Chapter 18

The Force Service Group

by Hugh M. Lewis

In the construction of the model of the universal elite I have deliberately avoided using popularly known titles and nomenclature and have renamed each type of unit and sub-unit. There are no squadrons or air wings, there are no divisions, armies, regiments, battalions or platoons. There are no task forces or fleets. I have done this to emphasize the distinctive nature of the model and to avoid prejudicial distortions in the readers mind. I will set these new organizational units in comparison with standard units of the most approximately similar nature. This will help to avoid confusion and to facilitate clarification as the model is constructed.

The force service group is the building block if the universal elite. It is the highest maximal level of centralization of command authority and the minimum degree of structural integrity for the universal elite. It is designed to function independently but not uncooperatively as a single comprehensively integrated military force. In size, quantitatively, it is roughly equivalent to a conventional division of regulars, being a little larger and more vertically filled out. It might be termed a medium division, in contra distinction to the dichotomization between light divisions which are primarily infantry with supporting apparatus and heavy divisions which are primarily armored, mechanized and equipment intensive units. It is both infantry oriented and an equipment intensive unit at the same time, designed for universal application throughout the range of warfare spectrum. It is not a low mix organization unit designed for a wide variety of roles. Yet it is much more than just a comparatively land bound unit, it has incorporated into its organizational structure a navy, air force and nuclear deterrence forces also. Its organization is founded not on specialization and differentiation, but rather on integration and comprehensiveness. It is a product of the concept of flexible response to aggression occurring all along the warfare spectrum. It is based operationally on an comprehensive elementary force strategy incorporating all the elementary force strategies: the continentally, maritime, aerial, and nuclear, combining the efficacy of all and transcending the inherent limitations of each. Its organization is furthermore founded on the premises of inter-human trust and maximization of human valuation, rather than the predominating fear based minimization of human valuator which are tendencies and characteristics of the conventional military organizations.

The force service group is designed to be comparatively small in size but at the same time capable of decisively defeating the next higher comparable unit level of conventional force organization all across the board. Within its areas of operation which is more extensive and variously intensive than with any comparable single unit, it will maintain decisive balance of force potential. Its "permanent" station will be aboard huge manmade floating islands that are nuclear powered, serving simultaneously as port for the variety of surface and sub-surface vessels which will in accordance with the maritime strategy maintain within its sector of operations complete control of the sea lanes and naval superiority, as main airport facilities for strategic and tactical aircraft which will issue out and maintain air supremacy within its sector of operations, as the permanent base for ground corps which will, in the fashion of the blitzkrieg strike by vertical airborne and sea borne envelopment with their armored equipment through the back door of any aggressor nation within its sector of operations, and contained on these islands and within the vessels issuing from them will be a variety of nuclear weaponry, strategic and tactical, offering a full countervailing range of strategic and tactical delivery systems operable today, under the concept of triad. Eventually these islands will become the base launch facilities of rocket ships and space shuttle craft, operating a quadrate of nuclear weaponry. Each force group will have enough nuclear weaponry to provide minimum deterrence status and maximum nuclear first strike survivability as part of the overall strategy of optimum deterrence value. Nuclear deterrence will be in the form of a quadrate which instead of being based primarily on land, will be based primarily on the sea and in space.

It may appear that by putting all the eggs in one basket, by becoming dependent on these centralized floating islands that vulnerability to nuclear preemptive first strike and to conventional attack would increase. But multiplying each force service group by sixteen and then multiplying again by four, the number of island bases operating with each force service group, and disperse these 64 islands randomly across the vast hydrosphere which composes 5/7 the surface of the earth, recognize that these floatable islands will never be in any one spot at any length of time and that they can rapidly disperse and concentrate, come and go randomly. And displace the majority of its force potential on a semi-permanent quick alert deployable rotational training status on board a wide variety of submarine surface vessels, air crafts and ashore and realize these are all constantly in motional flux in terms of location and speed of movement, while sub-units are constantly and comprehensively coordinately interchanged between force service groups so that unit identification and force strengths at any one moment will be incalculable, while each sub-unit is as powerful as a next higher comparable opponent sub-unit of conventional organization, give each island displaceable electronic, intelligence, satellite and spy capabilities to monitor every action on the earth simultaneously, give each island the electronic capability as a mobile command center for the overall comprehensive control and coordination of the whole universal elite, and the vulnerability for the whole would be reduced to a minimum level. The universal elite would have the relative world wide omniscience and omnipresence to deter aggression and to enforce peace as the police force of world government.

The approximate manpower of the force service group would be 50,000 persons slightly larger than the average conventional division with all its complements, both horizontally and vertically. The number of individuals deployed at any one time would be 4/6 the total manpower. Equipment would be 4/5 deployed across the board. The 1/5 equipment and 1/3 personnel would make a reserve rotational resource pool. Attrition in personnel and equipment would be replaced immediately from the reserve pool. The number and the size of the units of the universal elite would remain stable and fixed, the same no matter what situation or threat is confronted. This would simply command and logistical problems. Reinforcement would not be to augment or supplement strength but only to replace lost or worn out equipment or people to maintain the static level of strength quantitatively.

The only type of strength increases will be quantitatively in human improvements and in equipment improvements reducing the size and physical requirements while increasing force potentials. The intensive margins will increase while the extensive margins will remain static or diminish. This is the technological ephemeralization process of doing more with less applied to the military sphere of activity. It will be the controller of all future offensive military technological evolution. This comprehensive intensification process will be the direct result of the universal elite being the main economic controller of research and development of military technology over the world, especially of offensive oriented weaponry and through the modernization and integration process. This will mean qualitative increases in the maximization of human valuation and improvement of equipment, enabling substantial quantitative reductions. The main generators as well as the main benefactors of this controlled military evolution will be the universal elite, controlling all external sources and recipients of military technology. This cyclical, regenerative evolutionary process will become internalized into the organizational structure of the universal elite.

Each force service group will be divided into for equal, identically organized and equipped and interchangeable corps. Equipment for a fifth and personnel for a fifth and sixth corps will make up the reserve resource pool. Each corps will be based on a single floating island. A corps will be approximately comparative in size and organization to the conventional brigade or regiment with all the supporting elements. Yet it will be more comprehensive than a brigade in being structured by five distinctly differentiated command structures. Each structure serves a separate independent function. Vertically these five horizontal structures will be generally divided into two echelons, the first or front-line echelon and the second or rear echelon. The five structures or forces are: the land force, controlling all ground oriented weaponry and related tactical nuclear weaponry; the sea force, which operates all water vessels, ships, submarines and floating islands, and their supportive facilities, and all shipboard nuclear weaponry, strategic and tactical; the air force, operating all aircraft, tactical, strategic and logistical and the air based nuclear weapons system. Horizontally these three force structures are placed in the first, front-line echelon. The second, rear echelon, consists of the command force which controls all communication, coordination functions and retains the authority to utilize force and nuclear weaponry and the service support force which handles all rear echelon support activities, including internal security, military government, logistical support, engineering, "rear" echelon maintenance of all equipment, medical and health services. Each force structure will have its own independent chain of command and internal organizational structure, yet all will be tied together in interdependence of support activities and comprehensive command control to reduce the repetitive waste practices prevalent in the national military organizations of duplicative training and equipment production, duplicative and independent command structures and logistical services. Each will be bound to the other by the common organizational command super structures and logistics. This is similar to incorporating and integrating the independent branches of the US military, air force, navy, marine corps and army under a single organizational structure and logistics net to reduce repetitive duplication of the functions, of air wings, support facilities and force sub-units and to bring the competitive logistical needs of all branches under a single comprehensively integrated process.

It is this manner of organizational integration that bureaucratic waste may be avoided, coordination and efficiency increased. By this integration process the command structure becomes decentralized. What integration occurring at the national service level is brought forward and down to the divisional and regimental level of command. While previously divisions were the main point of integration by battalions, now they become as whole integrated armies and national services. The regiments become similar to the divisional role of integration, combining together the logistical and tactical operations. It will be demonstrated that this decentralization through integration will occur throughout the organizational structure all the way down to the platoon level. What are the net results of this bringing forward of command functions and responsibility down one and even two levels? By putting up front responsibility it will serve to strengthen qualitatively each unit, enabling a single combatant to competently match a squad, a squad to match an army platoon, a platoon an enemy company, a company versus an opponent battalion, a battalion a regiment, a regiment a division, a division a whole national army, navy and air force. By integration vertically what is conventionally a long series of 4,5,6 and 7 echelons of responsibility into two, a front and rear echelon, the logistical and command structures are shortened and individual responsibility is increased, reducing the snowball process due to individual lack of responsibility. By replacing authoritative vertical chains of command with horizontal inter-supportive dependence based on mutual cooperation and trust, the spirit of teamwork will develop efficiently beyond all that is possible with the spirit of inequitable slave driving and institutionalism. The concept of teamwork goes hand in hand with integration throughout the organizational structure strengthening the power and decreasing the means. It will be demonstrated that front and rear echelons will tie together at the company level of conventional organization, which I believe to be the most efficient level of convergence of functions possible. This company level is termed in this model the corporate team.

How do these decentralization, integration and team concepts affect he individual constituent in his relationships to the organization. This processes brings in the democratization processes and reform the social processes to make them more just and less dehumanizing. It entails humanization of the "system" and maximization of human valuation. The military social system replaces psychologically, physically and emotionally to some extent those equivalent civilian relationships from which the individual is divorced in the conventional military social model. The squad or platoon resembles a family, the platoon leader becomes both father and mother. The company comes to resemble a clan or the whole set of familial relationships. The battalion becomes the replacement for a township with the battalion commander becoming to resemble the mayor. The importance and extent of this correspondence of totalistic inter-human interrelationship should be recognized and its beneficial potential utilized to the fullest extent. Organization of the system should be geared to increasing this interdependence and relationships not just laterally over the military portions of an individual's life, to the neglect of other maintenance and growth functions, but longitudinally in scope over time incorporated throughout the individual's lifestyle. Care, interest, empathy, trust, education, health and love become the responsibilities of the "system" not just the purely technical and functional military relationships. The individual's "whole" life is dependent upon the military "system". It must be integrated to be kept whole, and not dichotomized into military and non-military positions, a process of personal and organizational dissection and dehumanization. These things are easier said than done, but if the are humanistically realized they will enhance the realm of the qualitative valuation of the system in its operational procedures, goals and characteristics. The personal philosophy and lives of the constituents must become integrated with the philosophy and strategic objectives of the "system" and realizable in everyday life. Certain unrealistic and dehumanizing social practices persist in the conventional military organization which must be reformed before the individual can be improved. This is the essence of the command control compromise.

The first reform of the military social system deals with the integration of the conventional dual command structure, that of the enlisted and the commissioned officer command structure, into a single command hierarchy which is open and accessible to all constituents of the system. The dual structure, with the persistence of the officer corps, is an anachronism of the middle ages, a carryover of social practice in which an aristocracy made war and made a common peonage without individual rights fight in their wars. Even though it has been modified to fit the bureaucratic organization under a democratically organized parent society, with the realization of a strong middle class, its persistence has a net negative influence on the operational efficiency as a whole. What are the outcomes of this negative influence? It is a fear based system, founded on the illusions of natural social class superiority, official superiority and not on real human quality. The modern social educational standards of today and the rise of the urban intellectual middle class completely make this dual command structure obsolete. Today many educated and proficient individuals find themselves controlled by an official who personally is unworthy and unqualified to the command and leadership role he plays, who as a real human hides behind his badge of authority and dishonest and superficial class disguises of artificial superiority. There are no real "super humans". No person should play the role of God over others. The majority of officers quite often live in an insulated and unrealistic "separate" world of unrealistic and unhealthy illusion fostered by the organization of the system. The further up the chain of command the more inhuman and unrealistic the standards become, as the leadership is progressively detached from the functional and operational reality of the results of their decisional authority at the front line level. By such an insulating system, the officer is forced to place his personal integrity and human valuation behind the "system" demands, reducing him to "selfless" unquestioning obedience and conformity in order to progress up the ladder of promotion. The higher up he is on that ladder, the less he is willing or able to exert his individuality and the more dependent he is upon the system, the less likely he is to reform it and with the most to lose from its reform. The system does not advance individuals with strong initiative, it advances conformist and mindless sycophants without any initiative. An independent nature is almost a sure guarantee of not being promotable within the conventional military system. Only by compromising one's own independent valuations and by blind acceptance of the tacit and unquestioned standards of the system can an individual hope to be promoted. The officer becomes an automaton sycophant serving the system, unwittingly protecting it and being in turn insulated from the reality of the operational results. The result is the crystallization of an authoritarian power structure, a top heavy centralism of affirmative power and nonfunctional bureaucratic inertia. The enlisted man finds that he too, even to a greater extent, in a more selfless and more dehumanizing manner, must resign his personal integrity and valuation to conformity and blind obedience to the "system". He becomes even more so than the officer, an unquestioning sycophant of the system, remaining at the front operational and lower portions of the machine, the teeth of the meat grinder instead of the driving mechanism. The future of the enlisted is limited in scope to a mundane technical specialist not advancing very high. He will remain in the lower operational company levels of command. Such a future attracts "lifers" and mediocre people who live lazy lives with no ambition and petty shortsightedness, wholly non-conducive to incorporation of the ambitious yet experientially qualified and humanly oriented individual who desires an active and bright future career. The technical and professional know how remains in the enlisted rank structure and does not progress above the company level. For the stubborn, intelligent and hard driven peon of high personal integrity who becomes degraded by the system, there is no future but that of an unfair and ungracious early discharge, a premature death in wartime or a gradual, idling dehumanization in peacetime. By integration of the command structure into a single chain of command open to every constituent it will encourage the individual professionalization, strengthen the qualitative human leadership levels behind the badges of authority, ensure equitable advancement of "qualified" people, decentralize command responsibility to the individual level, make the company command level the focal point of organization, brighten every constituent's future prospects and encourage the individual influence of initiative through active participation. A dual chain of command is wasteful repetition. A single leadership oriented, humanized chain of command is more efficient. It will require the individual to become more "qualified" for his promotion.

In the educational qualification in the development of the individual constituent may be observed the professionalization process at work in its clearest perspective. The military divides responsibility and required educational levels into strict unchanging categories and differentiated, specialized technical levels, intimate knowledge of the whole and as a whole is stagnated and inhibited intentionally. Knowledge must be made part of the human developmental process. The military must become more educationally oriented, more absorptive and accepting of individual on the job training mistakes that are a natural human part of the educational process. It should not seek to punish unintended mistakes. Education is not only military but affects every facet of an individual's life.. it means human improvement and net professional improvement required for modern operational efficiency. It must be encouraged creatively in every direction in which it manifests itself. This is one of the affects of integrating the conventional multiple echelon into two, front and rear echelons. People are limited in their integrative and specialized education by the concept of divisive multiple echelons, and division of routinized, specialized proficiency requirements. Individuals are required to learn and perform redundant and extremely limited functions and are not required to learn anything outside their own special fields. The individual should be encouraged to know as much as possible. Education is naturally unlimited from the human standpoint. An individual's military function will include many jobs and greater knowledge and responsibility whether it is the first or second echelon. The individual constituent will not only be required to be a tanker, a gun dummy, but also incorporated as a second and third echelon maintenance man capable of dismantling in detail and fixing his vehicle. An NCO will find his authority and responsibility directly equal to that of the commissioned officer and will be more respectable and respected by the constituent members of his unit. modern educational standards and professionalization requires integration of five and six separate echelons into a single front and rear echelon. It will contribute to the human growth and human value maximization of the system. Fear and ignorance will go out the window to be replaced with trust, confidence, wisdom and competence.

The rank structure typical of conventional military system is very much vertically and "officially" advancement oriented. The rank structure is highly divisive and many subdivisions within the generalized stratification of social organization. Promotion has been incorporated as the primary reinforcement and motivational system. Promotion can be initially quite rapid, generally slowing and becoming more difficult to attain the closer it reaches the apex of the pecking order. This official but quite unnatural selection system which is supposed to raise quality is nonetheless quantitatively billet oriented encouraging instead social power mongering and career competition mitigating against cooperative teamwork and individual qualitative development. It creates a divisive negative influence to efficiency through over stratified over dependent stress on rank. There exists within the enlisted rank structure generally five levels of rank which should be retained, while all other subdivisions which are operationally nonfunctional should be integrated into a single, most closely relevant level. There is always the beginner level without any rank, the civilian rookie without any military experience and who is a novice to military life. Once the initial basic training and military assimilation is accomplished the next rank is that of the enlisted, the B2 and B3 level who have made the grade of military status, the primarily functional level in which the beginning leadership is developed. Within the first enlistment period the second rank equivalent to NCO should be, equivalent to the commissioned status of lieutenant, captain or of E4, E5 and E6. The next higher rank is the staff leader, E7,E8, major or colonel. The highest level is that of the field grade and command leader, of E9 and colonel and general grades. The greater time between promotions will ensure experience oriented development, preventing novices who by first impressions, good social appearances or dramatic exaggeration of the mouth from acquiring power unqualifiedly and too quickly. In each level the training is oriented toward leadership, executive training of the next higher level while remaining primarily technical. By incorporating ranks, the pay incentive and power incentive of each general level can be boosted. The quantitative orientation can be replaced by qualitative development, while the rank structure can be more extensively professionalized into a system similar to that of the craft role, apprentice, journeyman, master craftsman and headman or Indian chief. The differences in valuation between rank will be greater, making the rank structure instead of vertically command advancement oriented, diagonally leadership oriented. It will encourage decentralization of authority down to lower levels which will acquire more responsibility for development and will be encouraged greater cooperative trust based on teamwork instead of fear based on authority. It will encourage educational promotion, democratization of the promotional system, improve qualitative leadership and enhance the efficiency of the system. What success does occur from the system is usually the influence of human qualitative growth in spite of the authoritarian structure, from small enclaves of human growth and valuation. The authoritarian power structure is only restrictive of maximization of full natural human qualitative growth. It is the minimum compensatory growth on which the authoritarian structure nevertheless depends for whatever viability it has. It is nonetheless growth oriented, even if limited from its fullest realization.

The promotional system is another area requiring social reform in order to humanize the military system. As it exists conventionally it is almost entirely dependent on the laterally limited extremely subjective valuations of the "officials" or persons in command. This encourages prejudicial neglect, preferential valuations and in equitable advancement of persons who gain rank through good social appearances and friendships rather than the qualitative expertise. This automatically closes promotions to all but the few pre-advantaged who through continuing conformity pick up rank undeservedly. Technical expertise or intelligence or decision judgment capacities become almost totally ignored. By closing the system preferentially and by making it a purely subjective matter, it automatically de-motivates further those passed up for promotion and cultivates only mediocrity based only on authoritarian conformity. The subjective dependence, epitomized by the command's proficiency and conduct marks, must be eliminated completely. It can be more efficiently displaced by objective tests and technical evaluations which are more realistically performance oriented. These objective evaluations must be further removed from preset standards which leads to indiscriminate promotion, but must be of a continuing individual development oriented nature. These should be set a minimum period of service and a minimum required set of performance standards which must be passed by the individual. Meritorious promotion based on "outstanding behavior" should be eliminated. Promotion should not be utilized as a primary incentive to "good behavior", there exists other preferable incentives. It leads to closing the futures of potentially career oriented individuals. It is the potential individual who sees himself continually passed over for promotion and his future career being blocked because of past mistakes or by petty people or preferential treatment who become de-motivated and whose behavior gradually declines. This is the dehumanization process.

Promotion cannot be arbitrarily wait upon "improved" individual performance subjectively judged by the commander. It places full responsibility upon the already incapacitated and disadvantaged individual. It is starting off on a prejudicial inter-human relationship that the individual is nothing, knows nothing, and to prove himself to others must change to meet the standards as they are judged in the eyes of the command. Such subsequent changes are not in his own personal qualitative performance, they are rather purely subjective in the eyes of the official "observer" in conformity to his own personal valuations. This encourages unhealthy, unnatural development. Promotion should not be automatic in the course of every constituent's service. This does not mean that minimal behavior standards should not be maintained. Nor does it mean that completely inept or continuing substandard behavior should be ignored nevertheless and rewarded. It does mean that the persons natural inherent limitations, his individual personality differences can be taken into account, people's idiosyncrasies are a natural part of their "valuation". These should be integrated into the social system and development oriented towards their transcendence. It is to recognize that a person's behavior is a product of many diverse and random external as well as internal influences. No individual is completely under self control all the time. Only God is perfect. To err is human to forgive divine. If the system wishes to stimulate the illusion of divinity in the constituents minds it must reform its operational patterning to fit individual differences. This applies to any social system, the military is not excluded from this consideration. It is also to recognize that self improvement is an individual process, very subtle in its manifestations and very gradual, occasionally suffering from periodic setbacks and not infrequent temporary regressions. It is to put the horse in front of the cart, not behind it, when taking the individual into account. Promotion should be more a criteria of experience, time in service and based on career future with re-enlistment. The human subjectivity might better be replaced with other objective standards serving as nomination factors, with continually elected leadership performances subject to election, democratic preference to performance conducted periodically over a continuing duration of time. Teammates and underlings, not discounting personal prejudice and jealousy make better overall critics and evaluators than the authorities, because they can view the nominee's behavior longitudinally as well as laterally, are subject to its limitations y first hand experience, observing as many aspects of the individual's personality. Physical athletic criteria should be minimized. Intellectual and technical expertise should be maximized. People will work better for one's they have participated in choosing, ones they feel that can be trusted, who will look out for them before he will cover his own ass. It will open the decision making process to a wider matter of choosing the lesser of two evils. The democratically based one is a preferable alternative to the authoritatively based one. As representatives of the new reformed social system, the authorities must still maintain some degree of decisional capacity. This degree might be expressed as veto power in the democratic process and the legal command power in "emergency" expediency situations most often notable to the judicial system. The higher the rank the more so this should be.

Basing the pay scale almost entirely upon the promotional system and pay serving as the primary incentive for promotion, results in another unjust and inequitable practice prevalent in conventional military organizations. The centralization of the system is expressed in the allotment of compensation, becoming unevenly distributed down the ladder. People get paid the same amount no matter what they do, or do not do, or how they do it or don't do it. This leads to the natural human cost maximization, relative inefficiency characteristic of government subsidized organizations. Ten people participate in a one man job, with nine chiefs and one Indian, drinking coffees and sodas, waiting to go on liberty, while the job did not need to be done anyways, such as raking the grass which is really sand. Some amount of decentralization of pay must occur, with its results expressed in realistic up front indicators, over a period of time no one comes to expect more for less and behavior modifies into a lifestyle with minimal personal expectations. A minimum pay standard for all service personnel must be set, covering the minimum cost of living adjusted for inflationary rates which are predicted for the coming years, not predicted on the past year. This should be also based on annual association, increasing with experience and time in service. Promotion should signify substantial increases of pay, but not be the primary and only means of pay increase. Furthermore, other supplementary pay incentives for improved behavior, for additional tasks, and sub-minimal work conditions. This is incorporating a subsidized pay scale with a profit incentive pay scale. Certain jobs may require compensation for special technical expertise or for substandard conditions. Extra duties beyond the normal work schedule should be compensated for. Contracts for specialized jobs can be drawn up. The service itself serving as a potential untapped labor force, moonlighting should be adjusted for.

This leads to reassessment and reform of other conventional military practices which are included as special benefits, primarily of promotions. Such things as exclusive club privileges, housing benefits, special quarters, improved working and living conditions should be used as incentives by themselves in conditioning every person's behavior. Some privileges such as first in line benefits should not be allowed to exist. Others such as BEQ and housing, special quartering and working conditions, should be the privilege of everyone or the advantage of no one. Two or three men private quarters should be the benefit of every person. These incentives can be gradually improved with promotion, but their potential extent should never be exclusive, except to the professionally inept. Saluting, saying "sir" and other obsolete, medieval, exclusive and dehumanizing social practices should be entirely eliminated. Disrespect is a subjective valuation, it does not entail disobedience to the law. No one individual is the law, no matter how much he may think he officially represents it. No one person's personal valuations preclude the law. The law itself does not preclude justice. The military as a social subsystem, cannot justly preclude the law or become insular to the application of human justice. The wartime dehumanization process does not entail similar peacetime forfeiture of fundamental human rights.

Consideration of benefits and legality leads to consideration of alternative reforms of enlistment and service portions of the service contract. Not baring certain minimal acceptance standards, due to age, physical limitations, mental or emotional defects, or past criminality, no human should be excluded from volunteering for service, regardless of sex, religion, race, nationality or political valuations. Today discrimination against females in the conventional military service is prevalent. The potential benefits of allowing them to participate in virtually any military occupations must be reassessed. It may eliminate limitations due to prejudice of traditional male institutions, widen the potential human resource pool, add the female character possibilities to a predominantly male profession, improve individual human valuation and eliminate many frustrations incurred from everyday military lifestyle. Yet special privileges due to sex or race must not be allowed either. The female soldier may be even more successful on the battlefield than the male soldier. The military social system must be completely equitable in its distribution.

Enlistment must be voluntary on a contractual basis. The model of the universal elite has no room for conscription of those who do not want to fight. Voluntary means the individual retaining the right to dissent as well as consent. Standard contracts should be issued to all persons placing them where they qualify as well as where they want to be. Standard contracts will be for the organizational model of the universal elite, 5 years with one year inactive reserve. The right to terminate without benefits and without continuing social deprivations after an initial period of 2 years of service, the terminator gaining inactive reserve status for the remainder of his contract. Bonuses should be equitable and compensatory as well as incentive oriented. Recruiting duty should not employ propaganda or use mass enlistment techniques for increasing enlistment. It should take the honest approach to reveal negative aspects as well as positive aspects of military career, and adopt a hands off approach in influencing human valuation. High pressure sales techniques should not be utilized at all. It may advertise and sell, but the recruiter's job must not be at stake for failure to fill quantitative quotas. A constituent's participation should be as voluntary, self willed as possible. There is no room for postmortem regret about initial mistakes with malingering residual feelings, hate or anger. This is especially true of a military organization in which a contract is ultimately a life or death matter. Upholding the idea of minimum human standards will further enable additional necessary reforms of the social system by achieving adequate employment levels. The social system should improve to increase voluntary participation, not rely on trickery and illusion of innocent youths who are ignorant of the military realities.

Other incentives such as post service educational benefits, life insurance programs, loan and credit options and an automatic pay allotment system in which a service member when he gets out receives in bonds or cash exchange the cumulative amount of savings. Full and adequate housing for all married personnel and adequate compensation for dependents should automatically be provided for.

There exist in the conventional modern military forces a penchant for excessive uniforms and clothing regulations, for ostentatious badges, insignia and medals. Forces in readiness tote excessive trivial baggage of personal military gear. Uniform and personnel inspections are carried out despite different working conditions and on the job uniform requirements. The force service groups sports a single formal dress uniform for official gatherings. This is for every force member the same. It is a fancy and impressive but simple in sporting no excessive jewelry. There are no summer or winter variations. Only one complete set of dress uniform, there should be issued work utility outfit, similar to olive drab utilities, which is distinctive in color and design variation for each service force and unique to each working condition. A minimum of two sets of utilities with standard accessories will be issued per constituent. There should be also special purpose suits issued, shorts, overalls, special utility clothes for work conditions. Beyond this minimum amount of uniforms which once issued should be reissued with returned outworn ones, there are no other uniform requirements. Hair length and other personal requirements ought to be as liberal as possible except in special conditions in which it might interfere with work. Formal high command inspections of such items ought to be conducted infrequently, minimally and under more realistic standards than they actually are, and for minimum issue, cleanliness, accountability and serviceability.

Training and educational reform in another criteria area for reform in humanizing the military social system. Education itself is the main driving force of human valuation, of humanization, maximization of reform, developing the individual to his own self fulfillment and his maximum potential in his official relations to the system. It is in this area that the greatest potential profits of reform are attainable, yet it is also the most restricted and undeveloped area of the conventional modern military organization. The requirements of the modern battlefield, its complexity and vastness, demands educational reforms of the conventional military system before fruits of success can be guaranteed. It is here more than in any other area of reform the precondition that professionalization, decentralization, democratization, integration, comprehensiveness and specialization and humanization come together interdependently to constitute prerequisites to the model of the universal elite. It is here that one cyclical regenerative feedback process of the human interrelationships to the social system in development come together for mutual profit.

Why such shortsighted neglect of the educational possibilities of virtually untapped pools of human resources. Conventional military organizations incorporate education as a bureaucratic process utilizing the dehumanization process, the minimization of human valuation to maximize death and destruction of war. The human is set a minimum price, he is a cheap, expendable and easily replaceable resource. He is designed to continue, to survive vast expenditures of the quantitative commodity. It has become substituted as a quantitative commodity. It has become substituted as a quantitative, virtually limitless commodity. What need is there then for education in such an organization. Only a minimal socialization process or externalized primarily negativistic behavior modification techniques to ensure unquestioning obedience and a minimum of technical overspecialized un-integrated knowledge to serve the machine of death. Here in the educational ties more than in any other field of the socialization process the contrast is most evident between dehumanization process of the conventional military social system and the proposed humanization of the model of the universal elite.

An initial basic training period of 8 weeks for all entering personnel resembling to a large extent the boot camps of conventional military organizations, is the beginning of the educational process. This most important part of training is designed to shed all newly enlisted of all their civilian type habits which are incompatible with the limitations and deprivations of military life. This boot camp will be the same for all members entering the service. It will inculcate in place of civilian pseudo values new military values, especially of individual self worth and teamwork. In this period the standard dress uniform will be issued for fit, the standard essential subjects training covering comprehensively the whole of the universal elite and a brief period of a week or so covering knowledge of each of the service forces. Physical fitness and mental acuity will be developed up to certain maximum standards. Short hair, harsh living conditions, no liberty, a highly controlled environment, higher individual and group standards of performance, continual deprivations and acquisition reinforcement will characterize this initiation to the universal elite. Even this most popular area of the traditional military suffers from the similar problem of quantification and authoritarianism which negatively inhibits individual human growth. Even basic training can be made "tougher" and yet more qualitatively human oriented. This part of the military educational system is perhaps the most difficult are in which to recognize discrepancies between negativistic human perseveration and the actualities of reality, and then to adequately institute necessary reforms. So much which is "cherished" as being a necessary fundamental of a military education might be more effectively eradicated while practices held outside of the military "norm" might be more effectively substituted. The illusions of boot camp must be eliminated. Yet this by no means necessitates transforming basic training into a cake walk. Quite the contrary, it means making it perceptibly more difficult for the individual. The primary goals of this initiation is the elimination of incompatible civilian habits, a better understanding of the military of the universal elite in all its operational areas, and an inspirational improvement in the individual's behavior. Incompatible habits carried from the civilian world into the military must be a primary focus. It entails elimination of laziness, shyness, mouthiness, alcoholism, drug abuse, excessive consumptive habits, improper nutrition, improper hygiene, petty selfishness and inhuman hypocritical values. In this way the individual's lifestyle can become highly controlled, insulated from the negative social influences. Yet it does entail the overly strict behavior modification program utilizing excessive negative reinforcement and physical punishment. One direction of improvement is to make the standard size of the training unit smaller than normal, of about squad size, lessening the ration of drill instructors to constituents, increasing chances of interpersonal relatedness and greater inter-human group solidarity. Individuals with certain common deficiencies and developmental requirements might for facility be grouped together, but this practice should not be solely for the sake of expediency, the group earning unjustly a derogatory title or becoming over insulated into a common unrealistic illusion. Another very important area is to make the instructors not only models of perfect men, but "living" models who can relate personally, empathetically, and even sympathetically to the needs and unique humanness of each of the members in his charge. He should not be perceived as a hypocritical inhuman and impersonal sycophantic dictator of the system. He should be a true professional. He should be not only impeccable in his mannerisms and dress, but also in his lifestyle and values. He should inspirationally be a model of true leadership, not only a representative of the system but a father, brother and friend as well to every single member of his squad. Rifle drill is one way of developing teamwork. The group must live, operate and grow together as a team, cooperatively like a family instead of competitively . honesty should always be stressed. A person's independent thinking must be constantly called upon. Every member should be allowed the chance of squad leadership, electorally and democratically and not just preferentially. The individual must not become just an automaton who has no mind of his own, who is trained only to respond un-constructively to verbal commands and not to assume the initiative. The training environment should be as relaxed as possible, allowing the individual free time in which he should freely and verbally express his feelings to the group. Each person's ideas and feelings should be expressed and honestly and openly criticized in more or less an open forum, daily. After each class questions should be encouraged and asked by the instructor. Punishment should not be made a matter of schedule, occurring frequently without justification, with see through petty excuses. The right to punish ought to be wholly up to the instructor's discretion. Reward for good behavior and improvement ought to displace and come before punishment for maladaptive behavior. While the group must always work together cooperatively as a team, punishment must not be doled out to the whole group for an individual's mistake, this only encourages herd mentality divisive intra-unit competition and an improper atmosphere for training. Rewards must always come as a group, not preferentially doled out to individuals, discouraging group cooperation and encouraging rivalry. The training schedule must adhere to the realistic limitations of time and the gradualism of human development. Basic training must not be over ambitious in its goal setting, inculcating substitute values in the individual which must be relearned or unlearned later in his career. It must offer more than anything else a fair start to individual self improvement. Individual differences and needs should be recognized and relevant reforms instituted. Maladaptive personalities and sub-minimal performers must be weeded out as operationally nonfunctional. Responsibility for this cultivation process must not be reneged by the instructor and problems allowed to persist too long for no purpose, only to become overly complicated of solution later on to no one's net benefit and to everyone's loss. The physical training program is good, but it must be adjusted to and augmented by a more rigorous mental educational program. Basic training is even more importantly a testing and comprehensively human oriented evaluation program to help determine qualification. To move on in training, into more specialized areas, into areas of preference, the individual must pass exhaustive tests of minimal qualification standards. Basic training consists of a 3 month training period, 1 month drill, essential subjects training, rifle and pistol training, physical education, 5 weeks force groups orientation in which the individual chooses and is selected for a general force direction in specialization and 3 weeks maintenance and mess duty.

Following the period of basic training there should be an extended 6 month period of specialized comprehensive job training and "qualification" in which the individual acquires minimal technical and tactical proficiency in his "profession". A person should be allowed to go into a field he choose so long as he qualifies for it. This process of "natural" selection should begin in basic and proceed throughout the initial year of training, reevaluations should be continuous and uninterrupted. The first month of this secondary level of training ought to resemble basic training almost completely. It should orient the individual toward the broad and general requirement of the force service he has entered. His living conditions should be as controlled as in basic training. As a person acquires more integratively specialized knowledge of his profession, living standards, still controlled ought to gradually loosen up, allowing more recreational free time. Participation ought to become more individuated and on a voluntary basis with the individual being allowed to implement his own decision making capabilities and leadership. The first year of training ought to never be completely uncontrolled. Certain initial standards must always be maintained such as open type living quarters, minimal basic pay, base liberty only, little recreational time and long work hours. This secondary training program ought to put people into platoon sized groups in which they remain throughout the initial year. The basic utility uniform is issued in this phase of training. Once this secondary training program is completed the next two months are spent on special duty assignments such as mess duty, guard, maintenance, in which the group continues to live together but lives in conditions completely resembling those of the main service forces. The last month ought to be designated leave period in which the individual is issued orders to a respective deployed unit as the end of his training period.

Certain areas of general knowledge which are usually limited and stagnate within the individual's mind in conventional military forces ought to be made limitless and developmental. Such areas include first aid and medical skills, legal and judicial knowledge, individual weapons training, language skills, general and applied mathematical and scientific skills, literary and self expressive skills, communication skills, military philosophy, technical electronic abilities, and a special military field that of self defense. These areas are supplementary to the ever growing technical and tactical abilities of specialized professions. They should be begun in boot camp and developed throughout the individual's career to highly advanced levels.

After the first year the individual is minimally qualified. He will be transferred to a deployed unit, a company team, which will be deployed within the different force service groups and become temporarily attached to each force service group of the universal elite. The minimum period of attachment to any force service group will be one year, after which the individual may be transferred upon request to another team or remain continually with the same one. Biannual six month cycles of individual training and deployment, following the 4/5 active to reserve human ration in which the teams will make practice landings and participate in maneuvers. Two months of alternate deployable alert status at sea and on special operations on land, one month of pre-deployment status on board the floating islands, one month of special MOS training, reevaluation and weapons qualification as a team at home bases, with BEQ living conditions and one month of leave. This training cycle will continue for a period of three years. The last year the individual will go back to NCO school or become detached to special areas such as barracks duty, embassy duty, sea duty. Upon completion of the first enlistment period he will be promoted to NCO. An individual failing promotion will be ineligible for re-enlistment. If he re-enlists he will recycle back through the training process as an NCO, become an instructor at primary and secondary basic school for the first year, joining the force service groups for the next three years and the last year attend NCO school and attend various special NCO functions. At the termination of his second enlistment period he will be promoted to SNCO. An individual failing promotion will be ineligible for re-enlistment. This process of recycling and selection will continue throughout a service member career up until 20 years at which time he has the option of retirement or continuing special honorary service at the highest command levels. If he is discharged less than honorably before his time is up he will not receive any retirement benefits. If a person is discharged honorably before his enlistment period is up he will receive benefits up to his attained level. There are only two types of discharge, honorable and less than honorable. If at any time he resigns active service he must retain the inactive reserve status for the remainder of the enlistment period.

There is in the conventional model a biased over reliance on the "official" written word and not enough on the "unofficial" verbal word. This is the extensive amount of bureaucratic red tape, of forms, release slips, arrows, paper receipts, written orders, to guard the legality of the system, which tends to be tedious, time consuming, and over weighing the burden of the system on the individual. An "official's" verbal order or request is similarly down graded and its importance especially to the operational efficiency of the system is speeding up results are concerned. Individuals should be entrusted to their own personal documents, all written orders and records, health, training, service and pay records should be kept at the platoon level of operation and duplicated throughout the command structure through electronic recording means. Paper requirements should be minimized and displaced by verbal, recorded oral requirements. The whole official information system, written and verbal, should be automated by modern recording and communication technology. There is another side to this coin, applying in training in which there is an over abundance of reliance on the "official" verbal word of "truth" and an under reliance on the unofficial written word. The whole training curriculum ought to be progressive and not stagnate to a limited body of "biblical" knowledge. The pocket size book is a useful and portable size of book for military education. Each individual should collect and learn from a growing personal library of ever more technical and complex material. These personal libraries ought to be supplemented by larger unit libraries at each level. The individual constituent should be an avid source of documentation, of literal scenarios, diaries, log books, of case studies, of tactical, technical and organizational critique, analysis and suggestions. An important area of application is in the publishing pocket books dealing comprehensively with different nations, economically, culturally, historically, tactically, geographically, linguistically with extensive maps of potential target locations, etc. given as an official package in the educational preparation of each individual.

It is in the objective of humanizing the military social system and organizational reform of the conventional military model that the model of the universal elite has been proffered. It may be observed that those who are the most opposed to such reforms will have the most to lose by the changes that such reforms entail. They are also in the best position to block such reforms. Humanity and morality demand such reforms toward the humanization of the military.

Military Dimensions