Universal systems relativity sounds like a oxymoron--that which is universal cannot be relative. But by this term I am referring to the universality of the condition systems relativity. All systems are different, indeed, particularistic and unique. The uniqueness of systems comes from several sources, namely their inherent complexity and variability, as well as their inherent heterogeneity of composition. The uniqueness of systems is also defined within a meta-systemic context that is always different and particular for each and every system that occurs. The differences between systems in a detailed sense does not preclude the grouping and generalization of systems on the basis of shared similarities and types.

In a formal sense, we may state universal systems relativity in this way: All systems, no matter their level of articulation, are relative to the meta-systems framework in which they occur, and each meta-system framework is unique to the system as it occurs. Similar systems in the same frameworks can be expected to follow the same kinds of rules and to respond in similar ways.

All systems as well, though they are functionally independent of their environment in a relative manner, nevertheless are in the long run dependent upon a stable range of environmental conditions for the stability of their developmental trajectory. We see this easily with plant systems like gardens--grow too many plants in too small a space, fail to feed them fertilizer or water them regularly, and one will see plants that are undersized and unproductive. The individual plant, as an internally separate and independent system, will continue to grow and pass through its stages of development, but in an abnormal and stunted manner.

Universal systems relativity states therefore, in a formal sense, that we ultimately cannot separate a system from the normal or natural meta-systemic context of the environment in which it occurs. All systems in other words come bound within a meta-systems context, and their behavior is critically determined by these meta-systems contexts.

It has been our own analytical presumption to stereotype systems as finite, delimited constructs that exist in some kind of ideal isolation from a natural world. We have approached most of science in this manner, and though it often entails great progress in specialized fields of knowledge and application, it comes at a cost of hyper-compartmentalization, generalization of knowledge to other problem sets, and capacity to deal with systems in naturalized settings.

It is not in our habit therefore of thinking about systems or representing systems in terms of a figure-ground relationship that interacts in significant ways with its meta-systemic context or environment. The fact that all systems are thus bound in such a gestalt-like frame has not precluded our pretension that they are isolatable and capable of being treated as isolated entities. Sometimes such analytical isolation is necessary, but more often than not it is simply misleading and oversimplifying of reality.

Meta-systems relativity also critically concerns the problem of our own knowledge and pre-understanding and preconceptions that we bring to systems. We impose even our own frameworks of seeing systems in their definition and perception of how they work. We need only point to a Ptolemaic way of looking at the sun and moon in relation to the earth and ourselves on the earth, as an example of how our own preconceptions, and ultimately, ignorance, can influence how we see and talk about things in the world. Acknowledging the relativity of systems, and attempting to objectify systems in a relativistic manner, brings us a step closer to understanding them in a less biased manner.

Universal systems relativity must be seen as a condition of our knowledge and capacity for knowing the real world, and for limiting our objective understanding of that world.  We seek a more realistic vision of the world, and the systems that compose the world, in the naturalistic contexts in which they occur. To pretend that we have absolute knowledge, or that we have discovered "truths" about the world that are complete and final, is to simply maintain an ideological illusion of a closed world, that things are just so, and no other possible way, and that what we know is certain and admits of no doubt or critical uncertainty. This is of course not the best attitude by which to build a science or by which to achieve a better adaptation in the world.