Chapter 7

The Abstraction of Conflict

by Hugh M. Lewis

Humans are limited channels for processing information. Abstraction by contextually defining models simplifies the information and decision process. Conflict represents a part of man's universal experience. The purpose of the abstraction of conflict is to provide a contextual map which is applicable to all warfare, to define a set of conceptual factors forming the essence of all conflict. If such a set of factors exists it should be possible to locate them in any historical survey of war, and in all forms of conflict, from the simplest form of hand to hand combat to total warfare, and should be applicable to all future conflict.

The epitome of the abstraction of conflict into conceptual factors is represented by what are commonly known as the "Principles of War". The principles of war represents lists of single words meant to embody fundamental concepts of warfare. The lists are the result of the accumulation of principles recognized through the history of military philosophy since the first contribution of Clausewitz and by subsequent contributions by MacKinder, Mahan, Foch, Douhet and Lenin. Different nations ascribe to different sets of these principles occurring under different alternative names. The twelve most common and generally termed principles are: Purpose, Initiative, Flexibility, Concentration, Maneuver, Surprise, Exploitation, Security, Simplicity, Unity and Morale. The principles of war are utilitarian and make sense. Successful strategists never knowingly violate them without evaluating the risks and expense of doing so. Yet they are limited. While they describe the characteristics of a comprehensive theoretical pattern of warfare, they do not by themselves adequately define a unified theory.. such a theory must describe adequately the essentials of warfare and these essentials must be universally applicable, unchanging and immutable. The principles of war are not immutable not universal. They can frequently be violated and foregone and on occasion may even be antithetical to the objective. They might better be described as some ingredients of the general recipe for the conducts of war for attaining strategic success generally. As such they are generally unilateral and positive, not directly applying to the enemy forces nor explicitly descriptive of the negative factors of vulnerability. While determining a set of concepts which might serve as the ingredients of a recipe for victory, they do not directly describe the operational process which provides a system of proper measurement for these ingredients by which they can be properly combined to produce victory. This operational process of combination implies a dynamic interrelationship of concepts, not just a static list of single word concepts. It implies formulation of operational patterns of war which are universally applicable, necessitating redefinition of the specific purpose of the abstraction of conflict as being to define in a contextual framework a comprehensive theoretical pattern of conflict which may serve as a universally applicable reference. Such an abstraction of conflict must not be subject to varying interpretation of the relative observer as are the principles of war.

Abstraction of conflict lends itself readily to modeling, simulation, and war gaming. An important aspect in understanding the value and limitations of employing models in the theoretical abstraction of conflict is by way of mathematical game theory.

Zero sum equations, in which one side's losses count directly as gains for the other side, reveals an important aspect of the theoretical nature of attrition in conflict. Lancaster's equations bq/br = -B1d, bd/br =-B2d in which q and d represents the number the opponent units, B1 and B2 are operational combat effectiveness coefficients, states that the rate of attrition of q and d forces is equal to the combat effectiveness coefficient times the size of the opposing forces, all other things being equal and assuming absolute freedom of engagement for each individual unit. The probability of either opponent's success is expressed: B1q2/B1q2+B2d2, B2d2/B1q2+B2d2.(PAGE 125)

This is the N2 law which means that the combat strength of a force is proportional to the square of its numerical value times the combat value of its individual units, all other things being equal and assuming that each individual unit can fire equally on any of the opposing units and the conflict involves only one brief engagement. This law does not account for the accumulation of operational losses over an extended period of time and for more than one engagement. The fundamental equation can be elaborated to include a lengthy series of engagements , bq/br =B1-a1q-q1d, bd/br =B2-a2d-B2q, in which B1 and B2 represents the rates of additional forces to the opposing units, a1 and a2 represent the coefficient unit operational losses. In these equations individual rationality of decision making is extended to the conflict situation. Zero sum equations become difficult to solve mathematically when they are elaborated and are only valuable to combat situations involving short term tactical conflict situations. Lengthy warfare has many variables, both sides could suffer losses simultaneously, when the gains to each side are worse anticipated after each pursues the most logical course of action, and cannot be adequately nor accurately represented by simple zero sum equations of pure conflict opposition. This leads to increased reliance on computers and digital simulations in non-zero sum gaming, in which one side's losses do not count directly as the other side's gains, and in non-constant sum gaming in which total gains and losses may vary over a given time period to more accurately represent possible more complex conflict patterns.

The drawbacks to reliance on analytical models and digital simulations in abstracting conflict are that they cannot adequately represent the human element of unpredictability. The most complex machine cannot think intuitively nor produce encounter decisions as well as the human can. While abstraction of conflict lends itself readily to modeling and gaming, these approaches do not easily lend themselves to definition of a comprehensive theoretical conflict pattern. Such approaches alone are self limiting and tend to add complexity instead of the requisite simplicity in theory. Any general equation of war does lend itself readily to logical dynamic mathematical description which allows accuracy in principle in describing the cause and effect relationships occurring and in the definition of the structure of the equation. The whole theoretical perspective is based on accurate knowledge of the nature of existing and probable situations and forces, expressed in most general terms and accurate description of the cause and effect relationships involved.

Any theoretical analysis of conflict must be reducible to the fundamental relationship of man and his environment. In this fundamental relationship man is the subjective element and the environment is the objective element. This reveals the recurrence of the duality concept underlying all military philosophy. The subjective element of this primary relationship is expressed in the general conflict equation as the negative factor of the intrinsic vulnerability (V) of man and of his physical tool extensions to the entropic effects of the objective element expressed as the positive factor of destructive force (F). Man in return is capable of delivering destructive force towards his environment for which certain physical extensions, weapons, serve as tools of war. All other factors and relationships of warfare are determinants of (F) and (V). all principles of war may be condensed to this duality concept of a primary relationship which the concentration of destructive force (F) is used against and to cancel the vulnerability potential (V).

Vulnerability value forms the ultimate limitation to the expression of destructive force. The vulnerability of man and his means of survival to destructive force is a valuation by man of the risks imposed by destructive force. Strategic formulation is an intellectual process whereby man evaluates the risks imposed by destructive force of the environment, by which the vulnerability factor is assessed, and the probable cause of action is predicted in order to achieve the reduction of these risks. Strategic formulation consists of evaluating possible risks and predicting the most probable risks, to maintain or gain control over the primary relationship. Control is expressed as manipulation of the risks imposed by destructive forces. Strategic formulation involves two forms of rationalization. The first is the subjective rationalization called possibilism. It consists of the evaluation of all possible risks, complicating the evaluation and leading logically to action to simplify these risks to maintain control. This course of controlling of action derived from possibilism is defensive action. The second is objective rationalization, called probabilism which recognizes the virtual infinity of all possible risk attempts to determine and predict the most probable risks. This simplification of risks leads to offensive manipulation which subsequently complicates the strategic risks. The prediction process is intuitive and forms the basis of directions for the manipulation or control of risks. The fundamental concept of duality involves the primary interrelationship of the subjective element while the latter is the only means of direction and expression for the former.

The primary relationship of the vulnerability and force elements is complicated when considered in terms of an inter-human relationship. Conflict involves at least two opponents. These opponents are the fundamental elements of this secondary relationship. The primary relationship becomes reflexive in terms of opponents. The original elements of destructive force and vulnerability are expressed in terms of each of the opponents as V and F for one and as V and P for the other. In the secondary relationship the destructive force of one opponent is relevant only in terms of realizing the other opponent's vulnerability, while the former opponent's vulnerability is measurable only in terms of the relevancy to the latter's destructive force potential, and vice versa. The science of war is involved primarily with the direct expansion of destructive force against the opponent's vulnerability and the indirect reduction of vulnerability to the risks of the opponents destructive force potential. While force is only realized in terms of vulnerability, force is canceled out by the opponent's force, being realized as one's vulnerability. The direction of force in this secondary relationship becomes important, and the original concept of objective-subjective dualism of the primary relationship is expressed in terms of offensive-defensive duality in the secondary relationship.

The concept of the defensive includes direct reduction of subjective vulnerability by physical interposition of material or of space between vulnerability and objective force to reduce force potential. Interposition of space implies the principle of dispersion, diminishing the vulnerability to area ration. The defense implies reducing enemy's realized force potential and can be accomplished in terms of nonphysical obscurity by counter intelligence operations, deception , concealment and camouflage. Defense also implies the indirect increase of the enemy's vulnerability, either by reduction of the opponent's force potential or increase of one's own potential. As the available force increases the defensive concept becomes obligatory, vulnerability must be reduced proportionately to increased force potential.

There are three types of vulnerability, structural, situational and psychological. Structural vulnerability is inherent in the physical nature of the objects involved. Situational vulnerability is the result of the proper conditions of time and place in realizing structural vulnerability. Psychological vulnerability when realized produces a physical vulnerability. There occurs in military systems concentrations of vulnerability which when realized have a critical effect in the outcome of war. Corollary defensive concepts reduce these types of vulnerability, the concept of reserve, of retaining an unused potential of force, and alternative plans of action or an alternative weapons system or alternative means of obtaining the objective, the concept of unity of command and coordination, of security and the value of interior lines of communication and the concept of economy of force, preserving limited force potentials, of not using too little to achieve an objective nor of using too much that it is wasted, so as not to achieve a net loss in value of force potential. Defensive action, by simplifying risks through increased integration, coordination, unity, economy and reserve is inherently easier than offensive action. Offensive direction requires more cost and complication of risks, yet the defensive is static and unviable, not by itself able to achieve decisive gains, which requires offensive expression.

The concept of the offensive is primarily concerned with the expression of destructive force. Destructive force is relevant only in context of situation and technology, not to intrinsic destructive potential but with its realization. Destructive force potential is expressed in terms of firepower of which range, accuracy, inherent destructive potential, rate of fire and volume of fire are determinants. The firepower of weapons have radii of expression and spheres of saturation, the area over which the destructive potential is fully realized. There are five phases for the expression of force, the preparation phase, logistics phase, movement of force out of battle, maneuver phase, movement of force in battle, the primary weapons phase and its radius of expression and the secondary weapons phases and the spheres of saturation. The determinants of force in each phase are time and maintenance. The physical determinants of force are the weapons, instrmentalities enabling employment of these weapons, relevancy of these weapons and instrmentalities, space over which it is expressed in its phases, time of this expression, maintenance of expression and the opponents vulnerability. These physical determinants dictate the maximum limits to the expression force. The force potential cannot be changed without first changing the value of the determinants themselves. Nonphysical determinants of force are the ability to produce contextual map of military processes, to devise instruments and instrumentalities relevant to that map, to formulate a doctrine relevant to the map and the means to employ them at all relevant military levels, the moral courage to employ them, the ability to realistically reevaluate the essential factors without self deception, and the will to fight. These nonphysical determinants do not increase the maximum level of force potential only enable expression to its fullest potential. The negative influence of these nonphysical determinants is more often indirect by allowing psychological vulnerability to increase opponents force potential. It is always preferable to consider the physical values of force and then the enabling nonphysical determinants. Force must always be evaluated as one fact or of the relationship.

In the conflict pattern there exists a constant variable, absolute time, T-which is identical for all opponents and adds dimension to all processes in the expression of destructive force. Time is the ultimate multiplier or divisor of the vulnerability and force values. There exists the human tendency to proceed as if time were an open ended continuum, especially during peace, instead of an absolute imperative, leading to a tendency for time to serve as a divisor of force and as a multiplier of vulnerability. Two situational aspects of time are the required time for the expression of force and the available time. The sequential aspect of time stresses the sequence of phases required for the expression of force. The simultaneous aspect stresses the continuity of expression of force when these phases occur simultaneously.

The space value which is another absolute translates directly into a time value in terms of the mobility factor of either opponent. Terrain and mobility determine the scope of the radius of expression of force. Differences of distance, terrain, interior and exterior lines of communication invariably translate into factors of time. Thus mobility, spatial and temporal, is a natural physical and nonphysical capability, including flexibility of purpose, of all opponents and becomes coefficient determining factor for the expression of force. A military system must naturally be mobile as it proceeds over space and through time. The mobility of the system as a whole, its absolute mobility, is that one of the least mobile components of the system. Mobility must always be advantageous unless the means to achieve it are detrimental. Mobility is the determinant of the scope of the radius of expression of force, not of military force itself. It must always be treated as an enabling factor in the secondary relationship. Mobility serves as a substitute for ideal weapons. Physical mobility serves as a multiplier of force potential and as a divisor of the vulnerability value. Nonphysical mobility does not multiply absolute mobility, but only allows its fullest expression. Time required for the expression of force is substituted by repeated use of weapons or by a multiplicity of weapons. It is manipulated in short by volume of fire, to determine the realization of a given value of vulnerability. The increased complexity of and interdependency of time relationships has made evaluation of the secondary relationships extremely difficult. If time values cannot be evaluated properly neither can the whole relationship.

So fat having recognized the essential factors of the secondary relationship and expounded the implications of each in the offense-defense duality concept, a general theoretical equation of conflict expressing this secondary relationship can be defined and a comprehensive direction of the initiator's force to prevent a realization of vulnerability and the upset of strategic center of balance. It accomplishes this diversion of force by resistance, cancellation by his own force potential and seeks to restore the original balance of peace or to replace it by an equilibrium of resistance, in which the initiator's attempt to achieve critical imbalance is frustrated. Equilibrium of resistance results in an increased and prolonged attrition rate. It results in a mutual escalation of patterned force expression, often getting out of control. The original conflict pattern must be controlled and altered in order to achieve the critical imbalance. The classical perspective reveals the difficulty to change in midstream the initial conflict pattern once equilibrium of resistance has set in. MF/<v>mf/V>. Arrows represent direction and time value of expression.

The objective of the initiator of the conflict pattern is achievement of a decisive victory, in which the critical imbalance is achieved and exploited as rapidly and as simply as possible. This is the concept of making all battles of a war into one single short conflict, in which the static balance of deterrence is restored with different values than the original relationship. It becomes the standard of measurement by which each event in the complete pattern is judged. A battle victory is of no significance unless it substantially influences the outcome of more important operations. This is the basic offensive sequential operational pattern of conflict in which each event is measured in terms of the final critical effect and thus each is critical in itself. A conflict which is indecisive is usually one in which attrition rates are high, equilibrium serving as a replacement of the original balance, the net results are a prolonged series of events through time, each contributing little or nothing to the net outcome of the conflict, being canceled out of relevant importance. The original objective may become unattainable or if attained may have cost more in attrition than is worth-a Pyrric victory. In this sense the accumulative pattern of conflicts dominates and becomes the prevalent pattern, never producing by itself a decisive victory. Not only is offensive action ultimately measurable in terms of decisiveness, but so too is defensive action ultimately measured in the same terms, though in itself in theoretical conflict pattern for this relationship can be identified. The pattern starts in a pre-conflict state of time known as peace, during which force potentials are expressed except for the nonphysical deterrent influence and as the vulnerability factors are unrealized. The first equation is the static balance of deterrence, in which potential exist unexpressed. MF/V = MF1/V1.. Mobility represents the utilization of the time element in the equation. No mobility of the static condition represents a one to one equivalency of the time element. Vulnerability is the divisor of the equation. The net product of the equation is the force potential.

The balance of peace is represented as a strategic center of balance of each opponent expressed by the fraction. Conflict is a continuation of this original relationship, in which the static balance of peace is replaced by a dynamic imbalance of compellence in which vulnerability factors realizable, expression of force is directional and mobility becomes a relevant factor of the relationship. Conflicts start when either or both opponents attempt to upset the original static balance of peace by setting a conflict pattern in motion for the expression of force and the realization of vulnerability. What is sought by establishing this conflict pattern is to achieve a critical imbalance. Opponents seek to establish an equilibrium of resistance as defense to the initiation of conflict. Either or both opponents seek to replace the original balance with a critical imbalance in which the other's strategic center is irreplaceably upset to obtain a more preferable static balance of subsequent peace. The initiator seeks to achieve this critical imbalance by attaining a high F value, a maximization of force reflected as a maximization of vulnerability, a high V, offensively and a minimization of his own vulnerability, a low "v" reflected as a minimization of the opponent's force potential, a low "f" defensively. A critical imbalance is sought to be achieved in a positive sense and avoided in the negative, thus representing the interdependence of the offense and defense of the duality concept of this secondary relationship.

The equation can be imbalanced from the outset or manipulated to become imbalanced. Once a critical imbalance is achieved, total defeat cannot be averted as long as the original upset is exploited by a continuity of the pattern of expression of force. The initiator of the conflict pattern must continue this pattern of expression and it must be directed toward the opponent's strategic center of balance. The opponent seeks to divert the decisive. It is of no value unless ultimately contributing to the net outcome in the negative sense. Defensive action does not win decisive victory alone, but is usually necessary before one can be attained.

All phases of the expression of force depend on the final phase of destruction in achieving a critical imbalance. In planning for a decisive victory, considerations of the phases are reversed and each considered in terms of relevancy to the final stage. A high F and a low "v" against a low "f" and a high V in any of the phases can result in a critical imbalance. An accurate perspective of reality is essential. The critical imbalance in the maneuver and logistic phases is a combination of for factors, superior mobility, which in the offensive sense is concentration and in the defensive sense adequate dispersion, superior judgment in disposition to negate enemy mobility ad effective inhibition in weapons phases of enemy realization of offensive and defensive mobility. Imbalance in these phases subtracts not only time but the equivalent energy which cold have been realized. Continuity of pattern for exploitation must be planned throughout every phase of expression. The more remote the phase the more important it is to be considered, for factors contributing to a critical imbalance can develop unnoticed, thus the importance of the preparation phase especially in peace. The crux of the preparatory phase is whether the expression of energy will result in a worthwhile expression of relevant force in the final stage in time. There are two stages of the preparation phase, the prewar stage and the wartime stage.

The groundwork for a critical imbalance must be laid in the prewar stage, except when enemy mistakes permit expression of critical imbalance by latter stage resources. Planning should be to lay such a groundwork to achieve a high probability of a critical imbalance of a probable opponent, with a minimum reliance on the wartime stage, which should be planned to provide a continuity of expression. Planning should be on development of weapons and instrumentalities of optimum value and for maximization of fullest potential with full consideration of the vulnerability factor oriented towards effecting a decisive critical imbalance as speedily and cheaply as possible.

If a critical imbalance cannot be achieved a conflict pattern should not be initiated. The nonphysical determinants of force and vulnerability do not directly by themselves increase or decrease the value but only indirectly by allowing for the fullest expression of the vales. Because these represent the human element in the relationship which is always unpredictable and imperfect, the absolute values in the final equation will always remain unpredictable and imperfect to some extent. It is the purpose of strategic formulation to minimize the effects of these nonphysical determinants in order to enable the closest approximation to one hundred percent of the absolutely possible values. No amount of human endeavor can accomplish what is physically impossible. The absolutely possible values of force and vulnerability are intrinsically available in the physical determinants. The human problem is to optimize the expression, not to increase its inherent possibilities for expression. False estimates of nonphysical determinants can imbalance the equation in for ways: by underestimating the intellectual ability of the enemy, his will and the ability to fight, by overestimating one's own abilities in wither area, or by believing that physical determinants of force can be overcome by superior training and morale. Doctrinal inadequacy cannot be compensated for by training in obsolescent methods of force. Nonphysical and physical determinants of force must be employed in quantitative and qualitative superiority and by technological and psychological surprise in adequate mass at the proper time and place, and be effectively maintained to prevent the enemy compensation in order to achieve a critical imbalance.

The general equations of war have not changed, the essential relationships remain the same. The values involved are changing drastically. Spatial limitations have diminished while the temporal span has been compressed. Automation in all phases has caused the exponential escalation of destructive force potential. Technology has exponentially expanded the final two phases of expression. War has become essentially an artillery problem.

An accurate analogy has become transformed into an inaccurate cause and effect relationship serving to impose outdated frames of reference on the evaluation of the expression of force. The four essential factors of the relationship and time as the absolute determinant must be kept in proper perspective in the theoretical conflict pattern.

Destructive force remains the ultimate dictator of the patterns of conflict. With time as its absolute determinant. Man's intrinsic vulnerability has remained unchanged. In conflict the values are never stable not static but are continuously changing. The values must be constantly reevaluated. None of the essential values can be evaluated separately but only in terms of the overall relationship in every instance. Accurate judgment of reality is crucial. An equation must be critically imbalanced in reality not just appear so. The significance of the victory invariably lies in its ultimate effect in time. To fight decisively one's response to challenges must be functional, relevant to the contemporary vales of the equation. Any nonfunctional response is indecisive. Every military act must have a direct and rational effect on the enemy's ability to express destructive force and the realization of vulnerability. The objective must be considered in its aspect of vulnerability. The relevancy of the objective is determined by the enemy's concentration of vulnerability, indirectly affecting his expression of force, relevant to the degree that enemy force depends on it. There is no shortage of defeat. To study success is far more valuable. The ideal of achieving the critical imbalance and decisive victory must never be forgotten in strategic planning.

1. This has been a summarization of the fundamental text of the book "Decisive Warfare: A Study in Military Theory" by Reginald Bretnor, copyright 1969, published by Stackpole Books, Cameron and Kelkner Street, Harrisburg, PA. 17105. Pages especially important for reference are-27, 28, 31, 32, 48, 55, 130, 131, 72, 75.,85, 112, 115, 122, 123, 124, 125, 95, 143, 144, 145, 149, 151, 136. I believe this book to be a major theoretical contribution to the understanding and elucidation of the abstraction of conflict in military philosophy.

2. Pages 22-28 of "Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices" by John M. Collins does justice to the proper perspective of the "Principles of War" showing both world wide application, the practical utilitarian vale of these concepts as a guide to the conduct of tactical forces, and an elaboration of the meanings and implications in "Military Philosophy" of these principles. Copyright 1973 United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD.

3. Pages 87-998 of "Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control" by J. C. Wylie from which part of the general equation of the abstraction of conflict is taken , offers an important and crucial insight into the proper understanding of Military Philosophy. The whole book, short, concise and to the point offers many important insights into military theory and philosophy and to the nature of strategy in general. Copyright 1967 by Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ.

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