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Chapter
Twenty-Four
Symbolic
Systems
If physical reality is composed of tiny quantum systems we call atoms,
and biological reality is made up of small prototypical systems called cells,
then human reality must be made up, not of individuals with autonomous brains,
but of symbols. Everything in the human world is symbolic, and symbols are the
stuff of human experience. Even things normally thought of in an objective
fashion as scientific or factual or real, are upon some level of our
comprehension, symbolic in structure and character.
Human knowledge, language, culture and social
organization all comprise components of what can be referred to as human
symbolic systems or systems of symbolization. All aspects of the human world are
symbolic, and even those things, like tools, or books, or eating and cooking
utensils, etc., the practical everyday things by which people make their
livings, have intrinsic symbolic dimensions and associations. The entire human
reality may be said to be symbolically integrated, and it is this fact of
symbolic integration that makes it interesting and special for consideration.
Human madness, the tendency to experience things not
really there, to have fixed ideas of reference, to project upon the world the
stuff of internal fantasy and dream, the disconnection between the thought, the
word and the deed, all can be seen as a failure of the very human system of
symbolization, a kind of psychic state of chronic confusion of meaning,
reference, and identity, the dysfunction of the very basic mechanism of human
adaptation. It is apparent that humans have been symbolic creatures for a very
long time on earth, and it is the growth of this symbolic character of human
nature that most distinguishes what it is to be human.
Language systems, cognitive systems of mind,
knowledge systems, formal or tacit, human cultural systems of transmission and
social systems of interaciton and organization, are all aspects and types of
human symbolic systems. We cannot stratify these into different levels except to
specify the individual processes and the group processes, and progressively
larger groups. Collective symbolizations facilitate larger and larger human
group organization, especially upon the level of ethnocultural and shared
ideological or paradigmatic consonance. We can say that human language,
cognition, symbolization, knowledge, socieyt and culture are not so much
distinctive systems, as they are perhaps alternative perspectives upon what
might be thought of as a single comprehensive system--the human system.
Human identity and human reality are symbolic in
structure and character.
Symbolization
Basic
Elements and Emblems of Human Civilization
To claim that human reality and behavior is
essentially symbolic has become a trite way of saying a little about a lot.
Humankind on earth has long trafficked in symbols, the rise of human
civilization can be understood as the synergistic culture-historical patterning
and developmental processes of elaborate symbolization, symbolisms and symbolic
chains have been the warp and weft of the rich, unfolding tapestry of human
culture history, and individual symbolic processes have been the primary
mechanism of the psycho-social integration of social reality and the principle
means of mediating the boundaries and relationships of the organism with the
environment.
Symbolization has been the basic
"evolutionary" process at the heart of the basic human transformations
of the world and in the world, and it is by the elucidation of the basic process
of human civilization that we can better understand from where we have come, how
and why we are what we are, our basic relationship to a larger natural context,
and where we are headed in our transformation of the world. Symbols come
incorporate human experience and we come to embody symbolisms in our being,
belief and behavior. Our experience, both psychologically/phenomenologically,
and collectively, becomes expressed symbolically in terms we are familiar with,
linguistically encoded, visually materialized.
Human symbolic activity provides the relational
context and culture-historical background against which we can configure our
understanding about human language. Symbolization works systematically in a way
very similar to how linguistic aactivity becomes structured and situated in
social context, and though language is a particular and especially interesting
mode of communication, it is also a kind of symbolization, intrinsically, that
is part of a larger contextual, culture-historical background itself articulated
in terms of symbolization and symbolic complexes. It is both specialized and
generalized, simultaneously, and this perspective forms the foundation for
symbolic linguistics. Linguistic activity, in either an analytical sense or
holistically, cannot be understood apart from its symbolic context, which is
synthetic, and it is primarily through language in everyday settings in the
world that we can better understand this larger symbolic context.
Symbols are anything and everything that comes within
the purview of human reality. All symbols by definition have both some 'formal'
or 'nomic' significance and some 'functional' or 'intentional' use. Even the
most basic of hand tools, or tools that make tools that make other tools, or
parts of tools, have a symbolic value, as "machines" that are both
formal and function in latent content, implication and pragmatic function. This
symbolic value, composite, multifaceted, variable, is both in spite of and
alongside of the history of the tool as a thing in the world. Similarly, all
ideas, however abstract, remote, or apparently pure and "a priori,"
nevertheless have some measure of symbolic use value and symbolic purposefulness
that relates it to a larger constellation of ideas, values, meanings and
associated behaviors.
Symbols have fuzzy, soft edges, and form harder, more
resilient "cores." It is the fuzziness and stickiness of the
boundaries of symbols that renders them easily adhesive to other symbols. It is
their malleability and plasticity which makes them so good to reshape in the
hands of the human imagination, fashionable and conformable to whatever
framework or mold we find it convenient to fit them to. Symbols thus tend to
cohere together to form symbolic chains, clusters, complexes and larger
organismic structures, and which sometimes coalesce into crystal-like formations
that gain some measure of historical stability as self-organizational systems.
It is the fuzziness of symbols that allows them to be
easily "transacted"--to be broken off from larger symbol groupings and
associated with other groupings in a modular manner. It is also the fuzziness of
the edges that makes particular symbols relatively difficult to
"isolate" as separate, clearly definable entities with their own
distinct boundaries. Symbols are especially difficult to explicitly define or
delimit within larger relational contexts, in which they are naturally embedded,
but it is in such frameworks that we develop a form of gestalt pattern
recognition by which we easily understand and comprehend symbolisms, context
bound, in a focal manner.
Symbols are analogous to the "molecules" of
human cultural reality--they can be arranged and rearranged in particular
conglomerations and configurations, to confer different "properties"
of basic cultural materials. They can be broken down into their elemental
"atoms"--the basic paradigmatic, periodic table of universal human
elements, or perhaps what Rodney Needham has referred to as basic symbolic
archetypes--unilateral figures, incorporating dimensions of reversal,
symmetry/asymmetry, of dialectical antinomies such as space/time, is/isn't,
up/down, right/left, etc., that may in turn be "deconstructed" into
"primary factors" of human experience such as tactile physical
contrasts like hard and soft or warm and cold, basic color representations and
sensations, symbolic use of basic numbers, certain sounds such as percussion,
basic phonetic articulations, basic geometric shapes and naturalistic forms like
animals, trees, etc., and perhaps certain basic emotions or feelings, gestures
like laughing or crying, and psycho-physiological patterns of response like
aggression, impulse, sexual attraction, social affiliation, etc.
Like language, symbols can be reduced down to the
compositon of basic signs that are concrete and metonymical in function. Signs
may be themselves symbols, or at least symbolic manifestations or
materializations, but the particular arrangement of signs, like the particular
arrangement of phonemes and morphemes in a word or sentence, configure to
produce a derivative, symbolic significance, context bound, that is holistically
greater than the some of its parts, part of a larger symbolic system,
synergistic, and the significance of which is "lifted" from the
particular, concretized significations carried in an atomistic and analytic
manner by particular individual signs or even strings of signs. Signs are
iconographic in function and purely mechanical in structural organization, but
symbols become metaphorical in reference/inference and analogical in structural
relation.
Like language, symbolisms carry "duality of
structure." Symbols also have a signification function in that they
"stand" for something else that is abstract and immediately displaced
from the immediate context of its signs. In terms of the psychological analysis
of symbolism, this structural function is referred to as
"representation" and is the most important aspect of human symbolic
behavior--the basis for the foundation of human culture and comprehension of the
world. All symbols are both signified and substantive in experience, and
significant and ideational or "contextual" in referring to something
else besides its own signification.
Symbols have a "mediative" or integrative
function in ordering human experience. Human experience is symbolically
integrated. We analytically separate out its dimensions of "syntagmatic and
paradigmatic" and of diachronic and synchronic structure after the fact of
its integrated experience through our combined channels and modalities of
sensory awareness and pattern comprehension. We do not experience the world in a
"non-symbolic" or "proto-symbolic" manner. This constitutes
the basis for the anthropological relativity of all human knowledge and
behavior--human behavior and understanding is symbolically constructed, and
filtered through the mechanisms of symbolization. This constrains, shapes and to
a certain extent limits what we know and how we can know it. But at the same
time, it offers us a mechanism for transcending these limitations to achieve a
sense of symbolic integration that, however imperfect, has at least the
appearance of being complete, whole, and comprehensive.
Symbols are used in one of two classificatory
schemas--analogical and homological. Analogical schemas correspond to synchronic
and paradigmatic classes, while homological schemes refer to the particlar
arrangements in which signs are regularly put, and the constraints governing
such arrangement. Another way of referring to this is in terms of referential or
contextual/relational structure and inferential or intentional structure. The
former relates, the latter differentiates and tends to isolate. The former
unites elements within a single sense of order or a general configuration or
symbolic domain of experience, while the latter interrelates different symbolic
domains of experience expressed in terms of particular, isolatable elements
distinguished from each domain. The former structure is typological and hence
tends to stereotype, the latter structure is taxonomical and tends towards
individuality.
Homological schemas require the utilization of
symbols as active parts, as mechanisms, in a process of production. Hence,
constraints governing homological schemas are greater and more restrictive than
those governing analogical schemas that are by definition more open and less
constrained in either a formal or functional manner. We recognize homological
schemas in the form of taxonomies of knowledge systems that name things and set
things into schematic frameworks of relationship, contrast and similarities
derived through properties of inheritance.
The two systems are "coordinate" in human
reality. They are convergent in the on-going symbolic construction of the
experiential fabric of human reality. It is to be speculated whether such
symbolic coordination is not due to the lateralization of brain function in the
integration of spatial and temporal dimensions of experience.
*****
We may speculate that there are many orders and kinds
of symbolism, distinguished according to their form and function. We may even
speculate that there are certain "meta-rules" for the organization of
these different classes, orders and kinds of symbolism in a systematic manner.
We may refer for instance to linguistic symbolisms, technological symbolisms, to
somatic symbolisms, relational symbolisms, psychological symbolisms, social
symbolisms, etc, depending upon our reference framework.
A key feature of symbols is that they must occupy
time and space--though they are contextually bound and relative, they are
nevertheless discrete. Symbolisms can be merged or amalgamated, but two separate
or distinct symbolisms cannot occupy the same place at the same time, without
one displacing, limiting or altering the other. Symbols can be said to have a
certain "mass" that can be described as the minimal threshold of their
integrative value, before they are altered or displaced from a significant
context or configuration. Symbol systems exhibit a kind of cumulative momentum
or historical movement that confers upon their trajectory a certain fundamental
stability and predictability of direction of change.
A particularly interesting order of symbolism is the
"emblem." The emblem is ultimately a kind of totemic symbolism that in
its own expressive elaboration can come to "stand for itself" and thus
create its own context that is both inferentially and referentially independent
of any other order or relation of experience. It is something like a proverb or
an idiomatic expression in a language that carries its own framework as a single
unit of meaning.
An emblem is defined as "a visible symbol of a
thing, idea, class of people, etc.; object or representation that stands for or
suggests something else." Originally, emblem was any kind of in-lay or
mosaic work or embossed relief on tiles. Tiles so embossed formed units that
could be arranged, transported and reconfigured in alternative arrangements, the
emblematic unit retaining its sense of individual wholeness. Emblems came to be
elaborated as allegorical pictures with a motto and verse, suggesting some moral
message or truthful "conceit."
An emblem became a kind of symbolism, or symbolic
representation, that contained three essential elements--a "Motto," an
"Icon" and some explanatory verses or the "Epigram." The
symbolic value of the emblem emerges from the interaction of these three
elements, such that "the three parts mutually elucidate each other, and in
doing so, convey the meaning of the whole emblem. In the construction of the
emblem, the three parts are integral to one another. They do not occur in
isolation or separately from one another, but within the same symbolic
"frame" of reference.
Emblems serve two basic functions--representation and
interpretation. "A res picta, an object from nature, art or
mythology, becomes a res significans, expressing a general truth or
insight. It is important to realize that all three parts of the emblem can share
in the double function of representation and interpretation." (Karl Holtgen;
Aspects of the Emblem, 1986: page 24)
There are different kinds of emblems.
"Devises" were a particular class of emblems that become its own
literary pictorial genre. Emblems themselves were said to come from the seals,
crests and signs on shields that ancient soldiers carried into war with them.
Such emblems often had a rebus reading, were talismans with magical properties,
had "propaganda" or persuasive power over people, and were used to
reinforce alliances and relations of dependency. In this regard, such emblems
have had an important place among populations that were illiterate or
semi-literate, making dissemination of their value widely available. It is no
coincidence that emblems are today typically found on different forms of money
or currency, and play an important part in the function of money in exchange and
recognition. Even today, in many Chinese temples, such emblems can be found on
painted tiles bearing scenes of Buddhist Gods, telling a story with a Confucian
moral attached. These epitomize the "conflation" of the three
teachings that is so characteristic of traditional Chinese "religionism"
that is thought of as inherently syncretic and synthetic in orientation.
Today there are many derivative forms that are
emblematic. Official badges and seals are survivals of a by-gone era of heraldic
emblems, crests and shields. Tattoos are often emblematic in design and purpose.
Cartoon strips combining words and pictures into a kind of story-line, often
with predictable characters, are an extension of emblems and emblematic function
on a very basic level, as are many illustrations in children's literature--for
instance, in Beatrice Potter or Lewis Carroll. Even illustrations in much adult
literature is emblematic or derivative of emblems in that the pictures and their
captions are held to be representative of something important within a text, and
within the larger world, and if one peruses old illustrations of old books
before the age of photography especially, one finds them used in a clearly
emblematic manner. Military or other decorative uniforms are emblematic, as are
the kinds of medals and medallions that are usually associated with such
uniforms. All forms of money, coins, bills and stamps, are emblematic in form
and function, as are many advertisements, company logos and signs. Posters are
similar kinds of emblematic devises.
Emblematic symbolisms can express several forms and
functions. They can be "authoritative" or confer a sense of identity
or legitimacy. They can be "enacted" and be "performative"
such as the signing of a declaration of war, or an armistice, or a speech that
accomplishes the same thing, or the breaking of a bottle over the stern of a
ship during its christening ceremony with a new name, and a prayer, or the
cutting of a ribbon of a new architectural building or monument, the unveiling
of a statue, or a ground breaking ceremony, or the breaking of a ribbon at a
finish line. By ritual and ceremonial extension, we can speak of the action of
emblems during certain rites of passage such as birthdays, marriages,
graduations, funerals, coming of age ceremonies, promotions, etc.
*****
A particular kind of emblem is the flag. The flag was
originally a totem, which is also a special kind of emblem in traditional
cultural context. The totemic function of the flag is to embody and sacralize
the collective identity of a group or the social order. They are thus
"collective representations" with clear territorial, political and
social implications. Early totems were frequently spirit familiars derived
directly from the natural order, and were most often identifying animals or
other living thing--the "dog clan" or the bear clan or the snake
people. Related to this is the notion of the sacrament, the tabooing of certain
kinds of food, or the taking of a holy sacrament. In this case, such an emblem
becomes symbolically what it stands for--for instance, the wafer represent the
blood and body of Christ. Burning the American flag can be seen as an epitome of
the expression of the basic freedom of expression that the flag represents,
while simultaneously representing the desecration of the very culture historical
order within which such freedom of expression is safe-guarded.
The culture historical study of flag history and
symbolism is referred to as "vexillogy." Early flags were "vexilloids"--usually
a geometric figure or an animal totem on top of a pole. The Romans legions had
their fasci, which emblem the Nazi's of Germany later adopted. Later "vexillums"
were made of cloth, and became the banners and streamers ancient and medieval
armies carried into battle.
Flags may be understood in reference to their
symbolic context combining four kinds of symbolism--active, verbal, concrete and
graphic. Ritual contexts of the presentation and handling of flags on ceremonial
occasions, for the prescribed display of the flag under special circumstances,
provide a kind of symbolic "grammar" for the ritual use of such
symbolism.
…..Active
symbolism involves motion: the upraised clenched fist, the triumphal parade, the
coronation ceremony, and a salute to the flag are all examples. Verbal symbols
convey their meaning through written or spoken words--the propaganda pamphlet,
national anthem, and oaths of allegiance coming to mind under this category. A
concrete symbol is any object that, in addition to its practical purposes, has
been imbued with a special symbolic meaning. When protestors gather under a tree
which recalls an event that is sacred for them, when a building or mountain is
the object of reverent pilgrims, or when some other ordinary object acquires a
mystic force in the minds of people it constitutes a concrete symbol. The most
potent symbols are those which combine all four aspects simultaneously. This has
long been understood in religion, where worshippers may gather in a temple
(concrete symbol), decorated with holy icons (graphic symbols) while they
perform rituals (active symbolism) by reading from holy scriptures (verbal
symbolism.) Many political activities are based on the model of religious
worship….(Whitney Smith, Flags through the Ages and Across the World:
pages 34-5)
Flags are more than just decorative or
representational devices. They are symbolic and communicative, constituting
factors affecting the world directly as they manipulate and are manipulated by
groups of people.
In general, the more widespread a particular
symbolism, the more abstract and simplified its basic form. Local flags and
emblems almost always tend to be more complex and explicit than those similar
symbols for nations and states. Flags have certain recurrent symbolisms--a
geometric sun or star, an eagle, Garuda, phoenix or dragon, or griffin, a lion
or bear or some other animal, certain basic distinctive colors, certain
geometric designs--a cross, circle, a wheel or Mandalas, or a crescent. Bars and
stripes have come to represent topographical elements of flags, trees, ships,
floral arrangements, and basic tools, and certain basic logos or inscriptions.
Many rules of custom and etiquette govern the ritual
use of different kinds of flags. Ritual surrounds and reinforces the sacredness
of a flag. The usage and manipulation of flags is always by ceremonial
ritual--raising the flag, flying it, folding it, its use in parades, at
half-mast, etc.
Flags
are displayed in relation to each other in certain ways again governed by ritual
protocol. Larger order flags must always be flown above lower ranking flags.
Flags at international events are flown side-by-side with one another as a
demonstration of equality. At the Olympics, it is not insignificant that the
gold medal winner stands highest above the second and third place winners,
respectively, as the flags are flown above in a similar manner. In battle, the
sign of victory is the hoisting of the flag over the highest point of the
enemy's position, and the greatest defeat of a unit is the loss of its colors or
standards in battle to an enemy.
The history of flags can be seen as through their
alteration and change through time. For instance the adding of stars for each
state of the Union, the rearrangement of the pattern of these stars on the
American Flag. The Civil War brought with it the Rebel flag with crossed stars
and strips. Eras of peace or alliance are sometimes signified and represented by
composite flags that are made by sewing together the individual flags of
participating nations into a single large square.
*****
It has been the individual distinctive symbolic
elements and their designs and "stimulus generalization" that has been
the substance of human civilization as a pan-cultural historical process of
development. Basic symbolic elements become carried or transmitted between
people, reconstructed, elaborated, modified and made to fit within new culture
historical contexts.
Elemental designs of symbols become simplified and
"stream-lined" over time as they become reproduced and reworked and
continuously modified to fit new environmental arrangements. New elements are
created to replace old elements that better "fit" into new
environmental contexts. The design, selection and displacement of elements is
determined by both their forma and function. They may work better than previous
elements or their overall design may be more "in harmony" with the
prevalent context into which they are currently fit.
In general, there has been an overall tendency for
new elements to be selected for which allows greater directional patterning of
development, toward increased "intensification" and control of the
symbolic power that underlies the development of human civilization. A
particular element of culture may work where previous elements may no longer
fit. It is not enough for elements to be merely different in a random fashion,
but they must change in a more integrative, intensive direction depending upon
prevalent foci of elaborative interest. History then becomes a great repository
and store-house of symbolisms, once pase', retrofitted, reactivated, then
moth-balled for some later date when the emblematic associations may once again
become meaningful and possibly even useful in some functional manner.
In this regard, we can see the advantages that a
culture would have that had the bow and arrow over those without, who had
feathers on the ends of their arrows as opposed to those without, who had a
conception of zero, or the use of the wheel, or of metallurgy or gun-powder, or
a conception of a single God, or literacy, or a Republican assembly, or a court
system with codified laws, or social stratification, or bureaucracy, over those
lacking these things. Whatever their form and function, such elements were
primarily symbolic in allowing the integration and intensification of
culture-historical patterning, a process we refer to as civilization. Once
invented, devised or "discovered," such symbolisms were readily
transmittable to other groupings, especially when there is no alternate form to
compete for cultural space. The borrowing of complex symbol systems often also
results in the modification, adaptation and improvement of such systems, as can
be demonstrated clearly in the history of writing and the transfer of
syllabaries from one group to another. The silk-worm and the secretes of making
fine porcelain were well-kept strategic interests of a xenophobic China, but its
eventual leakage and transformational consequences upon the Western World were
inevitable.
Any given "element" of civilization can be
identified by its "paradigmatic proto-typicality" in subsuming a range
of possible alternative "profiles" or instantiations. A paradigmatic
even "horizon" within which change is constrained. No single element
is purely technological or purely social or purely symbolic. Each element has
symbolic, social and technological aspects and consequences in its realization.
A tool or a weapon is never just a device for mechanical manipulation, but also
always carries certain symbolic and social values. The conception of a God is
never purely disembodied or abstract, that it does not somehow become
"trans-substantiated" through symbolic material forms and social
ritual process.
Syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations are
temporal-spatial dimensions of the on-going instantiation of the historical
patterning of human reality. They dialectically precondition one another such
that syntagmatic order or recursive homological structure determines the
selection of paradigmatic, analogical alternatives, and syntagmatic ordering is
determined by the selection of available, over-arching, paradigmatic categories.
The only a priori rule governing these arrangements
are that they "make sense" given the contextual environment of
relations in which they occur. The environment itself is changing and developing
in certain directions and their occasionally arises an appropriate arrangement
of circumstances preconditioning or making possible the invention, reception or
innovation of new elements to fill in the "gaps" created by the
changing contexts. In this way, there occurs independent simultaneous inventions
or changes when contextual conditions become "ripe" for their creation
to take place.
New elements, with new forms and new functions,
create new horizons of possible patterning, and lead to alteration in the
"systemic" structure of the whole context. In the endeavor to devise
completely new forms and functions, humankind has been notoriously
short-sighted. For a long time it was believed to be physically impossible for
people to fly, until the Wright brothers demonstrated otherwise. Since then,
less than a hundred years of of many Millennia, humankind has taken the basic
discovery and fact of human flight and transformed the entire world of its
civilization, such that now we have walked upon the moon and regularly fly
around the globe as an everyday, taken for granted facet of contemporary
society. Humankind has been much better innovators than original inventors, much
better at elaboration than the creation of entirely new elements. And this
process of symbolic elaboration and continuous functional adaptation continues
today in an on-going manner.
Symbolic
Systems & the Human Construction of Reality
Heinz Werner, in his thorough treatment of the
problem of human symbolization as organic process, defined symbolism as the
capacity, uniquely human, for allowing one thing to stand for, or represent,
another, so much so that we can refer to a form of symbolic displacement in
which the symbol frequently becomes the stand-in, the proxy, and the effective
substitute for the reality it represents.
The cognitive structure of symbolic behavior has been
sufficiently analyzed and empirically documented, in terms of the gestalt
pattern recognition functions, grouping, linking, and the use of analogical
relational structures in the organization of everyday experience. The
dialectical structure of this in mythology and in meaning has been aptly
substantiated by Claude Levi-Strauss, and the semantic construction of symbolism
in language elaborated by Giles Fauconnier. The use of logic and its influence
to symbolism has been aptly demonstrated as well.
It is safe to say that human experience,
understanding and the behavioral encounter and response with the larger world,
is symbolically structured and preconditioned by previous symbolically organized
experience that is brought to bear unconsciously upon the current moment of
apprehension.
It is also safe to say that this experience and its
symbolic structure is organized in a complex but fairly ordered manner that is
available to our systematic study and measurement. In other words, the structure
of symbolic logic that is characteristic of human cognition and cognitive
function is available ultimately to our understanding and modeling, and guides
our endeavors in learning how the brain functions organically, and in developing
models of artificial intelligence.
I have in the course of my own anthropological
research developed symbolic framing methodologies, in language, visual
recognition, cognition, memory, and in behavioral applications, that yield
direct empirical evidence to the structural patterning of human symbolic
structure, its cultural and psychological patterns of variation, and its
application to various kinds of problem sets. This kind of methodological
framework has proven itself to be of great value in the facilitation of learning
in many areas, at all age levels, in testing and evaluation, and potentially in
rehabilitation. It has as yet unexplored value in linguistics and in language
acquisition, in cognition and in cognitive development, and in social relations
and human development and individual/group behavior. The productivity of
this methodological framework, and its adaptability to a broad range of
alternative applications makes it a preferred choice of techniques in the
systematic study of human systems.
Theoretically, it leads to an empirically substantive
resolution of the classic worldview problem, especially when we combine with
this notions of complementary and relativistic frames of reference.
The application of symbolic framing methodologies
points clearly to an empirical ground for the presumption that symbolic
structure underlies human cognition, perception and behavior, and has a
consistent order of its patterning that takes on predictable results in testing
and experimentation. The implication of this is that by these methodologies we
have significant empirical evidence to support a claim for the human symbolic
construction of reality, as a natural process of human adaptation and survival
that leads to cultural patterns of social organization.
It was in the research and development of these
methodological frameworks that I was lead to development of a human systems
framework, and by extension to natural systems and meta-systems frameworks of
understanding. The discovery of general systems thinking was only after the fact
of this development.
Theory and models of the human or anthropological
construction of reality stem directly from this methodology and its application
to real systems. Human reality may be said to be symbolically constructed, and
even though we may be inclined first to see pragmatic or utilitarian functions
in things we have and do, we can never fully alienate the symbolic components of
those functions, or their implications for their value and function in the
world. We can even make the case that the symbolic component of any constructed
system is the primary function of that system, not matter what its other
material or pragmatic functions may serve as well.
We refer to the symbolic transformation of experience
as being when the symbols come to take the place of the real referents to which
symbols originally referred, and hence human behavior becomes symbolically
motivated and 'sublimated' in ways that may not otherwise be forthcoming from a
person on the basis of purely pragmatic or functional considerations. This
transformation occurs unconsciously and psychologically as much as it may occur
in crowds or groups, or in social contexts.
This symbolic transformation of experience is related
directly to issues of child cognitive development as well as to issues of
behavioral reform and rehabilitation of abnormal or aberrant behavior. Child
cognitive development is symbolic in its growth and transformation, and this
process is largely one of increasing differentiation of form and function of
experience, and increasing degrees of displacement and flexibility of
application of symbolic referents in behavioral response, upon increasing levels
of sophistication. This process is directly tied to primary language acquisition
processes, and for this reason language is considered intrinsic to the symbolic
mechanism of human consciousness.
This reference of symbolism and symbolization is not merely the material forms of symbols, flags or religious icons, that are common and immediately apprehended as such, but refers instead to a very basic level of human cognition and apprehension of everyday experience in the world, in all or most areas of human behavioral involvement. Normal waking consciousness is as symbolically constructed as is our dreaming awareness. These two worlds become confused for schizophrenics, for instance, as it may become for normal people under unusual circumstances.
Symbolic
Transformation & Differentials of Human Symbolic Behavior
Acquired human behavior is environmentally rooted and
the process of acquisition is largely a symbolically structured one, serving
symbolic purposes and functions as well. Symbolic acquisition of behavioral
response pattern serves purposes of internalization of control structures,
sublimation and channeling of libidinal impulse and aggression to more
constructive forms of behavior, motivating action and initiative, and providing
a context for creativity, imaginative play and constructive behavior. Unlike
biological control mechanisms which are largely set, automatic, and sometimes
triggered by specific kinds of stimuli, the symbolic control mechanisms that
surround culturally defined and shaped behavior needs to be regularly reinforced
and reemphasized in order to remain strong and powerful. It requires an external
context for effective demonstration and ritual reinforcement. It requires as
well regular participation, inculcation and the use of mechanisms for
inter-subjective evaluation and rehabilitation. Educational institutions are
some of the forms of socio-cultural institutions that have been developed
specifically serving these sets of needs in human beings.
I refer to the phenomenon of symbolic transformation
as the somewhat revolutionary cultural consequences that the acquisition of
symbolic behavior has had for human beings, both upon individual and group
levels of articulation. Symbolic transformation refers in a gross sense to the
sense of displacement of symbolic reference and attachment to forms that may be
disconnected or otherwise dissimilar to the original causes or referents to
which they are attached through a process referred to as symbolic transference.
As an example of the consequences of symbolic transformation, we may refer to
the capacity to set entire nations of people to make war and to risk their lives
in the process, based upon what are entirely ideological symbolisms that are not
directly tied to the problems of survival of the organism or reproductive
success of the individual as a biological entity.
In other words, symbolic behavior affects the
capacity in human beings to acquire alternative, variable forms of human
behavior, in consistent ways, that are not the immediate result of biological
factors of determination or biological control mechanisms, and which serve
either directly or indirectly any sense of biological interest of the organism,
either in terms of response to immediate circumstances or adaptive behavior to
local or general conditions. Human beings can be in fact quite readily induced
into consistent forms of behavior that actually may hurt individual or group
capacity for survival, or run deliberately against the grain of their biological
well being as a organism in the world.
Of course, the fallacy of symbolic reification, that
serves somewhat as a symbolic mediation device that serves to naturalize and
make seem normal and inherent what is otherwise and in a fundamental sense
arbitrary and artificial, and that serves frequently as a system of defensive
rationalization maintaining the integrity of life-experience, can often take the
form of biological naturalization of behaviors or acquired patterns of behavior,
that can therefore be acted upon as if natural or instinctual and construed that
way.
Money is a great symbolic device--it stands for many
things--wealth, power, freedom, well-being. Making money, often by whatever
means, is received commonly as a principle objective of human behavior, whether
it proves to be by hook or by crook. Though the value orientation towards making
money is regarded largely as a "materialistic" value system, the
concept and function of money in the world, in state societies with large scale
market economies, is almost entirely symbolic. This is not to claim that
money cannot buy things that are necessary, or that it cannot lead to
survivorship and affluence. But it is to say that money may be used for the
purchase of things needed for survival, like food or water, etc., but it is more
often than not used for a much wider range of purposes, most of which have
little or nothing directly to do with human survival. We can frequently trade in
kind for food, and we can even hunt or gather our own food, as our ancestors
once commonly did, or grow our food and cultivate it by our own efforts. But
money can allow us to buy food, clothing, etc., eliminating the necessity of
acquiring or making it for ourselves.
Thus we can see that it has been by means of a basic
and common symbolic form, a device like money, that we have effected a basic
transformation of human social organization from that of a cultural pattern
rooted in hunting and gathering, to that of one that is rooted on the market
exchange of commodities, ownership of property and capital, and the organization
and appropriation of productive labor. This has been a symbolic transformation
that has been accompanied by a transformation of our social organization and of
the way we adapt in our material world.
If we make the claim that money is a tool, an object
of material possession, then we can say that a tool is a symbol, and a symbol is
a tool as well. The fact that the earliest stone tools used by Hominids were
generalized to a range of functions, and were deliberately shaped and adapted to
special functions, came thereby to acquire cognitive and symbolic significance
for the tool maker/tool user, and this does not thereby render insignificant the
symbolic value of tools or the functional value of symbols as tools, or the
requirement for an enlarged cerebral-cranial capacity to learn to use and adapt
tools more effectively, as symbolisms and as tools.
It may be argued as well, especially by cultural or
historical materialists, that the economy and material means of production and
social organization changed before the need for money arose as a common,
standard medium of exchange was introduced. This may well be true, but certainly
the rise of situations that demanded such a standard medium, particularly in
state societies, also created the context for the symbolic importance and
function of money, and the pattern of organization and adaptation itself became
possible as a result of this symbolic transformation in the use of money as a
standard medium of exchange.
The symbolic transformation of humankind from a
species of animal bound by the constraints of nature, to an individual and a
social entity that is capable of arbitrary, intentional and independent
behavior, in the process becoming thereby bound to the constraints of symbolic
behavior and culture instead, has been both a boon and a bane to human kind. It
has permitted an unprecedented level of evolutionary success, the rise of
sophisticated civilizations based upon scientific knowledge, the cultivation of
the arts, refinement of values and sensibilities. It has permitted the
realization of alternative realities through the development of human
constructive and creative capacities that are the outcomes of they symbolic
adaptation and acquisition. But at the same time, it has been a mixed blessing,
as it has assured us of well of almost equally destructive and violent
capacities, capacities for individual and social deviancy and perversion of
behavior, for cheating and manipulation and exploitation of both people and
nature.
By means of symbolic transformation, we are capable
of behavior in ways far out of proportion to our natural biological limitations,
needs or capacities. By such means as well we are capable of modifying our
behavior quite flexibly, and are capable thereby of learning new forms of
symbolism and acquiring new kinds of adaptive behaviors.
If we observe wolves, for instance, we can observe
one troop of wolves, and pretty much describe the entire behavioral repertory of
all members of that wolf species. We can generalize from a single pack of wolves
to all packs of the same kind of wolf. We can do the same for almost all species
of animal, except perhaps for a few species of primates for whom rudimentary
cultural patterns of acquisition and transmission has been documented, and
possibly as well for some pods or family groups of cetaceans, who may also have
acquired learned, proto-cultural patterns of behavior.
It is primarily and especially in human beings that
we cannot easily generalize or explain behavior from one group to the next, or
even from one individual to another, and the problem of comparison and
comparative analysis of behavior becomes especially complex and problematic. And
this is primarily because almost all of human behavior has been symbolically
transformed and culturally acquired and transmitted. If we hypothesize anywhere
from 7,000 to more than 30,000 distinct languages that once occurred within the
past millennium, we can specify at least that many if not more distinctive
cultural systems that were associated with each of those languages, and this
does not include the dialectical patterns of variation found within and between
traditional culture areas, or the sub-cultural groupings, marked by distinctive
style patterns and behavioral sets unique to particular groupings in particular
periods and places.
We cannot expect so much variation of pattern among
human groupings to be accounted for on the basis of genetic variation alone, as
the human species simply is not that genetically variable. We are all basically
of a single common species with but minor sub-species and iso-clinal variations.
We are no where near the genetic variation encompassed by the household dog, Canis
familiaris, that has been the result of cultural selection and breeding
regimes for many centuries, and that has led to at least 150 unique types of
distinct canine breed, each with their distinct patterns of appearance and
associated dog behaviors.
What we can say, beyond any reasonable doubt, is that
human cultural patterning and behavior, often quite conservative in form and
structure, is quite variable and permits of a wide range of alternative
possibilities that lead to possibly an infinite number of possible cultural
configurations. No two cultural patterns in the history of humanity have been
alike, though there have been many cases of parallel or analogous development of
aspects and traits of culture, and frequent cases of homologous development due
to shared heritage or as the product of acculturative transmission.
The fact that cultural acquisition and transmission
is non-genetic, occurs as the result of learning and environmental relation,
entails that cultural traits and patterns can be transmitted widely and very
quickly, and cultures can change rather dramatically over short periods of time.
It becomes the case therefore, clearly, that there is
a wide range of variation of pattern of response behavior associated with
different cultural backgrounds and trajectories, and that we can speak of
symbolic differentials of such behavior as characteristic of all human beings
and as reflecting in a rather particularistic and relative manner the cultural
and sub-cultural differences occurring between groups of people, as well as the
psychological differences between individuals.
The basis of my dissertation thesis was that such
differentials were probably less random and idiosyncratically variable, and more
systematic and indicative of multi-level sharing between different groupings,
than might otherwise be thought to occur if we are looking at surface patterns
alone. It was hypothesized that structural isomorphisms and consistencies of
pattern, often not directly available to immediate observation, would emerge and
become available through comprehensive and detailed analysis and logical
deduction. I believe this is pretty much what we uncovered, in spite of the
challenges of conducting such research, such as issues of statistical
significance & random sampling, issues of interpretation, biased response,
distinguishing between psychologically idiosyncratic and culturally nomothetic
responses, etc.
Understanding such differentials in a systematic way,
and being able to correlate these differentials strongly to basic groupings,
provided not only an empirical handle for measuring cultural pattern, defined in
terms of symbolic behavior, as well as a means for systematically comparing
different patterns of cultural and symbolic behavior, but it provided as well a
vehicle for investigating the structure of human symbolic behavior and
cognition, patterns of deviance from normal symbolic function, and finally it
offered what proved subsequently to be a very productive set of tools for both
rehabilitating and facilitating the acquisition and adjustment of symbolic
behavior.
If we are to get at a true sense of the organization
of diversity in human reality, then we must do so in an ordered and systematic
way that allows us to make sense of so much complexity. We must find the
structural reasons and variables for such diversity and for its capacity for
adaptive organization, and then we must learn to apply these reasons in our
schemes for constructing a better world that can not only handle and tolerate
such differences, but promote such pattern variation in a way that it can be
truly productive and adaptive for all humanity.
There is every justification for wanting to do so.
The reasons, though complex, resolve to a simple set of central issues that have
always affected humankind in the most dramatic and tragic of ways. If these
kinds of symbolic cultural differentials underlie the kind of parallax
frequently occurring between people, psychologically and behaviorally, and
between groups of people socially and culturally, that lead, among other things,
to destructive aggression and perpetration of acts of violence against people or
the coercive use of the threat of violence in order to exploit people, then
understanding these differentials in a precise, measurable and systematic manner
may provide us the means for designing symbolic-cultural systems that
effectively mediate human adaptation and serve to prevent or at least inhibit
the occurrence and prevalence of human violence and exploitation in the world.
If we wish to create a more secure and peaceful world, provide an effective
framework for the mediation of differences and the resolution of conflict
leading to war and violence, then we must consider the scope and possibilities
afforded by such an approach to human cultural adaptation.
Human
Power Motivation & the Symbolic Transformation of Human Nature
If we are seek a sense of universal motive in human
behavior, whether we are referring to the behavior of people in collectives, or
as lone-individuals, or as investigators or jurors in a adjudication of a crime,
we must refer ultimately to the human drive for power, especially power that is
expressed socially in terms of human relationships and symbolically in terms of
the manipulation of the elements of one's life world.
From the standpoint of the anthropological relativity
of knowledge in the understanding of human behavior, I would make a strong claim
that all human purposive activity that involves even a minimal degree of
intentionality and planning, is primarily and ultimately motivated by what
amounts to a drive for power, whether this is expressed in social contexts or in
personal ways. Therefore, almost all organized human behavior, and even much
behavior that appears otherwise disorganized, is behavior that can be explained,
motivationally speaking, in terms of the need for power and the sense of
satisfaction that is gained from power.
This claim being made, it becomes incumbent to define
"power" in a way that is relevant to our argument. In a fundamental
sense, I would say that power is the ability to control change in a
deterministic manner, especially as change relations to other people and to
social relationships. In social terms, power translates into a sense of status
and a sense of control that is gained from the ability to determine a course of
events, especially as these events affect other people.
The drive for power can be largely unconscious, and
yet remains a prime mover in the organization of behavior. Because the sense of
status and control that is achieved from power is symbolic, it becomes a
powerful psychological motivator and inducement for behavior, so powerful in
fact that it may override almost any other drive or human need that may be
claimed to occur. Because power is at the basis of the symbolic
transformation of the human psyche, as the source of will and driver for
purposive determination, and because symbolic experience allows for the flexible
encoding and analogical transference of value and meaning from one form into a
variety of alternate forms, the drive for power is very plastic and very
malleable and itself can be sublimated and transformed in very different and
often interesting if not completely frightening ways.
The drive for power has one central weakness--it is
largely a vicarious and fleeting, impermanent experience. Once having achieved
power through the actual determination of an outcome, the experience, status and
sense of satisfaction gained quickly dissipates, lost in the stream of on-going
experience, and hence, as the sense gained from the achievement of power sinks
back below the surface of conscious awareness, the need to regain this sense of
power arises back up in however a rationalized and convoluted a manner.
It is apparent too that the drive for power is
largely an insatiable and unending need, and the achievement of power induces an
even greater need for gaining more power. We can speculate therefore that at the
core of the need and drive for power, especially when this appears to occur in
an extreme or inordinately large degree, is a deep seated and fundamental sense
of dissatisfaction and insecurity of one's own sense of ego identity in the
world. This sense of deep dissatisfaction I believe comes from the experience of
the loss of control, and the achievement of vicarious or displaced symbolic
control, in one's early years of development, mediated as these experiences are
by significant others and the often uncontrollable vicissitudes of one's
effective environment. We might relate this deep need to a sense of separation,
loss and rejection experienced by an immature ego, especially in relation to
significant others, and the inability to effectively compensate for this sense
of loss by replacement with others or displacement onto healthy forms. We may
suggest a fundamental sense of discrepancy in the personality and character of
an individual human being, bifurcated between a largely unconscious, libidinally
driven, power hungry persona, and a weak and fragile sense of ego that is
incapable of controlling the "controller."
In making these remarks I do not separate
qualitatively or distinguish clearly between what I would consider to be normal
cases and examples of the need for power and what can be considered clinically
or criminally pathological drives for power. The differences seem to be in the
degree to which this drive for power becomes the controlling factor of one's
behavior, and the manner in which this drive is symbolically transformed and
transferred onto a larger set of relationships in the world. In this sense,
writer who lives through the characters and plot structure of a novel may be
working with similar drives as a dictator who lives through the suffering and
repression of an entire nation, or a sadistic sexual psycho-path who lives
vicariously through the torture and cruel suffering of their victims.
What this drive for power is critically linked to, at
least in terms of human systems theory, is what I have elsewhere referred to as
the symbolic transformation of human nature that is most marked by the idea of
world openness and the lack of instinctive or other forms of natural constraint
upon human behavior. Human behavior is invariably transformed and becomes
symbolically expressed and mediated. Because it is highly plastic and highly
volatile, it is capable of being manipulated symbolically in a wide variety of
ways, often in ways that may be considered extreme, bizarre and naturally
perverse. Human behavior frequently shows signs of symbolically transformed
perversity largely not encountered in the natural animal world. Our tendency
towards aggressive action and violence, especially in group contexts, is
therefore probably not the show of an instinct for natural aggression arising
for instance from intra-specific agonism, nor can we attribute it to some
genetic predisposition per se. Rather, it is evident, that human aggression in
the forms it takes and in the ways we are familiar with it especially in modern
social contexts, is largely the result of the lack of natural mechanisms of
control over human "nature" and the consequences of the symbolic
transformation of this "nature" in ways probably not intended by
nature.
The plasticity by which this drive for power can be
shaped in so many divergent forms, and the degree to which the symbolic
displacement and transformation of human character can take, even to the point
of overriding what can be considered natural sexual urges and other natural
drives for food, a stable body temperature, etc., is indeed quite remarkable,
and I believe a very strong case can be made for the influence of hormones and
also the release of endorphines and other psycho-active agents as a by-product
of the quest and actual achievement of a sense of power. These
"psycho-somatic" side-effects of the drive for power may be the
essential component that predisposes humanity to a chronic abuse of
psycho-tropic drugs and narcotics and what is considered by some the universal
need for the achievement of alternative states of consciousness. This need for
periodically experiencing alternative states of consciousness, however induced,
including various forms of hallucination as well as hyper-suggestive states of
trance and other "out-of-body" experiences, seems to me to be a
consequence of the symbolic possibilities of the active human brain that quickly
finds tedious and monotonous the pace of normal experience.
If we watch animals in their sleep, we an have little
doubt that they are dreaming and that the subjective experience of their dreams
is very like the way in which we experience our dreams. Dreaming serves
therefore a very fundamental purpose for the active mammalian brain. The
functions of dreaming are not well understood, but must have a lot to do with
the reorganization of the brain, the filtering and integration of new
experience, and the symbolic processing of new experience in relation to old
experience that is stored as forms of memory or possibly posited in the neural
encoding of the brain itself. But it becomes equally evident that dreaming for
human beings takes on an entirely different level and order of meaning than it
does for instance in dogs, and that for human beings, states of waking
consciousness can at times become confused with dream states, the two
commingling at the edge of conscious awareness. Not to revisit old stereotypes,
but in severe schizophrenics we find people who are awake and yet who are as if
in a dream world of their own making. If schizophrenia occurs in dogs in a
manner and degree we find it in human beings, it would be a surprise to me as
I've not seen a dog yet I would call schizophrenic. But then we can assume that
dogs are more instinctively bound to nature, to a closed Uexkullian world of
"dog nature" than human beings seem to be.
It is not my intention here to rhetorically belabor a
scientific argument with only anecdotal evidence and an appeal to common sense.
I would say that the drive to some kind of power is resident in many forms of
animals, particularly in animals we refer to as active predators.
The capacity to control the outcomes of events in the
world are a direct extension of the capacity to control one's own behavior in
response to events in the world, however this is achieved, whether by instinct
or by symbolic construction. Biological survival, and an "instinct" to
live, especially for animals, is predicated on the capacity to interact with a
world in terms of one's behavioral controls. This "instinct" even
supercedes and hence precludes any drives toward reproductive success, which in
its way can be considered an extension and further expression of the self-same
set of instincts for survival. We may call it a "natural" will to live
or will to survive. This drive exists within us whether we are challenged by our
environments in any critical manner or otherwise. It seems often in ordinary
life, many of these kinds of rudimentary challenges are removed by design, by
cultural preference and by social directive, and often as not, with little to
replace it in any ordinary sense of lived experience. But whether suitable
contexts exist for its expression or not, the need for its expression may
continue doing its own thing regardless.
There is one last point that I must question in
relation to this thesis about the universality of the human drive for power and
the symbolic transformation of human nature, and this has to do with what can be
called a preoccupation for death and, possibly the fear or at least sense of
symbolic marginalization that comes from the experience of death, the threat of
death, or even just the existence of death. A perverse fascination with death,
with killing and the dead, seems to psychologists to be a pathological
expression of innate curiosity in life, and of a need to control one's
experiences of life.
The preoccupation with death and dying seems to me to
be a rudimentary expression of the drive for life and survival. In living
systems, and especially I think in living systems as sophisticated as human
systems, there can be no greater expression of power than the control of life or
death over another living being, for death is not just final, ultimate,
irreversible, but, I think often overlooked, it represents in a fundamental
sense a "win" in a kind of zero-sum game of living and an essential
form of competition between organisms. In this sense, the taking the life of
another, whether this is done on a field of battle, in a robbery, or as a
consequence of a psycho-pathic perversion, represent what might be referred as a
presymbolic affirmation of one's own life experiences and chances for success in
life. This is by no means a justification of why it is humans so commonly and
frequently take the life of other organisms, not just humans but of many forms
of life, and appear often to be fascinated by this scenario in their life such
that they would want to watch it over and over again played out in movies or on
television or in the news media. It is rather merely an attempt to understand
how it is that we can be thus fascinated by such a perverse and seemingly
destructive interest on such a basic level, and an at least tentative
explanation of why this just might be so.
Perhaps needless to conclude, the drive for power is
in all of us and may become expressed in many different ways. Many ways are in
fact constructive and healthy, and many other ways are obviously not. To become
psychologically and behaviorally caught in a particular trajectory of
development of this drive for power and its behavioral and social expression in
the world, versus some alternative pathway, is critical to answer and yet
probably so complex and multivariate that it is impossible to answer in any
final way.
Whatever trajectory we achieve in the course of our
life, and in the course of events in our life, we get caught into what can be
called a "circle of power" in which one set of events leads to
another, to social consequences and reactions, that in turn drive the need for
power to even greater heights, and power can become both psychologically and
sociologically amplified thereby. I'm exhibiting my need for power in
writing this overwrought essay, and, if you have read thus far, you are probably
exhibit some will for power in reading it to the end. The proverbial slave
exhibits power through the dependency of the master on the slave's
powerlessness. The will to power takes many forms symbolically in human
behavioral response in the world. It is shaped, harnessed and made available to
the world by the society in which we are a part and in which we enact our parts.
It is something of a mistake to cast the drive for
power as an abnormal or pathological characteristic of human nature, and to
portray it only in terms of sociopaths and other criminals. The drive to power
characterizes all human beings both equally and in uniquely individual ways. We
all manifest this drive, more or less, along a multi-dimensional continuum of
its expression in terms of strength, direction and transformation of affect,
aggression, activity and rationalization.
am of
the opinion that human achievement motivation (McClelland et. al.) that in the
modern global system is primarily expressed by means of money, that translates
into resource acquisition and appropriation, is what can be called a
structurally and socially normalized extension of fundamental human power
motivation, and the neverending quest to make money and to get rich is merely
one more culturally and socially sanctioned form of the manifestation of the
drive for power.
I think, as a refrain, that it is easy to overlook
the motive of power in our lives and in our world, especially if we are caught
up in the grip of power and its circles in our lives. We can repress our
confrontation with it, attempt to stifle, manipulate, alter or even extinguish
it, not only in ourselves but in others around us. We can especially rationalize
its ends and means in our life in practically any manner we choose to see it in,
thereby justifying it to ourselves in a satisfactory way if not completely to
others in the world. We can act out the drive and fantasies that the need for
power manifests itself in, and we can vicariously displaces and project it out
onto the world in all kinds of ways. I would even say, that in some social
settings, the drive for power can become so manifest and so overwhelming in
social life, that it must needs thereby be denied or ideologically justified in
a collective manner that not only "makes sense of it" but serves to
neutralize or remove any possibly negative consequences that apperceptive
realization of its possibilities (and potential horrors) might bring. As it has
been said recently, the fish rots from the head down. I think it is in this
regard, in a sense of projective symbolic displacement, much easier to recognize
the true intent and designs of power in others than to see and acknowledge how
it may play out in our own lives. Our ability to symbolically manipulate and
transform power is a form of power itself, uniquely human it seems.
Symbolic
Cognition & Human Knowledge Systems: The Noetic Revolution of Human
Civilization
The binding problem is a central problem in
overcoming the mind-body dilemma in both philosophical perspectives of human
reality and epistemology as well as in cognitive science and artificial
intelligence models of the human brain and mental operation. Basically, we must
ask how the brain organizes itself, and integrates its various networks and
centers of neural activity, to achieve human consciousness and mind, especially
in consideration of highly developed states of human reason and intellect.
Analytical approaches have sought mechanical solutions to this central problem,
in terms of neural networks and models of the neuron, but these solutions fall
short of a complete solution to this kind of problem.
In the anthropology of knowledge there occurs a very
similar problem in the question of (1) linking human cognition to symbolic
behavior and (2) extending symbolic behavior to the cultural construction of
human reality and to definitions of human culture. This problem is not in fact
unrelated, and the theoretical-methodological solution I developed for the
latter question in terms of symbolic framing provides a potential solution for
the former problem as well.
We may say at the outset that if the human brain is
looked at from the standpoint of human systems theory, then we can understand
clearly that the mind is the central emergent property of the integration of the
brain, and the components of the brain maintain themselves in a complex and
dynamic kind of equilibrium, involving normally a diurnal-nocturnal cycle of
sleep and wakefulness. We can further say that because symbolic behavior and
integration appears to be the uniquely defining characteristic of human mind, as
opposed to that of other known animals, then we can understand that the emergent
integration of the mind has to do with the mechanical organization of the brain
to produce symbolic awareness. This symbolic awareness is behaviorally expressed
and linguistically encoded and articulated.
We can attribute by inference states of mind to other
species of animal, especially obvious in highly intelligent animals. Experiments
with primates teach us that primate intelligence is as sophisticated as human
intelligence in many dimensions and shows many of the same basic components of
symbolic self-awareness and self-reflection that is characteristic of human
conscious awareness. Primates in captivity take readily to human cultural
preoccupations and patterns, and primates in natural settings have demonstrated
the emergence of rudimentary cultural adaptations and expectable variability of
patterning between different groupings.
If we examine what is unique about human knowledge
systems, and universal to these systems, compared to inferable animal states and
systems of knowledge, we can apply primarily the trait of "world
openness" to human knowledge systems versus what can be called an "Uexkullian
closed world" of the animal. We may state a continuing human plasticity to
learn and adapt to the environment on the basis of cognitive processing of
perceptual inputs and behavioral interactions that continues throughout the life
cycle. We can refer as well to what can be called the cognitively directed
behavior that is relatively independent of instinctual constraints or basic
drives, though obviously influenced by these drives. Human beings demonstrate a
remarkable degree of voluntarism and arbitrary willpower, as well as a cunning
of foresight and planning.
Human knowledge systems can be said to be symbolic
systems of encoded signals that have a material form and that demonstrate basic
design features of human language. We may refer to these as linguistically
encoded cultural texts. These systems provide largely directive or alternative
relative templates that are used for guiding human behavior, or alternatively
for the symbolic justification and rationalization of events. In preliterate or
oral societies, knowledge systems largely took the form of mythologies and
associated magical lore that were utilized to explain and organize the world,
including human social relationships. Story telling has been an important part
of this process. Encoding often to the form of ritual performance and even
architectural construction and aesthetic design in folk arts.
With the advent of systems of writing, attributed in
the main to the need for record-keeping connected to the rise of large scale
state-organized systems, and the advent of craft and labor specialization as
well as the rise of a formal priesthood, human knowledge systems took on a sense
of developmental differentiation that allowed a new level of understanding and
comprehension of the world to be achieved. Associated with this is a sense of
abstraction and awareness of conceptual independence of ideas from realities.
Associated with this also is the classical idea of the "Birth of
Tragedy"--the rise of an Apollonian virtue theory of the rule of law and
order and the regulated organization of human society. Vast repositories of
knowledge thus developed that represented organized collections of texts and
these provided a framework for extended and systematic systems of knowledge
transmission.
The next revolution of human civilization arrived
with the advent of mass printing technologies, which allowed the broad
dissemination of texts and provided a basis for increasing rates of literacy.
Associated with the advent of printing in Europe was the rise of the Renaissance
as well as the early development of a form of market capitalism and early forms
of craft and cottage industrialization. The key noetic transformation of human
knowledge systems was at this period of time the rise of science and the rise of
a non-idealized and naturalized view of humankind. With this came the active
exploration of the world and of worldview, and the development of a broader
range of alternative systems of knowledge. Associated with this was the
questioning of basic precepts and dogmas by which traditional cultural knowledge
and worldview had been organized, particularly as a product of a Medieval
Scholasticism that was focused on the problem of the exegetical translation and
interpretation of sacred texts.
The most recent revolution of human civilization has
occurred essentially in the last fifty years with the rise of electronic
broad-casting media and especially digital forms of knowledge recording and
storage. I see the advent of the Internet and newer satellite based wireless
technologies to be an extension of the same processes begun with the radio and
television broadcasting of the previous era, as well as with photographic and
film recording technologies.
We are today in the midst of this newest knowledge
revolution and we do not know the consequences of this in terms of the patterns
of integration of our world. We may say clearly that we are dealing with
symbolic and organizational structures in the world that are essentially
obsolete and that are anachronisms of the past standing in the way of future
progress. There is also no way to knowing for certain the outcomes of this
direction of development. What can we expect from the future of development. I'm
inclined to think that the next knowledge revolution of human civilization will
be the achievement of comprehensive systems of integration that are fully
automated and that might be based upon hybrid or exotic forms of quantum
knowledge storage and manipulation.
Dialectical
Symbolism
Symbols may stand for themselves as well as each
other and for other things of relative significance in the human environment.
Symbols have both a substantial, empirical basis in physical reality, by being
embodied within some 'thing' or set of things which come to literally represent
the symbol and its associated significances. Symbols also have a metaphysical
'essence' which phenomenologically and experientially transcends their corporeal
substance and figuratively represent the things they stand for. Thus symbols and
symbolisms stand between heaven and earth, the physical and the metaphysical,
and mind and body. It is their function to 'inter-integrate' and mediate these
two different and otherwise separate kinds of reality.
Symbolisms provide a sense of unity and integration
to human reality in a very basic kind of way. And we can look at the separate
realities of Man as but the two sides of the same symbolic coin of human reality
and thus understand that while we believe our feet are planted firmly in one
kind of reality and our head is obscured in the clouds of another, we are
actually only in a single kind of human reality which is preeminently symbolic
and usually two sided. Seeing a single, whole, un-dichotomizes symbolic human
reality, we no longer need to be so vexed by the dilemmas and illusions of being
simultaneously in two separate realities at once.
It is the substantial human physicality of the things
which stand for our symbols and the ethereal insubstantiality of the things
which our symbols stand for, that lead us to such chronic confusion over
symbols, ideas and things. It is sometimes difficult to fathom the ideology that
regards a gigantic arsenal of nuclear warheads with their promise of total
devastation as primarily of non-substantial symbolic value. They exist not so
much as weapons of potential or actual destruction, but as symbols of power,
control, mutually assured deterrence, strength and even perennial peace. They
have been allowed into our lives primarily as symbols of the kind of political
economic authority they represent and this is how their otherwise incredible and
horrible presence has become fostered into our lives. They stand forever poised
as both our weapons of ultimate force and as out symbols of ultimate power.
Automobiles are another example of objects of
possession and control which are primarily symbolic embodiments of our personal
mobility, status, success, power and freedom, and yet which we habitually even
compulsively use as functional vehicles for transportation. In this case, the
fossil fuel automobile has become a predominant cornerstone of our collective
modern existence as symbolisms of technological and industrial dominance and
success over our physical environments--inspite of the fact that they are
dangerous, polluting, expensive and ecologically unaffordable. They have become
the mainstay of our modern lives not so much because they are symbols of the
success of progress, but because they functionally mediate our physical
environments, whether we really need them or not. They have become symbolically
foisted upon our collective imagination because they have become a real physical
need of modern Homo automobiles.
It is the failure to understand that our realities,
whether ideological or material, are primarily and ultimately symbolic, that
leads us to mistakenly identify as inevitable matters of fact such things as
nuclear missiles and petro-powered cars.
Dialectical symbolism is a central theory in the
culture historical studies of the developmental processes of human civilization,
explaining how the dynamics of social movement, cultural change and historical
patterning function in a self organizing but predictable way. It is a systematic
theory about mind, how it works and the ways it becomes manifest in the
civilizing processes of culture history. It is a theory explaining how mindness
as culture historical frames of mind, has become expressed symbolically and
dialectically in the evolution and ecology of mind. It outlines this
evolutionary and ecological process of development of mind as the central thesis
of the study of culture history.
Dialectical symbolism stands Marx back upon his
head--it converts Marxism political economy and materialistic arguments back to
an Hegelian unfolding of Geist or Idea, except that it is not a theory of the
progressive immanation of Spirit, but holds the notion of the dialectics of
symbolism as the principle form and function of the expression of human
mind--all symbolisms leaves substantively real, epi-phenomenal 'things in the
world' which can become 'objects' of scientific verification and all symbolisms
has pragmatic, adaptive function in the empirical world which serves to
scientifically explain itself.
The gradual but increasing rapid, even explosive,
emergence of global human civilization is seen as an inevitable, mathematical
outcome of a long term process of the structuring of many different but
interrelated processes of patterned human phenomena. Given enough time and the
relatively irreversible character of many kinds of changes, the self organizing
critical state made up of many local culture historical processes of change.
The unfolding of mind has been a dialectical
process--its main thesis has always embodied its own contradictions which
eventual leads, through environmental change, to its self transformation. As a
dialectic it is always a synthesizing reality which transcends itself through
the fusion of opposites--it is a never ending process of revolution and
resolution about a central, common axis of directional change. The synthetic
transcendence of this continuous dialectical counterpoint is never an inevitable
outcome of this contrapuntal movement--it is the power of metaphor as vital
symbolism to combine contradictory opposites as if a single unity, but this is
always outside of the main axis of movement of the dialectic.
It is a movement from thesis to antithesis and back
to a new thesis without a necessary sense of progressive fulfillment or
realization. The dialectics simply describe the resultant patterning of the
social movement of symbolization about directional axis of transition and
change. The movement characteristically turns about a central axis and describes
an undulating, to and fro, cyclical movement of change through time and across
space.
Besides being essentially self organized and
non-progressive, the dialectics of symbolism are also complex in being
multi-modal and multi-thematic. Unlike the 'simple' dialectics of dialectical
materialism in which there is a single axis of movement, dialectical symbolism
involves the multiple movements about several axis of structural change
simultaneously--and these multiple axis of change are interrelated one with
another such that there is a net synergistic patterning of the entire process of
developmental unfolding. It is this synergism which confers upon the patterning
of culture historical process a 'life of its own' independent of its separable
or component patterns. We cannot understand the total dialectic merely by
analyzing the separate movements of each of its axis of change--the whole
dialectic can only be understood by revealing how each axis is interrelated to
the others and how the functioning of each is interdependent with the
functioning of the others.
Dialectical symbolism substitutes for the basic
materialism as the driving motto of Marx's theory the basic pan human reality of
symbolism and symbolization as the focal 'prime mover' of culture historical
process. The principle mode of expression of mind has been metaphorical and
symbolic--and it is from the starting point of the metaphor as the basic symbol
of mind that we are to understand its process, purpose and pattern of
development. The pan human processes of symbolization which 'drive' this complex
dialectic of culture history give to change the sense of patterned form--the
regularity we associate with stability--symbolisms are the vessels and vehicles
which contain and carry change. symbolization does not so much energize culture
historical process, so much as channelize the available human energies and
potentialities into focal directions of development. It harnesses these forces
around the central axis of change. symbols carry significance which mobilizes
people into action and metabolizes social systems to change. the function of
symbolization is primarily organizational--it interrelates and articulates
otherwise disparate elements in order to provide an overarching continuity to
change and action.
Symbolism organizes not only our metaphysical sense
of world view or mindness, but our physical representational worlds as well.
Symbolism intermediates our two worlds--the life of mind and our experience of
the environment.
Dialectical symbolism also integrates in the study of
culture history the different levels of analysis and synthesis, the general and
the particular, the universal and the individual. It shows how the pan human
problematics of mind are expressed and mediated on an everyday level of the
individual within larger contexts of relational sets. It shows that the
fundamental symbolic process is identical at every level of analysis and helps
to confer a sense of theoretical and philosophical unity to the whole range of
realities, from experiential to the conceptual.
Dialectical symbolism thus focuses the brunt and
burden of culture historical process, of change, of civilization, upon the
understanding of the individual in daily interaction with other people. It shows
how relative context is always generally defined in metaphorical terms and how
this context always symbolically influences the attitudes, orientations and
actions of the individual. It does so neither through passive constraint or
predetermination--the symbolic dialectic on the level of the individual's
reality is always one of continuous negotiation, compromise, transaction, give
and take, and contingency with ever changing complex environments.
Dialectical symbolism is in a sense a complete
theoretical orientation which qualifies it as a systematic 'science' of culture
history--its symbolic referents have a real, scientifically amenable basis in
empirical reality--but it is simultaneously something more than this in also
being a metaphysical and metalogical philosophical orientation which informs
such scientific theory--it asks ultimate questions and seeks relative answers.
******
Dialectical symbolism is dialectical in the sense of
encompassing a movement of mind from thesis to antithesis and back again through
synthetic transcendence, and yet the process is non-revolutionary in the sense
that there is no sense of governing necessity or purpose in its development.
Mind is not immanent or emergent from the dialectic, rather it is only the
result of the patterning of the dialectic. The movement of the dialectic from
thesis to counterpoint and back again, and the transformations it involves, are
always relative and relationally contextualized. It is the total set of
universal relations of mind which is evolving in an anti-entropic, directional
sense, in the process of its working out of its own possibilities and it is this
evolving context which accounts for the sense of transcendent development of the
dialectic within any given provenience.
Only in a universal sense is mind developing--in a
local culture historical context mind is simply changing in a less than more
random way. Though mind is evolving in a universal sense, we in our local frames
of mindness cannot ever know in any non-relative way that general direction or
how this evolution is occurring except to vaguely sense and infer its
directionality and systematicity from a broader sense of history and the changes
of mind in the so called structure of the long run. We can redefine our
understanding of this 'evolution of mind' from the ecological changes which have
come from it, but we can never conclusively prove that mind is evolving or what
its ultimate direction or purpose is.
The evolution of mind is not a metaphysical
phenomena--but it is a physical process of transformation which is experienced
perceptively through the senses. Mind is the potential total possibility of self
organized relational patterning of humankind in the physical universe. The brain
and its abstract functioning, the electronic super computer, DNA and cultural
transmission, exist in the world because mind exists as the expression of the
patterning of mind. As self organizing principles and properties of the physical
universe, its patterning is 'dumb' in a random, non-reflexive sense, and yet its
evolution is based upon an inherent 'anti-entropic' tendency to maintain a
weakly chaotic sense of order in the face of natural disorder and randomization.
It came into being as a statistical possibility of the long run, as the
epi-phenomena of a unique concatenation of 'forces' or 'events' which lead to
its self sustained growth and development.
In our limited and local framework we are forced to
accept the possibility of mind on the basis of a grand leap of faith, without
the possibility of conclusive demonstration and yet without it we cannot achieve
a coherent sense of order in the experiential universe of our collective being.
******
Dialectical symbolism is a theoretical orientation
based upon Hegelian dialectics applied to the evolution of symbolism as the
principle process of human culture historical development. It is neither
strictly a form of philosophical idealism nor a brand of materialism--symbols
are partly ideational and always materially expressed. Symbolism cohere
naturally to form 'synergism' of mind which embody contradictions of beingness
and non-beingness and which transcends these contradictions in their own
development.
Dialectical symbolisms is the central theoretical
orientations of culture history. The human being is by definition a symbolizing
creatures--it is an essential and vital part of our nature and character.
Symbolizing is a 'need' just like the needs of breathing, drinking water or
nutrition--without it we must perish as something less than fully human. Neither
can we distance ourselves from its omnipresence in our worlds nor separate
ourselves from its ultimate sense of realism. Symbolism confers upon our reality
an indivisible unity, and it brings to our sense of realism the possibility for
its own dichotomization.
The dialectic of symbolism is developmental, but it
is non-progressive and always incomplete. It revolves and resolves itself around
central directional axis of change in the unfolding of mind as an objective of
time, reality of beingness in the world. This central axis is that of time, and
it is irreversible in an absolute, non-relative sense. Our measure of change as
time is the measure of the duration of all things which have been and will ever
be. The dialectics of symbolism has as its basis the spatial mediation of
time--mind is the spatialization of time in human consciousness.
The symbolic spatialization of time is expressed as
beingness in the world--we know it as 'experience'. Mind thus becomes
expressible in terms of and through our experience of the world. The
construction of culture and the process of civilization is the expression of the
realization of our experience of mind--culture and civilization become
symbolically patterned in their unfolding dialectics in the form of mind. As
symbolic process, the development of civilization becomes the patterning of the
function of mind.
The dialectics of symbolism become experienced
cyclically, as recursive patterning and revolution about the axis of time.
All symbolisms have as their ultimate referents the
representation of time as the formal/functional mediators of change. its
spatialized manifestations are the expression of its beingness in the world--of
the human experience of the world.
Dialectical symbolisms integrates and idealist
versions of reality, and through integration transcends its own inherent
contradictions.
******
Many natural communication systems contain symbolisms
however mechanical or rudimentary. But it has been only humankind of all the
species of nature who have developed the capacity for the spontaneous creation
of symbolisms, their generalizations and metaphorical elaboration. Symbols
encompass human reality complete. All things and acts which are primarily
functional in the human world are also always symbolic but not all symbolisms
are necessarily functional or pragmatic in any concrete sense. Sometimes they
occur for a purely symbolic purposes, or spontaneously happen for no apparent
reason at all.
******
Symbols intermediate between the ideational
constructs of the human mind and the many physical signs occurring in the
environment--they are the synthesis of this intermediation, always having
analytically an ideational component and a sign set. It may also be said that
ideas are the synthesis of the dialectic between symbols as such and signs, and
signs are what remains once we've removed ideas from symbols. This informs a
kind of complex dialectic in which each may be a synthesis of the other two
components. Mind thinks symbolically and dialectically--deduction is the
inference of signs and/or symbols from the dialectic between ideas and symbols.
Induction is the synthesis of ideas from the conjunction and signs and
symbolisms. Symbolic abduction is the derivation of a symbol from the dialectic
between ideas and signs. Another way of putting this is to refer to ideas as
general metaphysical concepts and signs as particular, metonymical percepts. The
intermediate level consists of metaphorical symbolisms.
Symbolic development underwent a critical shift in
orientation, from extensiveness of mind to intensiveness of world view, when
symbols went from being based upon primitive ideas rooted in signs of the
natural environment to being based upon derivative signs based upon
independently existing ideas. The environment became transformed from being one
of a field of natural signs to one of a socio-cultural construction of
conceptual signs as reified ideas. Symbols switched from being 'sign oriented'
to being 'idea oriented'. The function of symbols shifted from a general purpose
mechanicalness to a special purpose organismic orientation.
'Signs/symbols/ideas' like 'mind/language/culture' is
in fact an integral, singly unified reality. The categories are useful
analytical divisions which in fact describe a single complex process of mind as
an unfolding stream of collective human consciousness within environmental
contexts. It describes the dialectic of mind in terms of how mind creates
itself--tracing the movement of 'meaning' between intensive center and extensive
environment. There is no way of clearly separating exactly what a sign is from a
symbol or what an idea is without reference to some symbolic sign. Signs,
symbols and ideas do not have exclusively concise boundaries.
This complex dialectic describes the developmental or
unfolding process of mind interacting or symbolically mediating with the
environment--or rather as the process of mind as a dialectical synthesis as the
mediation between environment and experiential human beingness. Symbols mediate,
negotiate, transact, identify the critical boundary between self and
world--symbols create a 'boundary' of identity which relates our beingness to
the world.
Symbols have an 'evocative' function vital to human
identity and beingness in the world. It is this which empowers symbolism as the
expression of mind.
******
A reflexive characteristic of our metalogical
metalogue about the question of 'what is human reality?' is that our
definitions, meanings and our information and communication are all primarily
symbolic and metaphorical in construction and function, and we may refer to
metaphorical symbolism or symbolic metaphors which compose the fundamental
quality of human beingness.
'Metaphor' comes from the Greek word meaning 'to bear
over', 'referring to a transfer of the sense of one word to another', and is
defined 'a figure of speech in which one thing is likened to another, different
thing by being spoken of as if it were that other; implied comparison, in which
a word or phrase ordinarily and primarily used of one thing is applied to
another…'
A 'symbol' is defined as '1. Something that
represents something else by association, resemblance or convention. 2. A
printed or written sign used to represent an operation, element, quantity,
quality or relation as in mathematics or music.' It comes from the Greek
'symbolon' which means 'token for identification'. A sign, token, pledge by
which one infers something, from 'symballein' or 'to throw together'. It is also
defined as 'something that stands for or represents another thing, especially an
object used to represent something abstract; an emblem; a written or printed
mark, letter, abbreviation, etc. standing fort an object, quality, process,
quantity, etc.'
The key symbol of meaning is the 'word as metaphor'.
Without language, humankind would have no culture nor civilization: Language is
the principle symboling system of human culture--it is the voice of mind.
Meaning is principally metaphorical, phenomenological, psychological and
abstracted from basic concrete percepts. Meaning is something suggesting
something else or its antithesis to human rationality. The word as metaphor
functions as analogy, comparison of similarities and the relationship between
different or disparate things, 'affecting' a meaningful crossover, or
'identification' between previously unrelated symbols, bridging differences and
creating new possibilities of relationship, patterns and integrities and
imposing alternative frames of reference out of an original context of meaning,
fusing together different meanings of different symbols to create new meanings
and new symbols.
Metaphor is connotative, suggesting new associations
and possibilities of meaning, expanding meaning qualitatively beyond mere one to
one correspondences between words and their dictionary definitions, as if they
were mere numbers or names or signs with the most immediate referents. It is
this metaphorical quality which allows us to reference more than is immediately
available to our sense, that allows us to go further in our meaning structures
to posit inferences and to ask and answer questions.
"A
metaphor, and, by extension, a trope generally, equates on conventional point of
reference with another, or substitutes one for another, and obliges the
interpreter to draw his or her conclusions as to the consequences. It elicits
analogies, as perceptions through language, so to speak, and those analogies or
perceptions become the intent and the content, of the expression.
Figurative
usage, then, because it makes a kind of prism of conventional reference, cannot
provide a literal field of reference. It is not formed by 'indicating' things or
by referencing them, but by setting pointers or reference points into a relation
with one another, by making them into a relation that is innovative upon the
original order of reference. It 'conveys' a re-negotiated relation, but, not
being 'literal' in any sense, cannot 'point' to it. Thus we may say that it
'embodies' or 'images' its object, figuring sympathetically by becoming itself
that which it expresses. When we speak of things that do not have conventional
referents, then out manner of speaking must itself become the referent. The
effect of the construction is embodied in its impingement upon conventional
reference; this impingement is simultaneously what it is and what it is
about." (Roy Wagner; Symbols That Stand For Themselves; 1986:6)
To write 'metaphorical symbolism' is something akin
to 'mixed metaphor' but more like 'power politics'. It is difficult to say
exactly which term, 'metaphorical' or 'symbolism' is the more general and
inclusive. The expression metaphorical symbolism is used to suggest more than
just a category of mind or a class of symbols--but to emphasize the point that
all symbols are by their intrinsic nature 'metaphorical' and thus to emphasize
as well the 'something standing for something else' function of symbols.
Furthermore, metaphorical symbolisms express or stand for a characteristic
feature of human inter-relatedness to reality--human beings define meaning,
express significance, relate to reality through the use of metaphorical
symbolisms. In a sense, it is a propos to refer to human reality or to human
relativity within reality, as irreducibly metaphorical and symbolic in nature,
and in structure.
"Any symbolic metaphor provides a conceptually
definitive frame of reference/inference serving to dichotomously separate and
distinguish aspects of reality--internal/external, subjective/objective,
figure/ground--'outer forms frame an inner meanings'. One may refer to
alternative symbolic functions, like 'dominant symbol', 'master symbol', 'key
symbol' or 'summarizing metaphor' or 'elaborating metaphor' but the primary
function of all metaphorical symbolisms is to serve as a frame of reference for
the conveyance of human meaning. In order to do so, any symbol must have a
primary referent which serves as 'signifier' or a 'denotation' which is concrete
and derived from the physical environment. To reiterate, all symbols are
ultimately derived from and refer to nature, no matter how abstractly or
indirectly. This primary referent may be simple or complex, either taken
directly from empirical, perceptual reality or else composed of many diverse
elements drawn directly from or abstracted indirectly from Mother Nature. This
primary referent serves as significant marker in that it embodies and
incorporates relatively significant meanings which are recognizable, however
unconsciously or structurally or concretely by the knower. The act of
recognition is a form of humanological involvement, an expression of the
inter-relatedness of human reality, bringing meaning to it.
The symbolic metaphor is applied, or recognized and
created within a universal reality of human meaning which is both continuous and
ever changing--a dynamic continuum which forms both a relational context which
is all encompassing and within which symbols are created, destroyed and
recreated, and reconstituted by new meanings and new relationships. Meaning is
derived from the human inter-relatedness with symbolic metaphors. The act of
recognition of a symbolic metaphor as a frame of reference/inference is properly
known as the function of 'identification'. The marker or primary referent serves
as a cognitive, symbolic boundary which identifies meaningful
differences--defining the identity of human meaning. Identification is a process
of differentiation of meaning inside and outside of the boundary of the symbolic
marker. Differences between relationships or 'things' or meanings outside of the
boundary and inside of the boundary are emphasized as relatively significant,
while the similarities are de-emphasized as relatively insignificant. Attention
is focused upon the figure in the foreground, outlined by the symbolic frame of
reference/inference, while the background if ignored. Furthermore, differences
within the boundaries of the symbolic marker become emphasized, the similarities
ignored, while the similarities outside of the boundary are emphasized to the
ignorance of differences.
Humans create their meaningful reality through the
process of symbolic identification. Furthermore, as frames of
reference/inference, metaphorical symbols also function as symbolic mirrors of
meaning, as a vehicle of both subjective reflection and of objective projection
of the self. Identification within human reality is properly a process of self
identification through the reflective/projective process of human
interrelationship. Symbolic identification expressed as a process of
interrelationship between external differences/internal similarities and between
subjective reflection/objective projection, defines the secondary referents of
symbols and metaphors. The primary symbolic referent serves as a metaphorical
mediator, or a medium of expression, a frame of reference for the identification
and recognition of the relationships of secondary reference." (Lewis;
unpublished manuscript, 1986: 53-55)
******
Symbolisms 'relate things' in an unmarked manner, and
'thing relations' in a marked manner. Symbolisms come in two basic forms--things
to be related and relations between things. Unmarked things and relations imply
contextual neutrality--a lack of significant emphasis which reinforces the
status quo of the identity of experience. The usual or 'normal' state of being
in the world is such an 'unmarked' manner of experience.
Marking significance is a matter of emphasis and may
have either a positive or negative connotation and lead to either positive or
negative evaluations of experience. If the 'normal' state is positively valued,
the tendency would be to mark negative evaluations of difference in a covert
way, i.e., unconscious symbolic context of experience and to overtly mark
positively evaluative 'things'.
'Relating things' temporizes space, and 'thinging
relations' spatializes time. Symbolisms of things are expressed
spatially--relational symbolisms are temporal. Matter is made of 'things' and
the 'thingness of relations; and mind is composed of the relations of things.
******
Analytically, human experience may be divided into
cognitive, emotive and conative or motivational categories or modalities. Like
'mind/language/culture', and 'idea/symbol/sign' it is better to consider
experience wholly as a unified field of 'cognition/emotion/conation'. This unity
is achieved through articulation of symbolisms in the environment and can be
spoken of as being 'synthetic' in dialectical structure. There can be no clear
separations between cognitive, emotive or motive components of experiential
events--all ideas have an emotional and a motivational dimension and all
emotions have an ideational construction and motivational implication.
It is by the 'cognitive/emotive/conative' unity of
experience that we can usefully recognize the internal structure of human
experience as a process of dialectical symbolization. All is experience is
structured, or integrated in this way.
******
Human consciousness is engaged in the process of
fixing symbolisms in the environment to fit intentional frames of mind or ideas,
and also in fitting frames of mindness in order to fix symbolisms in the
environment. Fix and fit are the mediation processes of human symbolization
which constitute its dialectic. This symbolic dialectic is critically related to
human adaptation to environmental change. There is a human predisposition to
preserve the constancy of symbols across differing contexts. But the process of
change, variation in the context, disrupts the symbolic continuity of
experience, so the need for fixing and fitting symbols within their contexts in
order to make sense of them is continuous and never ending as a process of human
consciousness. Failure to do so creates psychological incoherence which is
unsettling and dysfunctionally maladaptive. The process of fixing and fitting
symbolisms is referred to as 'framing' and there is a proclivity towards
preserving constancy and consistency of symbolic 'frames' across different
contexts.
******
The two functions of symbolization are reference and
inference. Reference is the process of relating a thing to its contextual
relations with other things. Inference is the process of determining a thing by
its interrelationships within its context of understanding. Symbolisms used
referentially are 'names' for things. Symbolisms used inferentially describe the
'verbal' relations between things.
Reference related to the denotation of a
thing--inference to connotation of relationship. Reference is deductive in
deriving something logically from something else--inference is inductive in
something else being derived from a thing.
Symbolic
frames are simultaneously frames of reference/inference. Mind functions
according to the dialectic of reference/inference frames. Any symbolism entails
both an explicit reference and implicit inference functions.
******
Symbolisms become 'fixed' by investment of certain
emotive 'values' in their structure. These values are achieved by 'marking' or
highlighting the symbolism in a figure/ground context. There is an emphasis upon
certain significances or order of significances and of stress which leads to
metaphorical salience and metaphysical importance. Emotions become encoded
through symbolisms into our cognitive mappings of experience and are recalled
through 'elicitation' and read by 'evaluation'. It is the cognitive evaluation
of symbolisms which leads to our sense of 'understanding'--it is their emotive
evaluation which leads us to their 'feeling' or 'sense of relevance'.
'Values' as organizing principles of the lifeways of
people and their ways of life have a symbolic structure of 'evaluation' which is
emotively fixed or fitting. Symbolisms have come to have an evaluative structure
in the way in which they dialectically articulate human cognition, emotion and
behavior.
Linguistic practices, through marking/unmarked,
over/covert categories or relative inter-or intra-sentential code
switching/mixing in our everyday usage of language, reveals the subtlety of the
symbolic process.
******
The primary human function of symbolisms is evocative
(to call forth, to elicit or bring forth). This evocative function always has
cognitive, emotive and perceptive elements. Symbolisms evoke meaning and
reaction. Evocations are basic stimuli to complex attitudinal and behavioral
responses. Specific signs or sign patterns act as triggers which actually
precipitate response--symbols generalize this stimulus function of signs from
their particular contexts of occurrence.
Symbols also 'fix' this evocative function in certain
environmental configurations--similar symbolisms evoke similar ranges of
response and experience. This 'fixing' stores latent or potential 'energy' in
environmental configurations--complex symbolisms become a reservoir of pooled
'response potential' which can have a delayed release and a triggering
threshold. Thus symbolisms come to have a relative value in their evocative
potential. This evocative potential 'empowers' symbolisms as the mediators of
transformational experiences in changing environmental contexts.
From the standpoint of the individual, an important
point of this evocative function is its emotional expression. The symbolic
synthesis is part of an emotional expression. The symbolic synthesis is part of
an emotional dialectic which integrates psychological and physiological
processes in natural and social environments. Emotional energy becomes 'stored
away' in certain symbolism--evocation of these symbolisms provokes or
precipitates the release of the flood of feelings--the stored potential
emotionally expressed energy dammed by behind symbolic frames.
******
Experiential isomorphism of mind and matter confers a
sense of symbolic symmetry of experience--a symmetry reflected by cognitive
consonance, emotive harmony and symbolic resonance within the environment. It
renders human reality reflexive. Cognitive dissonance is the result of a lack of
symmetry between experience and the environment. Experience and identity seeks
an equilibrium between mind and matter, a sense of ecology of beingness in the
world. Disequilibrium results in cognitive dissonance, and requires readjustment
of mind and matter in order to reestablish symbolic symmetry.
Such a synthesis presupposes a normative conception
of mind as a balanced, 'steady state system'--it is precisely this sense of the
identity of experience which makes possible a normative conception of the world.
It is actually a mechanism for the mediation of environmental change in the
environment, allowing ecological adaptation of the individual in the world. As
such, it is a mechanism of evolution. It presupposes a sense of adaptive,
functional integration in the world, which may or may not exist except as a
relative state.
******
Symbols are derived from configurations of signs--all
symbols are contextual in that they are derived from and conditioned by the sign
context in which they occur. As such, symbols depend upon their contextual
framework as an 'extrinsic' part of their 'negative definition' or connotation
by association with other elements. It is this contextuality of symbolism which
gives to symbols their unconscious depth of multidimensionality if meaning and
which renders them the vehicles of empowerment in motivating and directing human
action.
Symbols cannot stand completely isolated and
separated from all relational contexts--their coherence and relevance would
dissolve away into a chaotic disarray of separate signs. As such symbols are
always found interconnected with other symbols and thus become grouped according
to different 'principles' of patterning. Symbols have a boundary of their
possible experience--an outline which distinguishes their outer contextual
'horizon' and an inner structural 'horizon' which carries it across different
contextual frameworks and incorporated a range of variation of profiles. It is
this boundary which is transformative, variable and malleable and yet which
retains a net, overall thematic consistency in the life and function of the
symbol.
Symbols are composites of signs--they are
epi-phenomenal artifacts of human experience and the vehicles of human
condition.
It is this contextuality of symbolism which makes
them relational and relative and the by products of dialectical transformation.
******
Unconsciousness is the internalization or
introjection for the symbolic contextuality of our environments. It is always
encompassing and comprehending, always relational and yet indirect. It is total
and complete in its openness and all inclusiveness and yet our consciousness can
only cast light on only small portions of it at any time. All symbolisms must be
found or fit within a relational context in order to carry meaning--the
contextual relations of symbolisms must become internalized in the unconscious
as implicit, connotative, latent and over components of meaning which
'configure' the outlines of symbols upon a background.
******
Symbols are commonly related to other symbols,
normally occurring in groups or 'symbolic complexes'. People come to have sets
of expectations as to the cognitive coherence and perceptual consistency of such
complexes--these sets of expectations are quite cognitive and behavioral
'frames' into which experience becomes sorted and rendered significant.
Cultural environments are 'universes' composed of
interconnected 'symbolic constellations' or groupings of centrally oriented or
focal 'symbolic complexes'. A library is a culture historical cosmos of mind
composed of many books, each a symbolic 'constellation' made up of chapters,
paragraphs and sentences that represent interconnected 'symbolic complexes'. A
word is a 'sign symbol' or a 'symbolic marker' made up of sets of signs and sign
relations. Signs are relatively independent and arbitrary but when grouped
together in different arrangements create different symbolisms.
A cultural universe provides the unconscious
framework of an individual's consciousness--an individual's conscious is
constrained in definite ways by the kinds of symbolic constellations which
compose his culture historical contextuality. Different symbolic contexts
constrain the consciousness of the individual in different, but distinctive
ways. An individual's consciousness is an active, normative, energetic,
evaluating, selecting, focusing, defining, decision making instru-mentality of
mind which arbitrarily or customarily assigns values to various symbolisms and
symbolic complexes within respective contexts--it functions symbolically,
referentially reading from and inferentially reading into the environmental
experiences of people.
It is by means of the dialectic between the
unconscious substrate, or introjected relational context, and the symbolic
consciousness that people normally manipulate the elements and relations of
their environments and navigate through their collective shared worlds.
The unconscious, both individual and collective is
composed of experiential, referential and inferential 'frames within frames
within frames' that are drawn from the background of the culture historical
context and the 'cosmos of mind'. There occurs between mind, encompassing the
dialectic between consciousness and the unconscious, and the culture historical
context, a cybernetic interaction of symbolization. The on going conscious
experiences of people are 'fitted' into unconscious 'frames of expectation'
derived from similar relational contexts as elicited by the present sets of
experience.
Symbols recur and resonate in environmental contexts
in regular, ritualized and expected ways which are directly or indirectly
constrained by both the 'culture historical' flow of events and the past
relational contexts of understanding which are brought to bear upon the present
experiences.
Symbols which seem to occur 'out of place'--a poor
man driving a limousine, a rich man dressed in rags, or an adjective poised
behind rather than before the English noun it modifies, or a misspelled
word--then its experience no longer 'fits' the expected frames of
reference/inference. Frames then become disrupted and either the symbols need to
be repaired or 'fixed' or else the frames need to be 'reevaluated' and
reconstructed.
'Common sense' is largely composed of the expected,
unconsciously 'embedded' and ritualized regularities of the culture historical
universe of experience. These regularities are frequently left implicit or are
taken for granted in the experience of the environment. Common sense interacts
with cognition in both conceptual and perceptual ways, in the mediation of
symbolic environments which are both ideal and material, cognitive and
behavioral.
******
Symbolic dependency is a cognitive predisposition to
conceive or perceive symbols within expected frames of reference/inference which
leads to selective preference for regularly recurring symbolisms and to the
inability to 'cope' with symbolisms which occur 'out of frame' and to a
cognitive 'dissonance' about the irregularity of such symbolisms. This relates
to the capacity to tolerate margins of error and to the inability to manipulate
symbolisms independently of their expected, 'common sense' contexts.
Highlighting common symbols leads to an 'unconscious' filling of its expected
framework--to its common 'configuration' by which it is rendered significant.
Psychologically symbols take on a significance of their own, largely independent
of the actual experiences in which they occur, but predetermined by the frames
of expectation and the contextual configurations in which they 'common
sensically' recur.
Symbolic dependency leads to 'fixation' of a symbolic
configuration within a given framework or context of understanding--such a
fixation becomes invested with an inordinate degree of cognitive, emotional and
behavioral significance and importance as a centrally orienting and ordering
device of one's experiences. Disruption of such 'significant symbolisms and
their fixed frames' results in a great deal of symbolic disorientation and
confusion, emotional turmoil and to 'behavioral maladjustment' or failure of
'coping mechanisms' to functionally adapt in appropriate or expected ways. The
sense of ego identity undergoes a crises, disintegrating and breaking down.
Developmentally, symbolic dependency may be linked to a 'field dependency'.
Children should be expected to be relatively more symbolically dependent than
adults. As adults mature, they become more symbolically independent, but
symbolic dependency in adult life may lead to a failure to fully mature or
develop either cognitively, emotionally or behaviorally.
Culture
may come to reinforce or encourage or sanction some forms of symbolic
dependency, such as those acts or values relating to paternal authority,
libidinal ties to the mother, or to acts of violence or sexuality, and thus
discourage the development of symbolic independence in these areas. Likewise, it
may encourage development of symbolic independence in other ways and therefore
discourage symbolic dependency in indirectly related ways. Again, there is a
cybernetic interrelationship between the collective symbolisms of culture and
cognitive symbolism.
Symbolic dependency leads to the development of
elaborated symbolic fantasy life, both culturally and cognitively, in which the
relevant symbolisms, divorced from the validation of real experience, become
used in the distorted manipulation of frames of reference/inference. There is a
general suspension of credibility, even though the symbolisms so divorced may
carry heavy loads of cognitive, emotive and behavioral significance. Non-being
is the result of such exaggeration of frames and distortion of experience in
symbolic dependency.
******
Symbolisms become 'fixed' into certain 'categories'
of experience. Such symbolic categories take on an independence of relation--a
distinctiveness of separate identity among commonly related things--which come
to have special significance and come to be seen as pre-existent or previous to
experience, as 'coming before experience' and as therefore existing 'beyond or
outside of the realm of experience', even though its pre-existence must then be
verified by consecutive experience. Such 'categories' come to organize
experience in certain expected ways, and serve to simplify the problems of
maintaining symbolic symmetry in the experience of the world. Such symbolic
'categories' confer a certain a-priori 'imperativeness' to the generic kinds of
experiences which they subsume.
It is in such a way that symbolisms lose their
arbitrariness of representation, their original concrete signifiers and their
functional independence from the constraints of custom and culture historical
context.
Such categorical symbolisms accrete into symbolic
'configurations' which frame experience in certain pre-selective ways.
Configurations become 'fixed frames' which are relatively inflexible and
unamenable to experience in the environment. They are different from symbolic
constellations in that they organize the identity of experience intensively,
working ideationally from within, while symbolic constellations are
environmentally rooted and functionally derived from an extensive orientation in
the world. Symbolic configurations are a special order of symbolic
congregation--they carry past experience forward into the present and future.
Configurations are composed of symbolisms which are marked with special
categorical significance.
Symbolic categories and configurations compose 'world
view' as opposed to the 'natural' symbolic conglomeration of 'mind'. They come
to have a common senseness and 'givenness' which is frequently absent in the
paradoxicalness of mind.
******
Power rests in the Center. Movement toward the Center
represents symbolic empowerment of non-being--controlling change or the
possibility of 'non-being in the world'. Centeredness of world view defines
itself in terms of the symbolic empowerment derived from the super imposition of
fixed frames, symbolic categories and configurations of experience and
expectation upon the world. It is this fixedness of frames, its categorical
imperativeness reinforced by common sense configurations of experience and
expectation, which creates the grand illusion of the Center.
******
Symbolisms provide configurational frames by which to
contextualize and make sense of our experience. We share in multiple frames of
mind which confer a sense of continuity and order to our world and its
experience, orienting us in relation to things in ways which are predictable and
stable. We are actively reformulating our frames of mind in order to accommodate
the changes we encounter in confrontation with new environments. The dialectics
of symbolism are the dialectics of change. We symbolically construct our
realities based on symbolisms derived from past experiences--and then we
reconstruct them based upon modification to fit or fix our sense of change. Or
symbolic realities are constructed, negotiated, interpreted, evaluated and
configured in a world of on going change.
Frames are mostly general and generalizing in
orientation--they contextually relate particular elements of reality. They are
derived from and composed of these elements, but they take on a life of their
own--a metaphorical and metalogical level of 'importance' which 'translates'
change and difference in our realities.
'Frame disruption' occurs when events in our
environments occur which demand our attention but fail to fit our frames of
reference/inference or else work at their margins to undermine their relevance
and significance.
'Frame elicitation' is the calling forth of frames to
met or 'fix' the experience of environmental events or relational situations.
Signs in the environment stimulate or trigger the elicitation of frames, often
unconsciously.
'Frame fixation' is the relative inflexibility of a
frame to be adjusted to fit changes in the experience of environments. Frames
are carried forward and made to 'force fit' such changing contexts.
'Frame reinforcement' are conscious, ego coping
mechanisms which attempt to 'force fit' frames and environmental changes in
ways, cognitively, emotionally and behaviorally, which reestablish the relevance
and importance of the original frames.
'Frame reevaluation' is the effort to deconstruct and
reconstruct the frames in order to accommodate or assimilate the environmental
changes in such a way that restores the frames adaptive significance.
'Frame replacement' or 'revolution' is the complete
destruction of a frame, and its substitution by an altogether different frame
which may or may not incorporate the elements and relational patternings of the
old frame, but always in a new configurational arrangement.
Frames are devices of rationalization and
ritualization of human consciousness and behavior. As rationalizing devices,
they serve to order the experiences of the environment in a way that is
purposive or fitting to the 'design' of the frame. As ritualizing process, they
order behavior in prescriptive and predictable ways, controlling reaction and
response in ways which behavioral reinforce or ideological legitimate the
structure of the frames.
Frames become represented and are reflexive of
culture historical process in the patterning of social networks and in the
unfolding of social movements.
******
Frames are generally derived from 'schemata' that
exists within culture historical contexts. Schemata are the 'elements' of
culture. They are like 'cliché' of speech--they are either words or several
syllable phrases from which larger symbolisms are constructed. Schemata are
combined into schemas or 'strips' which are like sentences or paragraphs. Strips
normally describe or represent a single 'event' or a single combined instance of
experience. Schemata are the elemental atoms of culture history--they might be
thought of as the minimal component units of phenomenological experience. Strips
become the normally combined units of phenomenological experience. Strips become
the normally combined units--they are like 'molecules' which compose the
substantial fabric of culture history. They have a normal sense of ordering of
its component units which combine together for form the patterning of culture
historical process.
It is in terms of such phenomenological atoms and
experiential molecules that we construct, deconstruct and reconstruct our
symbolic realities in the paradigmatic patternings of culture history. Everyday
we are engaged in the manipulation of these minimal units of meaning in the
configuring and reconfiguring of our sense of identity in our world. We take
these units from the culture historical contexts in which the experience of our
world is situated. Our culture historical contexts are internalized in the form
of these units as they occur in groups and sets that form regular patternings.
It is in terms of such schemata and strips that we
build our frame and deploy them in our confrontations with reality. It has bee
estimated that there are natural, normal limits to our innate capacity to
process such units, and that these limits of 'long term memory' define the
structural sizes of various levels of groupings of such components. It is
estimated that the most elements that can be dealt with in the most direct
manner is around a hundred or so, and that the minimal units will be grouped in
composites of no more than five or ten. These one hundred or so elements are
derived indirectly from a larger context composed of no more than five hundred
elements. These five hundred elements can be structurally grouped into a single
taxon which contains no more than perhaps three thousand such elements. Over
time he total long term capacity can be pushed upward fifty or even slightly
eight thousand such 'bits and pieces'.
It is possible that these kinds of structural limits
in the capacity of symbolic systems superimpose other kinds of constraints and
have certain kinds of predetermining consequences in the patterning of culture
history. Any given system of symbolism must have a certain optimal carrying
capacity for its relative order of functioning. Any inputs overreaching this
inherent limit leads to a 'supercritical' state of overload which results in
'events' or damage to the system. Such a system may then 'evolve' into a new
systemic arrangement incorporating new elements and throwing off others, or it
may structurally lift the whole system to a higher more general order or level
of functioning.
It is also likely that the pathway taken by any given
scenario would be to some predetermined extent by the larger structural
relations of power in the context--such that larger more powerful systems tend
to 'swallow' smaller ones, while systems which coexist on a even parity of power
perhaps compete with or mutually resist one another or counterbalance each other
in directive ways.
Power, in its various forms, structures relationships
in definite ways.
Symbol
systems and the contexts which frame them, exist in critical and dynamic
states--their stability is a function of their flexibility to deal with
inevitable changes which alter their composition of elements.
******
Symbolisms accrete meaning, grow, mutate by several
mechanisms or principles of symbolic change. Metaphorically, symbolisms
continuously go through a process of 'extension of meaning' into other contexts
incorporating other elements and relations between elements. The looseness and
fuzziness of metaphor allows meaning to be extended or to be 'displaced' by
other meanings in a gradual but steady manner. Euphemization and Dysphemization
of language are examples of such displacement, in which 'bad meaning' tends to
drive out good meaning.
Symbolisms sometimes transfer meaning or significance
from one symbolic domain to another or from one context to another or from one
environment to another. Metaphorical meaning is easily transferred from one
symbolism to another, and this can follow a whole indirectly line or chain of
such transference such that the original significance may be very remote or
directly unrelated to the symbolism to which it becomes contextually related.
Symbolisms can also change from the mechanism of
'stimulus generalization' in that they signifiers of the symbolism become part
of another class or group of 'stimuli' to which the symbolism becomes attached.
Symbolisms can also be modified by continuous or
proximate analogical association to other symbols, such that the traits of one
symbolism become associated with the traits of the other one.
Signs,
Symbols and Ideas
Symbols are composed of signs. All symbols are signs,
but not all signs are symbols. Signs are the minimal building blocks of
symbols--they are characterized by their recursiveness, redundancy,
uni-directionality, uni-dimensionality and proximity of meaning. The metanymical
function of signs is mechanical and relatively non-arbitrary. Signs are context
dependent, occurring in an order which is not as random as with symbols--they
are 'harder', more highly constrained by their denotational significance.
Signs
may be elevated to the functional level of symbol, than carrying metaphorical
'suggestiveness' of meaning, but in doing so it looses its significant
determinacy. Signs carry fixed meanings--significance, which is always
metonymical, referring to 'things' at a concrete level. Employed in
combinations, signs become symbolic 'markers'--they loose their individual
metanymical significance as vehicles for carrying the metaphorically relevant
meaning of the symbol they stand for.
Whereas symbols function analogically and
metalogically, signs function homologically and relationally by logical
principles which disambiguate its significance. Signs have a communicational
purpose which requires that they have unambiguous significance--a determinacy of
value relatively invariable and inflexible.
Ideas are similar to symbols and signs--all ideas are
symbolic and are composed of signs but not all signs or symbols are
'ideational'. Ideas are the basic units of metaphysical importance. Single
symbols or even signs may be elevated to the status of an idea--'0' (zero) for
instance--but more regularly ideas are composed of sets of symbols in typical
arrangements or configurations. Ideas are abstractions--complex thoughts whose
only concretized embodiments are the signs employed for their expression. Ideas
are not normally constrained by any external reference or bound within a
context, but are 'super contextual'. Ideas are metalogical as well as
metaphysical in function, serving to 'focus' thought in given directions. Ideas
are also normally polythetic and polythematic as nomothetic categories. Ideas
are eidetic and 'meta-relational'--they refer to relations between things and
relations of such relations, but rarely to 'things' themselves. Ideas are
'constructs'--mental images built up from experience, but indirectly separate
from such experience.
A table is an idea of a sign, a symbol and an idea,
as is a 'triangle'--the 'idea of table' may be symbolized by the word 'table'
and be signified by an actual instance of a typical table, but is still only a
mental construct of mind.
Signs
and Symbols
It is important to emphasize the critical differences
and similarities between signs and symbols, as these differences and
similarities underlie the split between the sciences and the humanities---they
inform an important epistemological division in our rational knowledge. All
science is ultimately a study of signs as systems. The humanities are ultimately
a study of symbols as conglomerations.
Signs are 'symbolic markers' which carry specific
significance--as markers they function mechanically and automatically to produce
a significance which is moderated by proximate or sympathetic connection with
other signs. Signs do not 'carry' meaning separately as do symbols--they have
separate significance which is non-arbitrary--it cannot yield up or transpose
its separate significance. It is only in conjunction with other signs or when
signs become promoted to the status of a symbol that they act as vehicles of
metaphor. Signs function as 'markers' serving to anchor meaning to concrete,
contextually determinate reality. Signs are mnemonic devices--perceptual
'markings' which trigger significance.
In a strict sense, significance is a communicational
metaphor for 'information'--it is important for the significant of a sign be
clear and unambiguous in order to efficiently communicate information. They tend
therefore to be hard and strong. Signs denote some definite and specific--they
are therefore concise. Symbols 'connote' or suggest something general and
therefore vague. It is important therefore that symbols are indeterminate in
order to exploit their inherent ambiguity--their relevance depends upon a
'critical indeterminacy' or 'vagueness' or 'indefiniteness' of meaning.
A sign functions--it 'does something', performing an
informational, communicational service. A symbol 'means' something, integrating
by suggestion. Signs are special purpose devices. Significance is always context
dependent. 'General significance' refers to a classificational or taxonomic
function of signs--their hierarchical design--they locate and fix a context of
significant relations around a 'thing'--thereby situating and orienting a sign
within a framework of significations. A symbol may act as a sign, its
metaphorical function relegated to a special purpose by becoming context
bound--symbols come to have a special significance in a given context. A
password is a symbol relegated to the function of a sign. A dictionary is a sigh
system of symbols.
Sign systems communicate knowledge, solve puzzles,
reduce noise and communicate, describe, explain, predict and control. Symbols
systems create understanding, asking why instead of answering how, resolve
dilemmas, 'destruct' the given and determinate, and thrive on noise and
indeterminacy as the groundless ground of meaning.
Symbolic
Cohesion
Symbols readily cohere in to clusters, complexes,
constellations and galaxies because they have a characteristic stickiness--an
adhesive quality which allows one symbol to be readily lined to others. This is
symbolic cohesion.
In order to understand how symbolic cohesion works,
it is necessary to examine the structure of the symbol as a 'thing' and as a
'relation' between things. A symbol functions as a 'metaphor'--it is something,
'anything', which stands for something (anything) else. This metaphorical
function is polysemic--a thing can stand for many things at once--and
'multi-vocal'--a thing can say many things at once. Symbols have, therefore, a
certain metaphorical flexibility which allow them to be adjusted to fit many
different kinds of contexts--they are contextually independent and
generalizable--they are general purpose metaphors.
Symbols have fussy edges--their definitional
boundaries are rarely clear cut but phase into a wider less determinate
connotational realm of general metaphorical saliences. These fussy edges give
symbols an added malleability that allows them to be fit into varying contextual
schemas with relative ease and which allow two or more 'compatible' symbols to
be conjoined--to be hooked together by the conflation of their edges. Words as
metaphors are the archetypal symbols--compounding or modifying words into
phrases is an example of the fussiness and looseness of symbols.
The fussiness of symbols is due in part to the fact
that most symbols are composite sets of 'signs' which function as minimal
building blocks of symbols--these signs can be added to or
modified--conditioned, to alter the form and metaphorical function of a symbol.
Morphological conditioning of words are an example of this sign modification of
symbols.
The metaphorical 'general purposeness' and the
looseness of symbols allows them to be used in several ways--symbols may stand
for other symbols, for themselves, for other 'things' of significance, for
relations between symbols or things, or for relations of such relations. One
symbol may summarize a whole set of symbols, or a set of symbols may elaborate a
single symbol. Symbols can be arranged taxonomically into a hierarchical order
of determinations or can be used polythetically.
Symbolic cohesion is most often weaker than it is
stronger, allowing symbols to be easily conjoined into larger sets and allowing
symbols also to be lifted from one context and put into another. Symbolic
cohesion accounts for the conglomeration of symbols into patterned sets, but it
also accounts for the criticality of the structure of such
conglomerations--symbols systems may disintegrate as easily as integrate.
Systems
and States of Mind
Signs, symbols and ideas form their own separate
kinds of systems which operate at different functional levels of meaning. All
idea systems are symbol and sigh systems and all symbol systems are sign systems
as well, but sign systems are not symbolic or ideational. These systemic orders
inter-function and in most instances co-function and overlap but it is useful to
analytically separate them in order to understand their critical differences.
'Symbolic logic' is an example of a sign system,
despite its name. Linguistics deals with language at the level of a sign system,
but not as a symbolic system. In general, science does not treat symbolic
systems except as these systems are also sign systems. Mathematics is an example
of a 'pure' sign system. A sign system is necessarily a 'pre-determined
relational system'--in this sense it is 'pre-logical'--specified or specifiable
'relational rules' which serve to order and disambiguate its patterns, and
render the interconnections between signs decisive and exact or precise. These
rules function as direct constraints. Natural information systems, as with
chemistry, physics and micro-biology are sign systems predetermined by 'natural
laws'--man made sign systems, statistics, mathematics, traffic signs, cook
books, telephone books are predetermined by 'conventional rules'. Sign systems
tend to be directly and explicitly constrained--its rules are amenable to
direct, explicit explanation. Sign systems have a rational and an empirical
order--signs cannot occur at random or out of order or sequence.
The difference between a sign system and a symbol
system is the difference between a computer and the mind or natural language--a
mind may function like a computer if so constrained and a natural language may
be prescriptively regulated to fit a computer language, but a computer may never
function like the mind or natural language. A symbol system is metaphorical--it
tends to be indirectly constrained, context independent and analogical. It
functions to mediate multiple levels of meaning and mythologically in the
process of identification. Symbol systems are dialectical and 'dialogical'. They
are also syncretistic--composing a hodgepodge or a collage of different symbolic
conglomerations. Sign systems are denotational, symbol systems are
connotational. Sign systems function referentially, symbol systems
inferentially.
Ideational systems are metaphysical--ideas refer to
other ideas or to relations between ideas. Ideational systems are ideo-logical
and metalogical. They are rational systems that are tautological--ideas are
justified by other ideas, and are unconstrained themselves, but are themselves
constraints--ideas are 'rules' or meta-relational constructs ordering relations.
Frames
of Mind
Though Mind exists as a universal, all encompassing
possibility, its real manifestations consist of an infinite number of possible
Frames of Mind, attitudes of Beingness which inform our existence of meaning and
relevance.
Frames of Mind are different points of view, or casts
of light, which give to Mind its holothetic multidimensionality. Frames of Mind
cohere and link together to provide the on-going articulation of the possibility
of Mind.
Frames of Mind do not form a taxonomic structure on
the basis of essential differences in meaning of its components--Frames of Mind
are but varying combinations of ideas which are configured thematically about
some central axis of transformation. Different Frames of Mind may share many
similar components. Differences are not structural, but historical and
contextual--each Frame of Mind is contextualized within a larger comprehensive
framework of the possibilities of Mind.
Frames of Mind do share some common distinguishing
features of design and content. Frames of Mind have a particular provenience of
period and place which defines their cultural historical context of origination,
diffusion, development. Frames of Mind shift provenience as a process of gradual
steady transformation, just as language gradually changes and alters in an
imperceptible way. This transformation occurs regardless of the ideological
attempts to conserve the status quo of world view. Frames of Mind encompass
entire contrapuntal dialectics of thesis and antithesis--at any particular point
they are represented by the complete range of variation of world view manifest.
Frames of Mind are constituted locally by the total relations within the
complete text of their articulation. Frames of Mind flow sequentially--they are
streams of consciousness which appear to be historically continuous and yet in
hindsight can only be studied discontinuously--they are the opposite of the
frames of a movie being projected--where as the animation of the movies is only
an apparent optical illusion of the running together of a long sequence of many
discrete stills, the streams of consciousness of frames of mind are not the
derivative effect, but the primary experience of Mind, where as its analysis and
study entails 'slowing it down' to appear as if it were a sequential series of
skills. The transformational development of Frames of Mind can only be
discontinuously apprehended over the long run. Frames of Mind are set of
relations between things rather than sets of things--they provide formula for
the ordering of relationships between things. Different Frames of Mind can
describe the same set of things in essentially different ways. Every world view,
every theory, every field of inquiry is made up of multiple, overlapping frames
of mind--every Frame of Mind encompasses a plethora of different world views,
theories, fields of inquiry. Frames of Mind have thematic unity, and provide
thematic unity of understanding to diverse sets of date, things, relations.
Frames of Mind are basically 'meta physical' and the relations they are based on
are irreducibly 'meta logical'.
Frames of Mind are culture historical phenomena--they
are like languages and cultures in that they have an historical integrity and a
kind of synergism which makes them unique, and yet Mind is like language and
culture in the sense that all somehow share a similar set of universal
characteristics which define them across time and across the entire range of
variation. Frames of Mind are like 'culture areas' or language groups which are
defined on the basis of phylogenetic relationship.
Frames of Mind are our way of understanding from a
historical perspective in terms of its contextual articulation. They cannot be
understood of distinguished outside of the frameworks of understanding which we
superimpose upon the relationships which constitute it or the language by which
we interpret it--Frames of Mind are subject to the same kinds of biases and
problems of interpretation which all historical phenomena are prone to--they can
be constrained by the world view which predominates and dictates their
reinterpretation.
The understanding of Frames of Mind provide an
approach to the resolution of the paradox of history--the dilemma of rewriting
the past as a reflection of the present. Relational phenomena of the past were
independent of present and yet in some measure events of the present are not
independent of relational phenomena of the past--transcribing Frames of Mind is
by demonstration of how the present is or is not an indirect representation of
the past without the surreptitious projection of ideology. It involves
reconstructing the past as an 'independent event' of the present which
nevertheless has its own historical sense of precursory relations. Events of a
past become written in terms of a previous lost sense of the past which is
independent of the sense of the present. Frames of Mind are Frames of
Difference, focusing upon the relativizing differences inherent in historical
processes of change. Unlike world views they are not collectivizing
orientations, but detotalizing and relativizing orientations, serving to
historically isolate sets of relational phenomena within their contexts of
understanding and articulation. They exist culture historically as the necessary
counterpoint to any collectivizing world view, assuming that all world views
cannot be total or absolute in a sense of not being subject to processes of
historical change. Reconstructing past frame of
Mind is a hermeneutical problem of philology. It is a
vital and prerequisite problem if contextualization of the past in terms of the
past in a non-ideological manner is desired. At no point is the collectivity of
humankind comprehended by a single world view or paradigm--each point of time is
characterized by a plurality of perspectives and multiplicity of points of view
which provides the chaotic tension of the times--the dramatic sense of culture
historical importance. Past Frames of Mind provided the motivations and the
rationalizations for historical action which are basically lost to our present
world view. We cannot fully reconstruct these past frameworks of mind, but we
can come to a sense of their critical differences through the ideological
disinvestment of our own Frames of Mind and through seeking the unity of Mind
which constitutes the principle identity of humankind. In such a search for lost
difference, no stone can be left unturned, no matter how 'irrelevant' or
trivial, whether in relation to our own fields of view of to those of other
culture historical contexts. We can do no better than the excoriation of
identity to get to the problematic core of basic, underived differences.
Frames of Mind are always heterogeneous and complex
interactive phenomena encompassing the complete local context and configuring
this against a general universal context of possibility. They are continuously
dynamic in that they are subject to historical changes and process of
transformation. And yet different Frames of Mind share similar sets of things or
relations between things, recomposed differentially--the total range of which
may actually be finite and limited and the relations between which may be
systematically ordered in some complex manner. Different Frames of Mind are
united by a common ground in the possibilities of mind--sharing a similar
relational context which allow the possibility of intercommunication and mutual
recognition and understanding between peoples.
Cognitive
Dissonance and the Experience of Stress
Symbolic disequilibrium between experience and
environment induces a state of cognitive dissonance--cognitive dissonance leads
to a need to assimilate new environment to one's experiential expectations or to
accommodate ones expectations to new environmental problems. Cognitive
dissonance is the expression of the experience of stress which is created by
inexorable change. Stress becomes expressed cognitively, emotionally and
motivationally. Stress is a symptom of experiential disease of the self in the
environment. Overwhelming stress leads to a breakdown of the mind as an adaptive
mechanism for the mediation of change in the environment--trauma may result in a
'conversion experience' which leads to a consequential experiential
inflexibility--a fixation upon the stimulus of the traumatic event. Pathology of
mind--disintegration of the identity of being--is the long term consequence.
Mind
as an Adaptive Mechanism
Natural 'mind' evolved as a super organic adaptive mechanism or managing
change in the environment. It evolved at the level of the individual human
being, as a dual cybernetic system--an integrated natural sign system and
natural symbol system focused exclusively upon perceptual images. The
dialectical synthesis of a natural sign and symbol system was a primitive
ideational system of mental images derived from experience--perceptual events.
This ideational system may have been largely un-self-reflexive. Symbols remained
'sign oriented' and the natural environment was largely a 'sign dominated
environment'.
The evolutionary ecology of 'mind' sign systems were
'mechanisms of selective perception' allowing reduction of noise and
indeterminacy in complex natural environments--allowing maximization of carrying
capacity of environmentally adaptive information for purposes of 'organic
communication'--biological transmission.
Symbolization of signs allowed for a greatly
increased order of information processing, arising as a 'learning' or 'stimulus
generalizing mechanism' which enabled 'adaptive radiation' into a broad range of
environments. Symbols were largely perceptual images--concepts remained
'concrete' and 'non-abstract' . symbols become general purpose tools that could
be carried into different environments--tools were general purpose symbols which
allowed adaptive flexibility in different environments.
The picture which emerges is one of small
groups--family sized micro-bands spreading out from clan sized macro-bands.
Small group survival depended upon the selective fitness of the individual.
Adaptive radiations may have comprised only a small series--a wave of a few
hundred or a few thousand individuals in a kind of 'outward movement'. The
ability of 'mind' to function as a sign/symbol system in complex
environments--not just in hunting but also in gathering adaptations, lead to
'environmental generalizations'.
Two or three such 'adaptive radiations' are
apparently recorded in the hominid fossil record--the earliest is the highly
successful Homo Erectus. Later the adaptive radiation of Archaic Homo Sapiens.
Finally came the radiation of Modern Homo Sapiens in the upper Paleolithic
50-35,000 BP.
It is impossible that these early adaptive radiations
were characterized by mechanisms of species wide 'self selection'--preferential
mating of 'successful hunters/gatherers' and a gradual loss or culling of less
fit members. This early selective mechanism focused upon the mother infant bond
which promoted longer post partum infant dependency periods, a reduction in the
rate of ontogenic development, selecting for greater cognitive growth and longer
periods of 'learning'. Poor mothers would have been unsuccessful in
reproduction. Crucial to infant cognitive development would have been
peripatetic exploratory behavior, encouraging 'field independence'. Infant
orality--putting things into the mouth might have selected for mothers who were
able to keep a careful eye upon their infants and who knew the environment and
yet who allowed children to explore.
Saltational episodes, early evolutionary events, were
probably complex phases of rapid reproduction and population growth, perhaps
stimulated by the introduction of new symbols or new 'discoveries' and perhaps
preceded by a previous phase of population reduction or adaptive contraction
which bottle necked a gene pool. Rapid reproductive increase and selection
favored cognitive reorganization of 'mind' promoting symbolization. Successful
'cognitive' adaptation favored selective increase of the population, leading to
a gradually slowing adaptive radiation, which gradually modified the 'new
traits'. This process did not happen all at once, but took place in a series of
'steps'.
In this view, symbolic culture as an ideational
system that is conceptually oriented and highly abstract is largely an
'epi-phenomena' of human evolution--a burgeoning development of human 'cultural
evolution' (development) which emerged more recently and slowly but
exponentially began to depart from the tract of human biological evolution.
Seen in this light, culture either as process or as
material artifact is largely a secondary, derivative phenomena occurring long
after the cognitive evolution of human 'mind' as an adaptive mechanism in
complex environments.
Regulatory mechanism of 'culture' and 'cultural
ecology' the bio-psychological functions of culture arose after the evolution of
human mind, as secondary development and involved the development of the
ideational systems component of 'mind' as a symbolic system--putting to service
a symbolic system which had its own reasons in a previous evolutionary epoch.
Pre-cultural symbol systems were 'natural symbol
systems'--symbols derived directly from nature. These systems served several
interrelated functions--their primary function was to mediate changes in complex
environments--by the framing of events by 'cognitive maps' derived from previous
experiences. The empowerment offered by 'symbols' is to be found still in their
evocative function to elicit modes, moods, memories and physiological and
psychological responses which have their origin in 'instinct'--whether it is
mass hysteria, stress response, hypnosis, exotic ritual, mass media preoccupied
with sex and violence. They create the illusions of fear, of the separation of
death and non-beingness, which have their symbolic source in the biological
being of the primeval human being. The behavioral and physio-psychological
responses symbol systems evoke are discrete and measurable. Natural symbols
order an d channel such responses into appropriate patterns. The return to the
communitas of 'primitive states' of being is a natural inclination.
Symbols stand intermediately between ideational and
sign systems, serving to mediate and integrate these levels into a coherent
'whole'. This relates to the symbolic system function of individual
identification in the dialectic between being and non-being. Symbol systems
provide a 'cognitive identity of experience' of the individual which allows
functional adaptation to strange environments. This begins at the perceptual
level--the identity of perceptions--and becomes a cultural ideational identity
of conception. With the development of culture, natural mind of the individual
becomes displaced by the rational mind of the culture bearer.
With evolutionary development of mind, sign, symbol
and ideational functions differentiate and become more systematically distinct.
With
the development of culture history, symbol system come to have a higher,
separate ideational function which is critically related to the organization
structure of the social order. At this cultural order, natural symbol systems
come to have a sign system function which becomes contextually bounded and
conventionally non-arbitrary, tied by proximity to other symbols and come to
have a 'cultural evolutionary and culture ecological' super organic purpose. In
their ideological functional, abstract idea symbols cease to be arbitrary in
their implicit arbitrariness--having a functional significance of their own,
distinguishes from the sign function of natural mind.
World
View and Cybernetic Systems
The 'world view' of 'mind/language/culture' defines a
centeredness of overlap and integrative congruence between sign systems, symbol
systems and idea systems as a single cybernetic system. As sign systems, idea
and symbol systems are subject to the same kinds of constraints as all sign
systems but as an idea and symbol systems they become used 'both ways'--as sign
systems and as symbol systems and as ideational systems--the constraints as if
signs are lifted as symbols and ideas.
It is possible to cross reference sign, symbol and
idea systems with analytical categories of mind, language and culture, and to
investigate the relations between each of the nine combinations of the matrix.
It is also possible to speculate about the
evolutionary order of development of 'world view' from signs to symbols to
ideas, as a sequential unfolding of increasing sophistication. This sequence is
reflected in the development of writing--from idiographic and rhebus and
syllabic signs to alphabetic world symbols to modern concepts; but it is more
likely that 'primitive' 'signs/symbols/ideas' co-evolved together into more
complex 'signs/symbols/ideas'.
There is a sense of systems rooted in percepts--in
perception based experience--and of 'primitive systems' adaptive function to
process perceptual information. 'Sign systems' remain basically perceptually
rooted systems, though the signs may become conceptually abstracted from root
percepts. Symbols systems are anchored to sign percepts, concrete or abstracted,
but float loosely upon the conceptual, completely abstracted level. Idea systems
are no longer so anchored to percept based signs.
An 'etic' view of 'world view' would interpret symbol
and idea patterns as 'sign systems' in the way that the natural sciences elicit
from patternings of natural events basic ordering rules. An 'etic' view depends
upon the 'natural ordering' of human cybernetic systems, of symbols and ideas,
as if 'signs' and attempts to elicit what the rules for such a natural
arrangement might be. An 'emic' view deals with symbol systems as symbols, idea
systems as ideas and symbols, and tends to treat all human sign systems as if
symbolic and ideational.
As sign systems the cybernetics of 'world view' has
'nothing but' significance--but as 'symbol systems' they have 'something more'
importance.
Symbolic
Traits and Metaphorical Functions
The cohesive structure of symbols confers upon them
other traits and other functions as metaphors which are ordering principles in
the patterning of symbolic conglomerations. Symbols have depth and a
multidimensionality which allow them to recur and co-occur upon several
metaphorical levels of significance simultaneously. This accounts for their
'duality' of design--they function not only as signs at the level of
signification and as multiple metaphors at the level of salience, but they also
function metaphysically at a level of general relevance which is primarily
abstract. These three levels are designated as 1) metonymical significance, 2)
metaphorical relevance, 3) metaphysical importance. Each of these levels is
characterized by the degree of contextual dependence/independence of function.
A limited number of symbols can be used in an almost
infinite number of possible combinations to create an endless variety of
combinations. Nominal symbols refer to 'things' or other symbols--'verbal
symbols' refer to relations between things or symbols. Summarizing symbols refer
to whole sets of symbols, elaborating symbols elucidate a single symbol.
Dominant or master or key symbols are focal symbols which subsume or summarize
symbolic conglomerations. Strong symbols have strong cohesive characteristics,
weak symbols weak cohesiveness. Hard symbols are less fuzzy and more
determinate--soft symbols have greater conglomerations and less determinacy.
Peripheral symbols occur upon the margins of conglomerations, core symbols occur
near the center. Dependent symbols modify independent or unbound symbols.
Abstract symbols are mostly metaphysical--concrete symbols mostly metonymical.
Orienting symbols and organizational symbols are used to order symbolic
conglomerations--to 'center' them structurally. Independent symbols stand
alone--accreting their own significance or meaning free of context, or making
their own context.
Besides sharing all their design features of human
language, such as semanticity, prevarication, truth value, duality, hierarchy,
displacement, etc., symbols also have other characteristic functions. Symbols
may be synonymous or antynonymous. Symbols function analogically and carrying
meaning which is metalogical. Symbols are both reflexive and referential. They
are arbitrary. Symbols must occur in arrangements which are internally
non-contradictory and externally consistent with other symbols or experiential
reality. Despite their fuzziness and plasticity symbols cannot be erroneous or
out of order in arrangement. Despite arbitrariness, symbolic arrangements follow
conventions and are constrained in an unrestricted sense.
Symbolic
Conglomeration
Symbolic cohesiveness allows symbols to be aggregated
into conglomerations or congregations of various sizes. A minimum number of
symbols may form 'sets' or clusters--clusters may be congregated into larger
sets or 'complexes' of associated clusters which may in turn be further
aggregated to form entire 'constellations' which have a centeredness of
gravitational attraction. Constellations are grouped to form whole cultural
galaxies--what might be referred to as 'civilizations' of symbolic forms. These
civilizations occur within a single integrate cultural continuum referred to as
the symbolic universe. Symbol 'sets' of various orders have different
integrational functions experiences--presenting themselves in a series, ordered
one after another. They are read as a cultural narrative of experiences, or
'events' which are sequential in arrangement.
Symbolic complexes organize domains of
experience--different categories of complexes produce different categories of
experience--they are 'trains of events' or separable, qualitatively distinct,
'episodes' of experience. Symbolic constellations order different symbolic
complexes as 'trait complexes' which have a particular spatio-temporal locus.
Symbolic constellations resemble bounded 'cultures'
within a given geographical locale and historical period. They are an
arrangement of a series of episodes into a particular cultural historical
'epoch'. This is the level of experience which has received the greatest
attention by traditional cultural anthropology. 'Epoch' are ordered or arranged
into a culture historical tradition of civilization which frequently has a
specifiable boundary or set of long term growth patterns. Frequently this has
been called 'culture area' and has become a way of parsing the globe in terms of
cultural geography.
Traditional civilizations tend to span several
distinctive epochs, and may have a 'civilizing influence' extending well beyond
boundaries of political control. What characterizes symbolic constellations and
galaxies are not so much defining boundaries so much as 'complex centers' and
the distances between such centers. Complexity 'centers' symbolic
congregations--such complexity is made up of the local or regional integration
of symbolic complexes--several such complexes or sets of complexes overlapping
in such a way as to provide a symbolic unity of experience or of different sets
of experiences in an orderly and organic manner. Within a tradition such centers
go through a developmental cycle which leads to 'cultural evolution'--the
branching of traditions into different directions, the coming together of other
traditions, their extinction.
Cyrstallytic
Structure of Symbolism
Dialectical 'signs/symbols/ideas' cohere into
'symbolisms' of mind--salient focal points upon the culture historical
landscape. Symbolisms are the nodal points of the symbolic networks--the points
of overlap, conjunction and disjunction along symbolic pathways. They are
critical points of transition or transformation of mind, from one state of
beingness to another.
Symbolisms have a characteristic 'crystallytic'
structure--their reiteration and conglomeration forms recognizable complex
patterns which have a sense of symmetry, order and balance but which are
infinitely variable in design. Symbolisms are able to refract dialectical mind
through many different facets of beingness simultaneously. Similar symbolisms
within larger complexes take on characteristic, characterizable forms which
serve to distinguish them from other kinds of symbolisms--one symbolism will
have a similar structure as a similar symbolism--however separated in space and
time and though the actual symbolic markers or components may be heterogeneous
and quite different from one another.
It is this crystallytic structure which allows
different kinds of symbolism to integrate into organic complexes which then come
to have a super organic or synergistic function. Symbolisms have definite
compatibilities and complementarities with other kinds of symbolisms which allow
them to become functionally integrated and specialized.
Symbolism have their original function in the
individual's beingness in the world--and though they may be integrated to form
complex organisms, these larger entities come to reflect and take on many of the
basic characteristics of these symbolism on an independent, individual level.
Complex symbolism thus become organized into patterns which resemble the organic
organization of the individual. This allows us to compare levels of symbolic
integration in homologous and cybernetically related ways.
The crystallytic structure of symbolism not only
determines their patterns of development but sets the critical limits to the
growth in complexity of symbolisms, beyond which they are subject to 'random
events' which increase the likelihood of their disintegration over time.
The crystallytic structure of symbolisms makes their
growth somewhat self organizing and also self limiting. It also creates symbolic
'resonances' or reverberations which tend to become 'self amplifying' and
inter-integrative between different kinds of symbolisms--growth and decay in
some symbolisms becomes reflected in the facets of other symbolisms.
Basic
Simplexity and Derived Complicity
Symbols oriented toward the natural environment have
a basic simplicity about their design and function,--they are 'simplex' in the
way that they network mind. Symbols which are derived from ideational constructs
and which are oriented toward ideas have a fundamental complexity or
'complicity' about their design and function. Simplexity is basic and
'primitive' symbolic structure--complicity is always a 'derived' form.
Symbolisms develop from simple forms and functions into complex forms and
functions--they go from a general use design to one which is special purpose.
Basic symbols and derived symbolisms thus organize mind in fundamentally
different ways--the former being 'extensive' in orientation and the latter being
'intensive'. Growth of basic symbol is like an explosion diffusing outward from
a center of origin--derived symbols 'implode' in an ever increasing complexity
towards a center.
Simplex symbols form different inter-relational
patterns than complex symbolisms. Simplex symbolisms interrelate with a limited
number of other symbolisms in many different ways--each symbolism comes to take
on an independent identity of function which cannot be easily substituted by
other symbolisms in the network. Symbolism come to take on a variety of
functions which gives them a versatility but which limits its capacity for any
single kind of function. Symbolisms come to have an externally undifferentiated
design.
Complicit symbolisms take on special purpose
functions which come to define their relationship to other symbolisms--many
different symbolisms perform many different, distinctive and discrete functions
and these functions come to inter-integrate. One symbolism may be easily
substituted for another--it is their function which remains indispensable.
With simplex symbolisms discrete functions may be
lost without destroying the integrity of the whole symbolism--the symbolism
remains symbol oriented in its primary purpose. Complicit symbolisms become
function oriented--individual symbolisms may be lost without disturbing the
functions in relation to the whole.
Simplex symbols act as symbolic ideas organizing a
plethora of environmentally inscribed signs--complicit symbolisms become as
symbolic signs organizing a range of ideas. Simplex symbolism tend to be highly
internally differentiated but grouped on the basis of external differences and
intensive focus. Simplex ideas lack a focus, but have a locus within
themselves--complicit ideas have a focus, a center, but lack an internal locus.
Evolution
of Symbols
Symbolic conglomeration 'evolved' from simplexity
into complexity--individual pathways formed networks of symbolic clusters which
eventually coalesced into larger and larger centers. This 'evolution' is
actually a matter of fairly continuous development of the culture historical
continuum. There was always some minimal symbolic network of
humankind--individual pathways were never completely disconnected or
non-overlapping. And this minimal network arose out of and is directly rooted in
a minimal 'biological network'--the social behavior required for species
survival and propagation. And it is at this original 'baseline' that the first
symbolic rudiments of human culture history are to be found. The symbolic
capacity which later allowed the full scale development of culture history must
have evolved at this first stage in terms of the rudimentary network pattern of
humankind.
Symbo-Logic
Symbolisms, as systems and mechanism of mind, have a
logic of its own which occurs at an unconscious level and which predetermines
and preconditions conscious activity.
This unconscious symbolic logic exhibits certain
distinguishing characteristics--a recurrence and resonance of motifs, multiple
overlapping motifs, a consistent and symmetrical ordering or arrangement of its
components. The symbo-logic is largely an aesthetic symbolism and appeals to an
individual's aesthetic sensibilities and sense of design.
The unconsciousness of symbo-logic is the symbolic
context which is rooted culture historically to larger symbolic context of
understanding. It is an embedded and embodied 'mythology' of meaning which
reiterates and reinterprets and recreates a larger culture historical context
and which speaks unconsciously through the individual 'enactor' who is the
vehicle or voice for bringing it to the level of conscious manifestation.
Symbo-logic is characteristically a hyperbolic mode
of representation of reality--it involves a slight unconscious distortion to
achieve its effect. It is this hyperbola which distinguishes symbo-logic.
The logical aspect of symbolism is its sense of
syntactic configuration or arrangement which gives it relational constancy of
pattern across different contexts. Symbolic syntax is a kind of complex
dialectic involving a multiple number of thematic components contra poised to
one another and indirectly related through another mediating component. This
syntax is hypertactic, syncretistic and synthetic in that it involves conjoining
components by relational linkages. Symbols have a dual function in that they may
be either thing or relation or both--symbols relate other symbols. Symbological
syntax has a 'shadow' effect, a translative and transformative consequence, and
a reflectivity of symbolism such that one symbol is tuned into other symbols
which are contextually related.
It is the systematicity of symbo-logic in their
articulation and manifestation which allow symbolisms to be configured into
complex, sophisticated arrangements of design and to cohere into 'cultural
historical' complexes. Symbolism become 'woven' together in the worf and weft of
time and space to create a tapestry of meaning which represents and reflects the
reality in which it exists.
Part of the syntax of symbolism are the dialectics or
the logic of opposites, of infinite reduction and the multifaceted 'profiles; of
composite 'structures'.
Relational
Logic
The basis of symbo-logos is relational logic--that
set of principles governing relations between things and the contextuality of
things. Relational logic transcribes signs into different signs and involves the
translation of symbolism from spatial to temporal or temporal to spatial
dimensions--relational logic is spatio-temporal. It is hyper physical in that
the relations which it governs are beyond the purview of physical principles
governing the relations between signs. They are relations of partial identity
and relative differences between things based on ascribed values or importance
assigned within a culture historical framework or 'hermeneutic circle'.
This relational logic is nevertheless syntactically
systematic and forms the basis of the structure of the unconscious as it is
embedded and embodied in the relational context. It is based on the
hypostatization of the relation between things and the reification of the
attribution as if it were a 'thing' which embodies the identity and differences
of the things being related. The strength of the attribution is based on the
number of aspects of similarity and differences which it encompasses between
things. For instance, round balls of different sizes are related on the basis of
'roundness' but distinguished on the basis of girth. If such balls were of a
similar color and surface texture then they would held to be more alike even
though their sizes were vastly different. Relational logic involves a balancing
and a weighing of similarities and differences between things to determine the
strength of weakness of the relationship.. it allows different objects to be
taxonomically related on the basis of the number of shared affinities or
ascribed characteristics and thus forms a taxonomy which is polythetic and
non-hierarchical in structure.
These taxons tend to cross cut the physical
perceptual ordering of experience even though the two sets overlap and are
frequently contiguous. Principles of relational logic include:
1) Things spatio temporally proximate are more alike
than things distal.
2) Things of similar shape or form or of similar
sequential ordering are more alike than things of different form or sequential
ordering.
3) Things which share a number of physical traits are
more alike than things which have more differences between physical traits.
4) Things which are symmetrical in design are more
alike than things which are asymmetrical.
5) Things which share the same set of contextual
relations are more alike than things which have different sets of contexts.
6) Relations are more alike than things which have
different sets of contexts.
7) Relations between things tend to be hyperbolic
such that similarities or differences tend to be overemphasized or de-emphasized
such that emphasis of the former leads to a conflation of identity and emphasis
of the latter leads to contra distinction of differences.
8) Similarities tend to be positively values and
differences tend to be negatively valued.
9) Things become relatively ranked according to their
net positive and negative values.
10) Things of higher positive or negative rank tend
to have more salience--the extremes tend to be emphasized and the middle ground
excluded.
11) The systematic exclusion of the of the middle
range of value leads to the hypostatization of absolute values of identity and
difference between relational taxons.
12) These relational values become reified as
substitutes for the elements of the taxons.
13) There is a systematic process of substitution,
Grisham's Law, such that hyperbolic values and attributes tend to drive out or
displace actual relations.
14) Previous values tend to lose their relational
salience and become continuously replaced by more salient values, which in turn
begin to lose their salience.
15) The greater the valence between things the
greater the salience.
16) The greater the salience the faster the rate of
substitution.
17) Things of balanced valence tend to have neutral
value and are the slowest to substitute--the rate of substitution is more even,
gradual, continuous.
18) Neutral things tend to remain in the contextual
background.
Symbolic
Pathways and Experiential Streams
The function of symbolic congregations is to 'channel
experience' along certain spatio temporal pathways--experience becomes channeled
into continuous streams of meaning. Consciousness travels along these streams
both through time and across space. Symbolic clusters constitute individual
experiential pathways, arranging experience into a sequence of events--these
pathways for networks at the level of symbolic complexes--symbolic networks
situate individual experience into communities of relational, interpersonal
experiences. Separate such symbolic networks may converge or overlap into a
complex aggregation with develops a 'locative' center orienting different orders
of experience in an integrated way. A set of such centers forms a regional or
interregional dynamic leading to a complementary functional integration or a
widening sphere of influence extending over wide areas of space or continuing
through long frames of time.
At symbolic centers, networks converge and overlap
and take an essentially different structural character than in simple
aggregations. In such a way it can be seen how individual streams of experience
become channeled into converging common streams of cultural experience, which
flow 'together' in centers which constitute 'pools' or experiential reservoirs.
While pathways multiply and criss-cross in ever increasing social entanglements,
streams of experience steadily converge into a collective pool. In such pools,
'collective experience' takes on a 'corporate' character, such that the total
range of experience extends beyond the single spans of individual experiences.
Symbolic
Mazeways and Mental Mapping
Experiential pathways structured symbolically into
congregation and networks become a labyrinth of experience--a symbolic mazeway
composed of corridors of movement and change, turning points, intersections,
doorways and windows, walls and fences and open areas. The mazeway becomes an
expression of symbolic unconsciousness, or the unconsciousness is the expression
of the symbolic mazeway of mind--as it is composed of the collective 'unknown'
pathways which represent possibilities of experience. The existential
problematic of the individual is to learn how to negotiate these mazeways in a
successful manner, such that movement down a corridor does not lead to a dead
end but to gateways through which other openings may be found. We acquire
'cognitive maps' derived from our own or other people's experience--ideational
symbolisms which 'map' onto the mazeway and allow us to successfully negotiate
it. Mental 'maps' are cognitive constructions of experience of environments.
Centers
of Gravity, Centrifugality and Centripedality
Symbolic galaxies and cultural groupings have a
centeredness of gravity about which all symbols become oriented. People and
things become defined in relation to their centeredness. This field of gravity
attracts and pulls everything towards the center--it is a great constraining
force preventing movement from the center or crossing over to other cultural
centers. The force at the center is much stronger than at the
periphery--beingness at the center is much more constrained than beingness at
the periphery.
Cultural centers have a centrifugality and a
centripedality--things and people are thrown off from the center, diffusing
outwardly and other things are pulled into the center through gravitational
attraction.
The push and pull of cultural centeredness is the
result of symbolic displacement--two ideas of mind that cannot occupy the same
point in time and the same place. Symbols have an inertia, mind has a beingness
of its ideas. Movement of some ideas toward the center entails displacement of
other ideas from the center--movement of ideas from the center creates a vacuum
which draws in other ideas away from the center.
The center of gravity of a cultural grouping defines
the structural integrity of that symbolic constellation, the web of
relations--the culture historical fabric. The sense of integrity is greater at
the center--the consistency and coherence. There is less ambiguity or
uncertainty at the center. There is greater overlap between culture historical
boundaries and spatio temporal boundaries. Reality at the center is much more
highly 'structured'. There is greater momentousness of mind and culture
historical momentum at the center. There is greater symbolic and relational
'density' at the center, hence greater inertia. The closer to the center
something is drawn, the steeper the gradient for such movement, and the more
difficult such movement becomes. There is hence greater degrees of displacement
towards the center, with a corresponding greater centripedality.
The
center of gravity leads to an accretion of symbols toward the center, a gradual
aggregation of such symbols until a critical phase line is surpassed, at which
point forces of randomization begin to set in leading to the disintegration or
disaggregation of the center.
Symbolic
Universes and the Cultural Continuum
A culture is a limited grouping of particular people
in a given time or place--frequently circumscribed by a linguistic or
territorial boundary--or it is the distinctive way of life of such a grouping. A
culture exists in history. A culture consists of a given 'galaxy' of symbolic
constellations which accrete centrifugally about some 'center of gravity'. But
culture are rarely if ever completely isolated from other cultures--there is
always some degree of interchange across cultural borders. Culture describes the
pan cultural characteristics of humankind as it occurs through all time and
across all space, and the 'cultural continuum' is complete range of
intercultural relations and interchanges serving to situate separate,
distinguishable cultural groupings within a larger field of relations. The
cultural continuum encompasses all boundaries between cultural groupings,
whether of space or time or of kind, as being semi-permeable and non-absolute.
The cultural continuum itself has no recognizable boundaries--it encompasses the
symbolic universe of humankind as the total, but infinite, range of symbolic
variations and combinations available through space and time. The symbolic
universe has no edges and no beyond in an extensive sense, except the
unknowables of death and non-beingness.
It is moot point to ask whether there are not
multiple symbolic universes. There are as many separable symbolic universes as
there have been cultural galaxies and symbolic constellation with their own
center of gravity. These differences though are intensive and qualitative--there
may be infinite variations upon common themes, and no definite historical
boundaries but these remain many variations upon a finite number of common
themes. Cultural galaxies may be internally and intensively infinite, but they
remain always extensively bounded and finite in the fixed range of its
variations. Intensively, there are multiple symbolic universes, but extensively
there remains only one, and that is the symbolic universe of the cultural
continuum--the human universe of 'culture' as a defining characteristic of
humankind.
Though there are no extensive boundaries of the
cultural continuum, there are definitely recognizable 'horizons' of our
understanding of its universe, beyond which our knowledge gives way to the
unknown. As we approach our human horizons, knowledge gives way to ignorance,
and is replaced by myth and prejudice until we are no longer able to deal in a
scientific world of fact but in one of fiction. And this is an approximate
matter--approaching an ever receding point of absolute zero--or of absolute
nothingness.
Dialectics
and Dichotomies
The dialectical tradition reaches back to Plato and
Aristotle and took the form of discursive argument between an opponent and a
respondent in which the arguments were framed in a syllogistic arrangement. It
was not demonstrative in the way that syllogistic logic was held to be, nor was
it rhetorical or convincing as 'eristic'--the success of the dialectic was to
achieve an effective and relatively objective question and answer dialogue about
some central theme of discussion.
This dialectic tradition formed the basis of western
scholastic tradition up until the 18th century--it was the core part
of the curriculum of every major European university with but minor variations.
Even so, dialectics in the traditional sense has fallen by the wayside as a
polemical practice, with few surviving records of its many instances, or else it
has come down to us 'Hegelian Dialectics' which involves a transcendent
synthesis as an intrinsic part of the counterpoint between thesis and
antithesis.
The important point is that our academic tradition
remains steeped in an embedded tradition of dialectical practice though it has
become largely unaware the extent of its influence in the modern world.
Dialectics allows for a thematic dichotomization of reality between a thesis and
its opposite antithesis--an affirmation of identity and the negative denial of
difference. It is this dichotomization of human reality which provides the
consistent and extended tension of reason and relevance for theoretical polemic
and discourse--it also opens the way for falsification and prevarication of
truth.
The dichotomization of human reality is a consequence
of the pervasiveness of the dialectical tradition. Such a tradition has been
rooted in the importance of basic oral dialogue as a fundamental part of the
socio cultural fabric of language in a public forum. Dialogue and discursive
practice is at the heart of dialectics as a tradition of intellectual practice,
and dialectics was principally and purposely achieved by means of such
dialogical exercise. It also points up in the dichotomization of reality between
thesis and antithesis the essential duality of human understanding and meaning
systems as these are projected symbolically within cultural contexts. Basic
terms such as identity/difference, being and non-being, means/end,
rational/relative, mind/body, nature/culture, male/female, becomes the focal
center point for such dialectical discourse, pursued formally and informally as
an exploratory intellectual exercise in asking and answering questions.
Symbolism
of Cyclical Time
All time is cyclical--the circle is the only method
of for the measurement of time. The circle and the center of the circle are the
symbolic embodiments and spatialized representations of time (the clock).
The exact, ever diminishing perfect center of the
circle is the symbol of perfect, eternal time--time which transcends changing
and comprehends absolute peace. It is perfectly motionless time. Concentric
circles about the center expresses relative time which is also real and
incomplete time. It is the time of the cosmic which is in endless movement about
the center. The circle represents infinity--as the endless movement of time in
space. Distance from the center is the relative degree of change. The further
from the center the greater the rate of change, the faster the movement of time.
All change emanates from the center and orients itself around the center in
cyclical revolutions.
Linear time is the unfolding of cyclical time
projected upon a single plane. Linear time becomes spatialized time. The view
from the center must see linear time as 'progressive' and purposive--as an
evolution of events unfolding in a determined direction of change.
The
center constitutes the greatest degree of control over change. It represents
absolute control. It is the symbol of the Oculus or the pan optical eye of the
cosmos--the omniscient knower or envisor of truth.
The number of revolutions counted from the baseline
of time are the indexes of measurement of the degree of change from a point of
origin. Time is spiraling out worldly.
Journeying closer to the center is to embody greater
timelessness as the center of being. Journeying to the center is a journey to
absoluteness--absolute power, truth and time. Standing at the center of the
circle is to empower oneself with an omnipotency and omnipresence of spirit. It
is a symbolic and ritual act of absolute control.
Spirit always exist at the motionless, changeless
center--the exact center of the hub of the spokes of the turning wheel.
Emotionally, the center is the point of origin. It is
the womb of the mother. The essence of the female element. Time and change
become a male-female dialectic of roundness and straightness, pole and fountain,
etiphallic penis and vulva.
Natural time is time ordered periodicities and
sequences of events--eclipses, waxing and waning of moons, diurnal/nocturnal
rhythms, biological cycles, seasonalities of plants and the growth cycles of
animals, living and dying.
Calendrical time is ordered cosmologically by the
counting of the cycles of the sun and the moon. There is agricultural time and
historical time.
Mechanical
time, clock time, machine time and developmental time of the modern era with
increasing degrees of the symbolic directions of time. Time is linearized and
vectorial in its symbolization of force.
Cybernetic time are the cycling of systems of
information--the rate and capacity of the flow of information. Scientific time
is symbolic of prediction and control of physical processes.
Symbolic
Ecotones
Symbolisms and systems of symbolization evolve
boundaries and borders in the regions of mind which define the limits of their
adaptiveness and functioning. These boundaries might be described as symbolic
ecotones which serve to separate different symbol systems and to control and
constrain the interaction between outer and inner regions demarcated by the
boundaries.
Different kinds of symbolisms may overlap to some
extent, and thus integrate to form a large system, but symbolism of the same
order or kind tend to be mutually exclusive of one another which it becomes the
function of the ecotone to maintain separation and distance.
Ecotones are the edges of the adaptive radiations of
symbolisms in culture history. They are the adaptive boundaries of time and
space which determine where and when one style or trait ends and another takes
over.
Symbolic
Integration
Symbolic
Mediation & the Psychological Construction of Reality
The purpose of this chapter is to get at the basic
mechanism and sense of organization of the brain that accounts for its
evolutionary function in the creation and articulation of human culture. The
human brain is held to serve basically and generally as a symbolic pattern
recognition devise that leads to characteristic patterns of response at all
levels of perception, cognition, language and behavior. Typically, a number of
distinctive structures of the brain serve this general function in an integrated
way. We can speak of the brain functionally as a symbolic recognition-response
apparatus. If we sought to accurately model the human brain as an artificial
intelligence machine, then we would want mostly to try to capture and simulate
this process of symbolic integration that the brain achieves.
This symbolic processing is a direct result of the
complex cerebral structures that are built upon more basic brain structures. In
an evolutionary sense, the human brain is an outcome of selection for these
structures, and therefore symbolic processing must be seen as a natural outcome
of the hyper-development of more basic structures in the brain, and the basis
for their integration in the life of the mind. The basic functions that symbolic
processing serve are no different than the functions served by most animal
brains at different levels, and it can be most clearly understood in these
terms. It is a difference both of quantity and inherent quality of this
processing, that results in a structural informational patterning that is
fundamentally symbolic.
Mind is the self-aware human brain that has a sense
of biographical, traditional, and historical context within a cultural system.
Mind is the synergistic product of the functioning brain that is situated within
some anthropologically coherent context. Mind is therefore the net and total
symbolic patterning that the functioning of the brain achieves.
This sense of mind is fundamentally symbolic, and
therefore, it is basically culture. We can say unequivocally that the human
brain evolved as such, as a device for the carrying and creation of human
culture. It follows that if we are to better understand the structure of
cultural patterning, we must understand the functioning of the brain, and if we
are to understand the patterning of the brain and mind, then we must understand
better how the brain functions to create and transmit this patterning.
It does this primarily and exclusively through the
use of symbolization, such that if we are to understand either the brain or
culture, we must first have a clear idea of what human symbolization is and
exactly how it functions in the organization of our lives.
This argument is for a strong connection between
brain and culture, and implicitly, between brain, culture and language. This
connection is not deterministic in a one way sense of cause and effect. Again,
the information system described is a non-linear control system with feedback
cycles involved at multiple levels. Therefore, straight- forward attributions of
linear causality are misleading. It implies a strong form of cultural and
linguistic relativism, and a cultural cognition hypothesis.
While I am a relativist, and do adopt a relativistic
argument, the issue of relativism is one of inherent limitations of knowledge
and should not be confused with theoretical construction. Of course, a
relativistic hypothesis of a connection between culture and cognition does not
preclude the role of the brain or language in mediating this process. Just
because people of different cultures tend to think and act in different terms,
which is quite obvious to anyone, does not mean that in an organic and
structural sense most brains are not essentially the same.
The essential similarity and comparability of brain
structure among all humans accounts for the fact that on a fundamental level,
the structural patterning of symbolization, culture, and language will all be
quite similar and fundamentally inter-translatable. At the same time, this does
not preclude the notion that different languages frame thoughts in different
ways, and these thoughts lead to different patternings in the brain.
The argument I present herein is mostly derived from
advanced research I have conducted on symbolic framing over the past few years.
It has led to a fine tuned understanding of human symbolization, especially as
this is situated within cross-cultural contexts. It takes this to be mostly a
psychological argument, and I would argue for it being the basis for a
distinctive form of psychological knowledge that I call symbolic psychology. It
leads to the notion of the psychological construction of reality as but part of
a larger phase of cultural integration of human reality.
At the outset, I would say that in the cultural
context of a social grouping, symbolic psychology has definite linguistic,
social and cognitive facets. These must be understood as the consequences that
the symbolic structure of human informational patterning plays upon our lives,
as cerebral and brain-based as this may be.
The basis of human symbolization is rooted in the
design principles of Gestalt psychology. It is rooted in progressively refined
processes of basic perceptual pattern recognition that leads to reflexive and
refined feedback loops of organic human response. Memory patterns are organized
by means of the progressive embedding of perception-based patterns in the human
brain built upon multiple levels, and form the foundation of human cognition and
conceptualization or abstraction. Memory processes are themselves largely
pattern recognition in their organization.
We may make several preliminary statements regarding
the pattern-recognition processes of human symbolic consciousness.
Generally, figure-ground relationships are expected
perception-based patterns, such that, any disturbance of the figure or ground,
will result in either a confusion of the relational pattern, or else a
substitution of the pattern with expected material from the subconscious.
In other words, holes normally occur in the
perceptual field as a result of irrelation between figure-ground patterns. These
holes are regularly filed in with "mental" material that is derived
from memory processes of the brain, or else directly from perceptual stimuli
borrowed from the background.
The central symbolic function of the brain is
essentially to disambiguate its normal field of perception. Disambiguation is
tied directly to the issue of clear and correct perception, what can be called
immediate apperception or concrete perception. But in humans especially this
process is fundamentally mediated by higher order cerebral functions, such that
the framework of perception is referenced against an internalized cognitive map
or worldview that has its own sense of independent coherence.
Ambiguity of the perceptual field results in a kind
of noise that interferes with the symbolic processes of the brain. This can be
called a form of cognitive dissonance except that this term has other
psychological implications that are not necessarily intended here. It can be
said that the brain will naturally attempt to minimize ambiguity of its normal
field by attempting to disambiguate that field. It will either borrow material
from the environment in a kind of feedback process, or borrow internalized
material straight from memory, in a kind of feed-forward process.
Humans expect a coherent and undisturbed field of
view. In general, stimuli within this field are considered as neutral and
therefore are ignored. Focus is given to figures embedded in the background.
Normally, there is a differential gradient in a human being's perceptual fields,
between a central focus and a periphery that lacks focus. There may be distinct
zones of perception occurring between these extremes of a perceptual continuum.
This generalization is applicable to both vision and audition, and, to a lesser
extent, I believe, the sense of touch, especially as this comes to focus on the
tips of the fingers. The senses of smell and taste appear to be less refined in
human beings, though I have not done research in these areas.
Not only is there differential focus, especially of
vision and audition, but there is the ability to scan quickly the entire field,
that may be related to a secondary intermediate zone of perception, in search of
incipient or residual pattern clues. This scanning appears to be searching for
relationships that connect the focus to the periphery.
Scanning is also accomplished by searching focus that
goes to all corners of the field looking for clues. In vision, this searching
focus appears to be aligned to a horizontal axis, which seems inherently more
stable than a vertical or diagonal axis. I do not know what an equivalent might
be in auditory search patterns, although I suspect that it is an issue of front
to back, side-to-side, and proximate-to-distal relationships. In visual fields,
we can speak figure-ground, frame or field relationships, relative
symmetry-asymmetry, similar, dissimilar, proportion--tall/short, large small
above-below front-back, side-by-side and hidden form relationships. These
reflect spatial clues and cues. These patterns suggest to me that stereoscopic
and stereophonic triangulation is involved in focusing and in selection and
discrimination of the background field.
The paradox of this is that audition is primarily a
temporal phenomenon. One would expect disambiguation to occur in a sequential as
well as a synchronic sense. Sequential temporal disambiguation has a lot to do
with the selection process from a field of alternative choices, involving a
refinement of the total field. I believe that memory processes are inherently
tied to this aspect of disambiguation and perceptual selection, such that at
different levels there is an attempt to tie together phenomena, especially
change processes, in a temporal pattern or arrangement.
Thus we can describe various kinds and levels of
memory, for instance short-term memory, working memory, daily intermediate
memory and longer-term memory processes, depending on the function they serve in
linking together stimuli at various levels of functioning. These memory
processes all operate simultaneously in the background of one's consciousness,
and compose largely the subconscious of the individual.
If we are to see parallel-processing occurring, it is
not only on the level of concrete multi-sensory inputs, but in the background
level of the multi-functional levels of human memory processes that are
symbolically mediated.
Needless to say, the progressive organization or
stratification of these memory processes are based on thematic and structural
properties of the information being received, in accordance to frames of
expectation and reference that are symbolically defined and are linked to
differential patterns of response. We can identify, I believe, the primary
structural properties of pattern recognition at each level of memory process.
Short-term memory processes serve the function of
immediate apprehension of the perceptual field. That it has a finite limit of
7-11 sequential units suggests several things about it. First, it is concerned
with the functional organization of immediate experience, the ability to deal
with new and incoming stimuli that is a function of change processes. It must do
so very rapidly, almost reflexively. There is an automatic quality of its
occurrence, such that, as in second-language learning, when this breaks down,
there is no basic framework of connection between the inner world and the outer
world and only cognitive dissonance and confusion can result. It is working on
the fly so to speak. I can imagine it as a kind of first-end, first-out
feed-forward organization of information process. It is, as in a card game
analogy, what the individual holds in one's hand at any one moment. Of course,
the cards are always changing, and in a sense, have to change.
This is the second aspect of this first-level memory
process. It is very fugitive and transient and disappears quickly. We lose it
unless we repeat it. It vaporizes rapid. It therefore depends on new incoming
messages being received through the perceptual field. It expects this,
anticipates it, and needs it, otherwise it becomes rapidly dysfunctional.
The fourth aspect of short-term memory process is
that it deals primarily on a purely concrete, figure- ground level. In this,
primary and basic forms of of paramount importance, whether these are abstract
or derivative of nature. It deals with the discrimination of basic sights and
sounds that have only concrete symbolic significance in forming stimuli for
larger gestalt patterns. Thus the brain does not invest much of its resources
into it, though there is a fundamental sense of anxiety or neurotic perception
and field or frame dependency that seems to be associated with it and to some
extent interferes with it.
Thus, short-term memory process is the most matter of
fact level of functioning about which there is little or no attachment of
feeling, conscious or reflexive apperception or feedback usually involved. This
does not mean that there is not an extrinsic context or intrinsic context in
which stimuli becomes selected and apprehended as such, but the actual concrete
apperception of such stimuli seems to me to be fundamentally neutral, and
perhaps must be. It may not be completely neutral, or appear so, as
fright-reactions and evocative stimuli of basic emotions suggests that even at
the primary level, perception, attention and selection are regulated by certain
characteristic and definitive response patterns associated with pattern
recognition and experience at this level.
The fifth aspect of first-level, short-term memory
process is that it is represents a kind of informational bottleneck for new
incoming stimuli. It appears that the human brain is designed to deal only with
a few incoming new stimuli at one time, and this has to be somehow
interconnected to form a pattern. It leads to a frame-film view of the internal
introjection of new stimuli, a feed-forward process, that appears to take in
discrete amounts at a time, rather than on a continuous basis. In this sense,
front-end memory processes must be limited and fundamentally selective, else the
brain would be quickly overloaded with new stimuli on a continuous basis that it
cannot discriminate against.
In other words, the brain chops up the stream of
consciousness on a basic level of concrete experience in ways that are quickly
and automatically processed by the brain. It does this naturally. Of course, it
puts this all back together again such that our internal experience of reality
appears continuous and animated.
This leads to a related question of channel switching
such that the brain appears to be capable of automatically and quickly switching
its mode of primary attention from one perceptual stream of inputs to another on
the fly. Thus, at the level of primary attention, it must be considered that
incoming bits and pieces are chopped in such a way that they are essentially
equivalent units that are exchangeable in the flow process. This is an important
clue to understanding how this works. Clues in audition appear to be basic
sounds that are either natural, phonemic hence linguistic, or unusual sounds,
calls, screams, bangs, etc. Clues in vision appear to be basic geometric
constructs, like circles, triangles, squares, lines, dots, very basic natural
forms, like trees, four legged animals, leaves, etc., and highly unusual forms
that stick out--very odd shapes, and basic colors which are I believe
importantly, always associated with some thing.
Automatic channel switching also suggests two other
similar kinds of phenomena, channeling of perception along one track, and state
dependent perceptual recognition such that altered states of consciousness
result in differential patterns of short-term memory and primary attention.
The crossing over or synaesthesia of perceptual
processes between auditory and visual pattern-based recognition and, to a lesser
extent, the sense of touch and smell, may be related to the tying together of
these patterns in stereoscopic and stereophonic terms. In terms of memory
processes that link together temporally and spatially arranged stimuli, these
patterns may be integrated such that they create an inner "field" of
possible or virtual perception. Deja vue experiences are, I believe, examples of
the synaesthetic aspects of human pattern recognition, however else we may seek
to explain these processes.
It can be seen that cultural influences of pattern
recognition can normally occur in concrete apperception in affecting our primary
perception and processing of new information. Different cultural patterns lead
to different conscious processes that result in parsing the world in
fundamentally different ways.
The clearest example of this is in different language
patterns themselves in terms of the morphophonemic organization of sound
patterns. The broad range of variation of language pattern, by which the
spectrum of possible sounds created by the human speech apparatus is carved up
in different ways, does not need elucidation. That these differential
patternings are evocative of meaning on a very basic and concrete level for the
native speaker, and permit native listener intuition, goes beyond question. To
claim, as some do, that this parsing process results in the same basic picture
of the world for all people of cultures is ridiculous. There is basic
convergence of these patterning in terms of basic forms of stimuli, especially
drawn from nature--but the nuances of association, feeling, response tend to be
different in their configuration. The virtue and universal structure of this
process is that the mechanisms organically involved are species specific and
structurally the same for all normal human beings. This means that people can
learn new languages, and to see and think in terms of alternative languages.
This brings up a final point about short-term primary
processes of memory and pattern recognition, and this has to do with the
centrality of language. Short-term memory processes appear to be highly
correlated with basic oral patterns of sentential structuration of language.
Sentential structuration of language has a lot to do with the syntactic and
syntagmatic/paradigmatic organization of language process on the basic level of
the automatic production and recognition of sounds in coherent patterns. This
issue will be explored in the next chapter relating to symbolic linguistics, but
at this stage it is important to emphasize that it involves memory processes on
a primary level. In oral languages especially, sentences generally are parsed in
units that reflect the average capacity of short-term memory--the magical number
9. Languages appear designed to handle naturally just about this many constructs
"in a period" or "at one time" and its structure is defined
in this way.
Up to this point, this appears to have little to do
with human symbolization, except to explain the fundamental structure of such
symbolic process in human pattern recognition processes. Even very primitive
animals demonstrate very similar processes of concrete pattern recognition at
the primary level, though they lack human language and possibly the
sophistication of our short-term memory, but even our short-term memory on
average appears very limited and primitive.
Symbolic processes I believe really take hold on the
secondary level of memory processing, and this is what is defined as the working
memory processes. It is at this stage that a great deal of attention should be
focused. I will define working memory as that breadth of active memory that is
defined by a person's average attention span. In fact, it is possible that
people actually have several attention spans co-occurring simultaneously, some
short and others longer. If we try to count backwards from 100, we do not
usually get very far before being distracted, even if no distractions are there
to impede our progress. It takes great training of the mind to accomplish such a
task. Another example is to try to hold one thought in mind, unchanging, for as
long as possible. It does not require very long to loose one's train of thought.
I will define this as short span memory.
A more clinical definition of attention span, what I
would call intermediate span memory, is the kind of formula like a child's
attention span is the number of minutes per year of age, give or take a minute
or two. I doubt this is a correct kind of formula to apply consistently to all
people, but it suggests that we can tend to specific subjects or projects for a
period of time, before we tend to become distracted or shift attention towards
other subjects or projects. If one listens to a free and open conversation, it
is not hard to notice the drift that occurs over time from subject to subject,
and theme to theme. It becomes irritating to listen to someone who keeps coming
back to the same subject, or repeats a theme over and over again, albeit in
various ways. The length of intermediate span probably has a lot to do with the
received importance we attach to what it is we are attending to. If something is
of great importance to us, symbolically speaking, then likely we will tend to it
for a longer period of time than if it is of neutral or trivial consequence.
This is a caveat that teachers of any age group should keep in mind. Students
will become quickly bored with subjects to which they can attach little
importance.
In terms of the card analogy, if we consider the
cards in one's current hand as the equivalent of short-term memory, then we must
consider that any one round of play will be the context in which working memory
becomes defined. In this sense, it is not important to remember what has
happened from one round to the next. Indeed, it may be important in order to
achieve full attention in each round, to purposefully forget what happened in
the previous rounds, such that the limited channel capacity of one's working
memory are not entirely clogged with old and irrelevant information. Thus, a
single round might last 5 minutes or linger for ten minutes. In any one kind of
card game, it is predictable that the average length of a round would be more or
less the same, such that if these boundaries are not tended to, then distraction
or irritation will be expected.
If we engage in an open conversation, for which all
people appear to have a basic need at times, perhaps just to exercise and
stimulate certain aspects of their secondary pattern recognition processes, it
is evident that as a conversation drifts about from topic to topic. If we
afterwards query each person about the course of the topics, their order, or
even what were exactly the first or next topics talked about, we are likely to
get different answers that lack agreement. This would indicate a lack of
detailed memory or knowledge, hence a wide margin for error.
Working memory process is therefore of variable span,
depending on the intrinsic and extrinsic importance of the tasks involved. I
would venture that the extreme limits of this span is short-span and what I
would call long-span working memory process, and the intermediate-span
represents some kind of fluctuating average that is a product of the carving up
of the manifold of experience in one's daily life. The long-term limits of
working memory appear to me to be quite variable in fact. If we take examples
from work, play and education derived from around the world, we would find that
in classrooms, the maximum length of a period is usually just under one hour,
and in this period, there is framework for from 2 to 5 subdivisions of span. We
would find also that in the course of a day, there must be divisions every three
or four hours and that the maximum length of a work day ranges between 6 and 10
hours. If we broach these kinds of limits, it is expectable that people lose
their efficiency in tending to the tasks they are supposed to be tending to, and
diminishing returns set in.
In the organization of tasks, such as in schools, it
is evident that from period to period, subjects are varied, such that the
contents of a previous subject do not normally spill over into the subject
matter of the current subject. Students should not be bothered with questions of
the history of English if their present purposes are to study mathematics or
physics.
This brings up several critical points about variable
span working memory. First, some kind of learning process is usually involved,
such that there is a sense of carry over from one period to the next or from one
like episode to the next similar episode. In playing, working or studying,
humans learn things at a different level of attention and organization of
experience, and this learning is progressive in the sense that it affects their
ability to perform and play and function in subsequent periods. This brings up
an important issue about secondary processing, as there appears to be refinement
and modification of performance attached to that processing, such that we might
say, "practice makes perfect." There appears to be a sigmoidal
learning curve, or set of sigmoidal learning curves that occur over different
periods of time, such that in any one period or cycle of learning, there is an
optimum level of learning achieved, beyond which, negative feedback sets in.
It is clear that if we are amateurs at a game of
cards, even a purely chance game like poker, we are liable to lose on average to
one who has, by dent of long-term experience, played the game over and over
again. We cannot fully explain what it is we learn, such that if we were asked
what it is we know, or how do we do it, we are liable to return "I am not
sure" than a detailed report.
It is also true that we tend to naturally sort out at
different skill levels at anything we might try to do. There are different skill
levels in chess, such that if we are good, or even talented we rise to a high
level of performance fairly rapidly. Some people just have a knack for playing
chess, and others do not. If a poor chess player plays all his life, he or she
may still lose consistently to even a mediocre chess player. But this doesn't
necessarily mean that the poor chess player is poor at everything that person
does. That person may be a talented artist or a gifted musician, or a great
cook. And the gifted chess player may know to do little more than play chess.
Working memory is associated with skills and task
performance. Upper limits of working memory have been suggested, such that on
average people may only have command of a few hundred elements in any given
period. Such periods define behavioral frameworks, or settings that are well
defined culturally in certain ways.
In China, students tried to teach me a game of
Chinese cards that was similar to poker. I tried to learn the game several times
over, but after about an hour, I still did not get it. I had no "aha"
experience about the game that allowed me to understand what it was my students
were doing. I tried to reason through the game, and they tried to explain it
logically to me, but still the pieces of the puzzle did not fall into place. I
do not think that it was a sign of lack of intelligence, as I tried teaching
them a game or two I remembered from my childhood, like King's Corner and 5-card
draw or even go-fish. They appeared to become quite frustrated and disinterested
with either game after just a couple of hands.
If this is our definition of intelligence then it is
very narrowly defined and culturally limited in critical ways. It does bring up
the problem solving and puzzle-working aspects of working secondary processes,
associated with skill, learning, and performance, that are conventionally
associated with intelligence, talent and other positive qualities, especially as
these tend to be culturally defined.
Somehow, we come to stereotypically expect that all
Koreans should be great violinists, and that all Chinese are natural
mathematicians, students and businessmen. We expect Americans somehow know to
"shoot center" and invent new gadgets, and Japanese have green thumbs
and rake sand, and Germans create ideal bureaucracies, and British people make
wonderful naturalists, detectives and sailors. Many people even play up such
stereotypes in intercultural interactions. Many of these myths come tumbling
down in cross-cultural fieldwork, when we discover in our samples of experience
and surveys, that the average Chinese is no better or worse in business or math
than the average American. There is some sense of cultural focus and behavioral
patterning in shared contexts that creates a differential of experience,
training and attention. And this can be said to be true of about anything and
anybody we pick to describe.
Indeed, the more we work a problem, or solve a kind
of puzzle, the better we are liable to become at it, and this is regardless of
what it is we are doing. But there appears also to be wide variability in the
natural distribution of talent and also in the cultural differentiation of
working fields of activity and knowledge. Obviously there are some innate
factors of human intelligence operating, but even in problem solving terms, this
becomes very difficult to pin-down, especially in consideration of
cross-cultural differentials. How can we say someone who has no experience in an
area, by cultural definition, is less intelligent than one who, by cultural
focus, has a great amount of such experience. And cultures do come to emphasize
some things in the continuum of possible experiences at the expense of others.
We expect Balinese to be wonderful artists and performers. We expect that all
Blacks can dance and sing and make music. We expect that all Englishmen are
writers and statesmen, and all Italians make good food, wine and love.
In the theory of secondary recognition processes and
working, variable span memory, several points can be made. First, it appears
that fairly formal "rules" apply in most such contexts that determine
performance and ranges of performance, and also determine errors. These rules
may be formalized to some greater or less extent, but naturally occur as
informal or even purely implicit to the performance itself. We do not need to be
a great anthropologists to know how to play the game of Trobriand cricket or to
engage in effective exchange relations with other societies. We may be good
anthropologists and define clearly the rules of these kinds of exchange games,
such that we can predict success and failure, but that doesn't mean we know how
to necessarily play the same games or apply the rules in our own experience.
Our measure of the expert is largely on how well the
individual has learned the "implicit rules of the game" whether they
are formalized or not. This implies some degree of logic, and fairly mechanical
cognitive processing such as counting, comparing, and estimating. If we want to
derive the whole of mathematics from this basic pattern of cognitive skill and
operation, then this might become our game too. So logic exists in game playing
and normal human performance, even if the performance we participate in seems
inherently illogical in its own patterning. Magic is a wonderful example of
this. Magic is usually defined by rules of analogy that in a strict sense are
illogical. And yet, to perform magic well, it is probable that we must apply
logic on some level of its articulation.
Not only are rules learned at this level, whether
formal or informal, implicit or explicit, practical or general, heuristic or
logical, but also, ranges of relationships and things are also learned. We
learn, in other words, taxonomies of knowledge that are associated with the
rules. To some extent, the rules describe the taxonomic structure of what we
learn, but also, we learn things in different sets and larger constellations
that may be separate from the rules we come to apply to these things. Just as
there appears to be variable limits to the span of attention and memory in
secondary processing, there appear to be variable limits to the size and
complexity of the taxonomies that we associate with such processes. Generally,
such taxonomies have some external system of indexical reference by which we can
keep track of them. Thus, they depend for their sharing, reiteration and
reinforcement on their externalization in symbolic form, particularly in
culturally defined contexts.
Taxonomies, whatever form they take, have certain
predictable organizational aspects about them. However they are ranked or
grouped, they form some kind of "table of organization" that is
usually at least a two dimensional matrix. Minimally, like goes with like, and
different are set apart.
We come to think of an expert in a certain thing as
one who has a certain amount of detail of knowledge, and reliability of such
detail, such that this person will yield better than average results, if not
perfect results. If we are to see the whole structural organization of society,
we can see it in these terms. We do not want classrooms with too many kids in a
class, if we value one-to-one and interpersonal contact between the teacher and
the student. And if we are creating mega-sized cattle classes, it indicates that
we are devaluing such interpersonal experience in teaching, and instead valuing
rather impersonal models of such training.
Reliability of an expert is associated with
experience and training, such that an expert in a given area can give very
predictable results, and such that two experts in the same area will give better
than average similarity of results. If a medical problem is very serious and
important to us and the outcomes are great in costs or risks, then we are liable
not to believe the first doctor's opinion we receive. If we seek a second
opinion on a medical diagnosis, and if we find wide discrepancy with the first
opinion, then we are likely to go find a third or more opinions. But if we find
close agreement, we are more likely to accept it as the bottom line.
Another related issue is our expectations of teaching
and coaching in skill areas. We can always blame the teacher for the poor
performance of students, and bureaucrats in America especially love to do this.
Average skill levels in any one area, besides being largely culturally defined
and preconditioned, vary substantially from individual to individual. We can
throw a hundred students into one class, and expect the teacher to achieve
progress with all the students on an equal footing, but it will never be
possible. Ideally, a super teacher who is practically perfect in every way and
who carries magical remedies in her bag and who has infinite, time, patience,
skill and knowledge, should be able to do this. The standards we come to impose
on teachers therefore appear to be abnormally unrealistic to the extent that
they are normally idealistic.
Even given a hypothetically perfect teacher, students
would still vary substantially in their achievable skill levels in any one area,
even if they scored approximately the same on a standard achievement or
"IQ" test. This is to be expected, such that any teacher, no matter
how good, would be fundamentally challenged to bring out the best in each and
every student.
But it is true that a good teacher can bring out a
new level of improved skill in a student. Exactly how this happens in any one
area is open to debate. We can formalize rules, but with our Trobriand
anthropologist this may make little functional difference. We can get the
students to play their skill games, but they may make little average improvement
in their overall level of performance. We may hire a special coach or tutor, and
perhaps that coach has to go back down to basics, and re-teach the entire game
on a new foundation, to get the student to achieve new levels of expertise
previously impossible. Perhaps its all in the wrist, or the stance, or perhaps
in the first chess move or the first sentence. It has a lot to do with an
"aha" kind of pattern recognition that says "the pieces all
finally fit together" and that "I have the correct answer, not just
any answer, but the right one."
There are two sides of this in consideration of
secondary pattern recognition. First, there is at this level usually some
standard of performance, some sense of being correct or incorrect, from which we
deviate and by which we are measured. It demands a kind of perfectionism that
humans seem both obsessively prone to and yet imperfectly fit for. "To err
is human" but error can only be comprehended from some standard of
correctness.
The second side of this is that it is largely a
"aha" pattern recognition kind of system we are attempting to learn
and achieve in our performance. Unless we get the overall pattern of the
"system" involved, we cannot do the game or thing at all. There is a
sense that in complex informational systems at the secondary level, the greater
the "aha" experience we have in relation to any one system, the better
our performance of that system, and the less the rate of error and ambiguity
associated with that system.
To say this is fundamentally symbolic in a way we
might argue with the primary level, by which contrast we can call significant in
a pre-symbolic kind of way, is fairly straight-forward.
Obviously to replay the game over and over again,
from one round to the next, and especially if we are intending to improve our
performance, then it is necessary that we have some kind of cognitive set of
instructions and codifications associated with that performance. Like our mental
tools, we do not have to carry about each physical instance of the tool in order
to effectively use the template of the tool. At this level, we are talking not
just of one kind of tool, but a set of associated tools that serve specific
kinds of tasks.
We can say that symbolically we carry with us a set
of symbolic pattern recognition templates that function like tools by which we
can perform in certain ways under certain conditions and circumstances, and that
we can compare and judge our performance from one episode or period to the next.
I would call this a minimal definition of what is symbolic about human
experience.
This speaks a kind of cognitive symbolic
differentiation of experience into sets, systems, and periods that are
fundamentally irrelevant at the primary level of processing. The same primary
processing applies in any area or set or system we apply it to, but the same
rules and knowledge constructs and tools do not apply in the same way to every
event engaging primary processing.
There is a sense that once we achieve the
"aha" ness associated with a particular framework of behavior and
performance, we do not easily lose that in a symbolic way. Once we learn to ride
a bicycle, no matter how difficult the coordination of balancing, steering and
pedaling might be at first, we never forget it. We may be in or out of practice,
but even after fifty years we can get back on a bicycle and in five minutes ride
it like we've been riding one all our lives.
This is true with almost any kind of structured
activity we can think of, be it surfing, or swimming, or driving or cooking or
cleaning. We have in our mind a hard wired symbolic template that organizes our
behaviors in a coordinated manner that allows us to accomplish a certain kind of
feat. It may take us time to acquire such a template. Obviously, a set of
patterns in the brain is set up such that there is a reticulated pathway between
the important areas associated with the complex performance. When the feedback
loop begins, again always defined in the framework of some external context, it
happens automatically and reflexively, without a great deal of investment in
thinking about it or having to relearn the basic process.
This brings up the related issue. Surely, at the
level of secondary processing, there is some sense of aversion and appetite,
positive and negative association, frustration and response associated to
different kinds of tasks and things we do in the course of a day. Surely, much
of what is defined as abnormally neurotic comes from adaptational dysfunctions
associated with such secondary functioning. There is a sense to that we will
tend to excel in those things we are good at and become recognized for, and that
lack of recognition can even choke off the most talented among us. We tend to
like what we are good at, and love what we spend a great deal of time doing,
otherwise we may become very unhappy and neurotic creatures after all.
At this level too, there is a sense that our
performance and our choices in performance can be influenced by many other life
factors in the background of our experience. We may have bad days and good days.
It could come from a sleepless night, but a sleepless night might come from a
variety of causes. We may have unconscious hang ups--writer's blocks, golfer's
elbows, football knees or ribs. If we drink alcohol, we cannot perform as well.
If we are distracted by an attractive person then we may lose our round. There
may be more deep-seated factors influencing our performance and ability to
achieve either in any given moment, or throughout our entire lives.
This brings up a third basic level of memory
processing, but before I go to that, I would like to reiterate some symbolic
aspects of the secondary level of processing. It appears to be a level that
carries of heavy load in terms of conscious attention. In fact, it defines the
majority of conscious experience, especially to the extent that such experience
is directed to tasks or by goals. It is the level at which everyday language is
normally used and articulated. It is the level at which culture, too, appears to
exhibit the greatest degree of sharing and emphasis of consonance. It may not be
so important whether we really believe in God or angels or the devil, or whether
we like or respect the minister, as long as we show up for Sunday each week and
fulfill our social obligations in this way. This is not being necessarily
hypocritical. It is merely being functional in terms set down by a society. The
environment of the individual's life-world is to be readily seen as divided up
in terms of this level of cognitive processing. Cultural context is also
organized and differentiated in these terms as well.
To a great extent, there does not appear to be a
great affect associated with this level of operation. Most action at this level
seems to be relatively mechanical and indexical--somewhat boring like a
librarian in a library, unless of course the skill has implicit affective
associations in its performance. Dance with a lot of music is likely to be
inherently more playful and enjoyable for most people, even the most or least
skilled, than, say marching in drill.
Human beings seem to derive a natural pleasure and
enjoyment from being able to do something well, even if the skills involved are
themselves limited or even perverse in some way. At the same time, any task can
become tedious if no diversion is allowed, and no variation permitted, or if one
is constrained to repeat a task over and over and over again without
interruption or new learning involved. Captains of industry who are proud of
mass-production assembly lines should pay heed to this anthropological warning.
Frustration from such conditions can result in many different types of neurotic
and averse reactions.
The third level of memory process is conventionally
ascribed to long-term memory. I will ascribe it rather to a sense of
biographical memory that is described in terms of an individual's life
experiences and organization of their total life-world. It is sort of like
Shakespeare's famous lines following "All the world's a stage..." To
the extent that the person's experience is consonant or disconsonance with that
person's cultural and social realities, this experience will exhibit a measure
of affinity and sharing with other persons. It thus will find greater room for
social expression, objectification and external reinforcement, such that they
become "typical." But at this level, there is great room for variation
of pattern, and especially much idiosyncracy that can lead into psychosis and
socio-pathological disordering of an individual's sense of reality and
behavioral functioning in society. The vast social and cultural relativity of
this must be acknowledged also, as the important contribution of Ruth Benedict
to our understanding of human reality. To be deviant with a narrow and itself
relative set of social or cultural norms in any one area or set of areas of
life, particularly if these are associated with secondary levels of performance,
is not necessarily to be intrinsically disordered in a deeper or more
fundamental sense. It only means to be relatively discrepant with the implicit
norms and standards imposed within the context or society.
The biographical memory functioning is the most
classically psychoanalytic and therefore the most conventionally symbolic of the
three levels of function. In this sense, there may be little that is mechanical
about such memory, as affective dimensions and other aspects may have more
importance than the logic or the working value of the experience. It is more the
stuff of dreams.
It is difficult to describe a universal patterning of
organization for this, as it is deeply defined by cultural standards that are
themselves implicit to such patterning in the world. At the same time, they tend
to be highly variable from individual to individual. It is true that it is hard
to put a time value on it in the way that we can to variable span memory or even
short-term memory. In a sense it is inherently timeless, such that we might more
easily remember an experience from a year ago than we remember yesterday or even
an hour ago. We might remember last week better than the previous week. There is
a sense that clarity and accuracy of memory erodes fundamentally with time, such
that with greater age, there are greater holes, hence greater ambiguity, hence
greater filling in with background constructs.
But at the same time, what gets remembered, even with
crystal clarity, and what gets forgotten forever, may have more to do with
affective association and magnitude of associated events in ones life, as
"critical" or shaping or defining events, than with its sense of
importance in any more day-to-day or functional manner. This memory appears to
be often associational and therefore repressible as 'sets' of experience. If we
have some traumatic experience, it can be repressed out of conscious experience
and rendered normally unavailable to us. It may plague us in our day-to-day
functioning like a shadow hanging over our life. It causes unconscious reactions
to things we experience without our direct knowledge or understanding of the
origins of this experience. If, under certain conditions, we are made aware of
the deeply repressed material, it can come flooding back to consciousness as if
it happened yesterday or were happening at the moment. Even very minor details
can thus be recalled.
Thus it is apparent that the stuff of the tertiary
level of cognitive processing is largely the stuff of the Freudian and
Psychoanalytic unconscious, perhaps less all the psychosexual mumbo-jumbo.
It is thus that I refer to this tertiary level of
cognitive processing as the store-room memory. It tends to be large, or at least
of varying dimensions. It is more like multiple rooms all connected by doors
that can be opened and closed. In a certain room, we may clear out the things
kept inside, to make more room for other things. We may even tear down the walls
that partition the memory to make larger spaces, or build new walls to subdivide
spaces. At this level, we rarely go into all the storerooms at the same time. We
visit one at a time, or we stand outside, in the hallway of one level, and look
at all the labels on the doors. At any one time, on average, there is some room
that is open to us to explore, and sometimes, somewhat ambiguously, more than
one. Thus, at any one moment of our experience, whether waking or in sleep, or
conscious or otherwise, some kind of content from this tertiary level is
available for us for processing. It provides a kind of internalized background
by which we can configure our own figure-ground relationships with the world.
Those who appear hopelessly psychotic are sometimes permanently lost in this
inner world of their own making. It is like conscious dreaming that they cannot
wake up from.
As such, this background unconscious material
constitutes the substrate of inner meaning that comes to resonate quite deeply
with the background of our everyday experience of the external world. On very
basic and unconscious levels, we normally derive inner content to use in filling
in and solving the puzzles presented by our external experiences. This process
is quite apparent on projective tasks, especially ones involving inherent
ambiguity as in inkblot tasks. When called upon, we can superimpose on otherwise
quite neutral and inherently meaningless stimuli rather significant and highly
symbolic content that is derived from and organized by our subconscious psyche.
Though there is tremendous variation on this level,
it is still strongly circumscribed by cultural patterning, and it does exhibit
certain inherent structural designs that suggest universality about this
patterning.
First, from a cultural standpoint, on a cultural
level that appears rather superficial compared to deeper psycho-symbolic
dimensions, such patterning can be highly stereotypical in a symbolic sense. I
believe that it can be best characterized as being thematically organized on
this level, such that there is grouping of experience under complex symbolic
categories that are thematically organized. What is a thematic category of
experience.
I would say that anything may become a thematic
category if so construed. Any normal everyday performance on a secondary level
of experience can take on deeper symbolic resonances and ramifications in our
life that go beyond the mere mechanical aspects of what it is we are doing or
are supposed to be doing. And this is what turns the fact of going to church on
Sundays, whether we believe in God or the Devil or like the minister or not,
into an act of faith with many deeper religious connotations than just appear
"good" in the eyes of the elders of the community. In this way, going
to a barber or visiting the grocery store can take on thematic symbolic
dimensions that are in great disproportion to the actual facts of the process
itself. It can become a traumatic or quite dramatic experience in our lives,
particularly if, on the way to the grocery store, we have a headlong collision
or we witness an armed robbery. For most people, taking an airplane trip is a
normal experience, particularly if one is a businessperson who regularly flies.
But if a person survives a bad accident in an airplane, it is likely that the
person will never go on a plane again, or if they do, they will find it an
extremely uncomfortable experience, and for reasons they cannot fully control or
account for.
At this symbolic level, there is more than a little
real voodoo magic involved. Action by similitude or action by connection in the
symbolic world mean that things like one another, though of dissimilar
frameworks, may resonate in the same sorts of ways. Things normally or otherwise
dissociated with one another but found within the same odd symbolic framework
may come to resonate in similar ways. Therefore, a pumpkin in a pumpkin patch
may have the same significances as a jack-o-lantern at Halloween, and by
analogical extension, it could become quite similar to a skull with a candle in
it at a seance.
Thematic organization is largely cultural and
biographical in patterning and arrangement. People pick and choose their own
thematic categories, and create their own symbolic taxonomies. They create
themata from their experience, often rewriting their histories or experiences,
in ways that fit their symbolic sense of order. Thus the inner world that people
construct for themselves, largely built on unconscious themata, may have little
direct connection with the actual world of their experience. But there is an
important connection between the two, such that the external world serves as an
objective frame of reference for this inner world, largely mediated in everyday
experience on primary and secondary levels. At the same time, the internal world
serves as a symbolic frame of reference for the interpretation, and even the
experience of the external world on very basic levels of perception that can
become loaded with affect.
On
a deeper level, the design features of this thematic-biographical storeroom of
tertiary processing seem to be fundamentally mediated by certain characteristic
parameters of personality, relationship, natural associations, and organic
functioning. It is evident that some people are by character more extroverted or
introverted, more aggressive or dependent, more selfish or selfless. It is
evident also that people come to have their status identity defined in basic
ways that resonate on very deep levels the basic relationships between the
mother and the child, the father and the child, husband and wife, between
siblings and friends. We come to see authority figures as being like father
symbols. If we had a negative or antipathetic relationship with our fathers, we
are likely to have a "problem with authority" that affects about
secondary socialization and ability to identify and extend ourselves in everyday
life to more complex role patterns.
There appear to be very basic natural associations as
well. We tend to follow a kind of basic plant, animal, mineral, human or
abstract kind of symbolic consonance such that our experience on this deep
symbolic level is like a kind of living Thesaurus of meaning, homology and
analogy. We seem to have basic pathogenic associations of monsters and demons,
and, antithetically, idealistic associations of supermen and heroes and stars.
Organic functioning can influence this deeper structural patterning of the
unconscious as well, such that illness and drugs can induce dramatically altered
frameworks of experience and consciousness.
Thematic symbolisms and themata can also be organized
and expressive of deeper affective associates, drives, impulses and deep-seated
motivations related to sexuality and aggression. The value of Freudian theory is
that it taught us how conflicts that can be deeply rooted in our psyche can be
repressed, only to surface symbolically in indirect ways.
Indeed, the entire function of symbolization, as a
mediation system in terms of the externalization of drive and meaning and the
internalization of cultural order and experience, is in a sense the normal
repression and expression of experiences that would be otherwise incongruent or
discrepant in some way with external reality. That this is accomplished by means
of symbolic displacement, projection and introjection is therefore
understandable and not surprising. The same mechanisms that can cause
repression, can also be the mechanisms of de-repression.
All three levels of pattern recognition and symbolic
process operate simultaneously in normal conscious awareness to shape our worlds
and our lives in characteristic ways. This patterning is deeply influenced at
all levels by cultural sharing and reinforcement, and by the cultural
structuration of our external world. Symbolisms operate to integrate our world
at all three levels, largely because symbolisms take on meaning at all three
levels simultaneously in the inner world, while usually having some external
form of expression or frame of reference as well.
Thus each symbol is by definition a concrete signal
device, a mechanical device for the organization of knowledge, and a symbolic
device for meaning and projection of experience. Of course, as in language, some
things tend to be more one than another. It is hard to attach much symbolic
content to the word the that mostly has a mechanical reference function in
English as a determining article for a noun. A neutral pronoun "it"
also has little intrinsic value. A world as simple as "I" or
"is" might have much greater value and significance, as it points
inherently to something in English that has much greater symbolic importance and
presence.
Symbolisms not only organize experience and pattern
recognition in a passive manner, but they also tend to organize patterns of
response to our recognition of pattern. They determine and define the frameworks
for behavior and action, and even serve to pattern that behavior itself in
fundamental ways. Thus, not only do we think symbolically, but we come to act
symbolically as well and every action can come to take on symbolic significance.
Symbolic systems are defined by their openness.
Openness means that the elements that compose them can be rearranged into an
infinite number of alternative connotations to produce an infinite range of
meanings. The analogical structuration of symbols, as especially developed by
Levi-Strauss, entails that symbolism is largely flexible such that one thing may
stand for something entire different, even, at some level, its direct opposite.
Symbols can thus be substituted readily for other symbols. It is this great
flexibility of symbolic analogical chaining that permits symbols to help
integrate otherwise different or even contradictory experiences, and also, at
the same time, to continually rework and revise the interpretation of the
experience, or even the perception of the experience itself.
Another important aspect of human symbolization that
is related to its inherent relativity is its relative contextuality. To
understand the full significance of a symbol system, we must get inside it. Most
symbol systems exist within a culturally defined context, indeed, all symbol
systems arise from and must be contextualized within some kind of culturally
constructed context. This makes the meanings and associations found within all
symbolic systems relative to the contexts in which they arise, take shape, find
expression and change within. This relativity is expressed psychologically,
linguistically, socially, historically, and culturally. In a general sense, all
these various forms of relativity arise from and are based upon the fundamental
relativity of symbolization, and since all knowledge is symbolic in structure
and manifestation, all knowledge is also relative to the knower.
Of course, scientists would argue especially that
their knowledge, being objective, is not relative to the knower. In a basic
sense this is true, as scientific knowledge tends to be more contextually
independent a form of knowledge, than say religious knowledge. The relative
objectivity of knowledge is a measure of its relative decontextualization or
context-independence of the symbol systems that define that knowledge. In fact,
technically speaking, such knowledge remains context bound on some level, as is
demonstrated in this book. The contexts that scientific knowledge normally
refers to is defined not by people, but are inherent to the patterning of
nature, even if this nature is basically human in definition.
The model of symbolic cognitive processing presented
so far demonstrates a fundamental tripartite structure of the human brain in
functional terms of symbolic processing and pattern organization. Tripartite
structures, as in psychoanalytic theory, have been proposed, but should be
considered as fundamentally different than the model proposed herein. It is not
to say that these are mutually exclusive models. Superego processes in this
model find their place in the background of our lives and unconscious
structures, and they are largely the measure of the degree of consonance that we
share with some cultural orientation.
There is a sense that sociopaths that lack a moral or
ethical conscious, and who can nevertheless behave in rather normal ways, do not
have the kinds of internalized control structures that "normal" people
have. This is a symptom and a sign of a certain variety of mental illnesses that
will come to express itself characteristically in these people's lives. To some
extent, this can be measured by the degree of "de-individuation" that
a person experiences in some social contexts, a process that leads to permanent
derepression of the person's ego. On the other hand, it is well known that
certain conditions, such as crowding, darkness, stress, and heat, can cause
people in such contexts to become temporarily "de-individuated" and to
behave in ways that are not normal according to the control structures of their
society. These in general are aberrant social psychological phenomena, but they
do illustrate the social and cultural relativity of symbolic processes,
especially as these become internalized and arise from the internal processes in
the organization of mental functioning.
This kind of psychological relativity is important to
understand, because it illustrates the deep and vital interdependency of the
brain as a symbolic organ and the environment in which it is normally situated.
The tripartite structure of human symbolization as I have described it
demonstrates in fairly precise and general terms how it is the brain functions
to achieve a sense of consonance and coordination with the external world. Other
tripartite structures can be described, and these are no less true or accurate a
description of what is involved in the structure of the psyche. The point of
view adopted here rests on empirical research in cross-cultural frameworks based
upon symbolic framing methods. The model therefore arose from and attempts to
explain symbolic processes, and cultural patternings of symbolization, as these
were found in such contexts.
Symbolic framing methodology has been important to
the development of this theory. It has demonstrated, among other things, the
degree to which culture comes to define the content and organization of our
symbolic construction of our world, even on very basic perceptual levels. One
would think that such patterned differences were so great, that people would be
totally isolated in their own solipsistic mental bubbles.
In some strict sense of psychological relativism,
they probably are, except that their bubbles are always situated in some shared
external framework. From this is derived much of the material in their
construction, and the basic design that the brain permits for this construction
process is more or less the same for all human beings. This is the basis for the
so-called psychic unity of humankind. That people can become trapped in their
own bubbles is clearly demonstrated by some forms of mental illness, and that
there can be great disconsonance between the inner world and the outer world is
often found in neurosis and deviance. These can be thought of as natural
consequences of the pattern of variation possible within such a framework.
Individuals in any cultural configuration become
distributed out in some kind of bell-shaped curve of hyper-volume. Most
individuals can be found occurring within one or two standard deviations of the
norm, but some individuals will always be found along the tails. Curves may be
broad or narrow, high or low, multi-modal or otherwise. In general, in terms of
symbolic framing, the difference of such composite curves, as demonstrated on
different kinds of symbolic framing tasks, between different cultural
orientations is marked such that two different sets of curves must be considered
as fundamentally different.
Symbolic framing methodologies may be employed to
track systematically these kinds of cross-cultural differentials, but they can
also be employed to track differentials occurring in the process of cognitive
development, based on the concept of the symbolic differentiation of the
phenomenal field. In general, stages of development have been identified in this
pattern of development, and these patterns are to some extent tied to the
cultural framework in which they are situated. Stages of timing or scheduling of
significant cognitive developments vary both individually and culturally, and
are complexly patterned. The brain is developing in multiple places and in
numerous ways simultaneously, such that straightforward and general descriptions
of the entire process warrant further research.
It should be remembered that such development is
always behaviorally reinforced and symbolically situated on some kind of
defining contexts. Brent Berlin's example of cross-cultural differentials of
color acquisition is a fine example of this. It is evident, as in language
acquisition that a lot of preprocessing and preliminary development of basic
structures occurs. Much of the babbling of a young baby can be understood as the
exercising of the basic speech apparatus before real productivity ensues. There
is much semantic association and encoding on a concrete level that is
fundamentally pre-linguistic. There is a real sense that some symbolic forms are
much more basic and primary than others, and that predictably come before the
development of derivate symbolic structures, which tend to be much more
culturally and psychologically variable. It suggests that on some rudimentary
level, there is a basic substrate pattern of meaning that is shared almost
universally, and these will be reflected in the acquisition patterns of
children, more or less. The difficulty in determining this rests in the clear
and definitive isolation of such basic structures from the cultural overlay that
always comes attached to it. The entire cultural universe always presents itself
pretty much at birth to the child, and remains always present in the background
of the child.
In our everyday experience, if the relationship
between perceptual ground and conceptual figure is not clear, then the natural
tendency is to try to fill the figure in. We attempt to complete its identity on
the basis of previous experience derived from the organism's "frame of
expectations" that might relate to that stimulus field. In this regard,
understanding error patterns of perceptual constancy and mistaken recognition
become interesting, as they lead to an understanding of implicit frameworks of
expectations that individuals share culturally and that lead to differential
patterns of response.
To a great extent, though not exclusively, this
organization of the symbolic processes of the brain, and particularly of memory
structures, is mediated by language. Language behaves like symbolic keys that
can unlock different areas of meaning as these can are embedded in differential
patterns of the brain. Of course, memory process, though organized by language,
can also function separately from language, and thus the two are fundamentally
independent cognitive structures though in their functioning they become
interdependent.
It must be understood that at all levels, this
informational patterning of the brain is organized by two sets of constraints
operating in relation to one another. The first set of constraints is the
built-in design parameters of the universal structural mechanisms of the organic
brain itself. The second set of constraints, no less important than the first,
is the culturally constrained informational patterns that are presented in the
environment of the individual. To a great extent, normal everyday brain
functioning requires its reference and continual interaction with a structured
external environment that is organized in meaningful ways within the brain. The
brain can frequently shortcut its own circuitry by finding immediate reference
to the environmental context it is situated within. This short-cutting of
cerebral function can even take the form of reflexive responsiveness in relation
to fairly sophisticated tasks.
I would conjecture that the original external
patterns of the brain were mostly natural patterns presented by the behavioral
life-world of the proto-human. At this stage, human culture was mostly defined
by its direct relationship with nature. Thus, at this first stage, there was
strong isomorphism of identity between genetic and cultural patterning in the
world. They served the same purposes, followed the same patterns, and led to the
same sorts of conclusions. But even at this early first stage, that natural
environment had one important difference in that it was culturally mediated by
other individuals of a group of which the individual is also a member. In
particular, it became a natural landscape that was symbolically enlivened with
human attributions of qualities and mysteries.
The internalized brain, completely isolated, doesn't
go very far, and this is one of its intrinsic shortcomings. Sensory deprivation
studies demonstrate the consequences of shutting stimuli off from the brain over
the long run. It can rapidly lead into psychosis. The brain is therefore an
organ that is fully adaptive to external environments, and indeed requires these
environments in order to be functionally complete and effective. In this regard,
we can make several generalizations:
Stimuli commonly embedded in the background of one's
life and that are neutral in effect do not normally need to be deposited on deep
levels of memory. We might remember the grass of the field we played in five
minutes or five hours before as green. Similarly, we might have some
prototypical notion of what a blade of grass looks like, but if hard pressed, we
would probably not remember much else outstanding about that grass unless there
was something unusual about it that "caught our eye" and attracted our
attention.
Another way of putting this is to say that human
perception and cognition is "selective" and this selectivity of basic
processes can become extremely sophisticated, as it defines a central symbolic
function of the human brain to discriminate important from unimportant signals.
What gets construed as important is largely a subconscious matter. We do not
have to think about issues very long or deeply if we see a train headed straight
for us.
The selectivity of perception and cognition is in
essence the super-positioning of internalized symbolic frames of reference and
expectation, including what can be called intentionality structures and
motivational structures, upon our experience. Exactly what does all this mean,
and how does it work? I believe that the brain boils signals down on a
progressive sense to get at basic embedded patterns which it can interpret in
one way or another. Symbolic frames of reference are almost as variable and
diverse as the signal stimulus itself. Largely, individuals bring into any
particular behavioral settings a set of expectations, derived from previous
experiences from similar conditions. If an individual comes into an entirely new
and different situation, then there is little it has to compare the experience
to, though it may still try to draw from analogical relationships it can
establish in the field of relations.
Analogy is at the heart of the symbolic structuration
of experience, and permits the flexibility to define and redefine experience in
a variety of ways that may be suitable and consonant with one's expectations,
ambitions, feelings, etc. Analogy can be narrowed through rational frames of
reference to stricter forms of verisimilitude, identity, or relationship. But a
review of any literature of magic and religion will demonstrate that analogy is
a powerful force of symbolic human consciousness that is not constrained by any
necessary pre-constructions or reality testing.
Frames of reference and expectation are largely
constructed analogically on the fly of experience so to speak--in a manner of
loose association. Association generally begins on a wide and loose way, and
there is in the first stages little agreement, and therefore, little
reliability, upon what is construed. But association becomes narrowed with
greater attention and deliberation, such that the mind finally draws some kind
of conclusion. It may be the right or wrong conclusion, but the mind has made
itself up. It has disambiguated the field sufficiently not to require further
investment.
In general, even in figure-ground relationships that
are partially ambiguous, there is a tendency and an effort to search even for
very local patterns that may be disconnected with the whole set of
relationships. Any clues or keys are sought in the earliest stages of pattern
recognition that will facilitate resolution of the problem of ambiguity. Things
then get connected as much as possible, leading to some guesswork and the
superimposition of alternative analogical constructs. Generally, in this regard,
asymmetric forms are easier to disambiguate and decipher than forms with
symmetry. It is as if there is nothing in a symmetrical form to hook on to.
Instead, symmetrical forms are the subjects of direct projection of basic shapes
that may have little relation to the actual object in question.
Just like the brain requires some kind of organized
environment to function in, an environment that is hopefully minimally
non-chaotic, so also the brain needs some internalized sense of order to impose
upon that environment. Ambiguation of figure-ground relation is largely a sense
of discrepancy that arises from our inner view of the world and our actual
experience of that world. The "figure" we find, even perceptually, and
interpret as meaningful, against the "field" is largely the symbolic
figure we "configure" and impose upon the field from our own mental
point of view. We may therefore misinterpret what we see, especially under
extremely ambiguous conditions, or even see what we want to see.
Just as we need a normal frame of reference to
construe and organize the information of our environment, cognitive dissonance
and internal confusion can interfere with our normal patterns of perception,
ambiguating figure-field relationships that are otherwise basic and objectively
unambiguous. This is characteristic of people afflicted with neurotic or
psychotic dysfunctions. Their symbolic pattern recognition processes are
disconnected to the reality of the stimuli around them, or disproportionate to
that stimulus. Thus response patterns that result from that stimulus-recognition
are usually discordant with what would be normal in similar circumstances.
To a great extent the symbolic frames of reference
and expectation that we interiorize in our memory processes and rely upon in our
everyday functioning are culturally constructed and derived from our own
life-worlds. The organization of the interior "cognitive mapping" of
experience reflects, represents and orders itself on the basis of its
interpretation of the external world of relationships, patterns and processes.
Thus, symbolic perception, cognition and apperception
can be understood essentially as a form of projection and introjection of
symbolic stimuli that evokes patterned response. This perception is normally
ordered by basic and natural frames of reference and basic preconceptions, the
common sense of experience that we do not usually even take notice of. But times
do arise, as in darkness, when we come to fill in the gaps of our pattern
recognition with symbolic stimuli that comes from other times and places. We
miscalculate distances without normal frames of reference and trip over things
in our path. We can even see things in the shadows that are not really there.
The analogical chaining pattern of symbolization
characteristic of human mental function is not unlike what is described by
Levi-Strauss. It is built on very basic and core structures that are constituted
by minimal pairs or contrasts. By association these pairs are linked in ever
more complex chains of association to larger and larger sets of items, such that
there is a metonymic function involved. Constituent things can come to represent
the total, and symbolically represent them, or the larger sets can acquire their
own independent symbolic identity. In a sense, in symbolic chaining, everything
is interconnected to everything else either by principles of identity or of
contrast and difference.
To a great extent, the content of this pattern is
determined culturally, especially in traditional cultures that have strong focal
religious orientations. Much of the chaining associations actually arises from
and is embedded in the external cultural framework of understanding.
Associations are derived from the observation and experience of relationships
actually occurring in the world, or that at least are imputed, on some level, to
occur in the world. Supernaturalism and naturalism go hand in hand in the
organization of the world. However much we may want to systematically exclude
supernaturalism from a scientific worldview, at the edges of our knowledge it
always tries to creep back in.
It is by virtue of this analogical chaining of
symbolisms, as they are situated within representative cultural contexts, that
both integration of the individual's internal sense of the world, or worldview,
is achieved as if unitary and whole. The individual point of view, and
patterning of response, is made more-or-less consonant with the cultural
grouping of which that member is a part.
This pattern of analogical chaining can be
demonstrated to have its own minimal structure that can, in conditions of shared
structures, guide inference and reference functions of meaning. This structure
is rooted ontogenetically in the development of the child of emblematic
recognition of the perceptual world, which constitutes the minimum symbolic
parsing of the world into basic forms and their relations. Emblematic
recognition can be considered to be the first developmental stage of the child
leading to the symbolic organization of consciousness. It is characterized by
discrete patterns, such as analogy, diffuseness of object representation and
relation, syncretic-synaesthesic concatenation of different modalities of
eidectic experience. It implies a lack of differentiation between the thing and
the inner experience of the thing, or the unit of such experience in eidectic
concretization of symbolic experience, and direct displacement upon which
analogical chains are based.
Emblematic recognition is fairly mechanical and
incorporates basic figure-ground pattern relationship of direct imagery in a
very stereotypical form of emblematic devices. Emblematic recognition appears to
be fairly context dependent and bound, lacking a great sense of duality between
sign and signification. In other words, there is not great symbolic displacement
at this initial level. Emblematic symbolizations thus are additively accreted in
longer and more elaborated chains within which networks of associations between
symbolizations are built up in time.
In time, a more stable symbolic constancy of form
emerges that permits and is a sign of greater symbolic displacement. These
symbolic systems appear fundamentally undetermined, relatively unproductive, but
fundamentally open in at least one sense, in that they permit the child a very
rapid rate of acquisition.
Emblematic symbolisms in society, like seals, flags,
and badges, can be very basic and powerful in the effect of reinforcing the
basic ties that bind us in the world to the world. The experience of emblematic
symbolism is immediate, direct, concrete, diffuse, and mechanical. It therefore
has strength of affect which more derivative symbolisms often lack. Emblematic
does not go away with the development of more sophisticated symbolic structures,
but only becomes embedded on a very basic level of our awareness and patterning
of response.
The next stage of the ontogenetic development of
human symbolization appears to be the organization of these emblematic chains
and their relational values and connections, into larger categories that are
largely cultural prescribed. This system of classification and symbolic
organization is largely implicit and out of awareness, rendering it both common
sense and transparent to the subject-knower. Though the category may be only
loosely define and hence also undetermined in a basic sense, the category as a
whole tends to take on symbolic significance in place of its many parts. At this
place with a clear form of symbolic displacement occurring that is clearly
cultural constructed. Such categories thus carve out spaces or regions of the
culture-bearers "mindscape" that takes on a characteristic of feeling
"natural." As natural categories, they may comprise sets of relations
and symbolisms that appear very coherent with the natural patterning of the
world in a concrete way, and thus permit the insertion of symbolic
meta-relations between categories to be extended easily upon reference to the
external reality. Though the symbolic construct for the category may appear with
a concreteness of everyday experience, they may comprise actual relations and
significations that in fact are quite polytypic and fuzzy at the edges of
inclusiveness.
Cultural categories are good to think in human terms.
They appear to emerge in a child's second year and form the early basis of a
child's first world-view. Categories emerge and become more discrete and
flexible, and embedded in a sense that categories become parts of other
categories. Categories are very basic in our thought and symbolic processes. We
think in categories when we stereotype the world. This we do almost
automatically. It happens when we divide the world up, including our social
world. It helps to define our own identity in the world, and the roles we come
to assume in that world. Thus, we follow a categorical imperative in our
cultural lives that help to regulate our relationships and identity in that
world in very basic ways that are largely taken for granted as if these were
natural rather than just constructed.
Categorization of the world also entails a labeling
process that is inherent to the symbolic naming of the category, which is the
"nomic" function of language. Hence, categorization of the world
permits not only its carving up of experience and this arrangement into some
ordered set of relations in a shared space, but it permits us to reintegrate and
to manipulate this order and the relations and content it entails, in
sophisticated ways. Categories come to comprise sets of labels that exist in an
implicitly ordered arrangement with one another. They thus, in terms of their
labels, form associational chains of symbolisms that on another level comprise
and summarize a great deal of experience and meaning that is embedded
symbolically within the categories being represented. This can be referred to as
the symbolic representation of experience that permits its integration of a
secondary level of patterning, and which permits the secondary institutional
patterning of society.
The diversity, sophistication and complexity of the
categories of our worldview tends to increase, and becomes more differentiated
as we develop, such that we move to more sophisticated and effectively realistic
meta-models as we develop and mature. This sophistication and diffeentiation can
become reflected in the complexity and stratification of the social world that
we inhabit, and these functions are indirectly correlated with one another.
It can be seen therefore that the secondary level of
categorization has a basic symbolic function that can be understood in terms of
design. This describes the categorical function of the symbol in the
differentiation, mediation and construction of reality. Categories are organized
by rules that permit no internal contradiction leading to incoherence.
Categories are summarized by a label that functions metaphorically and
indexically point to a variety of possible subsumed meanings and associations.
The label defines the nomic function of language, and can stand symbolically for
and in place of the whole category or any part of the category it subsumes.
Thus, we can act and respond in terms of the labels as if we were dealing with
the entire category, and we do not have to invoke the full range or even part of
the range of associations it invokes. At the same time, the label can become
itself part of another category, or can be subsumed in some other arrangement or
readily expanded in its reference, to meet the needs of a changing context upon
demand.
Categorization is very important to the understanding
of the function of symbolization in human information systems. When we can
respond to labels, we can eliminate otherwise a great deal of noise and possible
ambiguity of our field. It allows us even to behave in ways that are automatic
and implicit unquestioned. They constitute the foundation of our cultural models
of the world, and indeed, of the worldview itself, in a very basic way,
providing that worldview with a sense of universality, or comprehensiveness as
well as of the appearance of integration and non-contradiction. Categorization
helps us to render a view of the world that is consonant with our cultural
context, and permits us to define and shape our cultural context in a way that
is consonant with our categorical imperative. This is fundamental to the
symbolic construction of reality.
Furthermore, categorization gives us a very powerful
handle to reinforce and alter our categories in inter-subjective relations with
others, that permits sharing, reality testing, and coordination of our symbolic
constructs. This is done primarily through what is referred to as the
conversational apparatus--basically the oral chitchat that people engage in
daily between one another, mostly on an informal basis in everyday life. It
helps us to stay in touch and in tune with the world, and to adjust our
attitudes and views of the world in ways that promotes coherence and
integration. Categorization through the nomic function of language is very
central to this process in casual conversation.
We can see clearly how this functions in gossip and
information exchange in small, closed communities, and directly how it ties in
with structural pattern of social relationships, especially as these may be
asymmetrically defined. Categorization defines in shared contexts conventional
and common knowledge that permits a degree of communication, consonance and
coordination of activities between people. Sharing the same or similar symbolic
constructs makes this possible. This is always in a state of dynamic tension to
idiosyncratic and individualistic constructions that are part of a private
universe of meanings. This kind of dynamic sets up a dialectical and dialogical
differential between psychological and cultural constructs of meaning upon a
very basic level. We can speak of the divergence of discrepant realities between
people, and also of the intrinsic incoherence and contradiction of meaning to be
found within shared symbolic constructs.
Categorization links and ties together emblematic
sets and chains of relations in meaningful ways. Labeling of categories makes
meanings and significations often implicit to our categories more available to
our experience and more functional available to our behavior. Categories,
labels, and categorical elements themselves can be bound into chains of
associations and larger structures, which can be governed by sets of rules. At
this level, we can tall about a relational-inferential symbolic structure that
has to do with the evaluation of truth-vale and the phrase structure of symbolic
language. This has a lot to do with our ability to test our knowledge structures
for their credibility and sense of realism in relation to our experience.
This level of interrelation between categories is
articulated in patterns of linguistic structure and production that involve
implicit relational propositions about the credibility of something being true
or false. This is referred to as the relational-propositional structure of
worldview. It can be found to be embedded in the structure of our language, in
the implicit logical structure of our semantic understandings of the world
across different cultural contexts, and in the organization of cultural
pre-understanding and inferences regarding social relationships in different
societies. The relational structure is basically inferential and referential in
function, whereas the categorical construction of reality is primarily only
referential in function. I will not at this point elaborate the propositional
structure of our worldview, but will save this for the next chapter. Here,
suffice it to say that it is foundational to the symbolic structure of human
consciousness, and it underlies both our view of the world and our means of
responding to and constructing the world. This is an inherent part of the
meta-logical function of symbolization in human reality.
It is evident therefore that symbolic processing and
pattern recognition are tied to a coherent view of the world, allowed for by
symbolic integration of experience between internalized and externalized
cultural worlds. In order to remain consistent and coherent with the external
world, there must be regular attachment and reinforcement with the world. People
in a sense have a built in need to constantly test their reality structures for
fitness and performance in the world. They may do this in many different ways,
in talking, behavior, relation, etc.
Watching the news or reading a newspaper on a daily
basis is an important mechanism for maintaining a view of the world that is
up-to-date, broad based and relevant to what is going on in the world. In such a
role, news media have important functions in reinforcing and even manipulating
people's worldviews on a daily basis. This kind of manipulation is most obvious
and marked in totalitarian societies that put a premium on propagandistic
control of the media. In such societies, the average person's worldview will be
clearly shaped by such limited parameters, where it is relatively easy to hide
the truth and rewrite history. But the same process is no less true even in
relatively open systems where media often takes its cues through private
sponsorship and government suggestion that can at times be both subtle and all
powerful.
The news is a fitting analogy for the process of
symbolic reinforcement that most people require on a daily basis. It is defined
as a horizontal form of transmission, but the study of its structure suggests
that it can operate on many levels of the individual's psyche. News can be
written not only to selectively inform, but also to selectively persuade, and
the rhetorical function of the news is no less subtle and no less important than
its informational function. That is why media announcement of disasters, wars,
or tragic events, can cause mass hysteria, and major psychological reactions in
people whose daily lives might actually be distant and remote from the source of
the news itself.
Symbolic reinforcement and testing is also
importantly done through what is referred to as the conversational apparatus
that describes the central role of informal, oral discourse in daily life. In
this sense, an important distinction is made between subjectivation of external
stimuli, as if this comes to constitute an important part of the person's inner
life, and even organic being in the world, and the objectivation of the symbolic
stimuli that is often derived from inner experience.
The daily conversationally apparatus allows people to
stay in synch and in tune with one another on basic levels of their identity and
being. It permits people to regularly test their frames of reference and
inference about reality, and to revise these in ways that are coordinate with
that of others.
Symbolic reinforcement of reality structures works
both ways, therefore, and allows cultures to accomplish transmission and
integration of itself through time and across space. Particularly, it serves the
purpose of the cross-generational reproduction of cultural patterning, and its
adaptive functioning in a larger context through chronic revision and
redefinition.
We refer to processes of enculturation and
socialization as primary vehicles by which the symbolic world of an individual's
group becomes internalized and planted into the life-world of the individual,
and by which this symbolic world becomes reiterated and perpetuated in
subsequent generations. This aspect of cultural transmission is very similar in
its general form to that of genetic transmission, as both cultural and
biological processes rely upon the same organism for its perpetuation. Needless
to say, cultural patterning is largely post-zygomatic and phenotypic in
expression. The entire possibility for cultural patterning arises from the
inherent behavioral and functional plasticity of the human brain. If the brain
were not so plastic and variable in its phenotypic patterning, then we would not
need to speak of cultural differences between people, and then we could have a
genuinely successful sociobiology of human culture.
The psychic unity of humankind is based on its deep
functional structure of the brain as an organ that accomplishes certain specific
and general functions. All people see, hear and think in more or less the same
way on the most basic and mechanical level, which we can call the "stream
of perception" level. There are of course differences. Some people cannot
hear certain ranges of sound, and others are color blind, and people vary
considerably and somewhat continuously in numerous traits of intelligence. Red
as a concrete perception remains, as a perceived color, essentially red for most
people, however it may be termed or identified or related to other colors or
not. But from that point on, from the initial parsing to more sophisticated
symbolic framing, cultural and psychological differentials come to insert
themselves with increasing variability and determination into the identity and
being of the brain. And because the brain functions as a symbolically integrated
and integrative organ, to render a seemingly coherent and whole view of the
world, it becomes impossible to distinguish clearly where one kind of influence
leaves off and another begins.
The wonderful symbolic plasticity of the human brain
therefore has made culture possible, indeed, necessary, in the adaptive success
and survival of the human being. Just as meaning of a word is independent of the
sign values that compose the word, so is the symbolic plasticity of the brain.
Hence also the symbolic plasticity of the cultural world, fundamentally
independent in its patterning from the organic and genetic structures that
composes and makes this capacity possible in the first place.
This is the fundamental paradox that besets our human
sciences, as it underlies the mind-body dichotomy and the nature-nurture
dichotomy that remains the perennial hot-topic of debate at all levels. The
plasticity of the human brain to be shaped in different ways is undeniable.
Those who would want to analytically and exclusively reduce this plasticity down
to finite genetic explanations of one-to-one trait correspondences in
personality in some grand ontogenetic calculus are implicitly denying the
central and most important aspect of this plasticity. This is its duality of
patterning in its fundamental design that renders it a symbolic phenomenon that
transcends genetic predeterminations. The young child is, culturally speaking,
and symbolically speaking, a "blank slate" or tabula rasa, even if the
slate itself is the organic and material vessel upon which subsequent writing
and work gets done. It is not to say that some kind of genetic predeterminations
do not have a post-zygomatic and ontogenetic influence in the unfolding of
personality structures. There are obvious and many differences in the organic
patterning and organization of organic brain structures and nervous networks
that are without a doubt genetic or at least genotypic in origin. There are
characteristic differences between males and females and possibly on some levels
between very different populations of people. It is to be expected that
classical Neanderthals, even if they were but a subspecies variation of archaic
homo saipiens may still have had some fundamentally different brain structures
than their "wise" counterparts. But this kind of genetic variability
of the organic brain appears to me to be somewhat like the genetic variation
found in Darwin's finches, but nowhere in the contemporary world do these kinds
of variation of pattern appear to mark a zygomatic boundary between human
populations. Evidence of language acquisition and cognitive development
universally suggests amazing structural uniformity of the brain on a basic
level, even to the extent that basic symbolic forms are widely shared, and may
even be genetically embedded as some form of instinctive memes.
But in the symbolic and epigenetic patterning of this
information and functioning, it becomes almost impossible to discriminate
clearly in almost any case where organic structure leaves off and cultural
plasticity of symbolic trait-patterns take over.
The evolution and explanation of brain plasticity of
human beings appears "obvious" on the surface but is not yet
sufficient in a scientific sense. Undoubtedly, the neuronal structures of the
brain are enormously complex and they behave in certain ways that permit
variability of response patterning, learning, forgetting, and remembering.
Behaviorist models of human behavior at least demonstrate that conditioning can
occur on fundamental mechanical levels, and that response pattern can be varied
on these levels.
It is somewhat reductionist to see every human
behavior or thought as a response pattern to basic stimuli in the environment
comparable to the classic Pavlovdog. It is not so reductionist to see this
patterning of stimulus-response as being symbolically defined and mediated in
the human being, such that basic stimuli can evoke complex response patterns,
and simple organic responses can be controlled by very complex and symbolically
defined forms of stimuli.
In this sense, the notion of stimulus generalization
so important to models of conditioning are important to understanding symbolic
mediation of such processes. For every symbolic frame, there can be expected to
be some minimally ordered pattern of response. The plasticity of the brain
appears partially explainable in a functional sense in these terms. Thus remote
and otherwise directly unrelated stimuli can evoke complex patterns of response
due to symbolic integration of experience. Patterns of basic response can be
organized through the same modes of symbolic integration into complex sets of
behavior that appear to have little direct bearing on the nature of the stimuli
itself.
It is a case that neural network patterns in the
brain can be complexly interconnected, grouped and extended on many levels to
make symbolic generalization of basic response patterning possible. This is
clearly the difference between a dog and a person. The dog responds to stimuli
in its life-world in a way very much like the conventional model of behaviorism.
The human being responds to the same sets of stimuli in the same life world in
ways that are fundamentally symbolic. A dog might watch momentarily the screen
of a television during a program, but a human being will watch that program in
fundamentally different and more intensely convoluted ways.
To a great extent, language is implicated in this
process and makes it possible. We can speak of the evocative and pragmatic
function of language, such that words can become like stones thrown, and such
that words alone can evoke complex response patterns in human beings. We can
tell a dog to sit, lie down, roll over, fetch, and it does so in a mechanical
way, usually with the expectation of a treat at the end of it. Humans can tell
one another so much more than this, and must do this if they are to remain
coherent and survive in the world. An example of the extreme influence that
symbolization can take in evoking complex and basic organic response patterns,
are the observed incidences of death by suggestion and to a lesser extent, the
physiological response patterns to accusations and persecutions of witchcraft in
many different societies. Somatization of mental states is common to many people
and in many societies, and to some extent, even these patterns can be culturally
and symbolically differentiated.
Undoubtedly,
the evolution of human language, and the organic brain capacity for linguistic
functioning and production, represented an important gradational step in the
tree of life. Whether this happened all at once, or only emerged over several
million years of selection and trial and error, remains perhaps unanswerable.
Consideration of transmission, reproduction and
reinforcement patterns of human symbolization, as this affects socialization and
enculturation of the individual to the group, and the articulation, integration
and transmission of cultural patterns, leads to a consideration of the
relationship of these processes to abnormal psychology.
Symbolic processes, as informational patterning, are
no where complete or perfect. Noise, in the form of dissonance is everywhere
possible and everywhere apparent. Noise is expressed psychologically on multiple
levels as ambiguity of experience and incongruity of internal and external
frames of reference. With the complex plasticity of the human brain, there is
possible, indeed, quite common, the inherent disorganization of this pattern on
many different levels and in many ways. It is true that all people experience
some measure of neurosis, dysfunction and even mild psychotic episodes in the
course of their daily lives. It is to be expected as a natural consequence of
both the hyper-complexity of cultural informational patterning and stress
attendant to such complexity, and as a natural consequence of the inherent
complexity and plasticity of the human brain.
The study of human abnormality has offered a perfect
natural laboratory for the understanding of human normality on many different
levels. The entire theory of psychoanalysis was derived from the study of
aberrant behavioral and psychological patterns in society. Indeed, any pattern
of error offers critical insight into the organization of pattern itself, this
is true whether we are speaking of primary acquisition of language or the
behavioral consequences of different kinds of diseases or aphasias of the brain.
Criminality and social deviance lends insight into the psychological
organization of society and culture as well, and mental illness offers insight
into both symbolic and organic patterns of mental organization. It is difficult
and not to the point to offer any general theories regarding this relationship
of abnormality to patterned normality. We can speak of discrepant patterns of
personality and sociality in individuals that are symbolically based and
perhaps, symbolically disordered about some implicit normal structure.
From a symbolic standpoint, and from the point of
view of ontogenetic development, there is a sense that earlier, basic structures
acquired or developed early, that are a part of what is construed as primary
acquisition, to some extent pre-structure and predefine later and more
differentiated patterns that are added to it, somewhat super-structurally,
especially in maturity and adulthood.
Thus we speak of primary and secondary socialization,
as if there is some clear boundary or critical difference between the two forms
of development. About the most that can be said in this regard is that early
cognitive development of basic structures of symbolic function must happen,
usually within an optimum period, before other forms of more elaborated
development can take place. If these early stages of development are missed
somehow, later development will be fundamentally retarded, absent or rendered
abnormal.
The result has been described as the occurrence of
discrepant realities, especially between internalized and externalized symbolic
constructions, and between primary and subsequent phases of its development.
These discrepant realities are not unlike the discrepancies experienced in
intercultural contact and the sense of disorientation and dissonance can be
similar in both kinds of cases. Discrepancies of symbolic integration are in a
sense homologous on another level of cultural patterning to what are considered
normal ambiguities of pattern recognition and processing of information.
Discrepant structures may occur at any level of the human brain, and may
constitute relatively basic and permanent patterns, or may be temporary and
relatively minor.
And if these kinds of discrepancy patterns are rooted
in symbolic dissonance, it is evident that they can become culturally shared
between people and frequently are. Thus, cases can be demonstrated of entire
societies adopting mass hysteria or of developing some form of social archosis.
The entire model of revitalization movements, of maze-way reformulation of
world-view and the resulting revolution that follows is the direct symbolic
extension and homological equivalent of the kind of conversion experience in the
life-world of an individual who accomplishes a basic symbolic redefinition and
reidentification of their life-world
In this sense, we can legitimately refer to a basic
ecology of mind. Human symbolization normally functions to maintain a basic
equilibrium or balance of patterning between internalized and external states,
between the individual and society, and on a collective level, between the
society and the rest of the world. To a great extent, this patterning is
cultural and symbolic, and the basis for the transformation of human
consciousness and civilization in the world. A disordered or incoherent view of
the world is one that is inherently ambiguous and that prevents maintenance of
ordered and functional relationships with the world. Disordered relationships
with the world can be both a cause and effect of such internal coherence, and
thus is defined the human system of symbolic integration of reality that
underlies the cultural construction of reality.
Blanket Copyright, Hugh M. Lewis, © 2005. Use of this text governed by fair use policy--permission to make copies of this text is granted for purposes of research and non-profit instruction only.
Last Updated: 08/25/09