Introduction to an Introduction: A Metalogue

by Hugh M. Lewis

 

The central problem of meta-science is the question of the integration of reality. This is both a philosophical, theoretical, methodological and an applied problem for the engineering of a better world. The question of the integration of reality concerns all kinds and forms of knowledge, non-exclusively, but it comes to focus upon central theoretical and methodological issues that inform and motivate the sciences and perplex the humanities with eternal conundrums at all levels of their articulation and application.

Formally, the problem of the integration of reality concerns two related kinds of sub-problem. The first is the problem of comprehensive integration of reality as a whole or a total or universal system. The second is the problem of the analytic integration of any particular aspect or part of reality in relation to any other part or aspect, or as a part of a larger system or subsystem. These two sets of problems are really like the opposite sides of a single coin, for we cannot have the one kind of knowledge without reference to the other kind as well. What is important to emphasize in a dialectical sense is the complementary rather than the contradictory nature of these contraposed forms of knowledge, for it is in their dialectical metalogue that new ideas and synthesis of understanding is permitted enough free-play to take place at all.

The first premise of meta-science is therefore that everything in reality is somehow related to everything else, even if just stochastically or as a matter of random happenstance, or however indirectly or remotely. Contextual analysis and understanding become critical to the explication of meta-science theory and method, as it deals with the relationships of objects to the environments in which they exist contemporaneously, as well as to those structural relationships that endure and that lead to systematic change in systems.

A second premise that follows from the first is that all components and all systems of reality, and probably the totality of reality, are inherently underdetermined systems. By underdetermined is meant that they are only partially integrated and controlled--relations with other components or other systems, are both determining and undetermined. A consequence of this is that the outcomes or state-path behavior of natural systems or of any real system cannot always be predicted or predetermined with absolute confidence or certainty. We will find that, as a consequence of this premise, all meta-scientific knowledge, indeed, all knowledge, is inherently relative by the fact of its inherent ambiguity and underdetermined capacity. All knowledge is fundamentally uncertain and ambiguous in character: i.e., it is relative to the human knower.

A third premise that follows from the first and second is that all aspects of reality are, in the sense of the original Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, subject to change and transformation. There are no elements or relations or aspects of reality, except for some "pure" or ideal forms of knowledge, that are absolute or permanent or that are not subject to the constraints of time and place. 

Of course, it can be well argued that certain mathematical forms, for instance the equilateral triangle, are by definition perfect or ideal forms. The question and problem with meta-systems science is that any real instance of such a form is but an imperfect and incomplete manifestation that is subject to the same basic laws of dynamics as all other systems. This third premise forms the basis for a principle of universal dynamics and the related principle of universal relativity of systems.

Leaving the cosmological implications of these principles aside for the sake of simplifying the problem at hand, these basic principles constitute the foundations of meta-scientific knowledge that underlies and informs all other forms of realistic knowledge about reality. We may say, for instance, that there is no form of knowledge about real systems that is non-relative in some manner, and often in many ways at the same time.

These principles also serve as strategic and theoretical guides in the construction of our view of the world, both shared and private, and in the articulation and adaptation of our sense of reality. Therefore they are critically important to our state of well being, both individually and psychologically, and collectively and socially. We can ill afford to continue to neglect the questions that meta-science brings to bear upon our common world, especially in relation to the central dilemmas that challenge us and our survival and prosperity in our world.

The problem of the integration of reality is a problem of understanding. It is, properly speaking, a problem of knowledge, and meta-systems science and natural systems theory are fundamentally and primarily concerned with knowledge systems in the world and about the world. All formal knowledge that is currently known is human knowledge, and such knowledge assumes the form of human intelligence and psychological function that is anthropologically characteristic and unique. 

In other words, it serves as the touchstone for defining what is special and typical of our human reality. As such it takes on specific characteristics of design and material expression. For instance, it is invariably linguistically encoded, and this encoding entails that it is without question linguistically relative to the system of its expression regardless of consideration of duality of pattern and arbitrariness of meaning. 

We may also safely assume that all such knowledge is symbolic in structure and function, and as such works in a uniquely human manner. Formally, knowledge systems are parts of communication systems, and knowledge theory shares with information a common ground in communication theory. Anthropologically, communication becomes culturally embedded and socially constructed, and takes on many varying forms and guises. We can speculate and advocate universal structures of code or syntax, but we are left only with evidence of variation of pattern that shares many common themes and elements.

Anthropological relativity of knowledge, the fact that so far all formal knowledge is passed through human brains and expressed in terms of human words and becomes embodied in terms of human experience and action, imposes upon the problem of the integration of reality a fundamental dilemma of inherent uncertainty. It is even of a kind of groundless anomie of epistemological and ontological status. 

The basis of this dilemma is what is referred to as the fundamental problem of anthropological relativity of knowledge, a form of relativity that embraces all forms of knowledge and all identifiable kinds of relativism of understanding and belief. And this problem imposes for us a kind of invisible barrier, or rather a receding horizon about our world that we cannot see beyond. 

Our worldview thus becomes in a fundamental sense anthropocentric, and there is really no escaping the solipsistic and self-limiting constraints of this kind of humanly centered worldview. No human being, of any color, persuasion or gender, can escape this universal condition of our own intelligence and of our own psychic unification, regardless of the multiplicity of languages, cultures and attitudes that abound in the world.

We surmise that other animals, especially with significantly large brains, have forms of knowledge, and operate within some kind of implicit knowledge system. Some of these tacit systems appear, with careful observation, to be surprisingly sophisticated and integrated within the life-worlds of the animals in question. 

We can see that for the most part these systems are the by-products of a long history of biological evolution that has permitted the survival and adaptation of these large brained creatures. And it is fundamentally no different for human beings as well, as when we respond with our intelligence we are responding in the manner that nature has designed and intended us to respond. 

Unlike the biologically and behaviorally rooted knowledge of most other forms of life on earth, our human systems of knowledge are characterized by certain kinds and levels of productivity, constructiveness, openness and a capacity to learn and devise solutions to complex problems. 

Much of this relates to and stems from our capacity for culture that has evolved as a suite of phenotypic and meta-biotic trait adaptations, transmitted through transculturative processes, for which we have ourselves become evolutionarily adapted in unique and characteristic ways. This has led to a uniquely anthropological trait referred to as "world-openness"--a trait that has resulted in our ability to apply and improve our knowledge to changing the world.

The proper attitude and approach for meta-science is not one of academic or intellectual hubris of our mental superiority, but one of acknowledged ignorance and humility before the great unknowns of our lives. It is an attitude of respect of all forms of knowledge and for all forms of ignorance and understanding as well. In spite of our brains, we remain intellectually weak and often challenged creatures. It is an attitude and approach to reality that is tempered and strengthened by a curiosity, creativity and a desire to learn about the world in as open-minded a manner as possible. 

It is important that we leave our egos, and our ethnocentric biases, at the door alongside of our insecurities and other ideological attachments when we enter the mansion of meta-science, for meta-science is both a realm for every human being, rich and poor, educated or uneducated, mean or nice. We must hang our hats and our coats at the servant's rack before entering the antechamber of its temple of knowledge. We must learn to put aside our prejudices and our presupposed conclusions about how the world works and why, in order to seek a greater and better understanding of the whole and its many parts.

Why is such an attitude important in the application and advance of meta-scientific knowledge? It is important because without it we can never hope to obtain the vision and insight into our shared reality, or the sense of objectivity and unprejudiced understanding that is possible with meta-science. Without such an attitude that acknowledges our own limitations and ignorance in the face of the unknown, we can never hope to learn more or improve our situation and condition in the world.

 


Blanket Copyright, Hugh M. Lewis, © 2005. Use of this text governed by fair use policy--permission to make copies of this text is granted for purposes of research and non-profit instruction only.

Last Updated: 03/08/05