by Hugh M. Lewis

Relativity has been a general concept and problem that has plagued Western Philosophers and other scholars for a very long time. We have inherited a classical Greek view of the world that provided little room for relativistic orientations, though Eastern philosopher's had been quite comfortable with the idea from the beginning.  As an a traditionally trained cultural anthropologist, within the Boasian Tradition, I have taken naturally to a relativistic orientation, although the proposition of cultural relativity is largely rejected by ethical philosophers and many anthropologists who want a more clearly defined deterministic model of the world and a single set of standards by which to judge the many ways of the world. Philosophically and theoretically, and even methodologically, the general problem of relativity informed my own dissertation research, at least in part, that was designed and executed on cross-cultural or comparative grounds. The problem of relativity underlies what is known in the Anthropology of knowledge as the worldview problem, and this informs the cognitive sciences, AI research & theory, as well as diverse areas of linguistics, psychology and other social science disciplines. Even before my fieldwork I wrote an extended manuscript on the problem of relativity that has now been e-published online for some years at:

 http://www.lewismicropublishing.com/Publications/Relativism/

The object of this brief article today is to address a central set of issues regarding: 

1. The definition of Meta-systems as systems-based context.

2. The relationship of Meta-systems context to the general problem of relativity.

3. The special relationship of General Systems frameworks to the problem of relativity.

4. Forms of relativity, particularly the role of physical and anthropological relativity in general knowledge systems, and their relationship to one another.

5. The theoretical and methodological role of defining and manipulating knowledge in terms of alternative frames of reference and units of analysis, and the relationship this has upon both systems-based and relativist problem sets.

Before proceeding, several caveats are in order. The general problem of relativism/relativity is difficult to deal with in any form or fashion because basically it proposes a certain inherent uncertainty of our knowledge, which is itself uncertain, and hence puts certain constraints and limits on our ability to know things in any certain way about the world in any fundamental or non-reductive manner. The general doctrine of relativism and the general problem of relativity has therefore posed an implicit kind of paradox concerning the certitude and ground of our knowledge, and our ability to know the world in any certain terms. Different kinds of intellectuals have found this implicit proposition unsatisfactory, particularly scientists who define their primary goal as certain, exact knowledge, Platonic and Rationalist philosopher's who seek a single ideal set of standards by which to measure and judge reality, and various kinds of ideologues and minor scholars who've had their own agendas and paradigms to peddle through the ages. The blatant and often strong rejection of the problem and paradox of Relativity has resulted in a general failure to adequately address the problem as anything but a pseudo-intellectual or minor concern, and therefore the general doctrine of relativism and the definition of relativity has been largely misinterpreted in a shallow sense, or else has fallen prey to being reinterpreted in a revised form as a kind of strong determinism of largely contextual/environmental factors in causal definitions of complex systems. Regardless of the gap in our understanding of the entire problem of Relativity and the doctrine of general relativism, it remains in the background of all we do, think and say, to plague us in our quest for ultimate truths and refined, mathematical formulas, and to mock us in the illusions of our own comprehension of reality.

1. What is a Meta-system, how is it systems-based, and what has this all to do with the problem of relativity, or are we not just making complex issues more confusing by mixing our metaphorical cocktails?

The concept of the Meta-system as it is used within the Lewis Works framework and various publications, has been deployed in several ways with several implicit meanings and several explicit definitions. None of these definitions or functions are considered exclusive of one another, and in a larger, general framework they are complementary to one another. 

First of all, a meta-system is a system of systems. Also, we may say from a more naturalistic and realistic point of view, it is the total surrounding systems-based context that always  embeds any delimited system we may be referring directly to, that is somehow bounded and made finite by the constraints and relationships of its multi-level attachment to the larger meta-systems context.

Second, a meta-systems framework is a conceptual apparatus that permits us a handle for both stepping outside of our own systems relationships and involvement, hopefully for a more objective view of reality, and for allowing us to look both at other systems, and at the natural meta-systems context as well, in a manner that will allow its greater objectification and generalization, especially from a structural and functional point of view.

We may say therefore that the definition of a Meta-system is systems based in the sense that all systems formulations and theories demand a form of contextualization, that, by necessity, must be in terms of and conditional to the relationship to other systems. This is centrally important to the doctrine of relativism and the general problem of relativity because relativism/relativity is in a specific sense the problem of the contextuality and contextualization of knowledge, both in terms of the real world, and in terms of other forms of knowledge and symbolic representations of knowledge. It is not surprising therefore that the key doctrinal statements in regard to General Systems Theory (Von Bertalanffy, 1968) deals in the latter half of the book with the general problem of relativity in various received forms (i.e., linguistic, cultural, & psychological). There is good reason for this, because both general systems thinking and relativistic doctrine demand the same holistic and synthetic (i.e., non-analytic) approach to knowledge and to attempting to see larger part-whole relationships of things to their surrounding contexts. We can conclude therefore that a systems thinking approach is de facto a relativistic approach, and a relativistic way of looking at problems implicitly involves a systems-based approach to such problems.

2. Saying that both meta-systems and relativism are contextual in approach to problems and understanding, and thus both approaches seek to relate focal issues to broader relationships and frameworks that serve to define and configure the issues as problem sets,  still begs the question of what is a more exact nature of the relationship between the concept of the meta-system and what I would call relativistic doctrine as a semi-coherent if not completely rational conceptual system. 

If we take physical systems as an example, we can state clearly and unequivocally that all known physical systems, and all physical systems in principle, are constrained by the laws of thermodynamics. Therefore, certain kinds of systems that are imaginable or conceivable, like perpetual motion machines, perfect vacuums, etc., are physically impossible. All such systems, as working systems, can be said to be relative thermodynamically to the context of physical relationships in which they immediately occur. If we follow chemical reactions in detail, as for instance in the study of physical chemistry, we can find various forms of equilibria occurring that affect rates of reaction and resultant pathways, and that in turn would be affected by the relative presence/absence of chemicals, heat, pressure, etc. We may refer to the classical principle of relativity that states that if two systems move uniformly relative to one another, then all the laws of mechanics are the same in both systems. This classic principle of relativity relates the doctrine of relativism on a level of physical systems at least directly to the concept of physical meta-systems. 

We may extend this same relationship to embrace both biological systems and anthropological systems, as derivatives of physical systems, and also as systems in their own right with associated emergent properties. We may state for instance that in the same sets of contexts, under similar operating bio-geophysical conditions, similar species of life or members of the same species or genus of life will respond in very similar ways, with the principles of evolution, selection and ecology operating similarly for both. If we extend this to the challenge of psychological explanations for human behavior, or anthropological explanations of the cultural patterning of behavior, we can emerge with similar kinds of conclusions that in comparable systems, similar or the same sets of basic structural principles would be operant--at this level the patterning of biological or human behavior would become at least expectable, due to the complexity that we are normally referring to at these levels, if not exactly predictable.

3. The reference has been made previously that those who engage in general systems thinking invariably refer to relativistic doctrines in support of their ideas, and vice versa, those who are inclined to relativistic orientations in their thinking almost invariably fall back upon and come to rely heavily upon systems based principles and general systems thinking in general or specific explanation of phenomena. The reason for this has to do with a concern for the holism of phenomena, and a faithfulness to the natural or real context of real systems and the relations and constraints these may entail for the behavior and outcomes of a system. The approach can be largely called "synthetic" in style, and "global" or "organic" in approach, versus and dialectically contrasted with an analytic and reductionist approach that defines a problem as a mere sum of its parts rather than a set of interrelationships between the parts in the synergistic creation of the whole. Emergent properties, or the synergism of systems that assume their own independent characteristics and state-path trajectory, are associated directly with the sense of equilibrium or steady-dynamic state pattern of relationships maintained or developed between the components of the system. 

The classic example is an biological organism, as in the case of an animal, even a human being, that is reducible as nothing but a collection of cell tissues that interact bio-chemically in complex ways--but beyond respiring, the human organism also has a set of associated behaviors external to the operations of cellular relationships, within a larger ecological environment in relation to other organisms that cannot be simply understood in terms of biochemical reactions. The human brain brings the problem set to an entirely new level of complex, constructive cultural behavior, structural patterns of behavior, social relationship and symbolization that cannot be fully explained by resorting only to physical or biological based explanations.

It can be concluded therefore that a general systems approach is consonant with relativistic doctrine, and both approaches demand and require one another, for the sake of the sense of synergistic, emergent holism of property (i.e., structural pattern) that is found in all systems, and for the sense of contextuality in which all systems are bound and constrained in the larger scheme of thing.

Beyond the fact of consonance between the two approaches to knowledge, we may say even more importantly that a systems-based approach, and a meta-systems framework, actually provides us a way of controlling and thereby transcending the problems and paradoxes that are normally associated with relativistic understanding and relativized problem sets, while being simultaneously capable of comprehending and incorporating these relativistic points of view. It allows us, simply put, to step at least one foot outside of the circle of our own symbolic relativity of our knowledge, to gain some sense of partial, if incomplete, comparative objectivity about that knowledge. It does this by the fact of the unification of a systems-based approach, and the presupposition that all real systems are structurally unified in a general sense, however independent they may be in their occurrence or happenstance.

4. The attacks against relativist doctrine should be all the more surprising when we realize that the modern physical sciences have been largely defined by principles of the physical relativity of systems, from Einstein's theories of special and general relativity, to the theories of the inherent uncertainty, complementariness and non-particularity of electrons in their orbitals and other sub-atomic "events." We can go on to postulate an observational relativity of the visible universe, and a universal relativity of the inferable, total universe, if we are so inclined. And the relativistic buck by no means stops there. If the very ground of our physical experience may be said to be some how, in a fundamental and larger sense, relative to our observation and point of view, to our rate of travel, our size, and the gravitational field in which we are immersed and can only escape with extreme physical energy, then why should we have difficulty with notions of biological relativity of species in eco-evolutionary or meta-biotic contexts, or of biological biomes, regimes and epochs in the natural history of the earth, or the earthbound relativity of all known biological life forms? Why then should we be especially upset and critical of rather studied notions of linguistic relativity, cultural relativity, social relativity, historical relativity, or psychological relativity of human behavior, when we find so much difference and contrast and individual uniqueness in the human world? Is it not possible that so many people have such a demand, a rage for order, that they must try to stamp out any suggestion of difference that might invite a larger sense of disorder?

The doctrine of relativism is a statement of the inherent uncertainty and therefore limitations of our knowledge. For all that we know or may believe we know, there is that much more in reality that remains unknown and probably unknowable. There is much more that remains known but not well known and poorly understood. Ideologically, for symbolic completeness and closure of our worldview, it is nice to live in a make-believe world in which everything is not only known, but known with unshakeable faith and certainty, as well as illusion. The promise of science is the promise of a continuous, never-ending horizon of the unknown, that we may always explore and learn new things about reality.

The various forms of relativity were alluded to above. From the standpoint of natural systems we may distinguish physical, biological and anthropological forms of relativity--within each of these general forms there are recognizable various sub-forms or types and general or specific instances of relativity. In fact, name me an area or field of general or applied knowledge, and I can pick out a form of relativity for that field that applies to the boundaries and parameters of its knowledge and the problem sets it is most theoretically or methodologically concerned with. We may extend the proposition of relativity to cover all real systems, and alternative systems, and the entire idea of alternation of possible systems invites the problem, or is the problem, of the relativity of such systems. Our earthbound biosphere is the only known form of organic life yet discovered--but this does not mean that some alternative system of life does not exist somewhere in the greater sphere of the Universe, and, once discovered, will bring us face to face, to the "relativization" of our own ideas and knowledge about what biological systems are and may be in the larger context.

Of special interest and importance from the standpoint of general systems theory is the problem of the anthropological relativity of knowledge. This is so because the only knowledge we have, know of, or can possibly use, is filtered through our own human screens of symbolic perception and cognition. Our chance encounter with alien intelligence will only suffer us the problem of translation of entirely different styles and ways of seeing and knowing the world. It will also suffer us the "anthropological shock" of the relativization of our own knowledge systems on a very basic level. More immediately important to us though is to comprehend the limitations that this form of anthropological relativity of knowledge actually entails for us, as it is so basic to our entire sense of awareness of the world, whatever our worldview or knowledge base, that we not only take it for granted, but proceed to act in ways as if it didn't even exist. The paradigmatics of scientific knowledge, so clearly elucidated by Thomas Kuhn, is a brilliant demonstration of the inherent anthropological limitations of even our most treasured forms of scientific understand, subject as this may be to predominating social and symbolic constraints. This is only a single noteworthy example, but not the entire problem in a nutshell.

5. All systematic research activity, which must be undertaken if we are to roll back the relativistic boundaries of our knowledge about general systems, must be approached from the standpoint of explicit frames of reference and well defined units of analysis. Any reasonable research design approaches general problem solving this way, especially if it is to have any pretense to being "scientific." Such an approach allows us not only to carve up the complexities of reality into manageable, bite-size pieces, that we can then take a measuring stick to, but also to arrange such pieces into meaningful patterns that we can then manipulate and manage in ways that make greater sense.

From the standpoint of the anthropological relativity of knowledge, we see the world through different sets of lens. The world will look to us very different if we are in the habit of looking at it through a light microscope versus a light telescope. Similarly, our worldview and the maps we hold of the larger sense of the forest of reality is largely constrained by the knowledge, beliefs, and values we hold of the world, however contradictory these may really be--in short, what psychologists call our "attitudes." To put it more precisely, our view of the world is conditioned by the lens of our "attitudes" manifest or latent to our behavior, culturally contextualized, and defined through the symbolic apparatus of our intelligence, emotion and perception of the world. The wonderful thing about human symbolic cognition is not only that it is socially and culturally shared, but that it is capable of enduring and managing contradiction to the nth degree, as well as mediating any kind of sense of contradictory experience that may "marginalize" or relativize our view of the world. If one wants to understand the true persuasive and controlling power of the communication and newsprint media, one must understand how these forms of media hold sway over our symbolic consciousness and imagination in shaping our view of the world and thereby conditioning our responses to it.

From a systems standpoint, in a phenomenological vein, we may say, as defined on the main web-page of http://www.lewisworks.com/, that for any problem set we may encounter in relation to any real or natural system we are dealing with, we may adopt any number of alternative viewpoints, or alternative possible frames of reference, regarding that problem set, and we may say, standards of realism and truth notwithstanding, we may imagine even an infinite number of possible alternative frames of reference for any given problem set. At the same time, from a systems standpoint in a scientific vein, we may hypothesize that for any given problem set or general kind or class or problem set, there may exist one, and only one, single most optimal solution for such a set, regardless of whether this solution is actually realizable or not.

In general, the progress of our scientific knowledge is taking us gradually from the former condition of a kind of "multi-cultural" tower of Babel in our knowledge, to the goal of the latter condition of having fairly precise, if not exact, optimal solutions for any problem set we encounter.

It was the great systems-based archaeologist, Lewis Binford, who inaugurated the revolution of New Archaeology in the early Sixties, breaking a Century long iconoclastic tradition of Culture History, by his seminal articles on systems-based archaeological method, who has also recently given to the world the most cogent and studied example of the systematic deployment of alternative frames of reference/units of analysis in his recent work Constructing Frames of Reference (2001). Defining alternative frames of reference, allowing us to systematically adjust and change our points of view of the world, requires thorough, indeed comprehensive, command of the knowledge base and information about any particular or general problem set. It requires the definition of such alternative frames of reference in terms of fairly precise and well defined units of analysis that are explicit and that become on some level at least available to scientific replication and experimentation. It requires furthermore seeing our units of analysis for what they really are, in relation to one another, rather than in terms or frames of what we might want them to be--this requires in turn a certain suspension of our preconceived frames of reference, our attitudes, and sense of credibility. When a forensic scientist or detective approaches a crime scene, the evidence is looked at in as fresh a light as possible, without presuppositions of what may have happened, or any of the baggage that the human may bring to the moment that is not in the setting itself.

As it has become with scientific archaeology, so it must become as well with all areas of our knowledge that we want to approach in a "scientific manner," i.e., in a systems based approach. A systems based approach, a meta-systems framework and context, and a relativistic orientation to problem solving may all be said to fundamentally transcend in a basic way some of the conundrums and paradoxes represented by the symbolic condition of our knowledge, by our own inimitable anthropological relativity, and by the importation of biased frames of reference and pre-selective units of analysis in our comprehension of reality. They offer us a way out of the symbolic box we are confined within in our view of the world beyond, and they offer at the same time a means for defining in a systematic way alternative frames of reference by which we may compare, contrast and optimize our possible solution to various problem sets.

General Systems Essays, Vol. I