There are, as well, other facets of Trobriand and wider Melanesian culture
which need to be taken into account in regard to the cultural appropriateness of
the cases to be considered. These considerations of context broach an important
aspect of the study, of its possible cultural relativity as something uniquely
Trobriand or typically Melanesian, immersed inextricably in a holistic web of
other traits and relations. It brings up the plausible generality of the model, and
of the somewhat paradoxical question of "how much context" is enough
in our translations, interpretations, models and theoretical representations of
any cultural logic.
The central theoretical issue is, of course, about the underlying and largely
implicit logical coherence of culturally encoded schemata that allow for the
public consensus and individual integration of experience and manipulation of
the common stock of knowledge.
"The analysis of litigation has shown that a model of folk logic
developed from purely western sources is quite adequate as an account of the
spontaneous reasoning of Trobriand Islanders. It is not straight Aristotelian
logic, because it contains plausible as well as strong inferences, but then so
does our own reasoning. There is no need to posit a different logic....The clear
difference between cultures with respect to reasoning is in the representation
of the world which is thought about than in the processes employed in doing the
thinking. It is clear that Trobrianders cut the world into a different set of
categories from those we entertain, and that those categories are linked
together in unfamiliar structures. But the same types of logical relations
underlie the connections, and the inferences that are apparent in their
reasoning appear to be the same as the inferences we make." (Hutchins,
1980:127-8)
Basic Metaphors
Hutchins bases his interpretation of this system upon the operation of
certain logical connectives which work like key inference eliciting metaphors
and which are used in a prototypical manner at several levels of implication.
The metaphor of keda or the pathway of the garden, is an important one
in understanding the relevant schemata and basic model presented in the text.
This metaphor of the pathway is reiterated in several places in the text, and is
seen as an example of an even more powerful abbreviating mechanism of cultural
codings than schematic chunks because it is able to compress whole episodes into
a single statement. "The keda metaphor allows the speaker to refer
to the individual episodes in the discourse in terms of the most salient events
within them." Determination of the keda, or history of the social pathways
a garden will make through the generations, constitutes the principle basis for
the litigation of disputes over land-claims. The success of a litigant often
depends upon his/her ability to reconstruct a credible history of
transactions--"such a history will typically trace the keda (path of
social movement) of the garden only a few generations back to some previous
rights holder whose claim is acknowledged by both litigants." (Hutchins,
1980:45)
Malinowski (1935) noted the frequency of the theme of quarreling over gardens
in Trobriand folklore. This metaphor may be important, not just for
understanding a broader Trobriand cultural network of exchange--when we speak,
for instance of the pathway of a particular armband or shell necklace in the
far-flung Kula Ring--but for understanding of more general process of cognitive
mapping in an individual’s effective life-world, as for instance, the
multiple, interconnected pathway a young child learns to take in her/his
adaptive navigation of a myriad of different, new experiences.
Another important metaphor is that of pokala and pokala exchange forms
the primary schemata of the cultural model. It was Motabasi’s
misinterpretation of Monilobu’s gift as "pokala" that constituted
part of the basis for his defeat in his claim. There is a linguistic confusion
between semantic levels of meaning of the term, between a general, unmarked,
basic form, and a specific, marked, explicit form. "In the most general
sense of the word, pokala denotes any prestation from an individual of
inferior status to one of superior status in the hope, but without the
promise, that something will be returned."(Hutchins,1980:25-6)
The general, unmarked form of pokala serves as the basis of several constrast
sets formed in relation to other marked kinds of exchanges such as katuyumali or
katumamata. Hutchins presents a diagram (1980: 28) that illustrates pokala as an
"umbrella term" which as an unmarked member is at the center of the
intersection of three dimensions: 1) institutional context of exchange; 2) the
medium of initial exchange; 3) relation of participants to land. These
dimensions are the basis of different contrast sets in wider domains of
exchange, one whose terms distinguishes between various expected returns,
another whose different terms distinguishes the various media of exchange, and
the third whose terms distinguish the social loci of use rights to the garden
plot. (1980: 27) Different pokala arrangements serve as alternative
"roads" or pathways to the acquisition of rights to property that
"are not traveled with equal frequency"(1980: 43)
The standard pokala is at the heart of interpersonal politics and thus of the
basic generalized reciprocities of social relations. It serves as the prototypic
form of social transaction "between a man and his mother’s brother or his
mother’s mother’s brother." It is the most frequent form of exchange
for land transfer that occurs--approximately 80%--within the "owning"
dala.
Annette Weiner remarks in her work on Trobriand culture that "The most
important part of making pokala, I was told, is not to say the word pokala
aloud when giving things to someone. To make pokala, a man gives and then
he waits. To talk about pokala is a shameful thing to do and can often
detract from success."(1976: 157)
"Pokala relations between the holders of resources and persons
who aspire to those resources are not legal contractual arrangements. To see
them only as legal obligations is to miss both the emotional texture of the
relationships, which is itself a major determinant of the volume of tokens
exchanged, and the freedom of choice available to rights holders and aspirants
in the formation and maintenance of such relations. Every exchange event is a
communication from one person to another of both an artifact (item exchanged)
and a social message. The movement of artifacts makes exchange important
economically. The participant’s interpretation of social messages makes
exchange important symbolically. (Hutchins, 1980:36-7)
It becomes apparent that the notion of pokala, and propositional schemata it
presupposes, enters into a broader arena of social exchange, relation, systems
of prestation, status, prestige and value by which Trobriand culture elaborates
itself as something distinctive in the world. But this should not preclude its
more general relation or relevance to other and larger cultural and symbolic
systems of exchange, status and value by which people use cultural codes to
construct and then make sense of their world.
The final metaphor which deserves mention is tupwa which signifies
that a garden is "extra, spare, left-over" (Hutchins, 1980:36) with
respect to the holder and has not yet been allocated to someone else. "As
long as a garden is tupwa, it is accessible to all types of pokala."(1980:36)
It was Kwaiwai’s opinion that the garden Kolubuwa was not tupwa in respect to
Motabasi, an opinion which he reiterated four times in the course of his
presentation, both in the opening, intermediate and closing statements, that
served to clarify, as a powerful recursive metaphor, the real status and history
of the garden and the insubstantial basis of Motabasi’s claim to it. That the
garden was not tupwa in respect to Motabasi was repeated in the Chief’s final
decision in the case. At this point, the deeper cultural significance of tupwa
might only be guessed at without the further elucidation of the broader
ethnographic context.
Expert Systems
The effort to fit such a complex as Trobriand land claim cases into an expert
system depends upon a clear and explicit model of the system formulated in terms
of basic "if-then" rules and confidence factors which are logically
connected. An expert system "shell" (Benfer et al., 1991) is basically
a system built on the basis of the elicited knowledge and implicit rules of a
human expert upon a delimited domain of knowledge, which is then emptied of its
informational content and contains only its skeletal structure of an inference
engine and interface.
The shell and design of the system employed was "backward
chaining." A backward chaining system is one that is "goal
driven" in the sense that it works from one of a few alternative goals,
taken as the terminal factive consequents of a string of related
"if-then" rules, and then searches backward among the number of
alternative antecedents until it achieves a "factive" confirmation.
The resulting search string or inference chain, starting from a limited number
of input facts and a given goal, to a final conclusion linking the goal to the
facts, may be quite long and convoluted in its logical permutations. The logic
upon which such a system may be classical or two value, fuzzy or Bayesian.
One virtue of the interface of a backward chaining system is that if it lacks
facts to connect to goals or subgoals, in solving its problem, it can be made to
query the user for more inputs which it then incorporates as "facts"
in the search-solution space.
There has been some debate over the question of whether such expert systems
represent anything more than sophisticated decision-tree models. While a
decision-tree is basically a static device and represents but one pathway
through a "search solution space," a rule based expert system, founded
as it is upon logical operators, is much more dynamic and represents alternative
pathways from which different decision-trees may be constructed. Furthermore,
the rules upon which such expert systems are built are largely implicit to the
knowledge of the informant, and thus are normally out of awareness in everyday
decision-making, though nonetheless determinative in their outcomes.
Decision-tree models based upon conscious decision-making models simply do not
represent this implicit level of structural analysis. Furthermore, expert
systems may be "generative" in that they may lead to the formulation
of new rules and the acquisition of new facts which might otherwise be oblivious
to the informant.
The important aspect of expert systems design in regard to their application
in ethnographic research is their role as mediational devices which allow the
concise and coherent translation of models or constructs of understanding
between a user and a foreign knowledge domain, or alternatively, an explicit
knowledge of the ethnographer and the informant's mostly implicit cultural
knowledge. If such systems can be made to work, they can be said to constitute a
kind of test of the coherence or non-contradiction of the underlying logic of
the knowledge structure. Whether or not this test of the model also constitutes
a test of the empirical validity or ethnographic consistency of the theory on
which it is based, is another, possibly unanswerable matter.
The Basic Model
The basic model as elaborated in chapter three of Edwin Hutchins' work Culture
and Inference (1981:46-61) concerns the acquisition, transfer and retention
of rights to the use and allocation of garden land by members of different dalas,
or clan groups in the Trobriand Islands. Rights to use such plots of land are
separate from the rights to allocate such land, and are subject to a corporate,
trans-generational history of title of the land as well as to a record of the
ritual exchanges which have been made, or claimed to have been made, in
reference to either the use or allocation of the land.
This history of land use, transfer, and entitlement, and the distinction
drawn between the right to use (R-use) and the right to allocate (R-allocate)
serves as the point of contention in competing claims to the land, as well as
the basis for the settlement of such disputes by an open moot officiated by
tribal officials. The record of rights of entitlement to land is in a sense a
matter of public knowledge, and is thus subject to the common cultural
constraints, sanctions and evaluations.
The model consists of a set of primary and secondary derivative schemas which
serve as the foundation for deciding the probability of possession and transfer
of these rights of allocation and use. The basic "master" schema
involves the case of member B of dala one giving "pokala" to member A
of the same dala in return for the allocation of both rights to allocate and to
use the garden and can be written in shorthand as:
A (R-allocate + R-use)
B gives pokala to A
B receives (R-allocate + R-use)
This schema provides the basis for a set of strong inferences to be made
regarding the likelihood of certain events, either the actual transfer of rights
to B, as well as the previous conditions which constrain the transfer--that A
originally has both rights to use and allocate the property and that B gave
pokala to A. If either A lacks rights to allocate or use the garden, or B does
not give pokala to A, then it is certain that A could not in the first case, and would not in the
second case, transfer rights to B. These corollaries can be written as:
1.
A (No R-Use or
No R-Allocate) & 2. A(R-use +R-allocate)
B gives pokala to A B does not give pokala to
B does not receive rights B does not receive rights
Similarly, it can be assumed that if B has
rights to the land or is using the land that was previously possessed by A, then
at some previous time B had given pokala to A, and A transferred all rights to B
which A had previously held.
The first set of derivative schemata involve the distinction between transfer
of rights within a dala, which are transferred intact, versus the transfer of
only use rights between dala, and which rights are therefore split between
rights of allocation kept within the dala and rights of use given to the other
dala. Rights of allocation cannot be transferred outside of a dala. This can be
modeled as follows:
2. A[dala one](R-allocate + R-use) & 1. A[dala one]
(R-allocate + R-use)
B[dala one] gives pokala to A B [dala two] gives
pokala A
A transfers (R-allocate + R-use) to B. A transfers (R-use) to
B.
In the second case above, the rights to a garden plot become split between
two dala. In the case of a third party (C) giving pokala to either A of dala one
or B of dala two, the resulting transfer will be only of either rights to
allocate, in the first case, and only the rights to use in the second case, but
not both.
1.
A[dala one]
(R-allocate) & 2. B[dala two] (R-use)
C[dala one] gives pokala to A C[dala two] gives pokala to
B
A transfers (R-allocate) to C B transfers (R-use) to C
Several counterfactuals can
be inferred to be true from these schemata. In the first case, C will not
receive the right to use the garden, and, in the second case, C will not receive
the right to allocate the garden.
"Katumamata" involves the "waking up of a
previous pokala" by a third party of the non-owning dala (C [dala two]) to
the owning dala, and involves the subsequent transfer of the the rights to use
the garden from B to C.
C[dala two] gives
katumamata to A[dala one]
B [dala two] transfers (R-use) to C
C receives (R-use) from B.
"Katuyumali"
involves the transfer of the use rights back from the non-owning dala to the
owning dala. This schema is represented thus:
B [dala two]
(R-use)
A[dala one] gives katuyumali to B [dala two]
B transfers (R-use) to A
The final schemata involves
the death of the owner of the land and the appropriation of the rights to the
land by the headman.
A[dala one] {or B
or C} (R-allocate + R-use)
A{or B or C} dies
(R-allocate + R-use) transferred to Headman.
Computer Representations of the Model
It is at first appearance a relatively simple and straight-forward matter to
transcribe this basic model directly into terms appropriate for an expert system
shell such as Intelligent Developer, (or, alternatively and preferably, Prolog).
Each of the basic schemata (pokala, katuyumali, katumumata) can be
represented by a basic rule set which covers not only the schema itself but all
implicit inferential presumptions which underlie and constrain the truth-value
of the schemata, such as the estimates of the likelihood of a transfer or
possession, or the likelihood of certain past events like the giving of pokala
or katumamata given current uses or claims.
Finally, the schemata, when linked together in some kind of order, or
"history," which each garden possesses, yields a simple decision tree
structure which represents the possible pathways by which the movement of the
rights to land can be traced from one party to another. The number of possible
pathways followed by the land rights, in the ideal case, becomes rapidly
increased with the number of transfers and instances of ritual prestation, and
the number of participants or the time depth involved, and resembles the basic
"search tree" that is so important in artificial intelligence design.
In the case of mapping this basic model, certain initial presumptions have
been made to simplify the resulting tree:
1. The prototypical model is written in terms
of a single piece of land, and thus the schematic history of this single
property is represented by one search tree.
2. "A" is the original owner of the
property, and is a member of dala 1 which originally held rights to both
allocate and use the garden.
3. No one has died.
4. Katumamata or katuyumali is given only to
possessors of rights to the garden.
5. "C" will always be of the same
dala, or clan, as "B". If "B" is of dala one, then so will
be "C" and if "B" is of dala two, then so will be
"C".
These presumptions keep the model simple--if any of these presumptions are
voided, then the resulting possible set of pathways becomes increasingly
complicated, and the number of rules required to adequately represent the
resulting possibilities rapidly increases to the point of being unwieldy by
single goal oriented expert system, and a multiple goal system would have to be
constructed.
The main goal of the design is to ascertain: 1) who has what rights, if any,
such that all people’s status in relation to the land are stated and no two
people share the same sets of rights, as fitting the paradigm of table one; and
2) four primary pathways of transfer of rights to the garden can be followed, as
fits diagram two below.
Table I
Paradigm of Possibilities
|
Persons |
R-intact |
R-use |
R-allocate |
no-rights |
deceased |
|
A |
yes/no |
yes/no |
yes/no |
yes/no |
yes/no |
|
B |
yes/no |
yes/no |
yes/no |
yes/no |
yes/no |
|
C |
yes/no |
yes/no |
yes/no |
yes/no |
yes/no |
|
Headman |
yes/no |
yes/no |
yes/no |
yes/no |
N/A. |
From Table One above it is readily apparent that there are many possible
combinations of who has what rights, with each combination representing a
separate pathway to be reckoned. The primary pathways represented in Figure One
below show only four alternative set of combinations of rights as illustrated by
the different outputs (Output A, B, C, and D).

It is apparent that many more combinations, such as introducing third or
fourth members who are making claims to the land, would produce a very
complicated and difficult to read map.
There is also a necessary ordering of modus ponens type rule sets ( if-then
conditional clauses) which any backward chaining expert system must follow such
that certain basic "facts" must be adduced before others can be
reasonably concluded. This sets in motion a built-in constraint to the scale and
scope of an expert system as a knowledge based system working within a
well-defined domain of inputs and rules, such that there is an a finite number
of rule sets and pathways which can be optimally handled within a single goal
paradigm. Too many alternative conclusions, entailing multiple sub-goals and
numerous alternative pathways, especially when these occur in the first order
rules connected directly to the given facts or when alternate goals may share
the same rules, rapidly reduces the representational capacity and resolving
power of the model as an adequate construction of reality.
We have soon reach the familiar Von Neumann bottleneck of a resulting
combinatorial explosion of the search space, without any clearly obvious or
"correct" functional algorithm to resolve this dilemma. This exploding
complexity would be reflected in the number of non-contradictory rules necessary
to control the system, and in the number of the conditional antecedents and
concluding consequents of each rule.
The following is a cursory outline of the rule sets, and
definitions provided for Intelligent Developer that is illustrated by
table one.
BEGIN. [Start]
Output. (Welcome) Pause. Output (Initial Presumptions) Pause.
Output(Pathways). Pause.
1. A is of Dala one.
2. No one is deceased.
3. If B is of dala one, then C is of dala one.
4. If B is of dala two, then C is of dala two.
5. Only B makes transaction to A, and C makes transaction only to A.
1. Did B give pokala to A? Pokala Yes; pokala no.
a. rule: If B gave pokala to A, then transfer of rights was likely.
b. rule: If B did not give pokala to A, then there was probably no transfer,
and A retains rights intact. Output I. Pause. End.
2.Is B of dala one or dala two? Dala one; dala two.
c. rule: If B is of dala one, then transfer of rights is intact.
Output(Indefinite). Pause. Seek(three).
d. rule: If B is of dala two, then transfer of rights to use only. Output(Indefinite).
Pause. Seek(four)
3. Did C give pokala to B? Pokala yes, pokala no.
e. rule: if C gave pokala to B, then transfer of rights intact. C holds
rights intact. Output II. Pause. End. f rule: if C did not give
pokala, then no transfer of rights. B holds rights intact. Output III. Pause.
End.
4. Did C give katuyumali to B? Katuyumali yes, katuyumali no.
g. rule: if C gave katuyumali to B, then C transfer rights use only. Output(Indefinite).
Pause. Seek (six).
h. rule: if C did not give katuyumali to B, then no transfer of rights. Output(Indefinite).
Pause. Seek (five).
5. Did A katumamata B? Katumamata Yes, Katumamata No.
i. rule: if A gave katumamata to B,then B transfer rights use back to A. A
retains rights to allocate and receives rights to hold, A holds rights intact. Output
IV. Pause. End.
j. rule: if A did not give katumamata to B, then B retains rights to use the
garden and A retains rights to allocate the garden. Output V. Pause. End.
6. Did A katumamata C? Katumamata Yes, Katumamata No.
k. rule: if A gave katumamata to C, then C transfers rights to use the garden
back to A. A retains rights to allocate and receives rights to hold. A holds
rights intact. Output. VI Pause. End.
l. rule: if A did not give katumamata to B, then C retains rights to use the
garden and A retains rights to allocate the garden. Output.VII. Pause. End.
Complete. There is not enough information for I.D. to decide
who
has what rights. Would you like to choose? A_intact; B_intact; C_intact; B_use,
A_allocate; C_use, A_allocate.
Endrule. If [END] , then Output(Finished). Pause.
Output I.
Because there was no pokala
given, there was no transfer of rights, and A retains rights intact to the
garden. Format(1). (A_intact, B_none, C_none)
Output II.
Because C gave pokala to B
who received rights intact from A, chances are that C was granted rights intact
to the garden. Format (2) (C_intact, B_none, A_none)
Output III.
Because C did not give
pokala to B, C receives no rights to the garden and B holds rights intact.
Format (3) (B_intact, C_none, A_none)
Output IV.
Because A gave katumamata to
B, B probably transfered use rights back to A, and A therefore holds both rights
to use and allocate the garden. Format (4). (A_intact, C_none, B_none).
Output V.
Because A did not give
katumamata to B, B retains rights to use the garden and A retains rights to
allocate the garden. Format (5) (A_allocate, B_use, C_none).
Output VI.
Because A gave katumamata to
C, A receive back the right to use the garden while retaining the right to
allocate the garden. A therefore holds rights intact to the garden. Format (6) (A_intact,
B_none, C_none).
Output VII.
Because A did not give
katumamata to C, A does not receive the right to use the garden, which is
retained by C. A has only the right to allocate the garden. Format (7) (A_allocate,
B_none, C_use).
Output (Indefinite)
It is yet uncertain
who has what rights. More information must be found.
Given the preceding outline, the expert system design follows the following
Figure Two of the possible pathways in the system:
Insert Figure II here.
Inference Values and Confidence Factors
An important aspect of this entire analysis is the use of inference in
cultural schemata--the use of a notation (s, p, T, and F) prefixed to each
clause denoting the degree of inference strength associated with the
statement--strong, plausible, strongly True, strongly False, plausibly True and
plausibly False, True and False. The possible inferences ranging from weakest to
strongest are:
strongly false (sF); plausibly false (pF); plausible (p);
plausibly true (pT); strongly true (sT).
One means of representing these inference values in Intelligent Developer are
the use of confidence values which can be arbitrarily assigned on a percentage
basis to each of the conditionals and conclusions of each rule.
strongly F. =10%; plausibly F. = 30%; plausible =50%;
plausibly T. =70% strongly T. =90%.
It is these uncertainty factors which drive inference in both the cultural
system and in its computer representation. These uncertainty factors are rooted
in the lack of public knowledge of the actual history associated with a garden,
and in alternate claimants manipulation of this knowledge in establishing the
credibility of their own interests. Given that a pokala has been made by a
member of the same dala, the transfer of complete rights intact is almost
obligatory, and thus receives a rating of strongly True; but if no pokala has
been made the claims of a recipient's rights to a garden will be regarded as
plausibly False. Cases of cross-dala transfer of rights, or back-transfer
following katuyumali, are less certain and entail plausible inference values;
transfer of use rights in these instances are not as obligatory as within dala
transfers.
Test Cases
These basic rule sets, if designed correctly and properly transcribed in the
form of Intelligent Developer, should hypothetically serve as an
"inference engine" by which to test the efficacy of the model as it
has been applied in the case analysis provided in chapter 4 of Hutchin's book
which presents a running dialogue of a land claims case. If the basic models of
the expert system’s are correctly constructed according to the logic of the
basic schema, it should be possible to predictively test the logical chain of
each of the following presentations to see if the expert system will reach the
same set of conclusions. In the case of Intelligent Developer, this also
requires that the exact ordering of choices be predetermined for each
presentation, based upon the rule ordering of the program.
Claimant's argue for rights to use and/or allocate the garden based upon
different interpretations of the history of previous possession, prestations and
transfers associated with the garden. The interpretation of the history of the
garden, because publicly unknown, can be manipulated to support different claims
to the garden.
The presentation by the alternate claimants in the case are divided into
episodes by which they build their claims and establish public credibility to
rights to the garden.
Motabasi’s Presentation
The first presentation is by Motabasi who is of the same dala
as the original owner but who had not previously used the land and who had left
the land untouched for many years but who then returns to reclaim and reawaken
past rights to the land.
Episode One
Motabasi claims that Motolala, Woiyaii and Taubagoni's rights
to allocate and use the garden are false, and that Motabasi holds these rights.
But Motabasi’s claim is in question. The previous
possessor of garden is uncertain, as well as the Brothers’ claims to have
given pokala in return for transfer of rights:
?{A + U(garden)}
Brothers give pokala to ?
? transfers to Brothers {A + U(garden)}
Episode Two
Motabasi establishes previous possession of garden:
Older Brother{A+U(garden)}
Ilawokuva plausibly gives pokala to Older Brother
P[Older Brother transfers rights to Ilawokuva]
P[Ilawokuva{A+U(garden)}
Episode Three
Motabasi establishes his claim to garden:
Ilawokuva{A+U(garden)}
Motabasi gives pokala and kaivatam to Ilawokuva,
by helping the old woman garden the land.
Ilawokuva transfers rights to Motabasi
Motabasi{A+U(garden)}
Episode Four
Motabasi interprets a prestation by Monilobu of a different
dala to Ilawokuva to be pokala, and not katumamata, and therefore to be
plausibly false:
Ilawokuva{A+U(garden)}
Monilobu gives pokala to Ilawokuva
Ilawokuva plausibly transfers rights to use the garden to
Monilobu
p. F[Monilobu{U(garden)}
Episode Five
Motabasi claims that he gave sufficient pokala to Ilawokuva
who transferred full rights to him:
Ilawokuva{A+U(garden)}
Motabasi gives pokala to Ilawokuva
Ilawokuva transfers rights to Motabasi
Motabasi{A+U(garden)}
Episode Six
Motabasi strongly disclaims his younger brother’s receiving
rights from their Sister because they did not support her:
Ilawokuva{A+U(garden)}
F(Brothers gave pokala to Ilawokuva)
s. F(Ilawokuva transfers rights to Brothers)
p. F(Brothers{A+U(garden)}
Episode Seven
Motabasi constructs a counterfactual schema in order to later
refute it in episode eight:
If(Inaveguwa{A+U(garden)}
and Brothers gave pokala to Inaveguwa
Then p. T(Inaveguwa transfered rights to
Brothers) and
p. T(Brothers{A+U(garden)}
Episode Eight
Motabasi asserts that it was Ilawokuva who held rights to the
garden, and implicitly not Inaveguwa, therefore his claims are valid and the
counterclaims are false:
Ilawokuva{A+U(garden)}
Motabasi gave pokala to Ilawokuva
Ilawokuva transfers rights to Motabasi
T(Motabasi{A+U(garden)}
Episode Nine
The schema in episode nine is implicit in the refutation of
the counterfactual construction of episode seven by the reassertion of the
claims in Episode Eight:
F(Inaveguwa{A+U(garden)}
if(Brothers give pokala to Inaveguwa)
then s. F(Inaveguwa could have transfered
rights to Brothers)
and p. F(Brothers{A+U(garden)}
Motabasi's hypothetical history of the garden can be
summarized in the following Figure Three:
Kailimila’s Presentation
Kailimila is the counter-claimant to the case and has
received a tactical advantage over Motabasi in getting to present his claims
after Motabasi. Kailimila has a certain credibility given a public history of
his use of the garden and the long term absence of Motabasi.
Episode One
Kailimila opens his presentation by ridiculing Motabasi’s assertion that
the people he listed whose claims to the land are false:
F(F(Motolala, Woiyaii, Taubagoni,
Inaveguwa{A+U(garden)})
Kailimila then reports an earlier and important conversation between himself
and Ilawokuva while Motabasi was still living away in another village, in which
she instructs him to recover the garden from Solubwa’s group who were of a
different dala and who gave pokala to her for use rights to the garden. By this
report Kailimila establishes that Ilawokuva was the previous possessor of the
rights to the garden, and by which is instantiated an entire set of schemas that
establishes his claim to the garden:
Ilawokuva{A+U(garden)}
Solubuwa, of a different dala, gives pokala to Ilawokuva
Ilawokuva transfers rights to use the garden to Solubuwa
Solubuwa{U(garden)}
Episode Two
Ilawokuva{A(garden)}
Kailimila gave pokala to Ilawokuva
Ilawokuva transferred rights to allocate garden to Kailimila
Kailimila{A(garden)}
Episode Three
Kailimila{A(garden)}
Ilawokuva{U(garden)}
Kailimila gave katuyumali to Solubuwa
Solubuwa transfers rights to use the garden back to Kailimila
Kailimila{A+U(garden)}
Episode Four
Kailimila reconstructs a hypothetical instruction to him by Ilawokuva which
would have made matters easier for him, involving an earlier katumamata given by
Monilobu to receive use rights to the garden:
Ilawokuva{A(garden)} and Solubuwa{U(garden)}
Monilobu gave katumamata to Ilawokuva
Solobuwa transfers rights to use the garden to Monilobu
Monilobu{U(garden)}
Episode Five
Kailimila reports the proceedings between himself and Monilobu, when he was
instructed by the court to give katuyumali to Monilobu to recover rights to use
the garden:
Ilawokuva{A+U(garden)}
Solubuwa gave pokala to Ilawokuva
Ilawokuva transferred rights to use the garden to Solubuwa
Ilawokuva{A(garden)} and Solubuwa{U(garden)}
Kailmila{A(garden)} and Monilobu{U(garden)}
Kailimila gives katuyumali to Monilobu
s. T(Monilobu transfers rights to use the garden to
Kailimila)
s. T(Kailmila{A+U(garden)}
Episode Six
Kailimila recounts the actual public event of giving katuyumali to Monilobu
and his giving up rights to the garden, and then turns to attack Motabasi’s
claims by comparing these to his own previous public record of rights to the
garden. Kailimila ridicules Motabasi’s claim to the garden by the weakness of
his assertions of never having gardened it and never publicly receiving rights
to it:
Kailimila{A(garden)} and Monilobu{U(garden)}
Kailimila gives katuyumali to Monilobu
Monilobu transfers rights to use the garden back to Kailimila
s. T(Kailimila{A+U(garden)}
Episode Seven
Kailimila recounts the schema for within dala transfer of rights to the
garden(kuluboku) and that the particular garden in question was not among those
allocated to Motabasi by Ilawokuva:
Ilawokuva{A+U(Wa, Kap, Bwei, [but not Kb] )}
Motabasi gives pokala and kaivatam to Ilawokuva
Ilawokuva transfers rights to Wa, Kap, and Bwe, (but not
Kuluboku) to
Motabasi
Motabasi{A+U(Wa, Kap, Bwe)}
Episode Eight
Kailimila recounts again the public katuyumali he gave to Motabasi in
exchange for use rights to the garden, thereby conclusive reassrting his main
claim to hold rights intact to the garden.
Kailimila{A(garden)} and Monilobu{U(garden)}
Kailimila gives katuyumali to Monilobu
Monilobu transfers rights to use the garden back to Kailimila
s. T(Kailimila{A+U(garden)}
The following Figure Four represents the
reconstruction of Kailimila's hypothetical history of the garden:
Insert Figure IV here.
Kwaiwai’s Final Opinion
Kwaiwai gives the final reconstruction
of the most plausible history of the garden, thereby deciding the case in favor
of Kailimila and against Motabasi's claims.
Episode One
Kwaiwai gives an initial hypothetical construction representing Motabasi’s
presentation:
If Ilawokuva{A+U(g)}
and Motabasi gave pokala and kaivatam to Ilawokuva
Then p. T (Ilawokuva transferred rights to
Motabasi)
p. T(Motabasi{A+U(g)}
Episode Two
Kwaiwai states that it is false that Ilawokuva did not have rights to the
garden to transfer them to Motabasi, therefore Motabasi did not come into
possession of the garden following his pokala:
F(Ilawokuva{A+U(g)})
Motabasi give pokala and kaivatam to Ilawokuva
p. F(Ilawokuva transferred rights to Motabasi) and
p. F(Motabasi{A+U(garden)}
Episode Three
Kwaiwai sets up a model to compete against the hypothetical construction of
episode one:
Ilawokuva{A+U(garden)} but
? someone had already transferred the rights to the
garden.
Episode Four
Kwaiwai reiterates the hypothetical construction of episode one to emphasis
its hypothetical basis:
If Ilawokuva{A+U(garden)}
and Motabasi had given pokala and kaivatam to Ilawokuva
Then p. T (Ilawokuva would transfer rights to
Motabasi) and
p. T(Motabasi{A+U(garden)}
Episode five
Kwaiwai begins to elaborate who had already transferred the rights to the
garden:
Ilawokuva(dala one){A+U(garden)}
Solubuwa(dala two) gave pokala to Ilawokuva
Ilawokuva transfers right to use the garden to Solobuwa
Ilawokuva{A(garden)} and Solobuwa{U(garden)}
Episode Six
Kwaiwai confirms Motabasi’s argument that one arm of bananas is
insufficient as pokala for the garden, making it plausible that Ilawokuva did
not transfer rights to use the garden to Monilobu:
Ilawokuva{A+U(garden)}
Monilobu gave pokala(one arm of bananas) to Ilawokuva
s. F(Ilawokuva transfers rights to use the garden to
Monilobu
p. F(Monilobu{U(garden)}
Episode Seven
Kwaiwai reinterprets this schema as katumamata rather than the mistaken
presumption of Motabasi that it was pokala:
Ilawokuva{A(garden)} and Solobuwa{U(garden)}
Monilobu gave katumamata or tiatavan to Ilawokuva
p. T(Solobuwa transferred rights to use the garden to
Monilobu)
p. T(Monilobu{U(garden)}
Episode Eight
Kwaiwai uses the metaphor of "keda" to refer to the pathway of the
garden, and thus, the author claims, carries the whole discourse organization to
a higher level that involves recursion among the propositions themselves.
Episode Nine
Kwaiwai reiterates the hypothetical construction of episode one:
If (Ilawokuva{A+U(garden)}) and
Motabasi gave pokala and kaivatam to Ilawokuva
Then p. T(Ilawokuva transfered rights to
Motabasi)
p. T(Motabasi{A+U(garden)}) and
p. F(Kailimila{A+U)garden)}
Episode Ten
Kwaiwai then reiterates the schema of episode five, in which the rights to
use the garden had already been transferred to another dala:
Ilawokuva{A+U(garden)}
Solobuwa(dala two) gives pokala to Ilawokuva
Ilawokuva transferred rights to use the garden to Solobuwa
Ilawokuva{A(garden)} and Solobuwa{U(garden)}
Episode Eleven
Kwaiwai’s statement refers to the whole episode five of Kailimila’s
presentation, in which Kaimila describes his recovery of the garden from
Monilobu:
Kailimila{A(garden)} and Monilobu{U(garden)}
Kailimila gave katuyumali to Monilobu
Monilobu transfered right to use the garden back to Kaimila
s. T(Kailimila{A+U(garden)})
Episode Twelve
Kwaiwai finally and conclusively reiterates the initial hypothetical
construction:
If Ilawokuva{A+U(garden)} and
Motabasi gave pokala and kaivatam to Ilawokuva
then p. T Ilawokuva transferred rights to
Motabasi
and p. T(Motabasi{A+U(garden)} ) and
p. F (Kailimila{A+U(garden)})
Kwaiwai’s presentation represents a succinct, authoritative and
comprehensive summary of the history of a garden, one which resembles almost
exactly Kailimila’s summary, except that the former incorporates the
conclusive schema of Motabasi’s relationship in the affair. The hypothetical
case of Motabasi’s rights it presents is necessary to the understanding the
basis for the trial and the conflict of interests between competing claimants to
the garden, and for showing how this case did not fit the history of the path of
the garden.
Kwaiwai's opinion is presented in the following Figure Five showing the
accepted history of the garden:
Insert Figure V here.
Intelligent Developer can be used to test Motabasi’s presentation
because it is the shortest one, and basically involves only three participants.
If the following paradigm of responses correctly provides for the questions that
the expert system asks, the expert system should conclude the same claim that
Motabasi concludes with.
1. Assume that Ilawokuva is (A), that Monilobu is (B) and that
Motabasi is (C), and that (A) and (C) are of dala one, but (B) is of dala two.
2. (B) gave pokala(insufficient) to (A), but (A) did not
transfer rights to use the garden to (B).[In the program, B did not give pokala
to A]
3. (C) gave pokala to (A), and (A) transfered rights intact to (C).
4. (C) has rights intact to the garden. [(B) has no rights to garden]
Given this scenario, the computer should conclude with C receiving rights
intact from A, and B having no rights to the garden.
The following rule sets, presuppositions and
responses represent the attempt to apply Intelligent Developer to
this summary history and need to be given in order for Intelligent Developer
to adduce the correct decision:
1. Ilawokuva, Kailimila and Motabasi are of dala one: Solubuwa and
Monilobu are of dala two.
2. Ilawokuva is A(dala one); Kailimila is B(dala one); Motabasi is
C(dala one); Solubuwa is B(dala two): Monilobu is C(dala two).
3. Solubuwa gives pokala to Ilawokuva, who in turn transfers Use
rights; Monilobu gives katumamata to Ilawokuva, and Solubuwa transfers Use
rights to Monilobu; Kailimila gives pokala to Ilawokuva, and Ilawokuva transfers
rights to allocate the garden to Kailimila; Motabasi gives pokala to Ilawokuva,
Ilawokuva holds no rights to the garden, and therefore Motabasi receives no
rights. Kailimila gives katuyumali to Monilobu.
4. A special rule needs to be added to account for Motabasi’s false
claim. This rule is to be written as "If C(dala one) gives pokala to A and
A holds no rights to garden (because of previous pokala) then C receives no
rights to the garden).
General Considerations of Theory and Method
There may be no one correct way to construct an expert system of a
representation, or a representation of a model, or a model of a text, or a text
of a translation, or a translation of another text, or a text of a dialogue, or
a dialogue of an event, or even an event itself, much less an expert system
model of a complex cultural event. Somewhere in the long chain of inference and
implication is a wide latitude for alternative variation and recombination. As
we move from the concrete realities of phenomenologically rooted experience
toward increasingly abstract representations of that experience, we risk the
greater possibility of error, bias, extraneous influence, deviation,
over-reduction, reification, arbitrariness, and metaphorical and evaluative
looseness.
With increasing simplicity and sophistication we risk greater spuriousness,
superficiality and unrecoverable loss of the sense of complexity inherent in the
original experience or event. And yet, in spite of all our constructions there
is a need to maintain a sense of convergence which is never satisfactorily exact
but always heuristically useful. We can preserve the "essential"
elements and do without the clutter in our most abstract representations, and
still have confidence that they say something significant, if not quite profound
or substantive, about our common reality.
Edwin Hutchins makes several important points in his brief book--points which
are subtle and yet profound in their implications. The logic of the basic
schemata which he elucidates, if properly reconstructed, seems to work when
correctly fit within the format of an expert system shell. The models prove
self-sufficient , and do not seem to require any other, extraneous presumptions
or information in order to make them "fit the facts." Though this
tends to corroborate his conclusions, it alone does not conclusively validate
his contentions of the logical order of the Trobriand system of land rights.
But concentrating exclusively upon this level of logical analysis of the
cases and schematic model that he presents would be to miss entirely the most
important interpretive dimensions of his contribution to the understanding of
culture and cognition--the significant role which culturally constrained
inference, linguistically encoded implication, and cognitively constructed
"chunks" of relational schemata may play in the corporate organization
of our shared experience--in the construction, instantiation, and evaluation of
our basic cultural models and their derivative elaborations of belief and
behavior.
In this regard, there are several points reiterated and emphasized in his
work which constitute its main theoretical points.
Schematic "Chunking"
In chapter five (1980:110-124), Hutchins talks about the possible uses of
the "cultural code" or "grammar" and the
"chunking" of our experience of the world into culturally appropriate
schemata--"a set of propositions which encode an episode" (1980: 61)
that can be propositionally justified and experientially instantiated and which
can be used to justify and exemplify our cultural encoded propositions about
experience. "The knowledge structure is assumed to be a cognitive structure
which is shared by the participants...Such a structure performs different
cognitive functions depending on the requirement of the task." (1980: 70)
Such schemata "are the knowledge structures which specify the
organization of culturally meaningful event sequences." (1980: 84) "The
schemata provide a specification of the organization of relations among the
component propositions. An ungrammatical organization lacks sensibility: it is
not culturally meaningful. That is not to say that a sensible organization is
necessarily true..." (1980: 61)
Such chunks are culturally prototypical and serve to linguistically and
representationally abbreviate and reconstruct a great deal of information within
a small, efficient cognitive space. Cultural chunking is useful in a number of
ways: 1) our understanding, explanation and evaluation of events and experiences
which may be problematic or ambiguous; 2) in problem-solving; 3) in our
judgments of sensibility, truth-value, likelihood and plausibility; 4) in
decision-making; 5) in framing our expectations and plans of future experience;
6) in our interpretation of violations of such frames of expectation; 7) in our
attribution and reference of personality traits, states of being, correctness,
to others and ourselves; 8) and in the interpretation of various speech acts and
other symbolic representations about the world. "In the absence of a
structure which specifies logical conjunctions among semantic relations in the
world, it is impossible to plan, and impossible to attribute plans to
others." (Hutchins,1980: 124)
Inference
The principle function of culturally encoded, schematic chunks are that
they allow users to make many complex inferences about our many different
experiences or events in the world with only partial background knowledge of
those events, history, or hermeneutical preunderstandings and which preclude and
precondition more definitive and complete knowledge. The propositional structure
of such schemata allow for inference, or the association of relative truth-value
and significance to both the representations and the things they represent.
"Inference is the process of determining the truth value of a proposition
by bringing to bear on its possible truth values the constraints imposed by its
relation to other propositions whose truth values have been previously
determined. In some cases the relations are such that the truth value of one
proposition is completely constrained by the truth values of other
propositions..." (1980: 55)
Such schemata provide systematic, ordered "plausibility structures"
by which we relate to, evaluate and make sense of our experience and the events
of the world. The important function of our schemata are that they allow us to
make predictive, correct inferences about the world with a high rate of success.
Public Knowledge
Similar to our scientific objectivity, the most important aspects about
cultural schemata and the events they stand for are that they instantiate and
are based upon actual experiences which are more-or-less publicly observable. In
large measure, the final decision of the cases presented rested upon the common
knowledge of events observed to happen in the past. "While it is possible
to use such a network of logical relations to infer the truth value of a
proposition from an inferred truth value of another, the chain of inference must
ultimately be anchored by a proposition whose truth value is established by
observation, or lacking that, by social convention." (Hutchins, 1980: 57)
Some propositions are more easily assigned truth value on the basis of
observation than others, and in cases lacking observable characteristics, truth
value must be established through inference alone. "Because of the
differences in observability of the propositions, some of the inferences
available in the schema are made more frequently and more naturally than
others..." (Hutchins 1980: 58)
Recursion
In the last part of the case analysis, Hutchin’s makes reference to the
meta-linguistic principle of "recursion" which refers to a
"higher level of discourse organization" between propositional
relations and between the schemata which encode these relations. Recursion is
one of the fundamental properties of schematic propositional representations in
that "since they stand for specific entities and events in the domain of
discourse, they are themselves concepts and may be linked by relations to other
concepts. This allows propositions to nest within each
other." (Hutchins,1980: 51)
He mentions key metaphorical statements demonstrating "the heuristic
power of a process of recursive embedding of progressively more complex units.
The metaphor of the movement of gardens in this case allows for the concise
representation and expression of relations among relations among relations among
concepts." (1980: 103)
"
The reader will recall that as a
formal structure, the model of semantic information representation has a
property called recursion. That is, a proposition relates a group of concepts to
each other, and a proposition is also itself a concept. A relation among
propositions is therefore also a proposition....Applying the recursion once
more, we generate a proposition which asserts a relation among units, each of
which asserts a relation among propositions. Each episode in discourse, being
modeled on a schema for a transfer of rights, asserts a relation among a set of
propositions. The structure generated here, then, asserts a relation among units
of discourse...."(1980: 102-3)
Implication
Implicit throughout the work, but nowhere explicit, is the notion that
implication is somehow the speakers' referential complement of the function of
inference. Cultural schemata are configured from, and refer implicitly back to,
a background of shared knowledge, pre-understandings, common experiences and
histories. In the different presentations, the speakers are relying upon the
listeners to draw the necessary, appropriate implications from the inferences
and statements they are making. Indeed, in the use of counterfactuals and
hypothetical constructs, inference itself is made implicit, and demands
implication. In this regard, Hutchins makes reference to "scripts."
"In addition to relations within the schema, the individual propositions
of the schema have relations to other propositions outside. Some of these
relations might be thought of as scripts for the internal structure of the
propositions. Thus, for example, there is script-like knowledge about the
typical actions of a man who has use rights in a piece of land. A holder of use
rights usually either gardens the plot himself or has someone garden it for him
each time the major field in which it is located is gardened by the community.
On the strength of his script-like knowledge, the fact that a man has not
gardened a plot of land himself nor had someone garden it for him may be taken
as circumstantial evidence against an assertion of his having use rights in the
garden.(Hutchins,1980: 57-8)
A paradox of Hutchin’s approach is that he presents an alternative,
highly suggestive, and even seminal theoretical framework without focally naming
it--perhaps because it is difficult to get conceptually hold of, or perhaps
because it is without its own name, it seems elusive in the imagination of its
possibilities. As "cultural code" he makes reference to a kind of
world knowledge or common sense which is conventionally constrained in important
ways. But as a "cultural grammar" it is something more than merely
convention-bound knowledge--its inference generating capacity and its
propositional, even logical structure, give to it more coherence as well as
flexibility as a sense-making mechanism than is generally associated with plain
common sense.
"Just as grammatical sentences may represent propositions which are
false, meaningful arguments may come to false conclusions. A compelling
deception is one that makes perfect sense. It is a common and sometimes
dangerous old strategy to treat sensibility as an indication of truthfulness.
Such a heuristic is understandable, though, in light of the comparative ease of
judging sensibility versus judging truth in most discourse. The importance of
schemata such as these is that they are standards by which sensibility is
judged." (Hutchins,1980: 61)
Conclusion: The Natural Analysis of Cultural Systems.
The logical consistency of the schematic model and the test cases appear to
be born out by their application in artificial intelligence programs. In terms
of its logic, while one "bug" existed in the program in extending down
one pathway that could not be accounted for in terms of the shell's syntax, the
model otherwise appears to be complete and not to be lacking in any critical
feature that would be necessary to its successful operation in a computer
program.
Expert systems have been the 1980's success story in the application of
Artificial Intelligence. Though the adequacy and falsifiability of such
computer-based knowledge systems in really representing the actual cultural
phenomena has been questioned, there has been a gradual extension of expert
systems designs into ethnographic research, particularly in the modeling and
rendering explicit of the expert knowledge of informants which is often regarded
as ordinary and implicit.
The strength of such applications comes from the paradox that though the
claim of the expert system's rules may be unfalsifiable, which if ignored, may
have dangerous consequences, nevertheless they "are precisely the kinds of
mediational models that ethnographers strive to formulate." (Pfaffenberger,
1988:76). The danger is to confuse and reify what is in fact only an alternative
computer model of ethnographic phenomena with the "validity" of a
theory that accounts for that phenomena.
But we must seek the sufficiency of the model at another level of analysis,
and ask again whether or not something might have been lost in the translation
and subsequent abstraction entailed by its schematic representation. Hutchins
notes that translators, as analysts, have the occasion to superimpose their own
logical frames upon native discourse "not so much in the translation of
language per se as in whatever we do to cause our readers to generate a
conceptual structure that they can use to make sense of the translation. If the
ethnographer errs in the presentation of the principles that underlie the
discourse, the reported discourse may still map nicely onto those principles,
but its meaning--the understanding it evokes in the reader--will be different
from the understanding evoked in the native by the original." (Hutchins,
1980: 48)
In the first section of his presentation of the basic cultural model,
Hutchins presents a set of Trobriand logical connectives with their general
English glosses and syntactic constructions. He notes the extent to which
pragmatic considerations, as well as semantic understandings, are required in
the interpretation of the meaning of connectives in natural discourse. "The
point of all this is two-fold. First, if we are to understand natural discourse
we will need to know what the logical relations are that these connectives of
discourse point to. Second, if we are to understand how discourse is understood,
we will have to have a way to explicitly represent these logical
relations." (1980: 50)
Hutchins does not believe that there can be any direct translation of
underlying logical connectives, because logic provides an appropriate
meta-language "for the organization of the structures to which natural
language points, but not for natural language itself. In fact, it seems that
deciding on a set of direct translations of logical connectives is one way to
produce a ‘wanton’ translation that can make the natives seem
queer." (1980: 48)
It is not too much to describe a naturalistic translation and analysis of
such discourse as an attempt to represent abstractly a dynamic cultural system
which is critically constrained both by conventional and contextual
associations, by reference and the ground of implication this entails, on the
one hand, and, on the other hand, a relational system of "logical
connectives" which aims not so much at reference, as at the kind of
"plausibility structures" afforded by its variable inferential
functions--by considerations and evaluations that aim at the internal validity
and truth value, or credibility of the statement independent of its actual
empirical referents.
The former kind of meaning is situated and dependent upon its contextuality.
It is always "local" in significance; the latter, like
mathematical understanding, is in a sense independent of context in its
fundamental "relationality"--it carries significances which tend to be
"general" in character. But before we commit ourselves to an
unbridgeable analytic/synthetic dichotomy, we must see that: 1) both reference
and inference functions are mutually constraining and constitute a principal
dialectic of discourse by which meaning is constructed and evaluated, and 2)
master metaphors, or "tropes," functioning on Hutchins’ principle of
recursion, such as "keda" or "pokala" or "tupwa",
act as bridging mechanisms between the analytic and synthetic components of
cultural constrained, cultural constructed meaning, on a level which is
metalinguistic and metalogical in structure.
It is worth noting that not only are the inference strength, metaphorical
salience or referential significance associated with particular schemata or
connectives variable in the extent to which they are culturally constrained, but
the direction of inference itself--whether right or left or upward or
downward--may be determined by culturally defined syntactic-semantic
considerations (Hamill, 1990.) In either case, clear ethnographic instances
exist demonstrating this important linkage in the "Worldview Problem."
It is suggested that such key metaphors bridge the empirical and rational,
the analytic and synthetic, the referential and inferential, respectively, by
effectively combining both sets of functions, and, by virtue of their symbolic
constitution and stylistic use, their symbolic function is also primarily
pragmatic, versus semantic or syntactic (but not exclusively so), in its
illocutionary force. It is in terms of natural language, and the metaphorical
structure of natural discourse, that concepts, schema and propositions, to use
Hutchins’ terminological distinctions, and reference and inference, salience
and significance, meaning and value, come together into an inextricable
entanglement we call understanding.
In natural language, we cannot clearly separate the one function or dimension
from the other. The best we can do is to recognize and perhaps point out the
prototypicality of some kinds of words and meanings as distinguished from other
kinds. Again, to reiterate Hutchins, "Just as grammatical sentences may
represent propositions that are false, meaningful arguments may come to false
conclusions. A compelling deception is one that makes perfect
sense." (Hutchins, 1980: 61)
Hutchins’ proffers a prescription for a naturalistic translation, as well
as for a naturalistic ethnography of how "people reason in the real
world"--by setting about to make rigorously explicit ethnographic knowledge
that would otherwise remain mostly implicit only, and to construct a model which
will adequately perform the functions required of the cultural knowledge.
BEGIN. [Start]
Output. (Welcome) Pause. Output(Initial Presumptions) Pause.
Output(Pathways. Pause. 1. A is of Dala
one.
2. No one is deceased.
3. If B is of dala one, then C is of dala one.
4. If B is of dala two, then C is of dala two.
5. Only B makes transaction to A, and C makes transaction only to A.
1. Did B give pokala to A? Pokala Yes; pokala no.
a. rule: If B gave pokala to A, then
transfer of rights was likely. b. rule: If B did not give pokala to A, then
there was probably no transfer, and A retains rights intact. Output I. Pause.
End.
2.Is B of dala one or dala two? Dala one; dala two.
c. rule: If B is of dala one, then
transfer of rights is intact.
Output(Indefinite). Pause. Seek(three).
d. rule: If B is of dala two, then transfer of rights to use only.
Output(Indefinite). Pause. Seek(four)
3. Did C give pokala to B? Pokala yes, pokala no.
e. rule:
if C gave pokala to B, then transfer of rights intact. C holds rights intact.
Output II. Pause. End. f rule: if C did not give pokala, then no
transfer of rights. B holds rights intact. Output III. Pause. End.
4. Did C give katuyumali to B? Katuyumali yes, katuyumali no.
g. rule: if C gave katuyumali to B, then C
transfer rights use only. Output(Indefinite). Pause. Seek (six).
h. rule: if C did not give katuyumali to B, then no transfer of rights.
Output Indefinite. Pause. Seek (five).
5. Did A katumamata B? Katumamata Yes, Katumamata No.
i. rule: if A gave katumamata to B,then B
transfer rights use back to A. A retains rights to allocate and receives rights
to hold, A holds rights intact. Output IV. Pause. End.
j. rule: if A did not give katumamata to B, then B retains rights to use the
garden and A retains rights to allocate the garden. Output V. Pause. End.
6. Did A katumamata C? Katumamata Yes, Katumamata No.
k. rule: if A gave katumamata to C, then C
transfers rights to use the garden back to A. A retains rights to allocate and
receives rights to hold. A holds rights intact. Output.VI Pause. End.
l. rule: if A did not give katumamata to B, then C retains rights to use the
garden and A retains rights to allocate the garden. Output.VII. Pause. End.
Complete. There is not enough information for I.D. to decide who
has what rights. Would you like to choose?
A_intact; B_intact; C_intact; B_use, A_allocate; C_use, A_allocate.
Endrule. If [END] , then Output(Finished). Pause.
Output I. Because there was no pokala given, there was no transfer of rights,
and A retains rights intact to the garden. Format(1). (A_intact, B_none, C_none)
Output II. Because C gave pokala to B who received rights intact from A,
chances are that C was granted rights intact to the garden. Format (2) (C_intact,
B_none, A_none)
Output III. Because C did not give pokala to B, C receives no rights to the
garden and B holds rights intact. Format (3) (B_intact, C_none, A_none)
Output IV. Because A gave katumamata to B, B probably transfered use rights
back to A, and A therefore holds both rights to use and allocate the garden.
Format (4). (A_intact, C_none, B_none).
Output V. Because A did not give katumamata to B, B retains rights to use the
garden and A retains rights to allocate the garden. Format (5) (A_allocate,
B_use, C_none).
Output VI. Because A gave katumamata to C, A receive back the right to use
the garden while retaining the right to allocate the garden. A therefore holds
rights intact to the garden. Format (6) (A_intact, B_none, C_none).
Output VII. Because A did not give katumamata to C, A does not receive the
right to use the garden, which is retained by C. A has only the right to
allocate the garden. Format (7) (A_allocate, B_none, C_use).
Output(Indefinite) It is yet uncertain who has what rights. More information
must be found.
Inference values and confidence factors
An important aspect of this entire analysis has been the use
of inference in cultural schemata. Important in this inference has been the use
of a notation (s, p, T, and F) prefixed to each clause denoting the degree of
inference strength associated with the statement--strong, plausible, strongly
True, strongly False, plausibly True and plausibly False, True and False. The
possible inferences ranging from weakest to strongest are:
strongly false, plausibly false, plausible, plausibly true,
strongly true
One means of representing these inference values in
Intelligent Developer are the use of confidence values which can be arbitrarily
assigned on a percentage basis to each of the conditionals and conclusions of
each rule.
strongly F. =10%; plausibly F. = 30%; plausible =50%;
plausibly T. =70% strongly T. =90%;
In terms of Prolog, these inference values can be written as
basic predicates, introduced as separate conditional clauses, and then written
as part of the goal. It might take the following form:
domains
inference = symbol
predicates
confidence_values(inference)
holds_rights_to(person, garden, inference)
receives_rights_from(person, person, inference)
holds_no_rights_to(person, garden, inference)
goal
what_is_the__confidence_value_of and
write( "It is", Symbol, "that X(Y,
Z)" ) and nl.
clauses
confidence_value(strongly_false).
confidence_value(plausibly_false).
confidence_value(plausible).
confidence_value(plausibly_true).
confidence_value(strongly_true).
holds_rights_to(motabasi, kolubuwa, confidence_value).
....etc., etc.
It should be noted that adding such inference factors
considerably lengthens the number of clauses, as well as the number of rules
needed to account for all the possible combinations in Prolog.
/* Basic Model */
domains
person = symbol
rights = symbol
clan =symbol
inference = symbol
predicates
name(person)
is_member_of(person, clan)
holds_(person, rights)
receives_rights_to_allocate_from(person, person)
receives_right_to_use_from(person, person)
receives_rights_intact_from(person, person)
receives_no_rights_from(person, person)
gives_pokala_to(person, person)
gives_katumamata_to(person, person)
gives_katuyumali_to(person, person)
gives_no_pokala_to(person, person)
gives_no_katuyumali_to(person, person)
gives_no_katumamata_to(person, person)
confidence_values(inference)
goal
who_has_rights_to_the_garden(Symbol) and what is the
confidence_value of (Symbol) and write ("It is "
confidence_value "that" name "holds" rights "to the
garden").
clauses
name(A).
name(B).
name(C).
is_member_of(name, dala_one).
is_member_of(name, dala_two).
holds(name, right_to_allocate, confidence_value).
holds(name, right_to_use, confidence_value).
holds(name, rights_intact, confidence_value).
holds(name, no_rights, confidence_value).
holds(name, rights, confidence_value).
rights(intact).
rights(allocate).
rights(use).
rights(none).
confidence_value(strongly_false).
confidence_value(plausibly_false).
confidence_value(plausible).
confidence_value(plausibly_true).
confidence_value(strongly_true).
gives_pokala_to(name, name).
gives_katumamata_to(name, name).
gives_katuyumali_to(name, name).
gives_no_pokala_to(name, name).
gives_no_katumamata_to(name, name).
gives_no_katuyumali_to(name, name).
receives_right_to_use_from(name, name, confidence_value).
receives_right_to_allocate_from(name, name, confidence_value).
receives_rights_intact_from(name, name, confidence_value).
receives_no_rights_from(name, name, confidence_value).
receives_rights_from(B, A, strongly_true) if
gives_pokala_to (B, A).
holds(B, rights, plausibly_true) if
receives_rights_from(B, A, strongly_true).
receives_no_rights_from(B, A, strongly_true) if
gives_no_pokala (B, A).
holds(B, no_rights, strongly_true) if
receives_no_rights_from(B, A, strongly_true)
receives_rights_intact_from(B, A, strongly_true) if
gives_pokala_to(B, A) and
is_member_of (B, dala_one).
holds(B, rights_intact, plausibly_true) if
receives_rights_intact_from (B, A, strongly_true).
receives_right_to_use_from(B, A, plausibly_true) if
gives_pokala_to (B, A) and
is_member_of (B, dala_two).
holds(B, right_to_use, plausible) if
receives_right_to_use_from(B, A, plausibly_true).
receives_rights_intact_from(C, B, strongly_true) if
gives_pokala_to (B, A) and
is_member_of (B, dala_one) and
gives_pokala_to (C, B).
holds(C, right_intact, strongly_true) if
receives_right_intact_from(C, B, strongly_true).
receives_no_rights_from(C, B, strongly_true) if
gives_pokala_to (B, A) and
is_member_of (B, dala_one) and
gives_no_pokala_to (C, B).
holds(C, no_rights, strongly_true) if
receives_no_rights_from(C, B, strongly_true).
receives_rights_to_use_from(C, B, strongly_true) if
gives_pokala_to (B, A) and
is_member_of (B, dala_two) and
gives_katuyumali_to (C, B).
holds(C, right_to_use, strongly_true) if
receives_right_to_use_from(C, B, strongly_ture).
receives_no_rights_from (C, B, strongly_true) if
gives_pokala_to (B,A) and
is_member_of (B, dala_two)
gives_no_katuyumali_to (C, B).
holds(C, no_rights, strongly_true) if
receives_no_rights_from (C, B, confidence_value).
receives_right_to_use_from (A, B, strongly_true) if
gives_pokala_to (B ,A) and
is _member_of (B, dala_two) and
gives_no_katuyumali_to (C, B) and
gives_katumamata_to (A, B).
holds(A, rights_intact, strongly_true) if
receives_right_to_use_from(A, B, strongly_true).
receives_no_rights_from (A, B, strongly_true) if
gives_pokala_to (B, A) and
is_member_of (B,dala_two) and
gives_no_katuyumali_to (C,B) and
gives_no_katumamata_to (A,B).
holds(B, right_to_use, strongly_true) and holds(A,
right_to_allocate, strongly_true) if
receives_no_rights_from(A, B, confidence_value).
receives_right_to_use_from (A , C, strongly_true) if
gives_pokala_to (B, A) and
is_member_of (B, dala_two) and
gives_katuyumali_to (C, B) and
gives_katumamata_to (A,C).
holds(A, rights_intact, strongly_true) if
receives_right_to_use_from(A, C, strongly_true).
receives_no_rights_from (A, C, strongly_ture) if
gives_pokala_to (B,A) and
is_member_of (B, dala_two) and
gives_katuyumali_to (C, B) and
gives_no_katumamata_to (A,C).
holds(C, right_to_use, strongly_true) and holds(A,
right_to_allocate, strongly_true)
if receives_no_rights_from(A, C, strongly_true).
References Cited
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1991 Expert Systems. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, Inc.
Hamill, James F.
1990 Ethno-Logic. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Hutchins, Edwin
1980 Culture and Inference. Boston: Harvard University Press.
Malinowski, Bronislaw
1935 Soil-Tilling and Agricultural Rites in the Trobriand
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Pfaffenberger, Bryan
1988 Microcomputer Applications in Qualitative Research.
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1976 Women of Value, Men of Renown: New Perspectives in
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