Chapter 5

Nuclear Warfare

by Hugh M. Lewis

Nuclear warfare represents the level of warfare at which the nuclear warhead is used. General war has come to imply a broad range of meanings especially in the context of an unlimited total war. By contemporary standards no war can be total today without the use of nuclear weapons. A general could occur without the use of nuclear bombs but it would be a limited war. This is not to imply that the use of any number of nuclear weapons would mean total war. Nuclear weapons might be used in a limited manner, nuclear warfare represents the upper technological level of the evolution of militarism. A conventional general war that compares to World War 11 in extent would be limited compared to the amount of destruction a general nuclear war would cause.

Nuclear warfare occupies a peculiar position in the warfare spectrum. Up until now the only nuclear bombs used have been those that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States, waking the world up to the modern age in which the terror of the bomb reigns. Since that first use the world has refrained from further use of these weapons in war. The nuclear bombs has lent credibility to the strategic bombing concept initiated in World War 11. It was a concept that was losing credibility with the conventional chemical explosive bomb. With the nuclear warhead it has gained so much credibility that it serves today as the foundation of general war strategies of the world powers. The credibility has as its only attestment the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, beyond these two instances it has in most parts been hypothetical and based on numerous tests, so frightfully devastating would be the consequences of first hand experience.

A big question mark hangs over the use of the bomb. The outcome is uncertain. No nation is willing to accept the guilt of breaking the ice by being the first to employ it in war. The bomb is still an unconventional weapon in the eyes of mankind. It is not yet an acceptable form of aggression yet its use forms the basis of the grand strategies of the major world powers. Its use has been the conventionalized on paper, but not by human experience. The current modes of deployment almost guarantees its use in the outbreak of hostilities between major world nations and their allies.

The fact that nuclear warfare has not been experienced has important implications. It has not yet earned its proper place in the prejudice and ignorance of mankind. General apathy until after the fact of its general first hand experience is an all too human trait. A total nuclear war may last only a few hours or days. The strategy of nuclear warfare is based largely on unproven assumptions.Would a general nuclear exchange necessarily produce decisively drastic results for the war making powers or for mankind? A nations will to resist and capacity to recover might be greater than anticipated. The majority of nations are have nots. Of these few countries the vast majority of the weapons are controlled by only two countries, the two most militarily powerful nations of the world--the USA and USSR.

Nuclear warfare could occur between a have and have not nation, a one sided affair in which the have not could not retaliate in like manner. Nuclear weapons today can be smaller in yield than the largest chemical explosive bombs, blurring any sharp distinction between the use of nuclear bomb and conventional warfare. The limited use of the bomb could make society used to the convention of the bomb. Being used repeatedly it might become the accepted and therefore inevitable means of conducting general war. A nuclear exchange between two or more have nations might result in an extended mutual escalation in which the exploding of a few low yield bombs might precipitate a total war on the modern scale.

Nuclear warfare may not always be classed at the upper end of the warfare spectrum. Its unique position could quite possibly be usurped by a future more lethal mode of destruction. It has so far served as a principle weapon of cold warfare with the diplomacy of brinkmanship--the threat of carrying any diplomatic action to the brink of total nuclear war, the consequences of which would be mutually unacceptable. The threat of nuclear war is the basis of nuclear strategy--the deterrence of mutually assured destruction, or MAD--of limiting warfare to maintain world peace by the balance of terror caused by the bomb. Even so the proliferation of the bomb is constantly increasing. Have nations are increasing their nuclear potential. The proliferation of the bomb is destabilizing the balance of terror and credibility of deterrence is gradually being undermined.

Nuclear weapons could become a common place a weapon on many levels of the warfare spectrum. In the hands of terrorists it could serve as a means of blackmail. It might become the main arsenal of the conventional forces in the conduct of limited warfare throughout the world. At such a time the militarism of international society will have evolved and the warfare spectrum will have been altered, the upper level occupied by a better mapped out form of warfare possibly not even utilizing the bomb.

Explosions result from the release of large amounts of energy in a very small area and in a very short span of time. The rapid restructuring of molecules can cause explosions. These types of explosions are caused by chemical reactions. The explosive potential of these chemicals has a standard unit of measurement, in quantitative equivalency to the explosive power of TNT, a common explosive. The original explosives, black powder and gun cotton are relatively low in comparison to TNT. Other explosives have been manufactured such as plastic explosives, which are high explosives in comparison to TNT.

The nuclear bomb represents a quantum increase in the explosive power when compared to that of chemical explosives. The restructuring which occurs in a nuclear explosion is not molecular, but is rather the nuclear restructuring of the atom itself, achieving the alchemy of synthetically transforming one element into another. Nuclear bonds of atoms involve far greater energies than do the chemical bonds of molecules, resulting in the release of far greater amounts of potential energies store in these bonds. This restructuring occurs naturally in all elements in the form of radioactive decay, but it occurs at such a gradual rate and over such a long time span that it is not explosive in its results and hardly noticeable by even the techniques of science. Technology has achieved the means of artificially stimulating the rapid explosive restructuring with the use of conventional explosives, which results in a far greater release of energy than is obtainable by the chemical explosion. The first atomic bombs were fission bombs in which an amount of unstable heavy elements, U235 or plutonium were surrounded by conventional explosives which when detonated resulted in a chain reaction fission of the atomic nuclei into those of more stable elements. These original fission bombs had explosive potentials so great that they were measured in kilotons or thousands of tons of TNT, as a standard unit of measurement. Another quantum increase in explosive power was achieved in the development of the nuclear fusion bomb known as the hydrogen bomb. These bombs achieved greater energy releases by the fusion of hydrogen nuclei to form helium nuclei. Instead of the reverse fission process of dividing heavier nuclei into lighter more stable atoms the fusion process involves greater release of higher potentials through the stimulated combining of light atomic nuclei to form heavier atoms.

For the fusion reaction to occur a high threshold of energy release has to be initially over passed to trigger the explosive restructuring process. This was achieved by using a fusion bomb as the detonator of the fusion reaction process the resultant energy release from fusion reaction is so much greater than it is more convenient to measure in terms of megatons, of millions of tons of TNT. It was found that this fusion reaction could be further used to induce nuclear fission of stabler nuclei, which again boasts the final explosive power of the nuclear bomb several times.

The nuclear explosion is different from the chemical explosion not only in its amount of destructive potential but also in the release of great quantities of nuclear radiation which adversely affects life. Nuclear radiation is not a by product of the conventional chemical explosion. The explosive power of the nuclear bomb is so great that it is convenient to think of the effects of the explosion in terms of periodical natural disasters such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes and tidal waves, not to mention the effects of residual radiation which causes sickness, death, birth defects and cancer and which may be linked with such epidemic diseases such as the plague. The blast effect is much like that of a hurricane or high winds, blowing down objects not deeply rooted to the ground, sending through the earth a shock wave which is comparable to major earthquakes, bringing down structures. The heat and radiation is much like that of a volcanic eruption setting fire to flammable objects and burning the flesh. If exploded in or near water the shock wave might cause a tidal wave which could wipe out valuable coastal areas. The single natural disaster might release much greater total amounts of energy, yet this energy release is generally spread out over a larger area in random haphazard manner and occurs over a longer lapse of time than does a nuclear explosion, which is sudden and immediate. Instead of occurring once in a great like natural disasters many combined explosions could occur in a short period of time over a more extensive or a more concentrated area.

A nuclear explosion causes first a blinding flash of light many times as brilliant as the sun, burning the skin and blinding the eyes, setting fire to buildings. This flash also contains high levels of radiation such as x-rays and gamma rays which can kill life when irradiated in sufficient doses. The flash is followed by a gush of high speed winds, blowing out windows and objects not firmly rooted to the ground. These winds set off a concussion in the earth in the form of a shock wave which shakes down buildings. The tremendous heat in the center of the explosion makes the air rise in the center carrying high into the sky a large column of irradiated smoke and debris, forming the peculiar mushroom, shaped cloud of the explosion as the dust cloud breaks up and disperses high up in the sky. This dust is carried by winds over wide areas and as it settles back to the earth infects large areas with residual radiation called fall out. The tremendous heat in the center of the explosion causes an influx of strong winds into the center from around the target area, sucking people and objects into the inferno. The deadly effects of an atomic bomb explosion may be felt miles from its center.

The immediate vicinity of the explosion is disintegrated and vaporized while the effects decrease in degrees by distance. The nuclear explosion creates a tremendous amount of energy at its center but as it radiates out its force dissipates rapidly. As the kilo tonnage is increased all along the nuclear scale, instead of a directly proportionate increase in the destructive potential as would be expected, the damage effects increase disproportionately. The larger the explosion the less proportionate the amount of damage occurring. A one megaton bomb will produce only the amount of damage equivalent to eight 40 kiloton bombs, while the ration of energy released is 1 to 25, the damage ration increase is disproportionate, 1 to 8. One 40 kiloton bomb will produce only the equivalent damage of approximately 1,200 one ton chemical explosive bombs, a 3 to 10 energy ration. A simple comparison of gross mega tonnage is not sufficient in determining the expectant amount of destruction. Large areas of soft targets are highly susceptible to the effects of nuclear explosions, while the more pin point and the harder the target area, the harder it is to destroy. These factors of destruction have important implications in the planning of nuclear warfare. Many environmental factors effect the results of the explosion, the height of the blast, atmospheric conditions, prevailing winds, rain, cloud conditions, snow, fog, temperature as well as the type of nuclear warhead used.

Also not taken into direct account is the planning of nuclear warfare are the long term effects. A nuclear exchange might set up a chain reaction precipitating major natural disasters such as earthquakes or eruptions. Also the effects of residual radiation from the wide dispersal of fallout cold adversely affect the course of life, producing many unhealthy generic mutations, sterility and the aggravation of the possibility of cancer. Many people who recover from radiation sickness will die later from radiation induced diseases. Large scale destruction will drastically upset the normal ecosystems on which human life is dependent, destroying social systems, law and order, communications, industrial infrastructure, food sources and water sources, means of sanitation and hygiene, widespread endemic and epidemic diseases coupled with radiation sickness and aggravating the initial effects, may increase the final death rate by as much as 50 percent. Many regions may be rendered uninhabitable. The tremendous release of large amounts of energy and the permanent suspension of dust particles high up in the atmosphere could also cause a greenhouse effect by altering the average temperature of the earth. Such a change in temperature by only a few degrees could melt the polar ice caps and cause a catastrophic rise in the sea level, flooding many crucial regions. It is possible that the entire biosphere could be destroyed as the end product of general nuclear war, bringing with it the extinction of the human species.

Within the range of nuclear warfare there are two distinct categories. These two types of nuclear warfare are generally known as tactical nuclear warfare and strategic nuclear warfare. Broadly defined, tactical nuclear warfare is the se of nuclear weapons in support of conventional forces to facilitate the defeat of enemy forces, while strategic nuclear warfare is the designated use of nuclear weapons to destroy the enemies homelands--their industrial and population centers and their capacity and will to wage war. These definitions are superficial and prove inadequate in a further understanding of the underlying implications of the differences. Ultimately the difficulty of definition is the difficulty in defining tactical and strategic. Distinct differences stop here while closer scrutiny reveals many similarities and enigmas. In any case tactical is subordinate to strategic, and tactical nuclear warfare represents the attempt to se the bomb in a limited manner, to conventionalize its use, while strategic nuclear warfare represents the potential totality of an unlimited nuclear war, the penultimate to Armageddon. There is no assurance that the limited tactical use of the nuclear bomb will not guarantee escalation to strategic dimensions. The bombs deployed for either type of warfare are the same with the largest tactical nuclear warhead in the megaton range while the smallest strategic warheads are in the low kiloton range. The majority of tactical nuclear weapons are in the low yield kiloton range, while the majority of strategic nuclear weapons occupy the high yield megaton range. In terms of destruction the two types of warfare are indistinguishable. Tactical nuclear warfare would entail collateral damage on the level of total strategic nuclear warfare for the nations involved. Strategic warfare does not necessarily entail the mass destruction of enemy population centers, but the emphasis of its targeting has been on the more remote strategic forces of the enemy, making it essentially tactical in nature.

Definition of tactical nuclear warfare suffers from a lack of comprehensive understanding. Basically it is the use of nuclear warheads in support of conventional forces. Some recognize tactical warfare as the indirect support of armed forces, distinguishing between the semi-strategic purposes of interdiction and the bombing of built up areas. Others stress tactical nuclear warfare as being used to support the entire theater of operations, but not directly employed on enemy population centers. Definition has been based on yield, setting arbitrary yield limitations while ignoring the range of capabilities of different weapons systems, some gray area delivery systems having ranges making feasible a strategic assault on an enemy homeland.

The preferable definition is the use of nuclear weapons aside from those employed by SLBM's, ICBM's and long range strategic bombers. This includes three distinct uses of tactical nuclear weapons.

The first is the direct close range support of tactical operations. Most of these weapons are of relatively short range and low yield and are used primarily in the direct destruction of conventional enemy forces. Included in these types of tactical nuclear weapons are heavy artillery, 155mm, 175mm and 8 inch cannons capable of firing warheads with a yield of less than a kiloton p to a range of 10 miles, atomic demolition mines, mainly classified to be emplaced in pre-constructed mine shafts for the purpose of channeling, destroying and blocking the advance of enemy forces along likely avenues of approach, a variety of short range missiles with a range of up to 90 miles and a yield of up to 100 kilotons, short range torpedoes, ship to ship guided missiles, depth charges and surface to air missiles. Aircraft also are capable of delivering several types of low yield gravity bombs, air to air and air to surface nuclear weapons..

The second is the indirect use of nuclear weapons in theater operations, attacking enemy lines of communication, rear area troop concentrations and local industrial complexes contributing support to the theater. These weapons include missiles of a range of 450 miles and a short range ground support aircraft capable of delivering warheads with yields of up to 400 kilotons. The third type of tactical nuclear weapons are semi-strategic weapons, gray area delivery systems including medium range bomber aircraft capable of reaching far inland to enemy population centers, and intermediate range ballistic missiles of a range approaching 3000 miles. The payloads have a yield of p to several megatons.

Tactical nuclear weapons were first deployed by the United States in Europe after the second World War to offset the weaknesses of the armed forces confronting the forces of the Soviet bloc, as a deterrent to enemy responses. Tactical nuclear weapons are deployed by the US on the doctrine of selective response to enemy aggression, of controlled escalation ranging from a warning strike to selective use with as little collateral damage as possible, to a general nuclear response. On the basis of this doctrine for tactical nuclear warfare, the United States maintains an arsenal of over 22,000 warheads with 7,200 deployed in Europe, 1,700 in Asia, Korea, Guam and the Philippines, 1,000 deployed in the Atlantic, 1,500 deployed in the Pacific and 10,800 on the continental United States.

This doctrine for the deployment of tactical nuclear warheads was first developed when the Unites States held a monopoly over nuclear weaponry, when its conventional forces were perceived as being quite weaker than those of the Soviets and vulnerable to aggression. The United States no longer maintain a monopoly over nuclear weaponry and there exists today a relative parity of conventional forces between the opposing nations of Europe. The USSR is believed to maintain 3,500 tactical nuclear weapons in the European theater in the form of 8 inch cannon, missiles, aircraft and sea based systems. None of its warheads are under 5 kilotons and most range in yield between 20 and 3,000 kilotons. The doctrine for the deployment of these weapons is not based on a concept of limited tactical nuclear war but on the concept of a massive strategic response, recognizing no distinction between TNW and strategic nuclear warfare, believing any limited use would inevitably escalate to a general nuclear war. Soviet tactical nuclear weapons might be deployed on a strategy of a preemptive first strike to enhance the war fighting capabilities of its conventional forces, rather than the deterrence of selective retaliation. The majority of the Soviet tactical weapons are missiles, IRBM and MEM's, capable of being use in a semi-strategic mode. These gray area weapon systems tend to blur any real distinction between tactical and strategic and provide the perfect means for escalation from the one into the other. The real distinction between nuclear weapons systems is more in their means of deployment and delivery systems and in their targeting.

Great Britain, France and China also deploy tactical nuclear weapons. China has about 50 IRBM's and MRM's targeted primarily at USSR. Independent deployment of nuclear weapons by France is based on a doctrine of general response to any Soviet attack which threatens the security of France. This independent nuclear stance by France compromises US efforts at collective unified defense of Europe, lowering the threshold to a general nuclear war. Other nations, such as West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece and Turkey possess weapons systems for the delivery of nuclear warheads and the US has earmarked over 3,000 warheads for allied use in Europe. This changed situation from the original deployment of TNW by the US creates new problems in the prospects of a future nuclear war than have not yet been solved.

The presence of tactical nuclear weapons in the forward based weapons systems id held as the major deterrent to any threat of Soviet invasion of Europe. Deterrence a function of war fighting capabilities is no longer served by the current status of deployment. The planned selective use of nuclear weapons is no longer valid due to the Soviet and French doctrines of deployment. Graduated response is based on the assumption of rational conduct by adversaries who perceive the same potential levels and the significance of each escalation. Graduated response would fail to deter escalation of limited to general war, instead it would probably enhance the risks of such escalation and lower the threshold of general strategic nuclear warfare. While the overall parity of conventional forces which exists today undermines the deterrent value of the forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, the presence of nuclear weapons negates the utility value served by the conventional forces. Little will be left for these forces to occupy once nuclear bombs have devastated nations. The inexperience with nuclear warfare in general generates problems for planning for limited warfare involving conventional forces. The manpower needs are subject to question, as to whether their should be greater dispersion, involving greater or fewer forces, or greater concentration. Tactical nuclear weapons no longer confers advantages on the allied forces in the defense of Europe.

The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in forward bases weapons systems is dangerously excessive, also contributing instability to the balance of deterrence. Besides the difficulty of insuring physical security of the warheads, the present nuclear weapons would cause too much collateral damage that would forfeit the ends of selective use. Yields of some warheads from 400 to over a megaton is considered unnecessary and overly destructive in battlefield use. The weapons systems, such as the aircraft fields with the necessary installations, the stock piling of warheads in different sites, and forward placed artillery, are vulnerable to capture and first strike, further destabilizing the deterrent value by actually encouraging the propensity for an enemy first strike. Faced with the possibility of defeat or capture, small unit commanders might employ unauthorized use of these warheads, destroying unity and escalating the nuclear exchange. The unauthorized use and security problems would become extremely difficult to control under the stresses of a wartime situation. The maintenance of a quick reaction alert of aircraft loaded with nuclear weapons to reduce the vulnerability to a surprise attack would allow little time for decision on whether or not to cross the nuclear threshold and to rationally escalate a nuclear war.

Tactical nuclear weapons in the US arsenal represents a gross yield of 500 megatons, a sizable proportion of the gross 6,700 megatons of yield represented by the strategic nuclear forces. The unrecognized pre-deployment of much of these warheads in forward based systems and the doctrinal basis for this deployment insure their use and extended escalation in future general war involving these areas of deployment. Limited tactical nuclear warfare magnifies the risks of a total strategic nuclear war. Once the atomic bomb has devastated one city, there would be little difference recognizable between the value of a German city to an American city, or a Polish city to a Russian city.

Immediately following World War 11 until the mid 1950's the United States had a monopoly over the nuclear arsenal, relying on the capability of its forward based long range strategic bomber forces to strike deep into the Soviet homeland as deterrence to the initiation of a conventional general war. This monopoly has slowly given way to a relative parity between the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR and the USA, while the nuclear franchise has enlarged to include Great Britain, France, China, India and Israel. The United States relying on the credibility of a preemptive first strike, maintains a lead in the evolution of strategic nuclear weapons causing a constant mutual escalation of nuclear force potential frequently referred to as the arms race. Strategic nuclear warfare has been one of quite rapid escalation in the direction which serves to enhance the possibility of a nuclear first strike, while the evolution has been peaceful, largely unproven by experience except by nuclear testing. The use of long range bombers as the primary means of delivery of strategic warheads gave way to the development of land based intercontinental ballistic missiles which later led to the development of strategic submarine launched ballistic missiles, the displacement of reliance on land based missiles to less vulnerable sea based missiles. These three principle strategic delivery systems form the basis of the doctrine of triad, the current doctrine of deployment by the USA and to a lesser extent by the USSR. The underlying principle of triad is to increase assurance of the survivability of alternative strategic weapons delivery systems to a preemptive nuclear first strike to administer in massive retaliation a credible second strike, acting as a deterrence to the initiation of nuclear war. The USA seeks to maintain a relative balance of equivalent nuclear force potentials between the three types of weapons systems, while still relying heavily on the predominance of its outdated strategic bomber forces. The USSR relies more heavily on the predominance of its land based missile systems than on the other two types this being the only area of its triad having any real parity with the United States.

The strategic bomber forces are a direct carry over of the conventional strategic bomber forces of World War 11. For the first ten years of the short history of nuclear proliferation it was the only means available for the delivery of nuclear war heads. During these formative years the emphasis on the development of this force led to the increased sophistication, range and payload of the bomber. Today the US relies on the B52 model first built in 1955 as the mainstay of its bomber forces, although alternate semi-strategic bomber forces exist such as the FB111. The expense of the development of these bomber forces led to the questioning of the cost effectiveness and the development of alternative delivery systems. The airfield installations of these bomber forces are extremely vulnerable to a preemptive first strike. The only way the bombers can be kept invulnerable is the expensive method of keeping them aloft fully loaded in rotation, or by being kept on a permanent quick alert status, prepared for take off at short notice at the edge of the airfields. The advent of the guided missile and the development of the interceptor jet aircraft have made the relatively slow high flying bomber very vulnerable to interception by anti-air defense. Newer bomber designs have been developed that can fly at supersonic speeds and drop to near ground level to avoid anti-aircraft defense, but the expense of development is prohibitive. Bombers have been equipped with nuclear air to surface missiles and improved air defense systems which allow them to affect nuclear strikes at relatively safe standoff distances from the target area, but these developments have been unable to check the gradual usurpation of the bomber as the mainstay of the strategic nuclear arsenal.

Even so bombers have certain advantages over other strategic delivery systems which make for the efficacy of maintaining this delivery system as part of the triad. Bombers can take a longer time to reach the target than do missiles and can be recalled in flight on false alert or change of plan, and they can be more selective in targeting and adjust targets during the course of the mission. These advantages make the use of bombers more rational and discriminatory than missiles in escalation of nuclear war and in the delivery of a coordinated debilitating second strike. Bombers have a larger payload and can fly around the world with in-flight refueling. Bombers, unlike missiles are reusable, increasing their value in surviving a protracted nuclear exchange, and can be modified for conventional limited bombing missions, making them dual capable. One disadvantage of recall after a false alert is that bombers require an important and lengthy turn around time to be ready for flight. Recall would require major adjustments in allocations, rendering the recalled force temporarily vulnerable to a preemptive first strike, the false alert being only an enemy ploy. An alternative course to the development of the bomber is the development of the strategic cruise missile, which can fly along close to ground level feeling the terrain on its pre-selected course to its target. The advantages over bombers are that they are less vulnerable to anti-air defense, are less expensive and can be easily concealed and fired from protected positions, being much smaller. The disadvantages are those of a missile. They are nor recallable nor re- adjustable in their mission, they are much slower than ballistic missiles, making them more vulnerable to anti-air defense, especially with the current development and deployment of downward looking surface radar detection systems. Finally they are not reusable.

The bomber served as the mainstay of the US strategic forces throughout the 1950's but the USSR due to its geographic position and lack of any forward air bases sought an alternative course in the development of strategic weaponry in the form of early land and sea launched ballistic missiles. The Soviet pioneering in strategic missile development led the US leadership to propagandize a "missile gap" in the arms race in which the US was presumably dangerously behind the Soviets, threatening national security. This "missile gap" led to the displaced emphasis from the development of the bomber to the development and increased expansion of US strategic missile forces, which quickly took the lead over the Soviet development of the ICBM. The "missile gap" was virtually non-existent.

First generation missiles had a range of up to 5,000 miles, were liquid fueled, surface launched and carried a single re-entry vehicle with light missiles carrying a smaller payload of 1 too 3 megatons and heavy missiles carrying a heavier payload of from 5 to 25 megatons. These first generation missiles could not be stored in a permanent ready to launch status, needing to be fueled prior to launching which required a lengthy preparation time, while the surface launching rendered them highly vulnerable to effective nuclear first strike. The single warhead missile was perceived as feasibly vulnerable to effective anti-ballistic missile defenses which began concurrent development, while the guaranteed radius in which 50% of the warheads would strike was up to 1,600 feet, making them increasingly ineffective to possible underground launched missiles. Second generations ICBM's were of increased range, had solid propellant allowing them to be deployed indefinitely in a launchable status, and were placed in "hardened" concrete and steel underground silos which afforded considerable invulnerability from a first strike. They were armed with multiple re-entry vehicles, each missile having instead of a single warhead carrying several warheads which would strike the target area in a shotgun dispersion and which rendered the missile delivery system invulnerable to effective foreseeable ABM defense.

MRV warheads also increased the chances of knocking out underground silos, making a preemptive first strike the credible basis for future evolution of nuclear warfare, which led to the development of MIRV, multiple individually targeted reentry vehicles, in which each individual warhead could be individually targeted to maximize optimum potential for destruction. The second generation missile also had an improved guaranteed strike radius of 30 feet, rendering the likelihood of destroying underground silos, which can be spotted by satellite reconnaissance and pre-targeted, relatively accurately. The speed of the ballistic missile is between 15,000 and 20,000 miles per hour, rendering them invulnerable to any current type of air defense while the warning and reaction time is only about 15 minutes. The disadvantages of the ICBM are that they are expensive and cannot be recalled nor reused after false alert. Future development is leading to MARVed warheads allowing each individual warhead to determine its position and by adjusting for windage, trajectory and other variations maneuver more accurately to its target. The number of warheads delivered by each missile is being increased trading off gross mega tonnage for increased lethality. While to reduce the vulnerability of the silos, alternate mobile systems, such as the shuffling of missiles from one underground silo to another or by carrying missiles aloft in cargo planes, being jettisoned and launched from parachutes or by being carried on ships dropped and anchored in the sea prior to launching are being developed. The MX missile, the mobile track mounted missile is one important development.

The Soviets have pioneered the development of the FOB's missiles, in which ballistic missiles instead of taking the shortest low trajectory route to the target, is launched in the opposite direction at a higher trajectory to enter partial orbit of the earth and to strike its target from the opposite direction with little or no warning time. The FOB's carries a smaller warhead and has less guaranteed accuracy, but defense and advanced early warning is more difficult because of the trajectory and direction of attack. FOB's is leading to the future development of the MOB's missile in which the missile enters full and multiple orbit of the earth before striking its target. The United States has not pursued this line of development fearing a costly cul-de-sac and crusading against nuclear proliferation in space as part of arms limitation. Future development of satellite systems and of lasers offer new possibilities of anti-missile defense, such as instantaneous warning on launch of the missiles, allowing greater reaction time, and the destruction of the missiles before they blossom in near space, at the ordinate of the trajectory at which they are most vulnerable.

Concurrent with the development of the ICBM strategic forces was the development of the submarine launched ballistic missile, a development which has gained for the sea based strategic arm considerable position, and offers much greater potential in future development. The Soviet Union pioneered the development of submarine strategic forces with the original deployment of surface launched cruise missiles in submarines which had a range of 300 miles. The development of the SLBM was quick to catch p to the current trends in missile development and has led to silent nuclear powered submarines capable of circumnavigating the globe without surfacing carrying up to 16 SLBM's launchable from beneath the surface with a range of 3,000 miles and with MIRved warheads. Future development calls for larger more versatile submarines with more missiles of longer range and greater lethality. Submarines are relatively invulnerable to detection before missile firing making them invulnerable to a first strike, while they can approach within range of any country to deliver either a preemptive first strike with minimal early warning to enemy defenses or wait out the initial exchange, to surface and deliver a decisive second strike. SLBM's are relatively inaccurate with a guaranteed strike radius of about a mile, making them ineffective against hardened silos but they are quite preferable against enemy airfield installations and population centers. The US starting as second in this strategic branch of development also gained an early lead in this capacity.

Five nations have strategic nuclear arsenals, but the predominant amount of nuclear force is divided between the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR. The other nations, the United Kingdom, France and China each posses forces of minimal strategic deterrence value. In a quantitative comparison the Soviet Union appears to have the edge over the US in ICBM's and SLBM's. The USSR has 1480 ICBM's as compared to 1054 of the US and 850 SLBM's as compared to 656 US SLBM's. Only in strategic bomber forces does the US have quantitative superiority, with 380 bombers compared to 135 Soviet bombers. All the other nations combined have a total of less than 100ICBM's, 128 SLBM's and a little more than 100 bombers. The picture changes when gross mega tonnages and the number of targets engageable are compared. Soviet ICBM's may engage a total of 2,654 targets delivering a gross mega tonnage of 2,950. The US can engage a total of 2,154 targets with a payload of 1,460 megatons. Soviet SLBM's can engage a total of 910 targets with a gross of 860 megatons. United States SLBM's can engage a total of 5,120 targets with 830 megatons. The initial disparity of the bomber forces increases with the US bombers capable of delivering 4,400 megatons to 4,000 different targets, compared to the 270 target and 780 megatons deliverable by the Soviet forces. The forces of the other nations combined can engage approximately 334 targets with a total of 370 megatons. The initial picture of strategic force capabilities is even more altered when considering the qualitative superiority of US weapons delivery systems and the comparative vulnerability of the bomber and submarine forces of the USSR to an initial first strike. The USSR can maintain only 11 percent of its SLBM fleet at sea, most of which are detectable by US anti-submarine forces, compared to the US capability of maintaining 50 percent of its fleet afloat most of which is undetected.

It is estimated today that there exists an overkill capacity in the current level of deployment of strategic nuclear forces. Under one thousand warheads are needed to destroy all significant population targets in the Soviet Union and China. There is an optimum number of engageable targets which once destroyed the value of any further nuclear exchanges would rapidly decrease. Beyond this optimum level diminishing returns rapidly sets in. 1,000 warheads might initially kill a total of 70 million, while quadrupling the number of warheads would only increase the number of deaths to 100 million. In strategic nuclear warfare, the term mega deaths is applicable to refer to the amount of guaranteed destructive capability. A few submarines could do unacceptable destruction on the nations cities, without attempting to knock out its strategic nuclear forces. The efficacy of the basic doctrine of triad for the deployment of strategic nuclear forces has been taken for granted. The optimal level of nuclear force potential has been over passed, resulting in overkill capacities and in the concept of mutually assured destruction which virtually guarantees that neither antagonist will come out ahead in a general nuclear exchange.

The United States had a monopoly over the strategic nuclear arsenal in the early years which was used as the basis of deterrence to aggression by enemy conventional forces by the threat of massive nuclear retaliation. The nuclear monopoly was used to offset the disparity in conventional force levels which existed between the allies and the Soviets. The US has lost its nuclear monopoly to the other nations, and has recognized the threat of Soviet strategic forces the only credible threat to the US homeland which exists today. The disparity between conventional forces no longer exists, while by far the US more than any other nation maintains the greatest capacity for projection of conventional forces overseas, much of which is based on the purpose of intervention in foreign affairs. Soviet conventional forces are primarily defensive in orientation. The US maintains nuclear superiority to maintain the credibility of a preemptive first strike as an option, on the fear that the Soviets, if they are allowed to attain nuclear superiority, with a clear lead in its missiles forces, will initiate an attack on the US. The US ignores the fact that the Soviets seek to attain parity to ensure credible defense of its homeland, in the form of massive retaliation, instead of superiority to enable it to launch an offensive preemptive first strike. The US catalyzes Soviet escalation by striving to maintain the lead in the arms race. Striving to maintain nuclear superiority over the Soviets creates mutual escalation in force potentials which tends to destabilize the balance of deterrence founded on the concept of mutually assured destruction. The capability to inflict unreciprocated massive retaliation no longer exists for the US, undermining any effort to maintain nuclear superiority. Optimum force levels of nuclear deterrence is well over passed. An unreciprocated first strike is virtually impossible. What in actuality exists is a balance of forces based on the deterrence of MAD. Mutual escalation of forces makes that initial balance ever more precarious.

The credibility of the concept of strategic nuclear warfare has been unchallenged since when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were devastated. Strategic nuclear war is based on inexperience and is largely hypothetical. Nuclear warfare lends itself easily too quantification and easy armchair hypothesis. It has been oriented and planned to be the culmination of decades of development in a spasmodic ordeal lasting probably a few hours or at most a few weeks. Not much has been planned toward what would be left after the crisis. Many nations might come out of it unscathed or the ordeal may deliberately involve every nation on earth to prevent a "victor". Nations may afterward posses nuclear arsenals or their arsenal may be completely used up or destroyed. The rate of recovery and rearmament might be fast or slow. Third world nations might emerge the new world superpowers. Once rearmed a second and third holocaust might be soon forthcoming. Nuclear warfare might become the convention. Any have nation, its back against the wall, would use the bomb in a first strike in a vain gamble for survival. What is the credibility of nuclear deterrence in an unsafe world?

The United States leads in the technological development of the bomb. It has sought to minimize the guilt of first use by its selective use in a limited general war. How credible is a doctrine that sells a better bomb to the public as the only assurance of peace? How much peace can a nuclear explosion bring?

This is the upper level of the evolution of militarism. No doubt the warfare spectrum will take on new characteristics, the bomb will take a back seat to another weapon and its use will become a commonplace event. It is probably erroneous at best dangerous at the worst hopeful to presume that mutual escalation of the balance of terror will bring permanent peace, an indefinite Pax Ballistica during which general warfare will be non-existent. War is a lesson hard learned by world society. A lesson frequently forgotten due to the widespread ignorance about warfare which fosters illusions of its value and a morbid curiosity on which militarism breeds. A lesson harshly relearned in the next war. Lessons soon forgotten are bound to be repeated. If history teaches anything, it teaches that any peace based on the balance of power is temporary.

The idea that the nuclear dilemma of two scorpions in a bottle will secure eventual permanent world peace is an illusion fostered by the nationalistic spirit of world politics. Nuclear war stands today as an epitome of the strategy of force and terrorism because of the doctrine on which nuclear weapons are deployed. The balance of power is founded on a spirit of mutual mistrust and fear between nations. Peacetime nuclear horizontal and vertical proliferation continues unchecked. The arms race is leading to a peacetime ephemeralization of weaponry. Weapons once made and kept permanently ready must eventually be used. While the intervening years of continuing cold war and peace allow room for world prosperity, the eventual climatic war will produce in an even shorter time on a world wide scale more destruction hitherto unwitnessed. Peace is an illusion of the warfare continuum. Before peace can be made a reality, the nuclear dilemma must be solved. Nuclear weapons are here in the world to stay, mankind must be able to live with them and to survive the ill affects of nuclear misuse and aftermath. The problem is to alter the warfare continuum intermittent peace, a product of rampant militarism based on mutual fear, into a peacetime continuum of intermittent warfare as a diminishing by product of the devolution of militarism and the natural healthy growth of human civilization based on mutual trust between nations and peoples of world society. We can aim in all our plans either for the minimization of warfare toward the eventualization of permanent peace or toward the maximization of warfare and the certain extinction of the human race.

1. "The Price of Defense: A New Strategy for Military Spending" by the Boston Study Group. 1979, Times Books, pages 62-97, 211-219.

2. "Strategic Weapons: An Introduction". Crane Russek and Company 1975.

3. "War and Space" by Robert Salkfeld, Prentice Hall Inc. 1970

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