Meta-systems Context & the General Systems Frame of Reference

by Hugh M. Lewis

 

If all systems are related to other systems, and if the multiple levels of analysis of reality are interconnected, then we can conclude that any real system must have a concurrent meta-systems context based upon direct and indirect relations that components of a system, or the system as a whole, has with its effective environment. Another way of putting this is to state that no real system may occur outside of or bereft of the effective meta-systems context the interactions of which will determine the alternative possible developmental trajectories that the system may assume. A meta-system for a particular system may be defined therefore as the super-systems context of that system. We may assume that all meta-systems context share basic structural principles of relationship, regardless of what level they occur upon or their size or order of complexity, and we may thus derive a common set of general meta-systems principles that defines a frame of reference for general systems.

We may say some things about meta-systems contexts as a general frame of reference. 

First, meta-systems are hierarchically stratified and arranged based on the principle that the emergent systems-based behavioral properties characterizing subsystems become organized at the next higher level as non-random systems, which in turn lead to newly emergent or integrative properties at the next higher level, subsuming all subsystems below it, and in turn forming the basis for a new super-system at the next level. These are what I refer to as Type 1 systems. 

Second, multiple co-occurring systems at the same level of integration, interact through time to produce heterogeneous, open meta-systems that may exhibit extensive integrative properties. These are what I refer to as Type 2 systems.

Third, the two forms of integration, intensive and vertical in the first case, and extensive and lateral in the second, may interact in complex ways, across levels and extensive systems boundaries, to produce complex patterns of behavior and determine outcomes of state-path trajectories of otherwise independent systems. We may speak therefore of emergent meta-systems that are the consequence of the extensive integration of subsystems. These are what I refer to as Type 3 systems.

Systems do not occur in isolation, but usually arise and interact with other systems, and a system itself arises as the consequence of the interaction of subsystems.

What we observe normally as "human sized" systems or systems that fall within our normal range of observation, are what can be called derivative systems, or systems that are built up from other subsystems. 

There is a built-in hierarchical stratification of natural systems. The basic levels of order that we are aware of at this time may be divided into the following:

1. Physical systems

2. Biological systems

3. Symbolic system

Each of the subsequent levels are rooted in the level below it. All real systems we are aware of fit into this framework. It is apparent as well that biological systems comprise a very small subset of the total set of physical systems, and that symbolic systems we are aware of comprise only a small subset of the total set of biological systems. Furthermore, higher order systems that we are aware of are derivative of, based upon and contained by the lower order systems. We may therefore take known symbolic systems, for instance, which are human beings, and deduce both biological and physical qualities from them. We may take any biological system and derive underlying physical traits, patterns and processes. 

Furthermore, each basic order of hierarchical stratification of natural systems may be subdivided into multiple distinctive sublevels of derivative organization. Systems at each basic level also tend to be compartmentalized laterally into extensive systems and larger super-systems. The patterning of this extensive organization of systems is fundamentally different upon each level of integration.

We must at this point only speculate, without further evidence, of the existence of basic self-organizing systems that are sub-physical, on one end, and super-symbolic, on the other end. We are inclined on either end of the spectrum to adopt symbolic ideologies of supernatural forces and entities, but from a systems standpoint we know this to be incorrect.

We must only ask ourselves, how can we imagine a sub-physical system to be, that results in the occurrence of physical systems as we know this upon a fundamental level. What would we even call such a sub-physical order of reality, and if it existed below the known physical level of occurrence, then how could we sense it, measure it or derive its existence empirically?

How can we imagine a derivative super-symbolic systems to behave and be organized? Our closest correlate perhaps is the arise of physical based alternative systems that manifest artificial intelligence--in these frameworks we have at least the possibility of constructing symbolic or super-symbolic orders of systems that would, in the final definition, totally eliminate any biological components. We are not in a position yet even to determine the possibility of such systems, but they are imaginable.

We must then speak about a fundamental condition of general systems relativity, that all systems are relative to the meta-systems context in which they occur, such that, all other things being equal, two or more systems that are similar in design structure, will, under the same meta-systemic circumstances, follow the same sets of governing principles and will thus follow similar behavioral trajectories. 

Because systems vary, and all real systems are particularly unique, no two real systems will have exactly the same state-path trajectory of developmental order or outcomes. We may systematically compare systems in a number of different ways, but overall in terms of the total degree of similarity, or isomorphism of pattern, that two systems may exhibit. 

 

General Systems Essays, Vol. I

2001

Hugh M. Lewis


Blanket Copyright, Hugh M. Lewis, © 2005. Use of this text governed by fair use policy--permission to make copies of this text is granted for purposes of research and non-profit instruction only.

Last Updated: 03/18/05