Chapter 4

Limited Warfare

by Hugh M. Lewis

General warfare is a term that has come to mean international war, which by contemporary standards would necessarily include the possibility of nuclear exchange. General warfare has become almost synonymous with nuclear warfare in modern literature, yet the association is not completely correct--general warfare is a more generally applicable term. The term nuclear and general denote two different types of warfare. General war does not necessarily mean the use of nuclear weapons nor does the use of nuclear weapons necessarily have to be general. General warfare involves supra- national conflict, representing wars in which the legitimacy of the sovereignty of the nations involved is not the crucial cause of the war, but rather the preservation of this already established legitimacy is the crux of the war. General warfare represents all forms of international conflict and is the widest ranging and most all inclusive type of warfare. Indeed a history of general warfare is a major cornerstone of the history of civilization. General war is the intermediate zone of warfare between low intensity types of warfare and the upper range of unlimited nuclear warfare climaxing in the totality of holocaust. This upper level of hot warfare is the level at which the concept of the totality of the participants or of the observers. Totality implies warfare of unlimited dimensions. World War 11 was for the contemporary observer a general war of unlimited dimensions, total by anyone's standards. Today a general war of proportional scale to World War 11 would not be considered a total war because of the capabilities for war have advanced far beyond the destructive capability of that war. This advance of this potential totality of modern war is due in large part to the advent of nuclear weaponry. A total war by today's standards would have to include nuclear weapons. Nuclear warfare has significant implications. Governments have restrained themselves from the use of nuclear weapons in general war because of the possibility of extended escalation might result in war in which no nation could win. Nuclear warfare sets a limit to the escalation of general war and it is this limit which divides general war into limited warfare and nuclear warfare and forms the basis of all limitations occurring in a non-nuclear, limited general war.

Within context of this nuclear limitation, limited warfare represents all forms of general war in which nuclear weapons are not used. It includes a wide range, from small scale reprisals involving brief incursions across national borders, the shooting down of foreign aircraft violating national territorial boundaries, to relatively unlimited wars involving whole continents--total even by modern standards. A whole set of other limitations occur in limited warfare, limitations which are unilateral or mutually recognized or implicitly understood in the conditions of the war. These limitations arise basically from the same fear of mutual escalation, which could pass the nuclear threshold and become uncontrollable. This fear of escalation has lead to the major concern for the consequences of even minor details of general war in the formulation of international strategies, which before the advent of the nuclear bomb were overlooked or delegated to a position of more local responsibility. Limitations may be geographically based, confined to borders, latitudes, or arbitrary zones, involving only a limited number of participants. Limitations may be in the objectives of the opponents, seeking only recognition of broader rights, or the cessation of some minor activity, or even unconditional surrender which is surrender nonetheless and not total annihilation. Moral limitations of war affect decision making, military social relationships and the morale of the military combatants. The moral reality of war is a crucial application of justice in the limitation of warfare which is frequently overlooked but usually understood and unconsciously recognized. The weapons used in the conduct of the war may be limited, such as restraining from the use of chemical or biological agents, or limited use of the weapons to the destruction of only uniformed combatants and not of noncombatants, or of particularly inhumane weapons such as flame agents or fleshettes. Limitations often arise from fear of reciprocal retaliation in like manner. These limitations may be implicitly understood from the actions of the opponents, arising from the mutual threat of undesirable escalation or extension. They may be unilateral on the part of a major world power involved in a war with a lesser power which is involved in a relatively total war effort, from fear of drawing in other nations, from threat to national prestige--to save face if it were perchance defeated-- by keeping the defeat minimal, or because of a lack of social cohesion due to the unpopularity of the war. A nation may be forced into a war it doesn't because of alliances, thus keeping its participation minimal. Finally a war may be limited by formal agreements as with the Hague and Geneva conventions or the limitations may be due to the inherent weaknesses of the opponents.

When considering possible limitations in warfare the concept of conventionality of a war comes into play with the opposing concept of unconventional warfare. The first use of the term of convention has its connection with the various international conventions, such as the Hague and Geneva conventions, by which certain types of weapons--shrapnel, dumdum bullets, gas, or flame agents--become outlawed by international agreement as unconventional, as did deliberate use of weapons on innocent noncombatants and civilian populations. But the concept of conventionality and unconventionality has come to imply much more than its connection with any international agreements. Conventional warfare implies the type of general war mutually accepted by the contending forces, usually as the traditional forms of combat and weapons which were used in previous warfare, while unconventional warfare means an unusual form of warfare by any current standards. The evolution of warfare and of militarism has come to means the evolution of the conventionality of war. The entrance into enemy homelands being effectively blocked by opposing conventional weapons and tactics, with a costly indecisive stalemate ensuing, new methods of forcing this entrance or of facilitating entry must be devised, until eventually a backdoor or side window may be fond into that homeland. As these new weapons and tactics are used repeatedly and are found to be effective, they earn acceptance by society as being conventional. Weapons or tactics unconventional in one war often become the standard of convention in the next. As new types of war become conventional, they replace other types of war which are forgotten and when reintroduced in other wars these are new and unconventional. In the evolution of conventionality the back door to the enemies, homelands have been effectively opened. This is the example of strategic bombing, which was new and unconventional in World War 11. It has evolved today in the form of nuclear warfare as the primary means of waging a conventional general war. There is a corresponding evolution of the terrorism of convention, a higher and growing threshold of acceptance by the average person in the amount of death and destruction in conventional general war.

While conventional weapons are increasingly improved in lethality and the potential for destruction, much of which is collateral, indiscriminate destruction and while terrorism of unparalleled levels has become conventionalized, one form of warfare, toxic warfare, yet occupies a unique position in the warfare spectrum as the epitome of unconventional warfare. Toxic warfare has come to be typified as the standard of unconventional warfare.

Toxic warfare is the se of toxic agents--poisons--to kill or incapacitate the enemy. The first and last use of modern toxic warfare was in World War 1. It was used against a totally unprepared enemy, evoking grim public outcry against it. Toxic warfare was then in its embryonic stages of development and was not employed effectively enough to achieve decisive results. The debut of toxic warfare produce a bad and lasting impression on world society, resulting in a prejudice against its further use and a widespread ignorance about its capabilities. Toxic warfare evoke images of atrocious and brutal death. Underlying the prejudices against its use is the argument that toxic warfare is a particularly indiscriminant type. It can't be accurately targeted like a rifle can be and it may backfire and get easily out of control. Making toxic warfare illegitimate by international convention helps to eliminate the variables and varieties of weapons of warfare and mutual retaliation in kind makes the use of toxic agents undesirable. Death is final and indiscriminant, no matter in what manner one dies. Strategic bombing and massive artillery barrages can be considered equally indiscriminate. The argument of mutual retaliation is not applied in the case of nuclear warfare or to the strategic bombing in World War 11 or Vietnam when the victims could not effectively reciprocate the utilization of like means of death. A nuclear explosion does not discriminate between uniformed combatant and an innocent civilian, nor are its after effects--radiation sickness and cancer, any less discriminate than toxic weapons. The human element used in targeting and discrimination in all these weapons is just as far removed as it is in toxic warfare.

The widespread ignorance about toxic warfare and its implications is still more persistent of the toxic gases and the field of toxic warfare remains largely unexploited. Toxic warfare does not entail the large amounts of the collateral destruction occurring in other more conventional types of warfare, nor is it any more particularly indiscriminate in its targeting. Toxic warfare does not necessarily imply the death of the victims, but it may be used only to temporarily incapacitate. Generally victims who do not die by toxic agents will recover completely without lasting side effects. The wide use of toxic weapons can be very discriminating, more humane and in the long run more cost effective than current means of conventional warfare. It can serve as the basis of a potential alternative to nuclear holocaust.

There are two types of toxic warfare: 1) chemical warfare--the direct use of toxic agents or chemicals in the form of mists, gases, vapors, particle clouds, or liquids; and 2) biological or germ warfare--the use of bacteria or viruses to invade the victims body to produce toxic results of poisoning or disease. It may be that underlying societies' aversion to the use of chemical warfare is a natural fear of a slow unstoppable choking death. The first agents used caused death in this manner but today a greater variety of different agents exist and each afflicts the victim in a different manner than choking. All do not necessarily cause death. They do not necessarily mutilate and amputate as does shrapnel and the concussion of explosive weapons. Those who do not die usually recover completely without permanent disability. The percentage of deaths to casualties is proportionately lower than with the lethality of other weapons. The underlying reasons for aversions to biological warfare may be more deeply rooted in the fear of the germ inbred throughout history by societies constant affliction by diseases and plagues, which until only recently were little understood, much less preventable. The greatest death rates in the history of civilization have been due not to wars but to the black plague. This prejudice against biological warfare underlies the argument that its use can become uncontrollable, highly resistant mutant strains might easily develop which may spread to epidemic proportions and become indiscriminating between friend or foe. If chemical warfare can become indiscriminating in terms of tens of miles, biological agents can become indiscriminating in terms of hundred of miles. Natural disease have caused a high attrition rate in most armies throughout history. Dysentery, malaria, dengue fever have never stopped armies from going to war. No biological agent need be used in war when the side effects are questionable, or for which there is no preventive cure. Very few biological agents necessarily cause a high death percentage, most cause only the temporary incapacitation of slight illness. If used wisely biological warfare can be highly selective in its targeting effectiveness and control.

There are several families of chemical agents, each distinguished by the manner in which they afflict a victim. The irritant gases such as CS and Cn, of the cause choking and lacrimentation of the upper respiratory tract and the external membraneous tissues, but rarely do they cause death. Such agents are widely used by police organizations to control riots or to subdue criminals. Chlorine is a choking agent which affects deeper into the lungs causing the lungs to hemorrhage and fill with fluid, resulting in death. Blistering agents such as mustard gases or lewisite blister the skin, the eyes and the lungs to cause death. Blood agents are gases which inhaled enter the bloodstream and restrict the blood from carrying oxygen to the vital parts of the body, causing death. The nerve agents affect the ability of nerves to transit nerve impulses causing uncontrollable responses and eventually death. Nerve gas is the primary form of chemical agent that would be used in a major conventional war. One potential type of agent, the mind agent, involves the use of hallucinogenic drugs, such as animal tranquilizers, LSD 25 and RD, not designed to kill but rather to cause temporary periods of irrational behavior by the enemy during which his defenses would be rendered quite vulnerable to attack, LSD is tasteless, odorless and can enter the blood through the skin as well as the openings and it takes a relatively minuscule amount to produce the required results.

Chemical agents are also classed by the ability to remain in a given target area. This ability is called persistence. Non-persistent agents such as nerve and blood agents are gases or vapors which evaporate and dissipate quickly and are rendered ineffective in a relatively short time. Persistent agents are generally liquid, such as the blistering agents, which evaporate slowly and remain in the target area for a considerable period of time. The means of employing these agents, the active states and the amounts required to produce casualties determine the effective range, target area and type of results. Another factor affecting the use of chemical weapons is the prevailing wind and weather conditions. Rains may wash a persistent gas away, while winds may shift and allow gas clouds over friendly or unplanned zones. A high wind will dissipate a gas cloud quicker than a slow or non-windy day.

Chemical warfare is not confined to the toxic warfare spectrum and has been used conventionally throughout the history of warfare. The use of incendiaries and fire, from ancient Greek fire, to Molotov cocktails, flame throwers, napalm and white phosphorous have been a conventionally accepted form of chemical warfare and represents a particularly hideous form of death. Chemicals to produce smoke screens or to signal are extensively employed. The conventional explosives, from gunpowder to dynamite to the new FAE bombs are the most widely accepted though unrecognized form of chemical warfare. The use of poison, of herbicides to defoliate and pesticides are other applications of chemical warfare.

Biological weapons fall into two general categories, active biological agents are bacterial and viral agents which upon invading the target body have direct pathological results from the presence as a foreign disease. Generally these active agents have a certain incubation period before the onset of the symptoms of disease. The disease usually follows a set pattern of development and has established death percentages. They may or may not be cured or prevented by vaccination. The other category consists of passive biological agents which do not directly affect the body but produces waste products that are the most toxic chemical known to man. Bacteria are also classed as anaerobic, which die in the presence of oxygen and as anaerobic which require oxygen to survive. Anaerobic bacteria cannot be freely transmitted through the air, but must be transmitted by vectors such as mosquitoes, ticks, mites, fleas or rodents. Aerobic bacteria are communicable, being transmitted by breathing or by touching infected objects known as fomites. Owing to the microscopic size of bacteria and the rapid rate of reproduction and to their particular indestructibility in harsh environments, biological agents can often infect wide areas rather quickly. They may not only be targeted at humans, but may be targeted specifically in an eco-war towards the infection of cattle, horses, pigs, chickens and crops such as rice, potatoes or wheat. Biological warfare might be a potentially strategic form of warfare attacking whole nations or regions, bringing starvation by killing off crops and or food supplies or killing or sterilizing whole populations without the attendant amount of collateral damage to material on which tends to negate the advantages of more conventional warfare. Biological weapons may be used concurrently with nuclear weapons, the effects of biological disease and radiation sickness complementing and magnifying each other to produce extremely high death rates in a general war.

Biological weapons are not confined to toxic warfare, but have been employed as conventional weapons throughout history. Dogs are used to guard, track and smell explosives. Pigeons can carry messages and reconnoiter. Horses have come to be looked upon as the inseparable ally of man in war. Poisonous snakes, insects and bats with incendiaries have been considered as weapons. Bionics and cybernetics are special areas of research which seek to duplicate biological functions as useful means of warfare. Camouflage is a spin off of nature, of man trying to blend into his biological environment.

Conventional general warfare has evolved into three categories, each distinct in the battlefield environment in which they occur. These are land warfare, sea warfare and air warfare, the evolution and precedence of each being roughly in that order. General war does not usually occur in which only one of these types of warfare happens independently of the others. Usually a general war is a mixture of all three types. Each type is unique in its battlefield environment and are interdependent in their successful execution.

Historically land warfare is probably the oldest type of such limited warfare. History of civilization is based largely on the history of conventional land warfare. Conventional land warfare occurs between organized armies of opposing societies, each army attempting to defeat the other in order to enable one society to impose its will on the other. Sea and air warfare have been spin-offs from this type of land battle. The single commonest factors of all armies are their imposed system of uniformity. This concept of uniformity has carried over into navies and air-forces, whose basic operational functions have become differentiated. The soldiers uniform is the symbol of conventional warfare.

In land warfare, more than with any other type, terrain is the key factor to its successful conduct. The capturing or defending of key terrain features is all important in this type of warfare. Land warfare is basically positional, with each army attempting to out position the other. Characteristic of this type of warfare is that each army has a front, a principle direction in which its forces are focused to bear upon the enemy forces, a rear which is the direction of the forces homeland and which the front serves to protect, containing the lines of communication, supply and command, and the flanks or the sides of vulnerability which provide means by which the opposing army can reach the rear. Often a force seeks to push back or crush the enemy's front, in a direct frontal assault or siege. Sieges often prove unsuccessful unless they are accomplished with an astonishing amount of surprise and with far greater superiority of force. Sieges are often directed against the enemy's barricades. If these barricades circumscribe the rear in a 360 degree circle, it often becomes easier to circumscribe the barricade itself with a blockade which cuts the enemy off from external resources so that they can be weakened into collapse or surrender. Instead of a general siege of the enemy frontal defenses it is usually more preferable to infiltrate the enemy's barricades, seeking out the weakest points and concentrating forces at these points to penetrate and bypass the barricade and to collapse the enemy front. Finally in a linear defensive position which can be out flanked it is usually more preferable to attack indirectly the flanks which is known as envelopment, by which the opposing forces simply bypasses the enemy front and attacks the rear in a turning movement, or else the enemy flank may be turned, by which more force is concentrated at one side of the enemy's lines than the other in order to fracture the lines. There may be a single envelopment around one flank, a double envelopment around both flanks, a triple and even a quadruple envelopment in the form of amphibious assaults, vertical helicopter or parachute assaults. Between the divided enemy forces a concentrated blow might be delivered at the critical fracture point, to separate the enemy forces and isolate them from their lines of communication, to turn their flanks and surround them, barricading them from access to their rear, or to roll them back upon their lines of communication and force retreat, a rout and panic. Between the opponents fronts exists an area which is occupied by neither force and is known as no man's land. The evolution of conventional land warfare has been the growth of the size of the armed forces involved, the extension of the geographical area and the extension of the fronts in width and depth with an increased area of no man's land. The weaponry has become more destructive and the organization of the armed forces has become more complicated and specialized, yet the essential geometry and geography of the battlefield remains relatively unchanged.

The specialization of the fundamental organization of armed forces has followed three general directions. The most basic root of all land forces has been the infantry, a branch which has proven universally adaptable to any situation. The foot soldier is the lowest common denominator of military organization. The infantry has remained the cheapest answer to the most critical problems in the military. The cavalry is the second general direction of specialization in the organizational development of armed forces. The cavalry, the traditional marriage of the foot soldier and the horse represents a sacrifice of economy for increased mobility by which the enemy forces may be out maneuvered, out flanked or penetrated by the shear momentum of this increased mobility. The traditional cavalry has due to technological necessity and development become mechanized with the use of the tank and the armored personnel carrier supplanting the old role of the horse in modern conventional warfare. Artillery represents the third general direction of specialization of armed forces. It employs the use of shear destructive force to destroy enemy barricades and to crush the enemy front. The use of slings, throwing stones, spears, bow and arrows, long bow, cross bow, of the arquebus, the catapult, the siege machine, to the development of the cannon, rifle, machine gun mortar, siege artillery to the development of the bomber and ballistic missile, this has remained an essential arm in both defense and offense to the conventional land force. Important in this specialization is the mode and direction of force employed. It may range from generally indirect modes as the mortar, artillery and ballistic missile to more direct forms such as the guided missile and machine gun. Along with the differentiation and specialization there has also occurred a certain degree of integration between the three traditional arms, at all levels and echelons of organization. Infantry is mounted and artillery is self propelled.

Modern land warfare has followed a recent development which is generally misunderstood and often results in its misuse and even at times in a prejudice against its use, this development is known as armored warfare, representing generally the mechanization of land armies. Its recent evolution is epitomized by the development of the tank as the mainstay of the modern conventional force. The first use of the modern tank in war post dates the use of the airplane in war. The early offensive mobility of land armies in World War 1 was based primarily upon the infantry and cavalry attack, and this mobility quickly broke down under the effectiveness of the massive artillery barrages and the general deployment of the machine gun and barbed wire, which cut down wave upon wave of infantry and cavalry. When the offensive mobility was lost, World War 1 rapidly degenerated from a short lived decisive war into an indefinite and indecisive siege war in which attrition rates became tremendous and whole armies had to go underground into trenches and bunkers to avoid the certain death from above. The tank was designed and evolved as a means by which offensive mobility could be regained. The tank was a combination of mechanized mobility and tracks to navigate off road obstacles, of armor protection from the machine and shrapnel and of increased armament in the mounting of machine guns and cannons which could be brought to bear on the enemy, by which the enemy's formidable barricades could once again be broken. The first tanks were primitive, unreliable, and unconventional, which inevitably led to prejudice against their effective use. The tank was not used decisively in World War 1, generally being piece-mealed to infantry units and not concentrated in mass to affect a penetration. The few occasions in which they were concentrated it produced effective penetration, but they outdistanced the infantry and the initial successes could not be followed up to produce decisive results. The allied armies, emerging victorious but decimated from World War 1 did not recognize the potential of the tank in general conventional warfare nor did they develop its full incorporitization into the conventional army. The few individuals who recognized its potential were often suppressed and ostracized by the high command, composed primarily of the infantry officer and the antiquated traditional cavalry officer. The tank threatened to usurp the central authority of the infantry and thus effected the traditional egos of the infantry minded conventional armies. It was unconventional and therefore unacceptable weapon. While the armies of the allies fell into general decay after World War 1, the German leadership sought to restructure their army to recoup its defeat.

The German command capitalized on the hard lessons of World War 1 and sought to employ armored warfare to its maxim potential. Armored warfare has evolved around the inherent offensive potential of the tank, which is represented by superior cross country mobility, concentration of firepower and armored protection. The success of armored warfare depends on the concentration of tanks in mass and in depth at a critical point in the battlefield, to overcome the enemy defense, instead of the piece mealing of individual tanks to infantry units, by which mobility is confined to the pace of the infantry and the tank suffers increased vulnerability from artillery and anti-tank fire. A lone tank is a beached whale, very blind and vulnerable from all sides. Tanks concentrated can extend the frontage firepower and reduce the overall vulnerability from the flanks and rear, which can be covered by other tanks. Also armored warfare depends on the mechanization of the infantry to keep pace with the tanks and to follow p on the advantages gained through penetration. The German army capitalized on this potential of armored warfare early on World War 11 to critically defeat the World War 1 oriented allied armies. The anti-tank weapons deployed early in World War 11 were of World War 1 vintage and were mostly ineffective in stopping newer and more powerful tanks. Anti-tank warfare has generally lagged behind the tank in development p until the advent of the guided missile, which has important implications in future warfare.

The beginning of World War 11, the advent of armored warfare, witnessed the development of many variations of tanks and many spin-offs which has resulted in the greater specialization of armored vehicles into various classes. The tank itself has evolved from several distinct types which were prevalent early in World War 11. Early tanks were often multi-turreted or without turrets, with several guns or with just machine guns. Generally tanks took the form of tracked hulls with a turret mounting a central main gun. Tanks were classed as light, of low tonnage, highly mobile, with little firepower--as medium, weight from 25 to 50 tons, with a compromise on firepower and mobility, and as heavy, tanks which were heavily armored and contained large armaments, big guns with proportionately fewer rounds, to the detriment of a decreased mobility and cruising range. The tank also evolved into distinct types of low cost mix varieties which generally were cast into the anti-tank role as infantry support, defensive tanks. These fall into two distinct categories the assault gun and the tank hunter. The assault gun stressed firepower and armored protection over mobility usually being turretless, with large diameter guns in a solid casement of the hull. The tank hunter stressed firepower and mobility over armor protection with thin armor mounting large guns in an unprotected or semi-protected turret, or else a light vehicle with a large gun in solid casement. The medium tank was the mainstay of the armored forces in World War 11. The specialized development of the other types gave way to the development of the high mix main battle tank. The MBT has come to replace the medium and heavy tanks and the cheaper lower mix tank destroyer and tank hunter as the main star of the modern mechanized conventional army. The MBT has developed into a highly efficient but also high cost tank at the expense of development along other more cost effective lines. The MBT has increased in armament, armor and mobility way beyond the levels of World War 11, yet its cost effectiveness in future warfare remains to be validated.

The evolution of mechanization has lead to the development of several spin-offs of families of armored vehicles. The light tanks gave way to the development of light wheeled armored reconnaissance vehicles used for scout purposes, for riot control, for command and logistics functions at the front. Armored personnel carriers developed as a means of allowing infantry and material to keep pace with tanks. Trucks were the principle means of transport for infantry but they lacked the armored protection and cross country mobility to conveniently carry the infantry mounted into the front. APC's have developed to be capable of performing a wide variety of specialized functions and are developing into a distinct high mix type of fighting vehicle, not only being designed to transport infantry but continually increasing its own firepower potentials. Closely akin to these two families is the amphibious vehicles cast in various roles, others are a mix between tanks and APC's, some of which are light tanks serving the scout tank hunter role. Artillery has been increasingly mechanized with tracks and armored turrets, quickly gaining preeminence over the towed artillery pieces as the rule instead of the exception on the battlefield. Finally the engineer tanks whose heyday was World War 11have come to occupy several category types. The recovery vehicle is designed to retrieve tanks or other tracked vehicles which are inoperable, and are equipped with a wench and boom and the necessary tools to pull the tank engine and to repair the vehicle up at the front lines. Bridge layers have been developed which can lay spans across rivers or ditched which would otherwise be unpassable by the heavier tank elements. Many specialized types of armored vehicles have been marketed over the years, yet the main battle tank remains preeminent on the conventional battlefield.

Sea warfare evolved as an extension onto the water as a continuance of land warfare. Some nations have been quite inaccessible by land but very vulnerable because of extensive shorelines and dependence on sea trade. With the development of the fighting ship and of the importance of overseas trade so too did sea warfare develop into an important form of conventional warfare. Sea warfare is conducted by navies which seek to establish control of the seas by defeating enemy navies. In this sense sea warfare is not as dependent on the terrain as are armies, rather than holding strategic points of value navies seek to defeat the enemy directly in battle by destroying the ships, and it is thus in a tactical sense simplified into a battle between a limited number of ships. Historically single naval battles between opposing fleets have served as critical junctures and decisive influences on the course of wars. By defeating the enemy navy, a naval force seeks to establish control of sea lanes to protect the overseas lines of communication and shipping which have always been vulnerable to attack. To increase security warships often escort cargo ships in convoys. Navies also seek to project power onto the land in various ways. Naval warfare is positional in the limited sense of key harbors and ports, which can play a major part in the control of the sea. A navy may seek to blockade a nation, by which it forcibly cuts off all overseas shipping rotes, in an attempt to strangle the nations source of supply.

A navy may also project force onto the land in the form of naval bombardments, sea based marine forces and more recently with carrier based aircraft. The ability of navies to land forces quietly on unexpecting enemy coast lines has always enabled marines or invading armies to overcome shore defenses. The legends of the ferocious Vikings, of successful pirates, and of illegal traders attest to the efficacy of these tactics. Navies have always been more force oriented rather than man oriented, precisely because of the vulnerability and superior mobility of the ship. The infantry once played a key role in naval battle, but their position was rapidly subjugated by the artillery firepower of the ships . World War 1 was the heyday of the big battleships which was the climax of cannon firepower in the evolution of navies. In World War 11 the battleship gave up sovereignty of the seas to the aircraft carrier, which had both the greater accuracy, firepower and range in the projection of force.

With the development of the submarine the subsurface has become increasingly important in sea warfare. The submarine developed into an efficient, hidden and invulnerable killer of surface ships. Submarine warfare has become an important alternative to surface warfare, by which an inferior navy may attack enemy shipping and warships without surface control. Submarine warfare aimed at enemy shipping became a powerful influence in the course of World War 11. In the development of naval warfare, the guided missile has supplanted the aircraft as the major means of firepower projection. Coupled with the development of the silent nuclear powered submarine which is capable of circumnavigating the globe under the surface and with the subsurface launched missiles, submarine warfare has taken preeminence over surface warfare. With the addition of nuclear warheads, submarine warfare has gained an ever greater importance as a credible nuclear deterrent force.

Air warfare represents more than any other type of conventional warfare the subjugation of the position of the human to that of the machine and in this sense it is purer in a mathematical strategic sense than the other forms of conventional warfare as a means of firepower projection. The aircraft has supplanted the cannon as the principle means of firepower projection. This and its strategic advantages, greater range accuracy and payload has lead to the development of the air force as a distinct military organization. Air warfare has evolved into two general forms of combat, one is tactical air warfare and the other is strategic air warfare. In tactical warfare the air forces seek to control the skies by establishing air superiority and then to project its force potential against enemy armies and navies and key enemy industry. The tactical air war has several specialized missions. The first is the aerial reconnaissance of the enemy army and homeland by which knowledge about critical enemy positions and movements can be learned. The second mission is to directly support army units and navy units in combat in what has come to be known as close ground support and tactical air support. The third mission is the projection of firepower in the form of bombs directly on the enemy by bombing or shooting enemy forces and installations, enemy defenses, shipping, communication and industry which are vital to the enemy war effort. This is known as international bombing. Finally to protect its troops, rear, and ships the air fore seeks to knock out enemy airplanes by the use of fighters, anti-aircraft defenses and by knocking out enemy air installations. This is known generally as interception. Along these lines many specialized families of tactical aircraft have developed. Aircraft have evolved unmatched in technical efficiency faster than any other type of weapons system. Today the technical level of modern aircraft has reached such a high state that few nations are able to produce competitive modern aircraft. With the development of guided anti-aircraft missiles, the efficacy of these extremely high cost, high mix tactical aircraft has become questionable.

Strategic anti-warfare was first conducted in World War 11. It is known generally as strategic bombing in which long range bomber forces will seek to bring about the demise of the enemy homelands capability and will to wage war by the mass bombing if population and industrial centers. Doubt has been cast on the efficacy of strategic bombing as to its real value. It is difficult to access the long term effects of such bombing, forcing such strategic centers underground, producing instead of a will to surrender, a greater hatred and reason to continue resistance. Strategic bombing has proven relatively ineffective to countries which are industrially underdeveloped, the population being primarily agrarian instead of urban. The bright future of strategic bombing has been dimmed a little in doubt, yet with the advent of the nuclear bomb the concept of strategic bombing has evolved into a never form of warfare which has very special implications, that is nuclear warfare.

Another increasingly important function of air forces has been in its development of airlift capabilities, by which an air force can transport quickly and at long range large quantities of material and troops. Air forces can project force onto the land by air mobile armies, such as parachute or glider borne men and equipment. Helicopters have become an important part in the air forces due to the capability to land in restricted areas in a vertical manner. They serve many specialized roles of support, medical evacuation, tactical airlift, reconnaissance, land have served the means of vertical envelopment by which highly mobile group forces can quickly land in force and be evacuated over extensive areas. They also serve in the role of close ground support, particularly as anti-tank weapons. The slow speed of the helicopter makes them relatively vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire, which serves to restrict their activity to tactical support roles of armies and navies.

Since World War 11 some weapons have improved, others have devolved, being supplanted or forgotten as necessary and inefficient. The effectiveness of many untried modern weapons has been put in doubt by the advent of a new type of warfare, missile warfare, which is the product of integration between electronic warfare and the conventional bomb. A modern missile is a self propelled warhead electronically guided to its target. Missile warfare represents a quantum jump in the firepower potential of armies, navies and air forces. These smart bombs have supplanted in preeminence in the modern battlefield the "dumb" ballistic gravity projectiles. These weapons are capable of destroying tanks, ships and aircraft. The effectiveness of armored columns, of close air support and of the aircraft carrier have been much reduced by the advent of the missile warfare. The relative economy of these missiles brings to question the efficacy of expensive modern high mix equipment, such as the main battle tank, high mix fighter bombers, and the aircraft carrier. The extreme cost of these weapons will become prohibitive to their mass production when their effective worth on the battlefield is decreased by the widespread employment of missile warfare. Missile warfare is basically defensive in nature, designed as anti-tank, anti-ship, or anti-aircraft. The offensive mobility of modern armies, navies and air forces is liable to diminish and even stagnate under the weight of extensive missile defenses. Future war may become very costly and indecisive to execute. Laser weapons may prove an effective form of anti-missile defense as well as anti-aircraft defense and with offensive potential as tank mounted weapons. The warhead potential of guided missiles, unless they are nuclear or possibly fuel air mixture explosives, which render a significant increase in explosive force is prohibitive to the use of missiles in an offensive mode. Larger guided tactical and strategic missiles, such as the cruise missile and the development of remotely piloted vehicles which have the potential for becoming superior to the current high mix aircraft, not requiring life support systems cold lead to more extensive offensive use of missiles in warfare.

Force potentials between the major opposing alliance systems, the Warsaw Pact and NATO have some years remained roughly equivalent and stable, the primary emphasis has been on the qualitative increase in the effectiveness of weapons of conventional warfare, along the intensification margin, rather than on the quantitative increase in force size. The destructive force potential has increased as an automatic consequence of the intensification of the technological effectiveness of modern weapons, but overall the net destructive capability has not increased as much as the amount of destructive force that is utilizable. This leads to the condition of overkill potential and much wasted effort to achieve proportionately much less real destruction. A relative parity exists between the balance of forces, with the Warsaw Alliance favoring quantitative superiority. This is only a general rule to which many exceptions might be found. Overall the balance of forces probably favors the NATO forces. There has also occurred an increased proliferation of military potential among many third world nations, who have acquired from trade what they could not produce domestically. The widespread proliferation of militarism and its attendant influences has aggravated the possibility and increased the chances for the outbreak of general limited war. The possible stagnation of a future limited war threatens to escalate the level to a more total condition of an unlimited general war involving nuclear weaponry.

Military Dimensions