PERANAKAN ETHNOCULTURE
(Copyright © 2000 Hugh M. Lewis. Textual references in this
work are covered by fair-use policy. A copy of this document may be printed
and used in the class-room for educational purposes)
02/19/00
The Overseas Chinese Mestizo
Chinese Me'tis Chinois' Thai
Chinese Burmese Chinese "Borneo"
Chinese Baba Beginnings
Nonya Culture Straits
Silverwork Nonya
Ware Nonya Costume
Nonya Beadwork & Embroidery
Nonya Cuisine Sireh
Chewing, Tea and Cards Architecture
Furniture Birth
Customs Marriage
Customs Peranakan People
The Social World of the Straits Chinese
Baba Malay Language Baba
Religion
"Peranakan" is a Malay term designating a particular Creole
culture of partly assimilated Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia. To an unknown
extent, these peoples' distinctive identities were the by-products of
political-economic and culture historical forces of social integration within
a colonial Southeast Asian context. In certain places during the colonial era,
especially in the so-called Straits Settlements, of Penang, Malacca and
Singapore, the "Peranakans" emerged as a distinctive, fully
crystallized ethno-cultural orientation with its own sense of cultural focus
and elaboration of distinctive, ethnically defined traits. This became the
highly stylistic culture of the "Babas and Nyonyas."
The Babas represent something unusual and therefore interesting in the
world, but not something that was to be unexpected, given the social
conditions and historical contexts in which they emerged to define themselves
as distinct and separate from all other people. They are not to be facilely
dismissed as but one more of many sub-groupings of the Chinese nation, but
another minor variant upon a dominant theme of sinicization, because they
stand clearly apart from all other Chinese in Southeast Asia--their cultural
orientation ran somewhat across the Chinese grain.
They represent a dynamic aspect of Chinese cultural character that would be
considered uncommon in terms of the patriarchal and xenophobic Sinitic
stereotypes. They represented a synthetic and syncretic capacity of Chinese to
readily incorporate and assimilate foreign elements in a creative way when
given the context and opportunity, and incentive, to do so, and to redefine
their own identity in a way which does not always fall beneath the umbra of
their Ancestor's Shadow.
But the Babas also stand for something else which is perhaps more
interesting from an anthropological standpoint. The study of their provenience
in time and place, their emergence, historical elaboration, and subsequent
submergence beneath the tides of modern historical developments, allow us to
ask critical questions about some of foundational concepts concerning culture,
ethnicity, social structure, historical patterning, and even evolutionary
processes of change.
They represented an interstitial, as opposed to marginal, sub-grouping of a
wider stream of humanity. Their life-ways straddled the entire rural-urban
continuum, and was as much a product of the cityscape as it was of the
countryside. They were not a band or tribe or peasant village. They were not a
ghetto, an ethnic enclave, a colony, a cult or sect, a caste, a class, a party
or a corporate institution, and still, as an enduring yet ephemeral historical
phenomena, they were as real and distinctive as any grouping on earth.
Uncommon as they have been, they did not stand completely alone in the annals
of history--there have been other similar kinds of groups in other parts of
the world.
To claim that the Baba Chinese were a residuum of a colonial era is only a
biased part of the whole picture. The emergence of their kind is to be
expected any time there has been prolonged, organized, and creative contact
between different cultures, different civilizations, different races, and
different streams of history--such groups form like swirling eddies in the
confluence of great rivers.
They are not so much transitional cultures as they are cultures of
transition--new and emergent possibilities of cultural patterning created as a
result of acculturative interchange and historical transition. They are
cultures of convergence that are only possible when different groups of people
are forced to live together in some degree of mutual symbiosis and tolerance.
From the standpoint of the study of cultural transmission and change, the
case of the Baba's represent an interesting model of an evolutionary process
of cultural speciation that occurs as the consequence of acculturation. The
fundamental reconfiguration of basic cultural patternings as the direct result
of such processes of acculturation, and the emergence of a new and viable
cultural orientation with its own distinctive sense of cultural value and
historical tradition.
This process of cultural convergence and speciation affects virtually every
aspect of the cultural configuration--evidence for the basic changes are to be
found in language, religion, arts, social structure, values, worldview,
dietary patterns, ethnic identity, etc. The patternings produced by the
convergence of two or more separate cultural configurations form something of
a moire' that contains elements of both configurations but in a new
arrangement.
With the Babas, we get a glimpse of culture history in the making--if not
actually on the level of individual actors and their decision-making, then on
the next higher level of primary social groups and communities acting in
concert and in a directed manner to fashion their own sense of history.
We can also see, in the momentous and inevitable turn of the wheels of
history, the larger historical structures that remain always in the
background, like the hour hand of a clock, slow and imperceptible in its
movement, yet inexorable in its constraint and imperative for human action. We
can clearly see how new cultural possibilities can be created, and then taken
away, by larger mitigating historical structures. If the conditions are not
appropriate for the germination of culture, as for the germination of
seedlings in the earth after a long and severe winter, then no amount of
growth can be expected.
With the example of the Babas, the general framework of culture history can
be articulated with the narrower focus upon the ethnohistories of particular
peoples of particular periods and places. With the Babas, we can get a partial
picture of how cultural dynamics intermesh with historical process. We can
write, and rewrite, the story of the Baba's in such a way that combines the
narrative frame of historical explanation with the descriptive frame of
ethnographic exemplification.
Ethnos names a basic operative principle in the definition of human
identity and difference in a social world. Human history has largely been a
narrative of the formation, conflict and resolution of human identities and
differences between different groups of people across time and space.
Ethnos also marks off a central principle in the study of the human
condition in the world, of its many variations, its 'grand arc' of
possibility, and its basic structures of pan-humanness. Basic human identity
is constituted socially and historically in the world--it is constructed--and
then, in turn, becomes the central organizing principle for the construction
of the world. We make the world in terms of how we see ourselves in it in
relation to other people, and we make our own identity in terms of how we see
the world of others.
Ethnoculture is my designation for the distinctive identity and difference
of a people that is defined both socially in relation to other groupings, and
historically in terms of its origin, development and direction, in terms
which are emically salient for the people who are so defined. The
objective of the study of ethnoculture is to discover and derive the basic
principle of ethnos as it is culturally and historically elaborated and
operative in the world, as well as the factors, which constrain and influence
its development.
Ethnoculture inevitably involves the inseparable problems of the
construction and "re-presentation" of reality, and the construction
of "reconstructions" as well as the problem of defining the
subjective/objective basis of group integration and the influences of change.
Thus, both ethnoculture and ethnohistory centrally deal with the dilemmas of
"historicity" and "facticity" in seeking primary sources
and questioning the political and ideological foundations of knowledge and the
tautological conundrums of theories, and hence both are a needed antidote to
fast and nonreflexive explanations about human experiences.
The ethnoculture of the Baba's is exemplary, and problematic, for a number
of important anthropological reasons. In seeking to establish a base-line for
traditional Baba Chinese culture, it will be discovered that such a base-line
is at best only a model, an ethnohistorical construction, that we need
elaborate only in order to subsequently amend or refute by the discovery of
contrary, alternative or supportive evidence.
The ethnocultural continuum of the Peranakan Chinese of Malaysia,
Singapore, and Indonesia manifests several significant dimensions that can be
referred to as social structure and process, language, religion and ethnicity.
Though the most visible Babas and Nonya's were the upper class merchants of
the port cities of the Straits, and were thus very much fixtures of the urban
city-scape, we can probably correctly claim that the "average"
Peranakan was a petty merchant trader who was "in the middle" in a
variety of senses. Also we cannot ignore a substantial number of rural
Peranakans who were agricultural pioneers and entrepreneurs, or who were long
settled in small village colonies that dotted the countryside.
We must therefore take into account a fairly broad range of social
stratification and occupational differentiation within Peranakan communities.
To be Peranakan was not to be only one kind of person and Peranakan cultural
orientation did not imply simply one set of acquired traits. It consisted more
of local and regional variations upon a common theme, and even thematic
variation upon a common, polythetic set of cultural features.
Peranakan social realities varied widely over both period and place. What
it may have been in pre-contact Malacca, versus what it apparently had been in
Nineteenth Century Singapore, to what it was to become in Indonesia or Penang
in the modern, post-colonial era, may well be quite different sorts of things
only somewhat spuriously subsumed under the same basic epithet.
Of course, from an ethnocultural point of view, we must assume at least one
basic chain of continuity between the distant past and the immediate present
and that is the linkage of cultural, if not biological, heredity. This is the
ethnocultural continuity of people who are the direct descendants, whatever
the number of generations removed or diluted, from those who first were known
as or eventually came to be called "Peranakan," and who have
retained some minimal sense of what it is to be a Peranakan. And in this sense
of familial inheritance, early childhood socializations, primary social
networks and corporate institutions, and important life experiences which
become played out in the relative presence or absence of the most significant
others, critically influenced and shaped the nature and culture of this kind
of ethnocultural identity.
And in this regard, both ethnos and culture become very real and very
significant social and historical forces to be reckoned with, as both come to
have a molding influence upon the subjectively lived experiences of the
individual "culture bearer." Both come to have a massive, basic
shaping and constraining effect upon experience and interaction in the world,
as both subjectively internalized and externally objectivated, and has both a
realizing agency of potentiality and a mediating mechanism in dealing with
change and difference.
This speaks for a much deeper and more basically rooted connection between
ethnos and culture than many scholars of ethnicity, who stress the
communicative, social, economic and political aspects of ethnicity, seem
willing to acknowledge. A primordialist view of the relation between ethnos
and culture holds that such an identity is more foundational and less easily
alterable than other kinds of identities--national, religious, social--and
that these other identities might achieve some sense of ingrained embedding by
their primoridialist connections with a peoples shared ethnoculture.
There are two theoretical implications of this primordialist view of
ethnoculture. First, the basic ethnocultural continuities--the common core of
a shared identity--cannot be simply negotiated away, transacted, traded in or
changed "for a new suit of clothes." Though boundaries between
groups are negotiated, these boundaries are always fuzzy and always encompass
a more conservative "prototypical" core. Second, the outward aspects
of ethnoculture are largely historically determined, and thus the actual
significances of ethnocultural identity are quite variable across space and
time--the combination of the core traits are likely to be lost or added,
variably mixed and interchanged.
A third implication forthcoming from the first two is that ethnocultural
identity tends always to draw from the past, from its traditions, its styles,
customs, habits, lessons and myths, for purposes of the present. It also tends
to appropriate elements and aspects of the present for the sake of
reconstructing and overcoming the "lost sense" of the past. This
makes ethnoculture both very functionally adaptive and very conservative. This
always creates a dialectical tension about ethnocultural identity that is
never without some contradiction and some interesting conflicts.
Another significant dimension of the problem of Peranakan
"Ethnoculture" are the social distances, contradictions and
obstacles spanned between traditional Chinese cultural foci, on the one hand,
and becoming a part of the Malay cultural tradition, on the other. Peranakan
culture was not just intermediate in the socio-structural sense of being
comprised of "pariah" merchant middlemen. They also were an
in-between socio-cultural phenomena as a "transitional culture or a
"culture of transition" arrested somewhere along the process of
assimilation of a minority Chinese group into the social ethos of the dominant
Malay host culture.
On top of being such a culture defined somewhere along a continuum of
assimilation, the Peranakans also came to constitute a "culture of
amalgamation" which was defined by some modicum of ethnic intermarriage
and intercultural integration. Even more problematic, we must also take into
account its orientation as a "culture of acculturation," subject as
it was to strong foreign influences.
And, to top all this sociological jargon off, we may speak of Peranakans as
being commonly also a "culture of accommodation" in that its basis
was formed in a context that promoted mutual interaction, basic reciprocities,
and mutual adjustments to social differences during different historical
periods. So we must again ask ourselves, what, and where, is Peranakan
ethnoculture?
In this regard it is commonly assumed that the principle barrier to full
assimilation of the Peranakan Chinese into the dominant Malay or Indonesian
societies has been the Islamic faith that prohibits intermarriage without
conversion. But evidence supports the contention that Islam was not everywhere
equally the same kind of barrier to intermarriage that it has more recently
and commonly become. It is also commonly contended that Malay culture and
ethnic identity has been founded centrally upon the principle of being a good
"fundamentalist" Muslim. This is a legal prejudice that has become
predominant in modern nation-states that failed to effectively separate church
and state, but being Malay has long been something more, or else, than only
being Moslem.
Conversely, it is often argued that traditional Chinese cultural identity
has been founded upon the principle of ethnos that is relatively independent
of any religious components. Traditional Chinese religious orientation is held
to reflect the openness and syncretistic character of the Chinese social
world, and the synthesizing qualities of the Chinese mind. But evidence also
suggests that there is something fundamental to the core of
"Chineseness" which has basic religious overtones. The Chinese world
and worldview may not always have been as open as it is represented to be much
of the literature, and Islam may not have provided the only barrier to the
assimilation of the "Peranakans" into the host society.
"Chinese Religionists" frequently seem to present as great a barrier
to passing between Chinese and Malay worlds as anything Islam has been
purported to do.
Regarding intermarriage, it is evident that interethnic social integration
and cultural amalgamation can effectively proceed without the requirements of
members of contraposed groups being wed, and that intermarriage is also a
sociocultural possibility whether or not other processes of social integration
and assimilation are occurring. What it seems to require most is the tolerance
and willing acceptance of the different families, and communities, that are
thus united--and nothing can so divide brothers and families against one
another as relatively remote, and frequently self-serving, political
interests.
It is worthwhile to briefly speculate on the ethnogenesis of Peranakan
ethno-culture, especially the focal and elaborate kind of Baba and Nonya
culture that apparently developed during the Nineteenth Century in the Straits
Settlements.
A romantic model would be a story of the original Nonya who set the entire
Nonya culture snow-balling in its development through the many successive
generations, from mother to daughter in an unending chain. Was she a Chinese
woman, the daughter of an Imperial emperor of China, sent to Malacca to take
the hand the Malay Sultan, adopting Malay dress, Malay speech, Malay beliefs,
but remaining basically Chinese to the core? Or was she but a young outcast of
a Malay kampong, a debt-slave or a concubine of a rich Chinese kapitan,
basically Malay in most aspects but constrained in fundamental ways by a
patriarchal Chinese tradition? Are the Nonya's basically Chinese or Malay?
It is not too far fetched to imagine a relatively small group of original
Nonyas of Malacca, somewhere in the Sixteenth Century, who found themselves in
a unique situation to create a whole new cultural patterning and style. They
subsequently elaborated and handed this culture down through their daughters,
essentially unchanged, until the twentieth century.
In this regard, it would do well to remember the subservient role of the
woman in traditional Chinese society. Only as a mother and matriarch of a
domestic household does a woman hope to have any power or influence, and only
as this power could be realized through a father, a husband or a son, or
alternatively, only through a separate status network-hierarchy of other
women, mothers and daughters.
The suffocating love of the mother for the son is a fundamental cultural
psychological theme of Chinese tradition and ethos. In an almost exclusively
male community--male dominated in every way--in the early trading outposts of
the Nanyang, an empty niche would have been created in a displaced and
makeshift Chinese cosmos. It was a niche that would have had symbolic, social,
structural and psychological components, by the dearth of Chinese women and
mothers that could not be simply filled by the services of a few prostitutes.
This niche would not have been an unattractive one to fill, as it had the
promise of some wealth and advantage among tradition bound people who would
not have otherwise realized such things. This empty niche left an opening in
the traditional Chinese cosmos for the incorporation of foreign elements.
We must seriously ask why it was almost exclusively domestic and female
Malay elements that came to so strongly define what was distinctive about
Nonya culture. We are left with a kind of proposition that there may be basic
dimensions to its culture that were defined along lines of female and male
identity respectively. A useful kind of distinction to make is between
ethno-political symbols that are primarily concerned with external boundary
maintenance and ethno-religious symbolism's that involve domestic relations
and conceptions of sacredness, and the association with these kinds of symbols
to male and masculine domains and features, and feminine and female traits,
respectively. In the case of the Babas and Nonyas, what fell away from the
tradition-bound Chinese Confucian orientation was the whole female side of its
cultural orientation, to become infused, ethno-culturally, if not quite
racially, with many Malay elements.
The second alternative was that Baba fathers and sons were left to fill
play the part of "reality culture" bearers--to use Alfred Kroeber's
distinction--in networks which were externally oriented to culture brokerage
and the mediation of differences. Nonya mothers and daughters were left
separately to play a role the construction and elaboration of an almost
exclusive "value culture" that was almost entire a feminine
prerogative. Within domesticated social spheres, women were left to claim and
compete with one another for status.
When we consider the religious orientation of the Babas and the Nonyas, we
are faced with another paradox--though incorporating many Malay elements
involving trance, superstition, animistic spirituality, spirit possession and
ritual, the Peranakan pantheon of deities remains basically Chinese in
character. We must confront the possibility that no religion or religious
system, as it is lived by an ethno-cultural grouping of people, is a purely
unitary phenomenon. We only have to look to the incorporation of local
deities, beliefs, and cults all over the world, into the sainthood of a
strictly monotheistic Catholic orthodoxy to see a similar kind of lived
religion in action.
The alleged matrilocality of the Babas and Nonyas, as a persistent and
pervasive social institution, also demands some sort of explanation in terms
of origins and primary causes. Though theirs was not a culture characterized
by chronic warfare that demanded the long-term absence of the males, they were
a settlement of sojourner-traders in which the economic interests of the males
demanded long periods of absence. They were also a group which may have always
been defined by some kind of interethnic stress or tension, if not always
outright conflict and competition. It is also apparent that though the
traditional Nonyas may have held the keys to the home, even the shop, as well
as to whatever domestic wealth possessed by the family, they were not
themselves involved in any forms of primary production or external economic
activity.
Unlike many other Southeast Asian women, they were not themselves petty
traders or producers. Thus we are left to explain an apparent exception to the
cross-cultural rule of matrilocality, in terms of origins and causal factors
that stressed the rarity-value of women who were in every respect a minority,
based upon their reproductive role as the principle providers and care-takers
of children who were brought up to think of themselves and call themselves
Chinese even though they often acted and talked like Malays, and in terms of
the elaboration of a strictly domestic, female-centered culture that was
transmitted through processes of both primary and secondary socialization
through the daughters.
The daughters became the principle culture-bearers, and inheritors of
values, attitudes, and characteristics that were distinctively Nonya. And if
the mothers were the principle arrangers in their children's marriages, then
they must have taken much care in finding suitable partners who would
contribute to, rather than take from, their domestically oriented,
female-focused culture.
Another paradox is that though in relation to their male relatives the
Nonya women were always in a subordinate position, at least within the
interior world of their domestic household, the differences of age came to
override those differences based upon gender. Within their own internal world,
the Nonya's came to control resources, power, prestige and privilege that
sometimes matched that of the Babas in the outside world. It is even more of a
paradox when we consider that young Nonya daughters still had inferior value
compared to that of Baba sons, though they were the principle agents and
carriers in the transmission of Nonya lifeways, they did not gain ascendant
status except through marriage, motherhood and the subsequent marriage of
their own sons and daughters. The Baba boys were clearly privileged, even
though from a strictly cultural point of view they would always remain
peripheral, because they still were under the penumbra of the ancestor's
shadow--it was still the Confucian thing to do.
Peranakan ethnoculture, especially the distinctive form that came to bloom
in the Straits Settlements during the Nineteenth and early Twentieth
Centuries, was clearly something more than just a by-product of colonial
political economy within a plural society. In fact, its occurrence may have
been quite separate and independent of the colonial setting, and some evidence
at least suggests that the colonial framework may have actually hindered and
limited its development and fluorescence in fundamental ways.
European colonialism did clearly serve to highlight it, to underscore its
ethnocultural distinctiveness and difference in ways that it may not have
otherwise been emphasized. The fortunes of the Babas and Nonyas within a
foreign administrative structure were only indirect results of this contact
and acculturation--the effect rather than the cause of such contact and
acculturation. It was the very inbetweenness of Straits Chinese society that
permitted them the latitude to serve the critical role of culture brokers and
articulatory intermediaries within a colonial social system, a role which was
effectively not available to the members of other, more tradition-bound
groups. And with their increasing wealth and structurally defined privilege
and opportunity within the colonial framework, their visibility,
distinctiveness, status and prestige also increased.
If the Babas and Nonyas were not directly the by-product of a somewhat
superficial colonial arrangement, then they must be understood in another set
of terms. If they weren't primarily colonial then they were preeminently
traditional, and what has been pulling them apart today have been larger
forces of modernization that have been wearing away the fabric of many
different people's cultural traditions. What is tradition from a modern,
secular point of view? Values and orientations of family, lineage, respect for
and preservation of the authority and legitimacy the past, a central place in
one's world for religion, the primacy of the family as the main stage and
process of socialization and cultural transmission, values of nurturance and
interdependency rather than independence and personal dominance.
"Tradition" defines the principle domain of ethno-culture.
The very factors that fostered the Peranakan's structural fortune in the
colonial era, led to their structural misfortune, their social disintegration,
their loss of visibility and status in the post-colonial era which as to
define itself along new lines, imported from the West, of modernization,
development and nationalism. As the Overseas Chinese have come to face
increasing ethnic segregation and discrimination in most modern Southeast
Asian nation-states, the splitting apart of splintered ethnic segments of
society and the widening gulf between indigenous majorities and Chinese
minorities has tended to pull apart and distintegrate the Peranakans who were
structurally in-between.
Each new generation of Baba and Nonya is left with fewer alternatives
other than to attempt passing into one or another of the segments of modern
society. Less and less of their own culture and their own people are left over
by which to continue to construct and maintain a separate, distinctive
Peranakan identity. Because passing downhill and out of contexts defined by
overpopulation and fierce social circumscription and competition for very
limited resources is much easier than passing "uphill," most
Peranakans have been undergoing resinification.
For some reason, becoming a Moslem in order to pass into Malay society has
never been a viable option open to most Peranakans. The losses in social
status and individual identity in both Chinese and Muslim worlds would have
been much greater than the few gains in social security and acceptability.
Though the Malays are in a structurally predominant and superior position to
the Chinese, their place is by no means an enviable one. Few Chinese would
undergo circumcision in order to trade places with their Malay counterparts,
neither in politics and especially not in business.
The only other alternative seems to be one of escape from the Southeast
Asian setting--to Singapore, or better yet, to the common wealth countries or
to the United States. English language, Western education, the acquisition of
money, material wealth, and Christianity are all efficacious vehicles for such
escape.
With the disintegration of Peranakan ethnoculture, we are witnessing a kind
of socio-cultural atomization of Peranakans into smaller and smaller
groupings, ultimately to become enclosed as separate family units, or even as
lone individuals culturally astray in the wider social stream. With fewer and
fewer social basis available for interaction in the wider world in purely
Peranakan fashion, more and more peranakans are feeling themselves cut off
from their roots, from the tradition in which they themselves were raised,
adrift upon the tides of change.
The Overseas Chinese
The "Peranakan problem" cannot be finally resolved if it is not
sufficiently situated within a larger setting--ultimately within the framework
of traditional and colonial Southeast Asian civilization. Many of the basic
structural features that underlie the formation and ordering of the Peranakan
world are features basic to the patterning and developmental processes of much
of the Southeast Asian world. The maritime openness and outward-looking
orientation, the natural, tropical environment, the role of rivers in the
integration and incorporation of diverse and different ecologies within a
single "interregional system," the recurrent structural theme of the
"organization of diversity," that like the supernatural percussive
melody of Gamelan, reverberates in every ritual, in every myth, in every
language.
Foremost of the themes that have united Southeast Asia as a region and that
help to contextualize the "Peranakan problem" is the influence that
diverse, foreign cultures have had in the stylistic and structural development
of what can be referred to as a typically "Southeast Asian
civilization." Acculturation, whether religious, political, economic, or
social in character, has long been a perennial influence in the region, and
different culture historical phases of acculturation can be used, almost in
the manner of archaeological stratigraphy or stylistic seriation, to uncover
the many layers of culture that have become embedded one on top of the other
throughout Southeast Asia. Each phase contributed to the development of
Southeast Asia upon a new level of sociocultural integration and structural
articulation. The incorporation of foreign elements, ideas, things, and
people, served as a common catalyst, a common stimulus, to the endogenous
elaboration and development of Southeast Asian civilization.
Inextricably entangled with the problem of such acculturation and the
incorporation of diversity, is the problem of "ethnos" as a central
organizational principle of Southeast Asian civilization. Ethnicity as the
study of ethnic identity and ethnogenesis as the study of ethnic origins, are
intrinsic and basic dimensions of Southeast Asian studies in general.
"...ethnic diversity is so fundamental in Southeast Asia that it is one
of the great laboratories for the study of ethnicity." (D. E. Brown,
1976:99) It was in general reference to Southeast Asia, and in specific
relation to the pervasiveness of the Overseas Chinese there, that had led J.
S. Furnival to formulate his now classic theory of "radical
pluralism"--the social integration of people of many cultures in a common
market place and under the aegis of a common political structure.
Because the Peranakans were basically Chinese, members of the so-called
Nanyang, the centrality of the principle of ethnos is especially important in
their study, such that we may refer to a basic Chinese cultural "ethos of
ethnos" that was part of the openness, organizational refinement and
intricacy, and adaptability of the Overseas Chinese social system.
This brings out the central dilemma of the study of ethno-culture, and that
is the problem of determining the appropriate criteria for drawing the line
between what constitutes an ethnic group, or an ethnic phenomena, or an ethnic
category or identity, and what is constitutive of genuinely
"cultural" ethos and difference, cultural traits, orientation and
tradition.
Anthropologists have typically treated culture in a nominal manner as if it
were some kind of boundable entity, a group, an organization of meaning and
value that endures through time and that evolves according to its own internal
logic. Ethnicity has remained somewhat of a sociological aspect, a process of
inter-group identification and ascription, reference and boundary-maintenance.
Ethnicity is commonly associated with a chauvinistic kind of pride--the
ethnocentric pride in the superiority of one's own way of life over others,
and, as well is commonly conflated with fallacious and fictitious ideologies
of racial origins and biological difference. Culture is typically treated as
something that is more fundamental, and basic to humankind. It is social, it
is universal, it is pervasive in all we do, it is largely out of awareness,
and thus mostly transparent and invisible within ourselves. And yet ethnos and
culture cannot be effectively separated in our analysis of human reality, as
neither can we teeth out what are psychological variables, historical changes
and continuities, and our own shared constructions of reality.
Ethnos and Culture coexists along a common continuum, a continuum that is
multidimensional and that is constituted by a complex relational dialectic
between many mutually constraining factors and forces. This ethno-cultural
continuum exists through real historical time, across real social space. It
only exists because all people, as actors upon the same stage, face a common
dilemma in transacting and negotiating the boundaries and areas of their
realities with other, different peoples.
Ethnoculture then, is the study of how people, their identity, their social
positionality, their consciousness and outlook upon the world, are critically
conditioned and constrained by their inevitable relationships with other
peoples. It is a study of human difference, of how such difference can be
constitutive of unity and diversity, cooperation and conflict, in the world.
Ethnoculture is also a study in how we become shaped by the many influences
of the social world that we live within, and how, in turn, we come to shape
that world. Finally, ethnoculture is also a critically reflexive study of the
relative limits of our knowledge of both others and of our selves in the
social world. Just as we cannot clearly disentangle where the study of ethnos
ends and the understanding of culture begins, so too we cannot finally say
where ends the problematic understanding of ourselves and where begins the
unproblematic study of others.
The understanding of Peranakan; ethnoculture cannot be had outside of its
broader 'traditional' Southeast Asian context. It shares many of the
continuities that are distinctive of Southeast Asian civilization.
Civilization is here taken to be a trans-cultural and panhuman process of
historical development--a process that is socially and culturally integrative
and interregional in scope. Certain general cultural style-patterns are
associated with particular instances of civilization, as are particular
incidences of "Great Men" or genius whose innovativeness and spirit
serve to characterize the style patterning of the age. The civilizing process
consists of a structural dialectic of emergent complexity in interregional
systems, a dialectic involving social, political, economic, religious and
psychological factors. It involves increasing levels and areas of integration
and increasing heterogeneity of socio-cultural transmission from local to
regional and interregional to global contexts, which result in stimulus
generation of modified patterns at all levels of human organization. Processes
of both exogenous, or external, acculturative influences of change, as well as
internal, endogenous enculturative influences are involved in the construction
and transmission of ethnoculture.
Peranakan ethnoculture as both part of a wider confluence of
Southeast Asian Civilization and as constituting a particular culture
historical instance of typical, and in some ways, prototypical, Southeast
Asian civilization, is the product of many diverse extraneous influences.
Thus, Peranakan culture has its place within broader cultural and historical
streams of the human world that deserve closer study and understanding.
A model of the function of ethnos in the decision-making process of
migration, identity and development that goes into the history of the making
of Nanyang civilization is evident from the consideration of Baba culture in
the larger context of the Nanyang. The Babas were a kind of pariah class
created through cultural integration, acculturation, and amalgamation between
Muslim Malays and Buddhist Chinese, in which basic differences in religious
tenets precluded the kind of complete cultural assimilation that was possible
in Thailand.
Post-Independence Malaysia fostered strict policies of structural
discrimination and segregation between the Malays and the Chinese. These
policies lead to the disintegration of the basis of Baba culture. Singapore, a
Chinese city, gained its own independence from Malaysia, and, in the
definition of its newfound national identity, excluded all that was Malay from
its own identity. Those aspects of Baba culture that were Malay were cast out,
leaving a gulf in its identity between the East and the West. At first it
strongly oriented itself to the British model, and later has gone through a
period of resinicization in renewing trade contacts with Taiwan.
The situation for the Babas of Malacca was just the reverse. The
oldest Baba community, and in many respects the most Malayized, these people
found themselves symbolically appropriated and at the same time enclaved as
the museum pieces of Malaysian national heritage. They have since come to
represent the archetypical Babas, though they were but a variant of a more
general theme. These Babas had no option in the matter but to submit to their
own cultural cooption by the Malays.
In Penang, the next oldest Baba settlement, which remains more than 90%
Chinese in composition, the pathway taken by the Baba communities was a bit
more tragic. These Babas strongly identified with the British, and were less
Malayized than the Malacca Chinese. They initiated a separatist movement for
Penang's status, similar to Singapore, but failed, not receiving the backing
by the British.
Ethnos can be seen as a principle determinant factor in the decisions and
opportunities open to people in the course of their lives. People attempt to
optimize their prospects, given alternative sets of possibilities, but these
possibilities themselves are constrained within a larger, ethnically defined
context, such that choices made are not unlimited, and vary considerably for
different peoples.
The Nanyang can be seen as a vast network of crisscrossing pathways that
allow labor, resources and capital to move in different, frequently shifting,
directions. Against systematic discrimination or persecution, Chinese are
faced with a range of alternative choices--they can either opt to assimilate
completely into the local population, become enclaved and ghettoized,
segregated and discriminated against, migrate 'back to china' or seek a new
homeland in another part of the Nanyang. The flight of Capital from Hong Kong
to the U.S., the Nanyang and the Common Wealth, is but one more example of
this social historical movement of people, wealth, resources and culture.
Which directions Chinese take will depend partly upon the dialect
group--Cantonese will take Cantonese pathways, and Hokkiens will follow
Hokkien roads. Not all Chinese of the Nanyang hold Singaporean culture to be
the model or principal orientation of their lives. The Singaporeans have, by
and large, been cut from their roots to the Chinese homeland, but many Chinese
throughout the Nanyang, Malaysia included, have maintained these Ancestral
ties for generations. Chinese may see Singapore symbolically as a success
story, as a financial capital and trade center of the Nanyang, but they do not
identify with the Anglicized, modernized Baba orientation of the Singaporean
people--they look elsewhere for their models of Chineseness.
The principle virtue and limitation of the Baba people are that they no
longer live directly under their Ancestor's shadow. Singaporean culture is
native to Singapore and the Straits; this is their homeland to which they are
fixed. Chinese who have kept their ties to the mainland have other options
open to them, but do not see Singapore or Singaporean culture; as the primary
alternative for their lives.
The virtue of the larger Nanyang identity that depends upon its old
identification with the mainland is that this permits the Chinese a relatively
wide access to a number of possible alternatives. Chinese become united under
a broader umbrella of pan-Chineseness that encompasses different dialect
groups. Such Chinese are permitted to work together and even trust one another
in contexts in which the only common bond may be a superficial knowledge of
Mandarin. This latitude is an advantage of maintaining a Nanyang orientation
not permitted to the Babas.
The principle of the cultural models of ethnos in providing options and in
constraining the directions of decision-making in peoples' lives is an
important one. We can see that such ethnos is always defined in relation to
reference or counter-reference groups--for the Singaporeans, the Malays are a
counter-reference other, and constitute the greatest threat to their separate
identity. On the other hand, the British model has served as the principal
reference group for these peoples. Other models are available to other
Chinese. Some may still look to the mainland, others to the Nationalist
Government of Taiwan. Many undoubtedly see their successful cousins in the
United States and the Commonwealth. Many are likely to follow those who came
before them.
Perhaps the greatest illusion that a Westerner could entertain with regard
to the Chinese is that they are all basically the same. The very basis of
ethnic Chinese identity; is its cross-cutting nesting of identities within a
larger network of social distinctions on the basis of village, clan,
kin-group, dialect, class, age, etc. Every Chinese person has a place within
the vast theater, and every Chinese is supposed to know this place. Indeed,
ethnos, or ethnicity, for the ethnic Chinese is the primary organizational
principle of their society. Chinese typically make fine distinctions between
other Chinese that are invisible to Non-Chinese eyes.
Intra-ethnic Chinese distinctions have been referred to as
"subethnic" identities based upon local-linguistic-ethnic
distinctions. It is highly ascriptive in character, being linked to the strong
patrilineal reckoning of Chinese kinship. Chinese successfully exploited this
organizational ethos of ethnos in navigating and negotiating several different
status-role identities within more than one organizational structure. They
thrive on a fundamental status ambiguity, inter-positionality between
structures, and a kind of chameleoness of code switching that would befuddle
others.
Chinese may well be one big family, but it is a family divided under one
roof. The terminological distinctions made in kinship reckoning are fine and
of massive detail. It is fitting that both Chinese heaven and hell are vast
multi-tiered bureaucratic structures occupied by greater and lessor gods. Clan
organization and a segmentary lineage structure facilitate mobilization as
well as fine-tuning of internal differentiation. Trade associations, secret
societies, Kong si's, all cross cut Clan and lineage structures to weave
Chinese into a closely knit social cloth.
Mestizo Chinese
The formation of the Baba culture may have been unique in Southeast Asian
History, but cultural correlates are to be found in other places and other
periods of the Nanyang. The mestizo Chinese of the Philippines,
distinguishable there since the eighteenth century, have made important
contributions to the historical development of the Philippines, being mainly
implicated in the Philippine Revolution against the Spanish, serving as a
major catalyst in social change and economic development of the Philippines,
and a leading component in the hispanization and creation of a distinctive
Filipino culture. Structurally similar to the Baba's, they constituted a
pariah group situated between the ethnically stronger Chinese and the
indigenous Philippinos. ".... In most parts of Southeast Asia the Chinese
mestizos (to use the Philippine term for persons of mixed
Chinese-native ancestry) have not been formally or legally recognized as a
separate group--one whose membership is strictly defined by genealogical
considerations rather than by place of birth, and one which, by its possession
of a unique combination of cultural characteristics, could be easily
distinguished from both the Chinese and native communities."(E. Wickberg,
"The Chinese Mestizo in Philippine History", in Journal of
Southeast Asian History, Vol. 5, no 1, 1964) These Chinese mestizos had
become prominent in landholding, wholesale merchant activities, and in the
professions. They grew in wealth as a middleman pariah class, concentrating
and virtually monopolizing on the internal trade of the Philippines.
The Chinese mestizo of the Philippines; was strongly hispanicized,
politically, in the adoption of Catholicism, in the adoption of Philippine
versions of Hispanic culture. Their dress was unique in this
regard--"models of what the urbanized Filipino of the late nineteenth
century would wear." (ibid. p. ?) Their culture was an urbanized one, and
the maternal influence hispanicized, catholicized mothers in the rearing and
socialization of the children, were important factors in the development of
the cultural distinctiveness of the Chinese mestizo.
Me'tis Chinois'
The Chinese presence in Cambodia and Cochin China, or what later became
South Vietnam, has been very old. Early evidence from the eleventh and twelfth
centuries AD mention the presence of a small Chinese community in Anghor Thom,
merchants and carpenters who came by sea and who married local women. By the
thirteenth century, a substantial Chinese settlement in Phnom-Penh is noted,
and the emergence of this center from a locally oriented one to a major
foreign trade entrepot, coincides with this settlement. Chinese communities
were found there by the Spanish and later by the Portuguese in the Sixteenth
and Seventeenth centuries. Cantonese mercenaries in the service of the Anamese
emperor established a fort at Mytho along the Mekong.
After more than a century of occupation, these Chinese were later forced to
abandon this settlement and migrated to the location near Saigon that later
became known as Cholon, "...and soon established a trading town that soon
became the centre of Chinese trade for the whole of Indochina. Many of these
Chinese adventurers married Annamese women and produced the Minh-Huong, the
Sino-Annamese who were treated as a separate minority group throughout the
nineteenth century in Annam and Cochinchina, and who, for a short period,
constituted a separate legal group in Cambodia as well." (W. E. Willmott,
"History and Sociology of the Chinese in Cambodia Prior to the French
Protectorate", in The Journal of Southeast Asian History ,Vol. 7,
no. 1, 1966)
By the time of the arrival of French and British explorers,
Phnom-Penh was mostly a Chinese city, composed primarily of immigrants from
Cholon, and who had tied up the local trade in fish and rice. These Chinese
were probably mostly Cantonese and Hainanese, the descendants of Ming
patriots.
Reference is made in the legal code of the Khmer Kingdom to granting of
positions of authority over the Chinese community to
"me'tis-chinois." (Lecle're, 1898:115) Chinese were not subject to
the legal marriage prohibitions between Cambodian Buddhists and
foreigners--perhaps because they were Buddhist as well, and because it was
relatively easy for a Chinese to assimilate, if he so desired, into Cambodian
society. "Any Chinese born in Cambodia was considered a Cambodian if he
adopted Khmer customs and dress Sino-Khmer were automatically
Cambodians." (Ibid, pg. 31)
Thai-Chinese
The Chinese in Thailand represent another instance of partial assimilation
and the formation of an important pariah group. Constituting perhaps an eighth
of the total population, they are small traders and merchant
middlemen--"virtually any article bought or sold in Thailand passes
through the hands of one or more Chinese middlemen."(Richard Coughlin, Double-Identity
1960: 2) Chinese traders in Thailand date back at least to the thirteenth
century. A French account from 1687 reports about 3,000 Chinese at Ayuthia. By
this time, the Chinese controlled most of the trade in the country. A Teochiu
Chinese, Taksin, rose to power as the King of Siam after expelling Burmese
invaders who had destroyed the capital. The predominant presence of Teochiu
Chinese in Thailand is probably related to this important historical episode.
Taksin was assassinated by his son-in-law, Chao Phya Chakkri, who founded the
present Bangkok Dynasty. The royal palace was established in the old Chinese
quarter of the city, "ruled by a rich Chinese merchant with the noble
rank of Phraya."
Continual warfare with Burma and Cambodia had decimated the Thai
population, and thus Chinese immigration was welcome. "Meanwhile a
war-surplus of females became available to the bachelor (or otherwise) Chinese
immigrants and Chinese blood was literally fused with both the royal and
common blood of the Thai people." (Joseph P. L. Jiang, "The Chinese
in Thailand: Past and Present", in The Journal of Southeast Asian
History, Vol. 7, no. 1, 1966:42)
Chinese figured prominently in the economic development of Thailand--they
held many 'tax-farms' and controlled the junk trade that was held by a royal
monopoly on foreign commerce. They constituted artisans, craftsmen, metal
smiths, builders, as well as mining, planting and timber.
Chinese-Thai intermarriage was great in old Siam, and there seems to have
been no boundaries or discrimination against such amalgamation. The net effect
seems to have been near complete assimilation of Chinese by the third or
fourth generation, with only some Chinese cultural elements, such as ancestor
worship, remaining. "Since the earliest times prominent Chinese were
often recruited to governmental, especially diplomatic service. The majority
of these were second generation, and were more than half assimilated..."
(ibid, pg. 51)
The status of the Nanyang Chinese; in Thailand was directly tied to Thai
tributary tutelage to Mainland China, and to their usefulness to both the Thai
royalty and to the Thai people in economic activities. The Chinese were not
discriminated against, and were given virtually free and ungoverned reign in
their own spheres of activity, and yet the Chinese were clearly made
politically subordinate to the Royalty.
They filled a critical, intermediary niche as a pariah group which was not
traditionally a part of Thai social structure, but which was necessary and
vital to the economic development of old Siam. With the encroachment of
Western domination over China, its loss of status to the Thai Royalty signaled
a reversal in the status of the Chinese in Thailand, so much so that by the
early 20th Century we find mention of the Chinese of Thailand as "Asian
Jewry" and the promotion of Thai nationalism, an orientation inherited
from the West, is closely linked to growing anti-sinicism. Policies of
enforced assimilation of the ethnic Chinese into Thai
culture--"Thai-ification"--and of systematic discrimination against
the Chinese in business and public life, have grown and continue unabated
until today.
Burmese-Chinese
The Chinese in Burma; are not outstanding in the History of the Nanyang.
Burma shares a common border with Mainland China, and this has constrained
status of the overseas Chinese there in important ways that the Chinese of
Burma have not been ignorant in taking advantage. Though highly visible in
many sectors of the economy, they were never as economically predominant there
as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, in part because they had close competition
with Indian merchants. Victor Purcell notes that intermarriage between Chinese
men and Burmese women was not uncommon, and that the male offspring of such
unions remained identified as Chinese, while the female offspring become
identified as Burmese. He goes on to remark that Chinese there become almost
completely assimilated by the second or third generation, losing all their
Chineseness--thus, despite a continual influx of new Chinese immigrants into
Burma, the total number of people identified as Chinese there remains
effectively stable.
"Borneo" Chinese
Evidence supports the possible presence of Chinese upon the island of
Borneo from as early as the 7th Century, and possibly even earlier, with
archaeological evidence dating to 117 BC, upon an old site in the region now
occupied by Brunei; and Sarawak. (Victor Purcell, 1966:11) Early Chinese
Chronicles of the Liang (502-566) and Sui (589-618) Dynasties mention
"P'oli", known since the Tang (618-907) Dynasty onwards as
"P'oni" and thought to be the early name for Brunei, had given a
description of its direction and of it's inhabitants which fit well that of
Borneo. Later Chronicles mention the same kingdom comprising fourteen
provinces extending along the northern Borneo coastline and as far as the
Philippines. (John Chin, The Sarawak Chinese 1981:1-2)
Assimilation of Chinese, of ulu-traders, in Borneo has been held to have
been widespread. Rates of intermarriage with native Dusun and Sulu peoples
were probably high. The Chinese have long figured in the "ulu" trade
and resource exploitation of Borneo, as well as in its mining and agricultural
pioneering. An early Kong Si system provided the organizational base for the
mobilization of labor and resources in the development of trade and resource
production in Borneo. Trade networks with indigenous peoples brought them into
continuous contacts and interactions with these peoples, as these people grew
accustomed to their goods and their presence. Chinese now comprise a
significant minority in Borneo, comprising most of the ethnic-dialect groups
representing the Overseas Chinese. Intermarriage with local wives was
frequent, especially in the earlier periods, in part because of the
male-biased sex ratio among the Chinese, and because such conjugal unions
facilitated economic relations with the indigenous peoples. More recently,
such intermarriage is virtually nonexistent, in either urban or rural segments
of Chinese society, and "Peranakans" of means are remarrying back
into "pure" Chinese society. "When it does occur it reflects
the low status of the individual involved and his difficulty in finding an
acceptable mate within the bounds of his own ethnic group." (David
Fortier, "The Chinese in North Borneo," 1957:16-7)
Peranakans/Babas
The Peranakan Chinese of Indonesia, "Peranakan" meaning literally
"mixed blood," were the group most closely related to the Babas of
the Straits. They are virtually identical in many cultural aspects, and yet
they have had different histories and different trajectories of development.
Both groups are principally Hokkien Chinese, both groups have assimilated
similar elements of Malayo-Indonesian culture, and yet both groups looked to
different European Colonial masters for their primary orientation in the
modern world. The demographic profiles of the Peranakans of Indonesian and the
Babas of Malaysia are substantially different--while the Nanyang Chinese of
Malaysia constituted about 40% of the national population, being the largest
group of Overseas Chinese, the Baba's represent only a small minority of the
Chinese. On the other hand, the Chinese of Indonesia, while almost as numerous
as the Malaysian Chinese, constituted only about 3% of the total population of
Indonesia. But on the Island of Java, where the Nanyang Chinese were most
numerous, the Peranakans constituted over 50% of the Overseas Chinese.
Enforced segregation, a policy begun with the Dutch, has long served to mark
off and isolate the Chinese communities in Indonesia. The principle division
there was between the 'Totok" or "Singkeh" Chinese, and the
Peranakan, or "mixed-blood" or "Indonesian born" Chinese.
More than 85% of the Peranakans are to be found in Java concentrated in the
main urban centers. The Peranakans were Hokkien descent, while the Totoks who
came later were primarily Cantonese.
Baba Beginnings
The Babas of Malaysia commonly referred to themselves as Peranakan, and
even though among Malays this may have had derogative connotations of
"mixed" or impure blood, the Baba's were proud of their heritage and
of their name. John Clammer notes that Peranakan "is the Malay
designation for 'local-born people.'"(1980:3) According to Tan Giok-San
who wrote the first comprehensive ethnography of the Peranakans of Indonesia,
the word "peranakan" is derived from the Malayo-Indonesian root
"anak," meaning child, with the prefix "per" and suffix
"an", rendering the meaning "born of." (1963:pg. 11). In
modern medical terminology, "peranakan" is the part of the female
anatomy closely describing the uterus. (Wazir Jahan Karim, "Prelude to
Madness: The Language of Emotion in Courtship and Early Marriage" in Emotions
of Culture: A Malay Perspective, edited by Wazir Jahan Karim, 1990:49)
"Malay midwives describe it as the place in the abdomen where 'the foetus
clings' and the baby begins to grow. Hence it is closely associated with
blood, semen and fertilization, in the sense that a foetus is recognized to
develop from a clot of blood after fertilization takes place." (Ibid. pg.
49-50) Peranakan Indonesia or Peranakan Malaysia refers to "born of
Indonesia" or "born of Malaysia" respectively. It came to have
the euphemistic connotation of "mixed-blood" and was applied to any
native-born who were of mixed descent--Arab Peranakan, Chinese Peranakan,
Dutch Peranakan, Jawi Peranakan, etc. It seems as though the Chinese
Peranakan, always a significant if not a preponderant minority, appropriated
the term as their own.
The terms Baba and Nonya, or Nyonya or Nona, are often applied to the
Peranakans, particularly of the Straits Settlements. These terms mean
"Man" or "mister" and "Woman" or
"Mrs." or "Miss," and carry the connotation of
"Gentleman" and "Lady." Again, according to Tan,
Indonesian kin-terms used by elderly women, referring to the child's spouse,
were sexually marked--"Babah mantu" (Daughter's husband) and
"Njonja mantu" ("Son's wife" Tan Giok-lan, 1963:pg.
125). One can only speculate whether the terms Baba and Nonya became marked
for those of mixed marriage between Chinese and Malayo-Indonesians, and thus
appropriated by the Peranakans to refer to the male and female spouses of such
marriages.
J. D. Vaughn, in his early work The Manners and Customs of the Chinese
of the Straits Settlements (1879) traced the etymology of the word Baba as
the a term used by Bengali descendents to designate European children,
"and it is probable that the word was applied by the Indian convicts at
Pinang to Chinese children and so came into general use." (Reprint, 1971:
2) R. J. Wilkinson held that Baba was a descriptive name for "European,
Eurasian and Chinese males to distinguish them from men born in Europe and
China," and a "Descriptive name applied to male Straits-born
Chinese." (R. J. Wilkinson, A Malay-English Dictionary, 1959: 50)
Kobayashi Shinsaku has speculated that Baba may have been a corruption of the
Malay word for father, Bapa, employed as an honorific for the Peranakans of
Java. (Kobayashi Shinsaku, Shina Minzoku no Kaigai Hatten Kakyo no Kenkyo,
1931:93) John Clammer cites speculation that "Baba" should be
rendered as "ba-ba," indicating ignorance of Chinese language and
customs. "If this is at all true, it would account for many Straits
Chinese disliking the term when it is applied to them!" (1980, footnote,
pg. 5) On the other hand, Png Poh-Seng notes that "In the heyday of
Straits Chinese prestige and influence, it was an advantage to be a Baba, and
it is not far-fetched to assume that all Straits-born Chinese then liked to be
known as Babas." ("The Straits Chinese In Singapore" in The
Journal of Southeast Asian History, 1969:pg. 97) Png Poh-Seng concurs with
the early definition provided by the Rev. Carstairs Douglas, "as it is
fairly certain from accounts of Sino-Malay marriages in Malacca that the term
was introduced to describe the progeny of such mixed parentage." (Ibid.
pg. 96)
Png Poh-Seng noted that "It was also not uncommon for families,
especially local-born Tiechius, to name their sons Tua-ba..., Ji-ba...,
San-ba..., Si-ba..., and their daughters Tua-nya..., Ji-nya..., San-nya...,
and Si-nya..., in order of age." (Ibid. pg. 98)
My wife, a direct descendent of the Nyonyas from Penang, sometimes sings to
our baby girl "Noni, noni keng, Ah pek jeep pang keng, pang keng mui bey
key so, Ah pek long toe" (translated, it reads "Noni, noni keng, old
man goes into the bedroom, forgot bedroom door is not locked, the old man
pushes it down") I ask her what the terms "Noni, noni keng"
stand for, and where she first learned it, and she says she doesn't know, it
just rhymes with the rest of the song, and it is something she had been
singing since she was a child.
Excessive ink spilt over the speculative etymology of such words as Baba
and Nyonya and Peranakan is not mere equivocation, as it points up a
fundamental dimension of ambiguity of such primary terms of reference. It has
been an ambiguity that is carried over into the other apellations
"Straits-Born" and "Straits Chinese" that are frequently
used synonymously. The British Rev. Carstairs Douglas, in his dictionary of
spoken Amoy Hokkien, notes that the term "Baba" carried over into
the Hokkien language to refer to "a half-caste Chinese from the
Straits." In the Straits, however, the term is applied to all Chinese
born there, half-caste or not." (J. D. Vaughn, 1879:pg. 2) John Clammer
again comments that "there was from a very early date a distinction
between the Straits Chinese, who were culturally distinct, and the other
immigrant Chinese in the Straits Settlements." (Ibid. pg. 4).
The fundamental ambiguity found in all three sets of terms, Peranakan, Baba
and Nyonya, and Straits Chinese, is one of the implicit denotative/connotative
significance of "local born/mixed-blood," respectively. Not all
local born Chinese were "half-caste" or "half-breed" even
though they may or may not have been called "peranakan", Baba, or
Straits Chinese, and, at least for the Indonesian Peranakans, about
three-quarters were of mixed parentage.
This ambiguity is essential to understanding the identity of the Peranakans
and Babas, because they constituted an interstitial group situated somewhere
between the Chinese and the Malayo-Indonesians, along two separate but
convergent dimensions--racial and kinship identity, on the one hand, and, on
the other, cultural identity. It was just this inbetweenness, so important
in-group and individual reference, which became linguistically
"marked" by such special appellatives and which could be used either
euphemistically in a positive way to connote ethnic pride or dysphemistically
in a derogative way to register cultural/racial inferiority. The connotation
of "native" or local-born is more positively salient than the
meaning of half-breed that carried a negative connotation.
Some of the earliest evidence for the Chinese in the Nanyang comes from
archaeological sites in Java, Sumatra, and Borneo, including Chinese
sepulchral pottery vessels, which date to the second and first centuries BC.
"From these finds, De Flines inferred, no doubt correctly, that Chinese
colonists or merchants must have lived in Indonesia as early as the Han
period." (Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, 1951: pg.
11)
There can be little doubt that the Chinese had been in Java for a long
time. No doubt that in these long settled communities, Chinese took local
wives and established families. There was in these Islamic societies a barrier
to the local assimilation of the Chinese. It is apparent that the Chinese took
wives from the lowest social classes, or slaves, from non-Islamic groups or
the Balinese. The inferior status of these women precluded their capacity to
culturally assimilate the offspring of these marriages "so decisively in
favor of native culture as did Thai wives. Furthermore, if sons and daughters
remained within the Chinese community, after a few generations, native-Chinese
intermarriage would decline, as the Chinese community provided its own wives.
We know that the first headmen or kapitans of the Chinese in seventeenth
century Batavia had Balinese wives, but by the eighteenth century their
successors were marrying daughters of other Chinese officers." (Mary F.
Somers-Heidhues; Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia, pg. 36-7)
Dutch policies legally prohibited intermarriage of the Chinese (1717) and
their assimilation to native status. They were quartered off in their own
colonies, required to wear typically Chinese dress and were not permitted
freedom of movement outside of these except when in service of the Dutch
interests. Later, in 1854, they were set into a separate, higher tax category.
Later influx of Chinese Totoks, and especially Chinese women, even further
discouraged assimilation and acculturation of this group, and even resulted in
some degree of 'resinification' into the new Chinese communities.
It appears that the Peranakans of Java, and perhaps Baba communities of
Malacca, became effectively stabilized sometime between the seventeenth and
nineteenth centuries, as effectively closed and self-perpetuating communities
which had their own cultural orientation. Coincidental with this period were
Imperial Edicts beginning in the early eighteenth century and in effect until
the early nineteenth century which effectively prevented further emigration
from Southeastern China and which strongly discouraged the repatriation of
those Chinese abroad, under penalty of punishment. It was then, during this
period that the Chinese communities could no longer look back to China with
the hope of some day returning to be buried there. This must have provided a
strong incentive for these Chinese to reorient themselves to their local
context, to effectively break off their ties to the homeland, and to cultivate
a sense of a local cultural orientation which involved some degree of
indigenous acculturation and assimilation. Once formed, these separate and
isolated Chinese communities, with their peranakan cultural practices and
orientation, remained effectively segregated up until their eventual
disintegration and demise under the modern policies of the new Indonesian and
Malay nationalisms.
The earliest evidence for Chinese communities in the Straits must be taken
to date from eunuch Cheng Ho's founding of Malacca in 1408. It can be safely
assumed that from the time of its founding, Chinese must have had a regular,
if not continuous, residence there. It is likely that the earliest Chinese
settlement had more of the character of a transient camp or a small trading
colony than of a settled, internally organized community. "From the
available Chinese, Malay and Portuguese sources, it seems certain that there
was a Chinese trading community in the port-city of Malacca before the fall of
the Sultanate in 1511. But whether these Chinese represented a permanent or a
fluid society, that kept coming and going with the monsoons, is still
uncertain. The size of the Chinese trading community was probably small and
insignificant. However, it laid the foundation for the development of a
permanent Chinese community in Malacca."(Yeh Hua Fen, Historical Guide
of Malacca, 1936)
There is no uniform agreement on this score of the early Chinese settlement
of Malacca. Victor Purcell is somewhat skeptical, having stated that permanent
Chinese communities were not established of any significant size until the
coming of the Europeans. It is apparent that Chinese had formed settlements in
some of the port cities of Java prior to the European contact, and these
perhaps constituted some of the earliest Chinese settlements in the Straits.
Mention in the early Portuguese references is only of Chinese junks whose crew
and traders remained on board. A Campon China is given on the map in Eredias
history of Malacca, 1613, but this settlement is only of a very small size.
The paucity of reference to the Chinese in the early Portuguese texts on
Malacca may not be an indication of the lack of Chinese inhabitants there so
much as an indication of the lack of Portuguese attention or interest in such
details.
There is a story of Sultan Mansur Shah, from 1462, to whom the Emperor of
China's daughter, Hong Li-po, was sent for their hand in marriage. The Emperor
sent a fleet of one hundred "pilus" bearing 500 daughters of his
paramantris as handmaidens to the Princess.
The well mentioned in this reference has long been the source of drinking
water famous for its taste, and perhaps its curative properties as well, so
much so that its waters have been transported to neighboring countries, as far
as Sumatra, during times of drought and pestilence. The location of the later
Bukit China, of the Princess Hung Li-po's dwelling, on this hill, and the
digging of a well at its base, may have been, from the standpoint of Chinese
Geomancy, a propitious place.
It seems likely that, sometime between Cheng Ho's first visit, in 1403,
Alfonso d' Albuquerque's conquest of Malacca in 1511, and the Dutch conquest
in 1641, Chinese sojournership at some point crossed the thin line to colonial
settlement. Evidence of grave inscriptions at the Chinese cemetery, Bukit
China, the oldest of which date to the sixteenth century, and the next set
which date to the beginning of the Ching Dynasty in the 1644, have some
bearing on the early Malacca Chinese. "One of them is that of the husband
and wife of a certain Ng by surname...The tombstone of the right one shows
that the dead was a Kapitan, surnamed Tay, while that of the left, the Kapitan
Nya, or Lady Kapitan or the Kapitan's wife, probably a native woman...."
(Yeh Hua Fen, Historical Guide of Malacca, 1936:pg. 79) The oldest
family lineages of Malacca Chinese, the Tans, Tays and Li traditions, do not
go back further than the first half of the seventeenth century. (Victor
Purcell, "Chinese Settlement in Malacca. Journal of the Malayan Branch
of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. XX, Part I, pg. 122-3)
The Dutch give reference to a Chinese community--"The 300 or 400
Chinese shopkeepers, craftsmen and farmers could be allowed to settle down at
their own convenience, provided they cultivate the gardens within their
territory. They can hire or occupy those empty houses that can be saved from
collapse or destruction. The ruined gardens between the river Boekit Tjina and
the southern suburbs should be lent to Netherlanders, Portuguese, Malaccans,
and Chinese to be cultivated.... For these some 800 to 1,000 Chinese settlers
would be very useful."(Justus Schouten, "Report of 1641 to the Dutch
East India Company") The Dutch appointed "Kapitans China" to
manage the Chinese community of Malacca, much as they did in Java and Batavia.
"The Chinese living at Basar on the north of the city have their own
Captain Notchin who lives on small merchandise." Thus we get the
beginning of a succession of "at least" eleven Kapitans China. These
were Hokkiens, and their descendants, who had fled the Manchus and who
maintained strong loyalty to the old Ming Dynasty.
By 1678, Governor Balthasar Bort gave a census figure of 892 Chinese in
Malacca out of a total of 4, 884 people. "The Chinese had 81 brick and 51
atap houses with 127 men, 140 women, 159 children, 93 male slaves, 137 female
slaves, and 60 children of slaves inside the city limit."(Victor Purcell,
1947:pg. 124)
By 1750 the Chinese population was 2,161, dropping to 1,390 in 1760, which
remained stable until the British occupation in 1795.
Most of the Hokkiens of this early period were merchants, but this
community became joined by a large Hakka contingent of farmers who pioneered
into the hinterlands and played an important role in the opening of the
interior states. "The famous pioneer of Kuala Lumpur, Yap Ah Loi, a
Fui-Chiu Hakka, was one of them..." (ibid. pg. 83)
With the onset of British rule in the Straits Settlements, the Chinese
population increased greatly there. The British found the Chinese useful, and
did not discourage the Chinese from developing the coolie system, or the
"credit-ticket;" or "Kheh-tau" system, of immigrating
indentured Chinese laborers in massive numbers. Within seven years of the
British acquisition of Penang in 1786 and the founding of its fort there in
their effort against the French, the Chinese population had increased to over
three thousand. Sir Francis Light, the British Founder of Penang, encouraged
the Chinese to immigrate there, "whom he held to be 'the only people of
the East from whom a revenue may be raised without expense or extraordinary
efforts of government.'" (T. Braddel, 'Notices of Penang", Journal
of the Indian Archipelago, 1850:641)
The first Chinese to establish themselves in Penang came from a Chinese
community in Kedah, and the first Kapitan China was a baba from there named
Koh Lay Huan. He settled there as a merchant, planter and tax farmer, and
maintained one family in Kedah and another in Penang. His son by his Penang
wife accompanied Sir Stanford Raffles to Singapore in its opening in 1819.
The other most influential Chinese families were the Khoos and the Kohs,
who were interrelated by marriage. The Khoo Kong Si is an old historical
monument to be found in Penang today. My wife's father's family may have been
descended from this lineage. "In the former days long-settled Chinese
families in Kedah and Penang had intermarried with Malays, but with increased
immigration from China from the middle of the nineteenth century, this mixed
Chinese-Malay or Baba stock tried to marry pure-blooded Chinese."
("An Immigrant Society," pg. 10-11)
It seems apparent that some of the first Chinese there were also the Baba
businessmen from Malacca, who rapidly took advantage of the opportunities that
were the result of British colonization.
A similar pattern began in Singapore with its founding in 1819, at which
time there were no Chinese present, but the Chinese population of which grew
to several thousand within a year. "Many of the principal Chinese
families of Malacca took part in the opening up and growth of Singapore and
Penang, but continued to keep their families and the family houses in
Malacca..." (Yeh Hua Fen, Historical Guide of Malacca, 1936: pg.
16) Thereafter, the Chinese population in the Straits Settlements grew
steadily. "In 1840, 5,063 of them arrived, and by 1865, twenty-five years
later, the number had increased threefold to 17,439." However, the
formation of large and more permanent Chinese communities in Malaya did not
take place until the 1880's when large-scale Chinese immigration began.
"The influx of Chinese immigrants by the thousands was mainly the
result of the establishment of British political control over the Malay states
after 1874. The economic development and the law and order brought about by
the British served as a great stimulus to immigration, and hence the Chinese
population in Singapore and Malaya increased substantially." (Yen
Ching-Hwang; The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pg. 4)
A census figure for the Chinese of Singapore in 1848 lists 1,000
"Malacca Chinese" versus 9,000 Hokkiens, 19,000 Tiuchius, 6,000
Cantonese, 4,000 Hakkas and 700 Hainanese. (Siah U Chin; "The Chinese in
Singapore", Journal of the Indian Archipelago, Vol. 11, 1848: pg.
290) An 1881 census recorded in Singapore 4,513 "Straits-born" men
out of a total Chinese male population of 72,571, and 5,014
"Straits-born" women of a total of 14,195 Chinese females.
It is apparent that during this early era of British colonization, the Baba
Chinese held an exclusive advantage over the new "singkeh" Chinese.
Maurice Freedman wrote, "When Singapore was founded as a British
settlement in 1819. Babas were among its first inhabitants, and they occupied
throughout the nineteenth century a prominent position in local Chinese
society, maintaining leadership within it by virtue of their commercial
success and by absorbing ambitious immigrants from China into their
ranks." ("Chinese Kinship and Marriage in Singapore" in The
Journal of Southeast Asian History)
It is apparent that these Baba's also held a kind of monopoly over the
institution of marriage among the Chinese of the Straits. "The Chinese
who congregate here are a mixed mass from all parts: the unmarried ones among
them are very numerous and the married ones very few.... upon a general
calculation I should suppose there were about 2000 married Chinese."(Siah
U Chin; "The Chinese In Singapore", ibid. pg. 284) The same author
notes that the greatest number of married Chinese men are "found among
the Malacca born Chinese next to them among the Hok-kien shop keepers, then
the Tio-Chin.... As for common laborers and coolies and those who have no
fixed employment very few among them get married." (Pg. 284)
It was apparent that the local orientation and settled state of the Baba
communities in the Straits resulted in the need to establish and maintain a
local system of marriage and kinship. With increasing immigration of Chinese
into the Straits Settlements, this community soon became a minority of about
10 percent of the Chinese population in Singapore. Most of the Chinese born in
the Straits Settlements during this era were Baba by birth.
Before the turn of the Twentieth century, very few Chinese women immigrated
into the Straits, and the ratio of men to women in these communities was very
unbalanced. "Originally the inhabitants of Malacca, the Babas later
spread to the Malay States and other British settlements. With increased
immigration, half-caste Sino-Malay; girls married immigrants from China as
their fathers were reluctant to marry them to Malays, and their progeny
would have less Malay and more Chinese blood. In time mixed parentage almost
disappeared, but the descendants of the Sino-Malays continued to be known as
Babas. Then by the time the Straits Settlements; came into being in 1826 there
were few Babas who were actually Sino-Malays." (Png Poh-Seng, pg. 96-7)
With the turning of the 20th Century, the Straits Settlements are well
established within a Nanyang network that extended across the Straits to
include the Peranakan communities of Java, as well as hinterland communities
in the interior states of Malaya. Penang, Malacca and Singapore had all
developed into Baba communities along divergent lines--those of Penang being
more Chinese, the Malacca more traditionally Sino-Malay, and the Singaporeans,
more strongly oriented towards the English due to the role of English in
education, modernization, urbanization and development.
The Twentieth century brought with it a basic change in the status and
position of the Baba and Peranakan communities of the Straits. Modernization,
the importation of Western-styled nationalisms in the form of new political
parties and movements, both in China, in many Southeast Asian nations, as well
as in the Nanyang, tended to increasingly exclude the participation of the
traditionally and colonial Babas. The Babas lacked the socio-political
organization of their Chinese cousins, and came into increasing competition
with these organizations. This lack of internal organization had its
advantages for entrepreneurship and acculturation to the British colonial
system, but it had critical disadvantages in the lack of mutual support,
political-economic mobilization and organization, etc.
The Baba's tended to lack the political conscience which begun to spring up
among both the indigenous Malays and the singkeh and "Totok"
communities, having defined their identity primarily in relation to the
British administrative authority. Indeed, in many occasions, their
self-professed loyalty to the Queen was more British than the British.
Thus the beginning of the Twentieth century marked the beginning of the end
of the traditional Baba way of life. Baba culture continued to sustain itself
as a community, but with increasing adversity and difficulty. It is likely
that socially and culturally it became increasingly atomized and
disintegrated, becoming a kind of home-bound family orientation which had less
and less to do with the changing outside world. They persisted with what
became increasingly ethnocentric, snobbish airs of cultural superiority based
upon their predecessorial claims, but this was in the face of decreasing
relevance and credibility within a modernizing world.
Invasion by the Japanese marked the end of Baba supremacy in the Straits
Settlements. Many Baba leaders were executed by the Japanese. After the war,
the Baba community retained much of its wealth, but lost most of its
privilege. In Singapore, they were effectively absorbed by the larger Chinese
component, and "The result of these processes was to make the Singapore
Babas less easily distinguishable--especially from the English-educated
Chinese who not only abound but are on the increase." (Clammer, ibid. pg.
8) In Malaysia, the Straits Chinese developed their own political
associations, later known as the "Peranakan Association," from about
1900. In Indonesia, the Peranakans were relatively late in forming their own
political organizations, remaining politically disinterested and neutral as
long as possible, until increasing discrimination encouraged the formation of
"Baperki" in the late 1950's.
In Penang, Straits Chinese leaders began the Penang Secession movement
which lasted from 1948-1951, and which was defeated by the joint efforts of
the British and Malay parties. The failure of this movement sealed the fate of
the Penang Straits Chinese to determine their own political, economic and
social future in relation to the newly emerging nation of Malaysia.
Since the independence period of Malaysia and Indonesia, the Babas and
Peranakans have been considered a dying breed and a cultural anachronism of a
bygone colonial era. Peranakan status in Indonesia, subsequent to the riots
and political upheavals and anti-communist reaction of 1963 and 1965-6, has
declined as a segregated community, and the Peranakans seem to have undergone
systematic 'ethnocide.'
In post-independence Singapore, the Peranakan community was resinified and
became increasingly modernized and westernized. Singapore national culture
effectively absorbed its Baba basis, using its western orientation as a basic
cultural model for its modernization. In the process Baba culture in Singapore
has become a thing of the past without much relevance to a nation preoccupied
with modern development.
Old Chinese sections of the city, a nostalgic reminder of the Chinese
colonial past, have been nearly completely razed to make room for modern
business buildings, malls and tenement flats. In modernizing Malaysia, the
Chinese community in general, including the Babas, has been on one hand
effectively segregated through structural and social discrimination, and has
endured under policies designed to enforce cultural assimilation to the Malay
national culture that remains traditionally Muslim in orientation.
The Babas of Malacca have been more or less symbolically appropriated as an
anachronistic model of Sino-Malay cultural assimilation. The Babas of Penang
and elsewhere have seen their community basically split apart. Some were
reabsorbed by Hokkien and Tieu Chiu Chinese communities, others more inclined
to the English language and British culture, being left furthest out on the
limb, with many who could afford the cost migrating to the Common Wealth
countries.
Ethnic revitalization can only happen in a dominant society that honors its
cultural heritage and traditions, and yet this can prove to be almost as
ethno-historically revisionist as a society that seeks to hide or erase its
past. Past cultural forms and models can be adopted by an emerging middle and
upper-middle class that were defined by its standardized national cultural
orientation as almost a kind of national mythology and as a form of elaborate
play that mediates the new and old in the transformations of the past into the
present. As an intermediate, somewhat transitional cultural model, Sino-Malay
Baba culture can and has been appropriated by both Singaporean and Malay
societies to legitimate a larger range of national cultural
interests--different elements of the original culture have been highlighted
and emphasized, and other, contradictory aspects, conveniently ignored or even
forgotten.
"The Baba is thus faced with a terribly difficult identity problem--he
has a culture, but one for which the sustaining conditions have vanished; yet
he is encouraged to think of his culture as an important contribution to the
Singapore ethnographic scene. Indeed, I have even heard it said that the Baba
culture is the only 'true' Singaporean culture. Mutiracialism as a policy may
well therefore have the (presumably unintended) consequence of artificially
supporting minority cultures which in the normal course of events would
probably pass naturally away." (John Clammer, 1980:139) Yet the
contradiction was not a part of the original culture, but a part of the
current conflict of competing identities, interests and trajectories.
Nonya Culture
It has been argued that the Baba's did not in fact possess their own
culture--rather, they possessed a distinctive ethnicity that became translated
in certain specific ways. ".... The term 'Baba Chinese' is commonly used
as an ethnic label and it should not be assumed that since there is such a
thing as an ethnic group there must therefore be a Baba Chinese culture which
is shared by all Baba Chinese and entirely distinct from other ethnic
groups.... What can be derived is that there was and is such a thing as a Baba
Chinese ethnic group who used some cultural traits to distinguish themselves
ethnically; we cannot, however, conclude from such scanty data that there is a
distinctively Baba Chinese culture...." (Cecilia Ng Siew Hua, 1983: pg.
98-9)
Such an argument begs the critical question of where we should draw the
line between an ethnic group and a genuine culture, and how we should define
either culture or ethnicity in contrast to one another. In this regard, the
Babas had shared with the rest of the Nanyang, albeit not as strongly, in the
basic Chinese organizational principles, an ethos of ethnos--such that ethnic
identity and difference became the basis of a shared cultural orientation.
It seems that socio-cultural barriers of language, religion, custom and
belief were great enough to have caused an effective separation, isolation and
emergent distinctiveness of cultural orientation among the Baba's and
Peranakans. Barriers to marriage and mobility by Chinese in Islamic society,
unless proclaiming faith in Islam and foregoing one's own, usually cherished
Chinese cultural identity, were strong enough to prevent rapid or complete
assimilation of the Chinese merchant communities.
These communities also maintained some modicum of contact with the Chinese
mainland and with other Chinese communities, as well as with a broader,
outside world. These Chinese had an Imperial civilization several thousand
years old to look back to as a source of ethnic pride, identity and solace--a
civilization that was quite developed and sophisticated for its time. Chinese
have long been notoriously sinocentric in their value orientation and
world-view, wherever they may be found. They never give up completely a core
of Chineseness. Furthermore, these communities were likely to have received
periodic injections of new immigrants, sojourners, or refugees who were
navigating the Nanyang, even during its era of Imperial ostracism and
isolation from China.
Thus, community separateness of these early Chinese in Java and Malacca was
defined as much from without as from within. Once these communities had grown
to a sufficient size, say several thousand; they were stable enough to be both
racially and culturally self-perpetuating. The two or three hundred year
period of their early pre-modern development was certainly long enough for the
emergence of a unique cultural orientation to be well-formed and virtually
complete in most aspects. In this regard we only have to look back upon our
own shallow sense of American history to see how quickly, and firmly, a
typically 'American' character and culture formed in the world, and what its
consequences may have been in the world.
It is possible that the base of this cultural orientation developed
relatively early in its basic form, and once having come into being, grew in
size and elaborateness, but remained basically the same to be perpetuated via
'ethno-endogamy' through the many generations.
It is difficult to refute, or interpret, the material evidence for Baba
culture. Silver-work, Chinaware, styles of dress, cuisine, marriage customs,
speech, all suggest a basic difference and shared uniqueness of the Babas from
either more traditionally oriented Chinese on the one hand, and the Muslim
Malay culture on the other.
To attempt to triangulate Baba ethno-culture, we can sense a convergence of
the evidence toward support for the idea of a distinctive cultural
orientation. Distinctive aspects of Baba culture emerge in language, religion,
material culture, social structure and organization, in values, world-view, in
literature, as well as in self-professed aspects of personal identity and
group affiliation.
Furthermore, if the Babas and their Peranakan cousins in Java in fact
constituted a unique cultural grouping in the world, then there is a need to
find some sense of focus and center for such an orientation, as well as a
sense of its own self-styled 'raison d'etre' and basic understanding in
relation to the world.
The cultural focus of Baba and Peranakan culture was upon the domestic life
of its womenfolk. Virtually every material artifact that is identified as
distinctively Baba is related to the personal dress, adornment, cooking, and
marriage of the women. It is something of a paradox that we should choose to
call it "Baba" culture as opposed to "Nyonya" culture.
This focus fit the historical picture of the origin of the culture-women
had central value and status, as they were relatively few in an immigrant
colony context that was heavily male-biased. John Clammer speaks of the
"rarity-value" of girls in such a society, which accounts for the
seclusion imposed upon younger women, especially unmarried Nyonyas, as well as
for the relatively high status of Nyonyas, and even for the frequent
occurrence of female heads of households. "A woman, particularly an
elderly one, would on the death of her husband become household head, rather
than allowing such a position to fall to her eldest son. This is not so
surprising when one recognizes that she would already have been exercising
considerable (if informal) social power in her household." (1980:38)
It seems likely that the Nyonya wives of the Chinese were the principle
elaborators of its distinctive cultural traits. They were not the silver
smiths, potters and craftsmen who made these artifacts, but they must have
been the mothers of the craftsmen, as well as the principle buyers of the
wares. It also seemed as if the cultural orientation was set up, from early
on, to secure its reproductive base, to confer upon its women a special,
privileged status which made them symbolically and socially attractive in
lucrative marriage arrangements, and to promote a social structure that is
based upon 'marrying in' to the community rather than marrying out, and to
'marry up' the social ladder rather than across or down.
If the original wives of the original Babas were in fact of low status or
they were slaves or concubines. ("In addition to such voluntary unions,
it was possible for the Baba community to purchase Malay girls who were debt
slaves or to marry those who were partial outcasts because of their social
behavior." L.A.P. Gosling, 1964: 216) then these wives must have from
early on formed their own sense of anti-structural communitas, within the
context of which they elaborated their own symbolic system that they
subsequently bequeathed to their children and grandchildren.
This female orientation of Baba culture would explain the relatively
a-political nature of its orientation, and the freedom which the Baba male had
in defining his own identity as either Chinese "Towkay" or Western
"Orang Pute." The male was involved almost exclusively in mercantile
activities that accrued material wealth to the household and the community. If
perchance he became a leader, a "Kapitan China" or a Towkay, then
this was done so on a model that was more appropriately, prototypically
Nanyang Chinese. It is noteworthy in this regard that the Babas wore either
western dress or Chinese costume, but rarely the Malay sarong. On the other
hand, the customary dress for the Nonya was the Malay sarong and kerbaya,
adorned with jewelry distinctively peranakan in style. The Baba was quick and
emphatic in stressing his Chinese identity--the Nonya was persistent in
cultivating a more Malay style of life.
If this was the case, then the apolitical character of Baba culture allowed
the male the freedom and capacity to acculturate and accommodate different
political symbol systems--either Western or Chinese or Malay, without his
cultural identity as "Baba" being threatened or compromised. It was
not that the Baba could not deal politically in life. Indeed, he often did so
with unusual talent--rather his cultural orientation allowed him the freedom
to engage politically or not without cultural constraint. Notions of
territoriality and boundary were negotiable. About the only real political
boundary firmly in place being that boundary which secured the domestic life
of the culture.
The domestic life of the women, perhaps being more religiously oriented
rather than political, constituted the core of the Baba culture. It is
noteworthy in this regard that the Nyonya women were rarely themselves engaged
in petty trade--a not uncommon preoccupation among Southeast Asian women in
general. Rather, they were engaged in domestic management, and perhaps as
well, in their husband's bookkeeping. Furthermore, they were renowned as
inveterate gamblers, with their own style of card game. It can be expected
that the religious patterns of the Nyonyas were distinctive in several ways
that helped to reinforce and reflect this somewhat exaggerated domesticity and
female orientation of the culture.
Nyonya women had eventually achieved, within their cultural universe, a
degree of independence, autonomy and status which was not characteristic of
their more traditional Chinese or Malay sisters. "A change came over our
people. With good intentions, certain people relaxed the old rules and
gradually the old restrictions became impossible, and almost all at once our
Nyonyas insisted on their rights.... All the evils complained of
against the Nyonyas may be traced to the pernicious bondage under which they
have been brought up...." ("Our Nyonyas" Straits Chinese
Magazine; Vol. VII, No. 4, Dec. 1904) They were not marked off as an
inferior caste, but came to claim for themselves the principle prerogatives of
their culture.
Uxorilocal residence patterns; has long remained a curiously anomalous
feature of Baba culture--institutional arrangements that have persisted
historically in spite of the loss of its original cause and reason. The wife's
spouse married into and lived in the mother's household. The senior Nonya in
such a situation would come to have a degree of influence, especially when her
husband was away on business, which would make their status and position in
society enviable.
The wife would retain a measure of respect and familial support she would
not have if she had moved into the husband's parent's household. The husband
would find himself in a peculiar position, especially for a more traditional
male not brought up in such a household, in which he would have to compromise
some of his male prerogatives, and in which he would find himself compelled to
achieve in ways he may not otherwise have done.
The male, and the son, probably retained much of his privileged, paternal
Chinese status. But he was more compelled to define that identity exclusively
in terms that was outside the household, and, furthermore, basically outside
of the central bounds of the culture of which he was attached, if not by
birth, then by marriage. His only cultural obligation was to protect and
support his domestic base of support, but not necessarily to dominate it or to
be a central part of its domestic orientation.
According to my wife who is a direct descendant of Nonyas, the male child
would be taken out into the male world by the father, while the female child
would remain in the female world of the mother.
The following is a summary of most of the cultural traits that are
identified as distinctly Baba and Nonya. It is worth reiterating that these
traits are all related to the world of the Nonya.
Straits Silverwork
A long tradition of local handiwork by Chinese silversmiths dating back to
at least the sixteenth or seventeenth century, and which became obsolete in
the early 20th century, produced many kinds of objects now quite rare that
belonged to a distinctive style tradition. Silver and silver-gilt articles
were long regarded by Nonyas as status symbols (Ho Wing Meng, 1976:38)
They commissioned or bought from local silversmiths mostly fine items of
jewelry for personal adornment, ornamental articles and "utensils
specifically to give that added touch of luxury and ostentation to their
ornately furnished homes." (Ibid. pg. 38) These articles were not the
large size of similar European goods, but were confined to "personal
ornaments, objects of virtue, occasional pieces of trophies, decorative bowls
with matching saucers and spoons, little tea-cups, teapots, wine-ewers, pillow
and bolster plates, incense burners, curtain hooks, ornamental plaques, little
vases and betel nut or sireh boxes." (Ibid. pg. 38)
Extant pieces of antique Straits silverwork are generally small, fine and
noted for their intricate workmanship. Their decorative motifs first present
to the eye a chaotic confusion lacking unity of theme. Phoenixes, Dragons,
Lions, dogs, against a floral background of prune blossoms, chrysanthemums,
lotuses and peonies, are occasionally interspersed by Buddhist-Taoist symbols.
This hetereogenous assortment of motifs made such silverwork unappealing to
early connoisseurs as compared to the more elegant and simple designs of Malay
silverwork that presented only geometric or arabesque floral motifs. The bulk
of this silverwork was intended as wedding gifts, and the symbolisms portrayed
carried Chinese cultural-religious significance for the recipient of the gift.
The style, though cluttered and thematically un-unified, is exuberant with
energy and is so clean and clear in relief that it conveys a sense of three
dimensionality.
Not all Straits silver is this fussy, some is of quite simple design, and
some is done with an eye for patterned symmetry. Overall, the conception of
design of Straits silver is held to be simple and recognizable clear--for its
ornateness and intricacy its patterns are rarely distorted or ornamentally
overburdened. Chinese silversmiths preserved the original form and integrity
of the basic utensil no matter what the design--the designs is exclusively
relief as opposed to chased or engraved works, ornate and varied.
Buntal pillow plates for embellishing bridal pillows were adopted from
ancient Hindu-Javanese civilization of Palembang and Kedah. Other kinds of
articles include bracelets, Nonya hairpins, sireh boxes, curtain hooks,
ornamental bells, caskets or "ganchu ranjang", and talismans for the
bridal bed, distinctive belts and buckles worn by Nyonyas, ladies purses, key
holders, brooches, "kerosangs" or buttons for the front of the
kebaya blouses, necklaces and chains, earrings, finger rings, anklets,
hairpins ("kerok kuping chuckuk sanggul" which means to
"scratch the ear, pierce through the hair"), as well as other
miscellaneous items such as chopsticks, pocket plaques, buttons, "and
other types of ornamental accessories for the bridal troussseau." (Ibid.
pg. 89)
".... The majority of Straits Silverworks...may generally be dated
back to the nineteenth century; for it was during this period that the baba
community reached its zenith of prosperity; so that large quantities of silver
ornaments, jewelry and other objects of virtue were turned out to meet the
requirements of the nonyas whose love of ostentatious display was
proverbial.... By the 'twenties or the 'thirties Straits silverworks had
virtually become a thing of the past." (Ibid, pg. 95)
Nonya Ware
The Nonya's were renowned for the elaborate and richly decorated
porcelain--".... In the days gone by, the wealthier babas spared no
expenses or trouble to procure direct from the famous porcelain-centre of
Ching-te'-chen, Kiangsi Province, grandiloquent vases, ornamental jars,
gold-fish bowls, flower pots with matching stands, ceremonial basins and
complete dinner services and tea sets sometimes running into thousands of
pieces specially designed and decorated to their own specifications."
(Ibid. pg. 38) The designs of these pieces are noted for their multiple
colors, their variety and richness of design, and for the presence of design
patterns on the inside of bowls and plates.
My wife's mother owned a collection of these dinner ware handed down from
her grandmother, which she would have inherited were they not destroyed in the
container in which they had been packed away. According to my wife, they
consisted of plates and bowls of various sizes, spoons, and a big porcelain
soup ladle. The designs were deep, muted blue in color, of an indistinct wavy
floral pattern--brushed on designs that were undefined.
Nonya Costume
The "baju panjang," a long sleeved, knee length, thin transparent
blouse, with scalloped edges, worn with an inner white undershirt, held
together by the "kerosangs," a set of "three round silver-gilt
or gold brooches studded with pearls and other precious stones. Underneath a
sarong was worn. They tie their hair into a top bun, tied with three pins. For
special occasions, cloth slippers are worn, "often richly embroidered
with silk or gold threads, sequins, beads and gilded ornaments." (Png
Poh-Seng, 1969:110) "Except for young girls, a large handkerchief folded
diagonally into a triangular shape was usually draped over the right shoulder
as part of their outfit. This was fastened to the baju with a jewell
brooch from which might dangle a bunch of gold lucky charms." (Ibid.
pg.110)
The style of Nyonya dress has seemed to change over the generations. From
about the "baju panjang" gave way to the sarong and kebaya,
introduced by the Javanese peranakans and adapted from the Malay "baju
kurong" similar to the "baju panjang" worn by elderly Nyonyas.
The Kebaya was adopted by younger Nonyas, a shorter version of the "baju
panjang" made of muslin-like or voile fabric and much more elegant in
appearance. The Nyonyas used a great deal of fine floral or foliage lace in
their kebayas, the best embroidery coming from Javanese Chinese tailors. This
was worn over an inner vest-coat. The Nyonya kerbaya differs somewhat from the
Malay or Indonesian forms by being more loose fitting, whereas the latter are
typically body-hugging "V" shaped "tapering towards the waist
and then flaring downwards to emphasize the women's narrow waist-lines."
(Ibid. pg.27) The tighter fitting form has been adopted by the younger
Nyonyas--the grandchildren of the Nyonyas of a half-century ago who wore the
more traditional "baju panjang."
The Nonyas adopted their own style of hair-dressing from the Indonesian and
Malay customs of combing their hair backwards in long tresses which are
twisted and turned into a large loose knot, shaped like a donut, at the back
of the head, which is secured by clips and pins. The Nonyas combed their hair
very tightly back in the form of a long plait held together by the application
of water glue, and twisted into a small, tight topknot called "sanggul
siput," which means literally "sea shell". "The top-knot,
in the old days, was usually embellished by three remarkable-looking silver
hair-pins of various sizes; the largest being about seven inches long, with a
bolt-like crown, is inserted right through the knot, while a second and
shorter one, more delicately designed to look like a spray of leaves set with
pearls or semi-precious stones, is inserted crosswise into the base of the
top-knot; and finally, the third and smallest hairpin, similarly designed, is
inserted into the stem of the knot. Like their Malay and Indonesian
counterparts, the Nonyas sometimes inserted jasmines and other highly scented
flowers into their hair buns." (Ho Ming Weng, 1976:27-8)
Nyonya women were noteworthy for their over-dressing and ornamental
ostentation of jewelry. "It has been suggested that many wives pestered
their husbands to buy them valuable jewels to enhance their security; others
found in diamonds a salve for the trials and tribulations of domestic
life." (Png Poh-Seng, 1969:111)
Nonya Beadwork and Embroidery
Nonyas made in their homes colorful beadwork and embroidery. They
embroidered their kerbayas in colorful, lacy floral patterns. They made cloth
shoes, slippers, vases, purses, spectacle holders, jewelry containers, wedding
ornaments out of colorful beads--items which resemble in both design and form
both the silver-work and the ceramics. Mothers taught their daughters and the
work was mostly domestic. They used tiny beads and special threads of silver
and gold. Designs incorporated animals from the Chinese Lunar Calendar as well
as floral patterns.
Nonya Cuisine
Spicy, using a lot of tamarind, coconut milk, chili, banana leaves for
wrapping and balachan, a fermented shrimp paste, "petai" and
"jering", a kind of seed, "gulai" curry, and Kueh, small
cakes using a lot of coconut milk, gula malacca, or brown sugar, screw-pine
leaf, or "daun-pandan," "bunga telang," giving the Kueh
coloring, wrapped in banana leaves and steamed. Chinese dishes would be added
variations of fragrant seasonings to give an extra tang to the
dishes--"Food which is neither hot nor spicy is considered unsavory to
peranakan palate." Nonya cuisine has largely passed away, except for a
revived interest and taste in it as an "ethnic food." Among the
Hainese of Singapore, Nonya food became a part of their own style of cooking.
"Until recently the Hainanese cake-vendor popularly known as the 'Otah'
man was a familiar sight in Singapore. His daily visit was welcomed by most
Straits Chinese women and children." (Png Poh-Seng, foot note, pg. 100)
While residing several months in Penang, our street would be visited daily
by an Indian man on a bicycle peddling Nonya "kueh," sweet cakes and
curry puffs. My wife always delighted in his coming, and thereby first
introduced me to the blue-green sweet rice cakes of the Nonyas. "The
preparation of food in Nonya style, it should be noted in passing, is a
complex and laborious process, and it may be for this reason too, that this
sophisticated art might be irretrievably lost when the last surviving
generation of elderly Nonyas passes from the scene." (Ho Wing Meng,
1976:30)
Nyonya cuisine is said to have been similar to that of the Peranakans of
Java. According to the ethnography of the Peranakans of Sukabumi by Tan
Giok-Lan, the Peranakans preferred food basically Javanese in style--dry
boiled rice, sate, goat, chicken, beef, pork, vegetables, especially
"pete" and "djengko", a sourish vegetable soup called
"sajur assem," a kind of salad called "gado-gado" served
with fried bean curd or "tempe" and peanut-cake or
"ontjom." My wife on occasion has made for me "gado-gado,"
served with "krupuk" or fried shrimp chips. "The popularity of
this dish is indicated by the fact that it appears at the table of even the
elaborate parties of wealthy Peranakans." (Tan Giok-Lan, 1963:42-5)
Chinese elements incorporated into this menu include Chinese noodles, or
"Mie," or "Hokkien Mi" or "mee," bean-curd,
"tao hu" or "tahu," bean sprouts, or "taoge,"
bean sauce, or "taotjio," soya sauce called "ketjap", and
dried shrimp called "hebi". All these imported items are known by
terms derived from Hokkien--an indication of the Hokkien origins of the
Peranakans of Java. "As with most of he food of Chinese origin, a
Peranakan noodle dish looks and tastes different from a Totok one."
(Ibid. pg. 44)
Sireh Chewing, Tea and Cards
The chewing of sireh, or betel nut, is a common Southeast Asian trait
adopted by the Nonyas, who are alone among the Nanyang Chinese in practicing
this custom. A thin layer of quicklime paste was applied over the sireh leaf,
along with a sprinkle of the astringent 'gambier' and thin slices of areca
nut. The leave is folded into a small square and then chewed. Chewing the leaf
has a slight narcotic effect, is bitter in taste, and stains the mouth a
reddish color.
It was customary politeness to offer sireh to guests, and the sireh
service, "tepak sireh" was a standard accouterment of the Nonya
household.
My wife remembers these sireh sets, simple lacquered pieces not as ornate
as the fancier silver ones found in the picture books. The set consisted of a
small lidless box with four smaller caskets and cups on a tray. "No
important social function went by without the presences of that ubiquitous
'tepak sireh.'" (Ibid. pg. 29) The exchange of betel nut was an important
part of the prenuptial ceremonies of a nonya wedding. For the most part, sireh
chewing was mostly a Nonya habit rarely adopted by men.
Sireh-serving was typically accompanied by tea, a typically Chinese and
un-Malay aspect of the practice--steeped in fine porcelain teapots and served
in small, dainty teacups. The Malays customarily served coffee instead of tea.
My wife remembers that her mother would brew up both coffee and tea for her
guests.
Nyonya women were noted for the frequency with which they were brought
before British courts on charges of gambling. They played a card game called
"chap-ji-ki" or "Cherki," that required four players. The
games would last a long time, several hours running. Nonyas would pay little
children to shuffle the deck. My wife mentions the long narrow cards that they
would play with, and their special style of handling these cards. They would
gamble with money, or even jewelry. One court case involved eleven Nyonyas,
reported by a husband of one of players who had lost $50,000 in jewelry and
had attempted to replace this by cheap imitations. "The other event was
known as the 'Wong-tye-sin' case. Wong-tye-sin was a god of fortune that had
come into prominence by prescribing medicine during an outbreak of the plague
in Canton some fifteen years before. This god had been brought to Singapore
and four shrines had been opened, whither a large number of Nyonyas
went for advice as to lottery tickets..." (Song Ong Siang, 1967: 440-1)
Architecture
Some evidence suggests that in some cases, an architectural variant in
interior house design, in shop-house design and in the design of business
fronts, existed among the Peranakans--incorporating both Malay, Chinese and
European styles and designs. The interior usually contains a large central
hall, for receiving guests and for the location of an ancestral altar. The
altar is on the far side, facing the front doors and the steps up to the
house. "While the staircase of the house is a cultural feature of the
Malays, it is treated as if it were the main entrance of a traditional Chinese
house and is built at the position which fits into Chinese architectural
thinking."(Tan Chee-Beng, 1982: pg.34-8)
Usually built on stilts, they are raised off the ground, and the spot on
which they are built are also raised slightly. These houses vary slightly
depending upon the affluence of the families living in them. But such
adherence to traditional building styles is also uncharacteristic of either
the Malays or the urban dwelling Chinese. Windows are small and barred, and
the interior is dimly lit. Bedrooms lead off to either side of the central
hall, flanking it. The kitchen may be located on either side or to the back of
the house.
My wife drew me a floor plan of her Grandmother's house. The floor plan is
remarkably similar to that mentioned above, complete with the central hall,
flanking bedrooms, front door and stairway, ancestral altar and kitchen. Like
most of these rural homes, it was built up upon stilts, and had an atap and
corrugated tin roof.
Nineteenth and early twentieth century architectural design in Singapore
and Penang, especially of the shop houses of Chinese businesses, suggest a
distinctive "Straits" style that incorporates elements of an English
tradition with those of a Chinese. It was a style sometimes referred to as
"Chinese Baroque" or "Chinese Palladian"--"that
unique neo-classical European architecture, characterized Greco-Roman columns,
and the Peranakan-Chinese style originating in Malacca" (Ilsa Sharp, The
Straits Times, April 28,1979.) The facades of these houses often presented
a smallish appearance that belied the multi-floored spaciousness within.
Interiors of wealthy Straits Chinese homes also showed traits typically
Baba. "A whole new culture, reflected in quite unique forms, including
the domestic interior, had grown out of the amalgam of Chinese, Malay, and
European ways. Certainly in their desire to identify with their British
overlords, the Straits Chinese; were the first to enthusiastically embrace
Western fashions internally and externally."(Norman Edwards; 1990:122-3)
Generally, in Straits Chinese terrace houses, guests were entertained in a
front hall containing the principle altar of the household, "dedicated to
the Goddess of Mercy, Kwan Yin, and the God of Wealth. Set behind the altar
was a wall or screen to deflect the path of evil spirits and to demarcate the
first hall from the second, immediately behind. Views beyond this screen of
the interior of the house--its succession of courts and interior spaces--were
only admitted gradually and under privilege. Distant acquaintances and
visitors were allowed into the first hall only. Friends and closer colleagues
were taken into the second hall. In the truly traditional Peranakan household,
close relatives and other members of the family and lifelong friends were
granted admission to the third or the fourth halls." (Ibid. pg. 154)
Furniture
Closely related to the architecture was the distinctive design of the
furniture which completed the interior--ornately carved, inlaid wooden pieces
were common in the homes of the wealthy, and simply but similar pieces could
be found in the more humble homes. The "tu kacha," or glass
cupboard, black and white wooden sofas and chairs, or "hup soo ee,"
a movable screen, the "kepong angin" or "blocking of the
wind", a Nonya dressing table, or "mega sanggol rambot," and
the reclining armchair, or "krosi sandah," jewelry boxes, and the
elaborate, grand "ranjang kemantin," or "the bride's bed."
Birth