Chapter 6

The Foundations Of Military Philosophy

by Hugh M. Lewis

In approaching the study of military philosophy there exists several different viewpoints which when integrated together formed the foundations of military philosophy. The military mind shapes strategic thought and the course of strategy in history. Men are not merely products of their environment but are creative, innovative and dynamic. Ideas of strategic thought have to be transmitted. The primary form of communication has been literature, transcending the relativity of place, time and culture, compromising the collective military mind and the whole body of military philosophy. The military mind is a casual expression used in describing philosophy, made up of separate but interrelated concepts which fall into distinct groups to form perspectives of philosophy. These conceptual perspectives form the foundations of military philosophy into which all concepts can be classed. Words are limited in conceptual formulation and complete communication of ideas. These limitations must be recognized i.e., the inability of one word to accurately and adequately express a complete concept or the rigidity of conception occurring around different words--such as strategy--which creates in the collective military mind an inflexible conception, improperly oriented in context to the body of military philosophy. The foundations of military philosophy are conceptual. These conceptual foundations fall into four distinct perspectives. Three are functional perspectives, functions of a time frame of reference. The fourth is nonfunctional. It is theoretical, providing the necessary synergistic comprehension of the other three, providing the unity of these functional perspectives without which philosophy is incoherent. The time frames of reference are the past, present and the future. The forth involves the necessary abstraction and unity of these three time frames. The essential duality in all the perspectives revolves around the tactical employment of force and its relationship to the human observer, both objective and subjective, in the relationship between the functional and nonfunctional perspectives. The functional perspectives are the classical perspective, dealing primarily with the past, the operational perspective, dealing primarily with the present, and the strategic perspective which deals with the future. The nonfunctional perspective is the theoretical perspective. Each of these viewpoints offers a distinct perspective of warfare, yet each rarely occurs in the literature of military philosophy independent and unrelated to the other perspectives rather usually occurring in combinations.

The classical perspective of war has been by far the predominant viewpoint taken in military philosophy. The classical perspective is the historical approach, utilizing the literary transmission of prose and poetry in the telling of fictional and non-fictional stories, first and second hand documentation of dates and facts of past wars. The past is the only source from which we are able to draw the experience of warfare. History is the universal experience, offering continuing patterns of conflicts in various combinations of circumstances and attitudes. Mistakes of the past are often repeated. The past is no longer fluid, the variables of war are no longer changing but have become concretized into definitive form. It is not an infallible reference source. The historical transmission for the experience of warfare is as secondhand experience, and as such is highly susceptible to the whims of the author to distortion of the events to fit traditional, political, social, or personal ends. The classical perspective often has followed the traditional military school which studies war as a unique and separate event, attempting to divine a theory of pattern from these isolated events instead of considering war as a dynamic social phenomenon with many influences. One can approach the study of war to prove a preconceived theory which can result in the distortion of the truth. The secondhand distortion is one element of the fog of war which so obscures its clear conceptioning in the collective military mind. Much of the classical perspective consists of irrelevant and redundant references and over documentation of battlefield events to the exclusion of outside controlling factors. The classical perspective achieves its efficacy only when used as a means to understand and define objective lessons and analysis of the patterns of warfare necessary for the exemplification of theory. The study of the past is important only in its relevancy to the present and future perspectives of war. Irrelevant subject material has received far too much attention. It is with the purpose of divining theory of warfare that the past should be studied. The theoretical perspective of history underlies the essential dualism of the classical perspective. The history of civilization has been rich with war and the patterns which these wars have followed have been mostly unpredicted. There are liable to be future wars assuming unpredictable patterns and therefore planning for the future should take care to not directly translate into present contextual conditions the past relationships of historical patterns of warfare.

Consideration of the classical perspective leads to the second fundamental viewpoint of military philosophy--the operational perspective--just as consideration of the past is important, only as it concerns the present. Thus in terms of relevancy the operational perspective maintains the time frame of the present as its standard reference. It has received far less attention as a distinct viewpoint than has the classical perspective. It is basically theoretical and largely unquestioned, yet it involves the most people--the majority of military personnel. Ultimately strategy and history have relevance only if adequately translated into operational usefulness at the present moment. Strategy provides direction for operations which involve two phases for its expression of force, logistical preparation and tactical execution. The operational perspective focuses on the patterns war assumes as a result of a cause and effect relationship with a set of operating factors, rather than as an event and the fact of war itself. This has influenced the historical survey of war as being studied as a result of a combination of political, economic, social and psychological factors. This has altered the classical perspective of the study of war not as an end in itself, as traditionally studied as a series on war as a function and means of policy, economy, society and morality.

Military literature and the system generally uses the term operations exclusive of implied logistics. Logistics suffers from the same lack of precise definition as strategy, the lack of proper perspective of logistics in operation. Often logistics is not kept within bounds of military understanding and results in faulty strategic determination.

"It ignores the reality that military operations while they may be primarily tactical or primarily logistical, are always a blend of both tactical and logistical action. "

"Logistics is the creation and sustained support of weapons and forces to be tactically employed to attain strategic objectives…"

"…Thus logistics is not wholly economics nor is it wholly management as these subjects are understood in the academic and business world…" Instead logistics blends both of these subjects with the elements of military command,, military decision, military criteria and military vale…"

"Logistics is the bridge between the economy of the nation and the tactical operations of the combat forces."

The contribution of the operational perspective to military philosophy suffers from the fact that its approach has been primarily practical and a theoretical in emphasis. A theoretical operational viewpoint is crucial to a complete comprehension of military philosophy. Theory that abstracts the operational patterns of war would serve as a unifying dimension to the singular and different relationships which are studied. Two distinct theoretical patterns of war have been identified. The first is the sequential or directional pattern of war which includes the tactical sphere of the utilization of force, in which each identified instance or event directly affects the next, in temporal sequence, and builds up in a critically decisive influence on the outcome of the war. The second operational pattern is the cumulative effect of many minor separate actions, of which the logistics sphere of operations is a part, each independent instance contributing minimal or negligible influence in an indirect manner to the final outcome, but when taken together, repeatedly in combination, can be seen to have a measurable impact on the net results. Warfare in the second cumulative pattern has never alone achieved the desired decisive outcome, without the supplementary influence of the other. This suggests an interdependence and complementariness of the two patterns and emphasizes the underlying duality warfare which is the current theme of this essay.

Warfare has occurred in the past in distinct and identifiable primary patterns which enable a categorization of warfare. These primary patterns have occurred as the reflection of many different social, economic, political, psychological factors resulting in a varied combination of infinite intensity and scope in the occurrence of the patterns of war. The operational patterns of war, though in the past having being unpredicted and capable of occurring in an infinitude of degrees of variation, are subject to clearer comprehension by a unified theoretical perspective which may enable a greater degree of influence as the prediction and control of future patterns of warfare.

The duality of the operational perspective exists in the relationship of society to tactical employment of force, in how the necessary resources are procured, organized and directed in war. Expressive of antithetical ends--the logistics approach from civilian to military use with the limitations in the transformation of resources into force--and the tactical approach in the use of force dictating needs resonating back to society. The end effects of the operational employment of this force takes the form of sequential or cumulative patterns.

The strategic viewpoint concerns the future of warfare, primarily the prediction and control of the patterns of war. The importance of the strategic perspective cannot be over emphasized. Its clarity suffers from a basic lack of unity of definition of the meaning of strategy. Strategy has received many definitions each having different implications. The term has been applied indiscriminately to many different concepts. The strategic perspective suffers as a whole from a panopolism of semantic definition. Accurate and all inclusive definition of strategy tends to defy earnest efforts of understanding military philosophy.

Clausewitz defined strategy as the "art of employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war. In other words strategy forms the plan of war, maps the proposed course of the different campaigns which compose the war and regulates the battles to be fought in each. Such definition is frequent recurrent. It conveys a limited conceptual basis of understanding strategy as confined to the utilization of tactical force in battle as the fundamental end in war. It implies that battle is the only means to the strategic end and that every consideration should be subordinated to the aim of fighting a decisive war. It ignores the necessary political decisiveness of war. War implements national policy, for policy is the first criteria for deciding whether when and how to use military force. The underlying distinction between strategy and policy in this definition encourages soldiers to subordinate consideration of policy to military operations and policy makers to over step their sphere of responsibility and to interfere with soldiers sphere of influence. The definition of strategy should emphasize the subordination of military strategy to policy and distinguish between the respective spheres of influence of each. Such definition would put into proper perspective the viewpoint of strategy.

Moltke defined strategy as "the practical adaptation of the means placed at the general's disposal to the attainment of the object in view". The military commander is responsible to the government , which can intervene in the implementation of strategy, replacing the military commander or adjusting his strategy, but it should not interfere with the tactical employment of the tools of war. This is reminiscent of the state of affairs of the top policy makers considering every detail of a single air strike in fear of political reverberations and to avoid undue escalation or undue response. Definition should stress that strategy is not to simply seek overcoming enemy power, but cold have a complex limited nature such as to await a cumulative drain on the enemy force potential. Thus "a policy of limited aim imposes a military strategy of limited aim, not of decisive aim".

Liddel Hart defines strategy as "the art of distributing military means to fulfill the ends of policy". This definition is confined to military strategy as distinct from governmental policy when in fact the two terms have been applied interchangeably and are used synonymously. This emphasizes the need for a more general and comprehensive definition of strategy, one which is suitably applicable to both military and political spheres of influence. J.C. Wylie defined strategy as "a plan of action designed to achieve some end, a purpose together with a system for of measures for its accomplishment". This definition is at the same time all inclusive and specific in its implications. Most definitions of strategy are mere verbal enumerations. We need an analytic definition of strategy. Henry E. Eccles defines strategy as "…the art of comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives."

Corollary to the definition of strategy are the meanings of two related terms recurring throughout military philosophy, grand strategy and tactics. Grand strategy emphasizes the all inclusiveness of the meaning of strategy and implies its subordinate nature in which decision making occurs at multiple interdependent levels of objective determination. Perhaps the ultimate subordinate is indefinable. Perhaps the primary purpose of military philosophy is to map out its realm. More specifically grand strategy is almost synonymous to state policy in execution, guiding the conduct of war, directing the political, military, moral and economic resources of a nation towards attainment of its policy objectives, as distinct from the policy itself. In proper perspective grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace, seeking to avoid damaging this future state of peace.

The theoretical perspective although often playing an important role in influencing strategy, is rarely recognized as a distinct perspective in itself. It is a most critical perspective to the foundations of a complete understanding of military philosophy. The vastly increased complexity of the military system and its increased human constituency has led to an increased emphasis on the operational perspective while this viewpoint has remained essentially theoretical in application. The increased amount of destructive force and its increased chances of occurrence has made at once more difficult and most vital an accurate strategic perspective. The increased size of the human population and the specialization of the human role in military technology has resulted in a lack of general comprehension of overall continuity and a general reneging of individual responsibility to the whole. The need for a comprehensive theoretical perspective is increased. The theoretical perspective is distinct from the other three perspectives in that while the other are involved as functions of human endeavor able to be fit within a reference to a time frame, the theoretical perspective is essentially non-physical and non-functional in time. As such the theoretical perspective cannot alone determine operational patterns of warfare past and present nor predict or control these patterns into the future. The theoretical perspective is important in that it provides comprehension and unification to the functional perspectives, helping to cement the foundations of military philosophy in the relationship of man and mission, the conceptual and practical, of ends and means. It provides continuity of perspective to the past, present and future. It simplifies and clarifies the human viewpoint in all the functional perspectives. The efficacy of the theoretical perspective is that it provides relevancy to the classical perspective, order and unity to the operational perspective and simplicity and a sense of correction and direction for the strategic perspective.

The theoretical perspective involves a unification into coherent patterns of the varied conceptions of the three functional perspectives. It provides order for the military mind.

Theoretical doctrine is based on knowledge of the nature of existing and probable situations and forces and of the cause and effect relations governing the actions of these forces.

There are two methods of constructing theories. We can construct a theory based on "tautologically impeccable" elements, which are purely logical, deductively derived and mathematically consistent with the initial limiting presumptions. The limit of such theoretical construction is that the final theory exists in a vacuum but it cannot be applied consistently to any real situation until the ideal preconditions on which it is predicated come to pass. Such a theory must stand the test of experience, remaining consistently correct under every possible variation of nature. Such theories are rarely foolproof to reality. We can build a theory to explain empirical facts of past occurrences. The limit of this method of theorizing is that such a final theory cannot explain what might happen or what feasibly could have happened. It cannot be applied with reliable consistency to any future events.

The theoretical perspective must construct a general theory from both these methods. It must integrate in some constructive form of abstract expression both these deductive and inductive methods. Such theory can only be created by human intellection and empirically improved over time to withstand any possible occurrence. Military thought can never be formulated with the precision of scientific method. It consists of a set of concepts forming interrelationships of cause and effect from the records and patterns of the past experiences and behaviors of humans. Humans have always been and probably will always remain very unpredictable factors in any type of theory.

Theory deals with the abstraction of relevantly important generalizations from the military field of activity which is predominantly influenced by the quite unpredictable human nature in order to simplify the application of human activity. The human element is the primary source of unpredictability which makes theorization of military activity so difficult. Whatever else warfare and the military might be claimed to be, it remains predominantly in the realm of human activity. All four perspectives are important only from the point of view of the human observer who must objectively apply his intelligence and creativity to empirically derived data. Military philosophy remains primarily a normative exercise subject to all the human weaknesses and the relativities of place and time. Nevertheless there remains a central point of view, derived from universal human nature. The duality which undercuts each of the four perspectives becomes most evident in the theoretical perspective. The duality comes from the relationship of the human to the reality of military activity. It is the same source of the essential duality which undercuts every field of philosophy. It might best be described as coming from the fundamental analytic-synthetic dichotomy of philosophy in general. This duality comes from the human tendency to dichotomize his existence into separate conceptual and real worlds, a basic dichotomization which subsequently infects every thought and action of human behavior. Man must learn from theory to integrate the apparent duality which expresses itself in military philosophy as the fundamental dichotomization of ends and means. Integration simplifies and clarifies human activity. Integration starts with theory. It is derived from that common key of human nature which can lead to either creativity or destructiveness.

A certain dualistic nature exists throughout the functional perspectives which forms the basis of the theoretical perspective. This dualism represents the opposite approaches to the same problem which is the primary goal of the theoretical perspective to discern. It is not in the approaches themselves but the problem which they reveal that is of greatest importance to military philosophy. Such an identifiable central problem exists and it supplies the basis for a comprehensive theoretical perspective. The dualism of the classical perspective is a combination of the study of conflict in history to determine operational patterns and governing principles of warfare and the use of historical events to provide proof for a theoretical perspective of war. The operational perspectives reveals dualism in terms of two distinct interrelated operational patterns of warfare, the sequential (tactical) pattern and the cumulative (logistical) pattern. The strategic perspective demonstrates duality in terms of grand strategy and of tactics, of matching ends with means. The theoretical perspective emphasizes a duality in terms of two general problems which provide central direction for military philosophy.

The first of these problems may be considered as the domain of military science and deals generally with the abstraction of conflict to discern the context of a theoretical operational pattern of war which is universally applicable to all conflict past and future. It is concerned with the direct approach to the application of destructive force. The abstraction of conflict deals with the historical survey of war to define patterns of war and the tactical application of strategy. In short it is the primary concern of the science of war. The second of these problems falls into the realm of the art of war and is generally concerned with the realization of strategy, or as opposed to the direct application of force, the indirection of destructive force. The realization of strategy involves the survey of past wars to prove a theoretical pattern of war and is primarily concerned with the cumulative operational patterns of war and the direction of grand strategy. It is primarily concerned with the art of war. The fundamental dualism recurring throughout the foundations of military philosophy falls under these two general problems of military science and the art of war.

If a comprehensive theoretical perspective exists, it might possibly be outlined by the following set of conclusions. Warfare has occurred in the past in mostly unpredicted patterns. Wars are liable to occur in the future with unpredictable patterns. Though warfare may be categorized into a spectrum of primary types these are reflections of many variables. Wars are liable to assume an infinite variety of patterns in the future. A comprehensive theoretical pattern of war would be universally applicable and therefore should ease prediction and control of future patterns of war and enabling control over these patterns is the central concern of strategy and therefore is vital as an objective of war. The enabling factor of control over war is ultimately the manipulation of the risks imposed on human valuation by destructive force. Any comprehensive theoretical pattern of war must contain this enabling factor. An underlying concept of duality recurs throughout the study of military philosophy, resolving the dilemma created by this duality is the primary problem of military philosophy. The dualism represents two opposite approaches to a central problem, the definition of which is the goal of the theoretical perspective. Military science implies the objective understanding of the process of conflict while the art of war implies the subjective application of this science to the realization of strategy in war. This is the underlying concept of objective-subjective duality of military philosophy. These two approaches are the objectivity of war concerned with the abstraction of conflict and the subjectivity of war concerned with the realization of strategy. The integration of the two approaches resolves itself around theoretical creation.

1. "Military Concepts and Philosophy" by Henry E. Eccles , Rear Admiral USN (ret.), Rutgers University Press

2. "Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control" by J.C. Wylie, Rear Admiral USN, 1967, Rutgers University Press

3. "Strategy" by B.H. Liddel Hart, Frederick A. Praeger Inc. Publishers

Military Dimensions