A GENERAL THEORY OF HUMANOLOGY
ABSTRACT
"Humanology" is a systematic synthesis between an ongoing
question and answer dialectic between scientific Anthropology and
anti-scientific Anthropology. In my mind it is simply 'a-scientific".
The generalistic doctrine of humanological relativism provides an
alternative contextual frame of reference and a pretextual idiom for the
dialectics of 'Humanology". The doctrine of " Cultural
Relativism" has been eschewed by both philosophers and scientists alike.
For good reason it has never been formally elaborated as a theory.
Metaphorical symbolism comprehends reflexively the "before
unapprehended relations" between symbols. It is a
"reduplicative" metaphor for the metaphor of symbolic human
reality--the mise en abyme of human consciousness which nevertheless
constitutes the paradoxical ground of being.
Metalogical Mythology is both beyond logic and a "metaphysics"
for logic. While mythology is categorically beyond the purview of objective
comprehension by scientific rationality, scientific rationalism is not beyond
the metalogical purview of mythological comprehension.
Science has become the grand imperative in our Modern Age of progressive
development--so that we refer to a predominating configuration of the
stereotypical scientific personality. Humanology provides an alternative.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
1 CONTEXT AND PRETEXT 1
II THESIS 38
III ANTITHESIS 65
IV SYNTHESIS 91
A General Theory of Humanology
Toward a Universal Metalogic of Human Reality
This is a fantastical creation of my own mind--an unconventional
juxtaposition and informal manipulation of many basic concepts central to a
rational coherence of the Academic discipline of Anthropology.
It is written with the bias that socio-cultural anthropology has fallen
victim to its own scientific rationality--that it is slowly choking,
asphyxiating through its own self banalization within Academia, even before
its own time, its own "coming of age", its own maturation. This is
an attempt to provide a systematically formulated alternative framework; a new
synthesis compounded from a dialectic between anthropology and
anti-anthropological conceptions.
The justification and rationalization for this work lies in itself as an
end in itself, providing a heuristic alternative. The provision of alternative
frameworks of consciousness and conceptioning is necessary and indispensable
for broadening our human reality and for our collective capacity for creating
viable alternatives within our common reality. This is an especially relevant
necessity in our modern age foreshadowed as it has become by apocalyptic
visions of global crises of nuclear holocaust, over population and
undernutrition, world wide power differentials and class inequalities, between
the "First", "Second", "Third", and
"Fourth" Worlds, and global eco-systems climax signaled by the toxic
pollution of the polar ice caps, the death of the oceans, the devastation of
the tropical rain forests, international deployment of nuclear energy
technology, etc. etc. It is no overestimation to claim that human civilization
has pushed itself to the edge of species suicide as well as the inexorable
extinction of the biosphere. In response to this seemingly incurable plight, a
heightened sensitivity and new awareness of the dilemmas and consequences
involved, and a new world wide collective consciousness of need for a new
order of human civilization, has been gradually arising, and aspiring more and
more to make itself heard, understood, and felt upon the world stage.
This quasi-formal exercise in general anthropological theorization is as
useful and valuable a contribution to such new world revolution of human
civilization as any rigorously controlled methodological contribution of
empirical research of any narrowly focused, hypothetically delimited,
precisely definitive scope. As a theoretical exercise in independent, critical
thinking, this work can have no better justification.
I wish to acknowledge the support and assistance of Drs. Richard See,
Corinne Wood, Wayne Untereiner, Mikel Garcia, David Depew, and Marlene Dobkin
de Rios, all of whom helped me to "see" human reality a little
better than before, and, especially Dr. Jacob Pandian, who has unwittingly
become my Academic mentor.
CHAPTER I
Context and Pretext
Toward a General Theory of Humanological Relativism
Relativity is defined as "the condition or quality of being
relative". (American Heritage Dict. 1983) Relative is defined as
"1. Relevant; connected; related. 2. Considered in comparison to or
dependent in something else. 3. Gram. Referring to or qualifying an
antecedent." (American Heritage Dict. 1983) More precisely,
relativity is defined as "1. The condition, fact, or quality of being
relative. 2. The close dependence of one occurrence, value, quality, etc. on
another. 3. In philosophy, the theory that all knowledge is relative to the
mind, or that things can be known only through their effects on the mind, and
that consequently there can be no knowledge of reality as it is in
itself." (Webster's Dict. [unabridged] 1983) Relative is also more
precisely defined as "1. related to the other; dependent upon or
referring to each other…. 2. Having to do with; pertinent; relevant;…. 3.
Regarded in relation to something else…. 4. Involving or expressing
relations; meaningful only in relationship…. 5. In grammar, (a) designating
a word that introduces a subordinate clause and refers to an antecedent….
(b) Introduced by such a word…." (Webster's Dict. [unabridged] 1983)
All of these definitions reveal two important and interrelated
insights--first, all of the defined connotations are variation of the same
general meaning of the notion of "relative', even the reference to its
proper grammatical employment, and, secondly, these variations of general
meaning expresses a common theme of relation or relationship,
and relatedness between the known and the knower, i.e., of knowledge in
general. What these definitions collectively express is a general relativity
of human understanding of reality, with the implication that relativity is
a universal condition of this reality.
Furthermore, these meanings express that this universal condition is a human
condition of relatedness to human reality through relative
knowledge. A "relativist' is defined as a person "who believes
in relativism" or as one who " believes in relativity".
Relativity is clearly a matter of belief, as such it is both scientifically
untenable and philosophically tautological, even solipsistic. No amount of
empirical evidence or rational reason, no matter how extensively consistent or
intensively coherent, can either prove or falsify the belief in relativity.
Even more, once one takes a "leap of faith" and commits oneself to
an existential choice to believe or not to believe in relativism, than one
either enters a conceptual, notional realm of universal human relativity from
which there is no escape, in which 'everything is relative" or else one
arbitrarily excludes oneself from such a version of human reality, and instead
must declare that "nothing is relative" or that "everything is
non-relative" which logically results in the deductive imperative "everything
is absolute". Either way, there is no escaping from the mental
mazeway, whether by its acceptance or rejection, presented by the possibility
of universal human relativity.
Relativism is defined as "the theory of ethics or knowledge, which
maintains that the basis of judgment is relative, differing according to
events, persons, etc." (Webster's Dict. [unabridged] 1983) The
following Chapter is a systematic attempt to define the theoretical framework
of a general theory of humanological relativism, which is universal
in human reality. To date, there has been no such systematic formulation
of Relativism, and therefore the general notion of Relativity remains very
misrepresented and misconceived in the literature upon related topics. Coming
under the purview of this General theory of universal humanological
relativism are many applied versions differentiated as "historical
relativism", "meta-ethical relativism", "epistemological
relativism", "psychological relativism (egoism)",
"linguistic relativism", "philosophical relativism" and
finally and most importantly, "cultural relativism". From the
viewpoint of this theory of "General Relativism" all of these
diverse topics are but thematic variations comprised within a single
theoretical, general framework--the differences in kind are not so important
as their common kinship under the odd job label of "Relativism".
Relativism is a coherent belief system, until now only implicit and largely
presupposed, which in its consistent explication entails teleological
realization or actualization as a behavioral system, or an Ideology.
This theory of General Relativism provides a formal framework, within which
to focus critical attention upon some of its more particular features and
important implications for the understanding of culture and history, of
symbols and symbolism, and of mythology as an inherent "metalogical"
mode of the Human Mind. As a framework, this theory provides both a context
and a pretext within which to frame and understand these particular topics. As
a context, it is appropriate to refer to relational contextuality or contextual
human reality, which describes the basic rational structure or structural
understanding, of human reality, or more precisely, of human interrelatedness
and interrelationship within this reality. It is pretextual in
that it makes explicit what was formerly implicit, presumed true or false,
presuppositious, tacit and a priori to any of its topical subjects. Through
its formal conceptualization and definitive operationalization of its key
terms, it provides a rationalistic idiom for the discussion of human
relativity and human reality. As an idiom it is conceptually circumscribed,
hence its possibility for an infinitude of alternative interpretation. As an
rationalistic idiom it is simultaneously circular and yet also comprehensive
in its encompassment of human reality.
In its operational definition there have been so far become evident certain
key terms. The theory is termed "Humanological" Relativism for the
obvious, self evident reason that in its discussion there is no simple or
clean separation of the quality of humanness and of human
relatedness in the conceptual understanding, or conceptuality,
of "human relatedness" in the conceptual understanding
or conceptuality of "human" relativity of "human
reality". There is neither any clean separation of the meanings of
"human relativity" or "human reality"; understanding and
definition of one automatically implies the other. More precisely "human
relativity" preconditions and provides the conceptual basis of
understanding "human reality"--and its meaning is intrinsic,
inseparable from the meaning of "human reality". The belief system
implied by the term "General Relativism" automatically acknowledges
this "a priori" a fact of human interrelatedness between the
"relativity" of knowledge about human reality and human reality
itself. Another key term is the adjectival "Universal". Both human
relativity and human reality, and the "humanological relativism"
which their interrelationship acknowledges, are referred to as universal
in the sense that there really can be no going outside of human reality, or
the human relativity of human reality, or for that matter, outside of
"humanness" in relation to reality--for wherever we may choose to
escape to, we are still within its universal boundaries. Human universality,
universal human reality, universal human relativity are convenient expressions
expressing both the bounds and boundarilessness of human reality, human
relativity or humanological relativism. Similar to terms like
"Perfection" or "Truth" or "Eternity" or
"Infinity" it is more properly called a "summarizing
metaphor" or a "rational ideal" which manages to somehow
accomplish the impossible--the combination of opposites in a single word, the
resolution of inimical paradoxes, the synthesis of antithetical meanings.
It may be well argued that the expression "universal relativity"
is an inherent self-contradiction of opposite meanings, and therefore a
"non-sequitor". The paradoxical power and difficulty of its formal
understanding lies in its metaphorical combination of contrasts which are
common sensically, logically inimicable. Simply stated what the metaphor
"universal relativity" expresses is the notion that everything,
humanly identifiable, distinguishable, isolatable, within reality is in some
way relative to that human understanding, as well as being relative to reality
itself. There is nothing, which can be humanly understood as such, in whatever
form, which is not part of this relative universe of human reality.
"Relative universality" expresses as well this inescapable,
intrinsic condition of human reality. But there is the more syntactical and
semantical argument that the term "universal" implies a condition or
meaning or sense of "absoluteness" or of being "absolute"
which is inherent to its definition, and referential meaning, and therefore it
is self contradiction to include it with its opposite, relativism, with its
logical connotation that "nothing is absolute" or "everything
is relative". But the argument, when more precisely delineated, is that
universal relativism acknowledges every possibility, however remote or
improbable, as a undivorcible part of human reality, even if only as the
remotest of possibilities. Even absolute ideals like "universality"
itself, are possible within a relativistic context, existing as possibilities
however remote and unlikely. There is another way of understanding this
central characteristic of universality:
I believe there is only one reality, and therefore
there might only be one true cognitive map of that reality no matter
how many alternative symbol systems and schemes of organization we choose to
interpret it in. No matter what names we choose to use in carving reality,
whatever peculiar distinctions or inferences we wish to emphasize, ultimately
we must be brought back to the beginning precept--we are inevitably dealing
with one and the same reality. This might seem absolutist, but I wish at the
outset to qualify it rather as being absolutely relativistic in the
conception of "truth". The problem of this truth I will return to at
the end of this discussion--suffice it to make this initial distinction
between truth and reality as a necessary point of entry into
what otherwise I believe to be a closed "self contained" system of
philosophical conceptioning which is inherently circular and cyclical in
nature.
Believing is only one reality, it is appropriate to proffer a tentative and
simplistic definition of that reality, which can be subsequently modified and
elaborated and scrutinized in detail and refinement in the remainder of this
preliminary discourse. Definition of reality, then, is the primary problem of
this philosophical concatenation. Yet already I have implicitly defined
reality in its singularity, which I can re-explain by describing reality as
being universal and our map of that reality is concomitant comprehensive.
This definition poses a basic paradox in the definition of reality. The way we
define reality is dependent upon the way we come to know and understand
reality. To understand universality our knowledge must be comprehensive.
Ultimately reality and our map of that reality, though essentially different,
are at the same time one and the same thing. Restated the definition of
reality poses this essential dilemma--reality is a comprehensive
conception of the universal, which also has an inextricably human meaning.
We cannot separate reality from our epistemological knowing of that reality in
our definition. This human quality about reality poses a special problem in
the definition of reality, one which I call the universal human dilemma.
Reality and human existence are inseparable in the definition of reality.
The human cannot directly conceive of the totality of reality in and of
itself, as separate from human existence. We can never ever step completely
outside of the trees to see the whole forest. We can never have a completely
objective perspective of reality, we are ourselves trees in the forest. We
cannot ever be completely objective in our evaluation of our existence or of
our reality. We cannot never transcend our own subjectivity enough to
understand ourselves or our reality in our scientific sense that a botanist
seeks to know a tree. Here is the heart of our fundamental dilemma of
understanding. (Lewis 1983, unpublished manuscript, pages 2-3)
General relativism admits of the basic belief that "in human
reality, since it is universal and relative at the same time, everything and
everything that is humanly imaginable is possible, only if the possibility
exists within a hazy incoherent dream or as some absolute ideal, or even as an
'impossibility' but also cautions with the scientific rejoinder, 'since all
things are relative, it follows that some things may be more possible, or
probable, than others'." What this "universalistic relativism"
accomplishes is the creation of a conceptual framework which is open ended,
unbounded and all encompassing, yet circumscribed and "comprehended"
within such key terms as relativity, universality or humanology.
It can be reasonably well demonstrated that while relativism allows for the
possibility of universals and absolutes, on the other hand absolutistic
thinking, the logical consequence of a denial of the relativistic doctrine,
systematically excludes the possibility of relativity, and therefore can be
described as more "close ended" and bounded in its delineation of
"absolutes". Absolutistic thinking is inherently more circumscribed
than is relativistic thinking. In a sense both absolutistic and relativistic
thought can be modeled as opposite extremes of a single continuum of human
conceptual reality or "conceptuality" but in another sense
relativism is to be seem as a broader based framework within which to
conceptualize about human reality. This is both the strength and weakness of
the general notion of relativity, as in its complexity it has the possibility
of more sophisticated and accurate models of reality, and yet because it tends
to defy simplistic understanding of reality, in its intrinsic specification of
contexts and interrelationships, it lacks wide appeal to a mass audience of
many who crave simplistic understanding of reality. Absolutistic thinking, on
the other hand, has the attractiveness of parsimony and simplicity.
An absolutist is defined as "one who favors absolutism" and
"absolutism" is defined "1. The quality of being absolute or
certain" which implies the preoccupation with the need for absolute
certainty about our knowing if reality, a preoccupation which led Descartes to
his famous philosophical aphorism "Cognito Ergo Sun".
Absolute is defined as "1. Literally, in a general sense, free or
independent of anything extraneous. 2. Complete in itself; whole. 3.
Unconditional….4. existing independent of any other cause….5. unlimited by
extraneous power or control. 6. Not relative….7. free from imperfections;
perfect. 8. Actual; real; as an absolute truth. 9. In grammar, (a)
independent; as the absolute case: applied to a word or member of a
sentence not immediately dependent on the other parts of the sentence in
government; (b) used without an explicitly object: said of a verb; (c) with
the noun understood: said of a pronoun or an adjective…." (Webster's
Dict. [unabridged] 1983) Absolutistic doctrine has a long, well developed
(unlike relativistic doctrine, which is comparatively unelaborated, except in
certain "oriental" philosophical religious doctrines) tradition in
Western philosophy which stretch all the way back to and stems from Platonic
Rational idealism, which posits that there exist in reality absolute, perfect
forms, independent of and a priori to their realization by human knowledge,
which can only crudely approximate these forms. The exact definition of this
ideal reality varies with the particular philosopher, from Cartesian Geometry
to Kant's Noumena, but the underlying idiom is the presupposition of a
Monosenic, Monotypic, and Monothetic Label, like Art or Aesthetics or Beauty
with an upper case letter, or "Ethics" with a capital "E"
as something existing independently of the ethical or relatively unethical
behavior of human beings. The quest for the mind then is the quest for a
single, monosemic, monothematic definition of the meaning "meaning of
High Art" or of "Good" or "Truth" preferably
summarizable in one concise statement, and encompassing all phenomena which
comes within the purview of the presupposed heading. This in turn leads to a
search for absolute, "universals" or "universal principles of
Laws" which determine the relationships between discrete
"absolute" atomistic entities. It leads to a formal theoretical
orientation which is directly contraposed to General Relativism, and is
referred to as Absolute, or Universal Determinism, "the doctrine that
everything is entirely determined by a sequence of causes" through which
we are lead to search for ever elusive final, or ultimate causes, primary,
unilineal, and analytically describable. Analytical causality defines the
interrelatedness which characteristically structures modes of human
understanding which form a conceptual universe of Determinism--Rational
Idealism--Absolutism which is dialectically contrapuntal to the relativistic
doctrine composed of Humanological Relativism--Universal Relativity--Universal
Human Reality--Possibilism and Probabalism. Both conceptual
"complexes" are in a sense antithetical answers to the question
whether "universal human reality is relative or absolute in human
understanding". As mentioned before, the former alternative, though more
seemingly parsimonious, is also more restrictive and simplistic from a
rational standpoint:
In short, anything designed "universal"; (1) can
only be done so by relative comparison to what is not universal, (2)
necessitates expansion of its definition in order to encompass an ever
increasing range of variations and the theoretical ignorance of these
variations, (3) as a general rule must always exclude inevitable exceptions in
order to remain rationally coherent, i.e. the principle of parsimony, (4)
implies inevitably either an absolutistic all inclusive standard or else an
atomistic exclusivity. As a device of conceptual organization one wonders
whether universality/particularity is more revealing about our own preferred
prejudices and value systems of a defensive rationalization than about
anything humanly realistic. In short, as useful a simplifying device as it
might first appear, it is always only relative to the meaning we arbitrarily
and customarily assign to it, and it might be better if it were discarded in
lieu of some more accurate and relativistic model of describing human reality.
There is no such "thing" within a universalistic context of human
relativism, as an a priori universal, "absolute" which is
independent of our posteriori, after the fact of the recognition, label and
definition of its human meaning.
In our theory building we have an important choice, we can either delight
in diversity and multiply complexity in congruence with the detailed
"facts" or else we can opt for simplicity and seek to impose some
primary standard of uniformity in the authoritative guise of
"universality". We soon reach a point at which we must opt either
for empirical accuracy and consistency or else rational parsimony and
coherence--then we are allowed to proceed only in either direction, towards
accuracy at the sacrifice of parsimony, or towards parsimony at the cost of
accuracy. Our quest for universality/particularity is founded upon a belief in
the existence of an ultimate essential uniformity of relationship between all
human beings, pervading all reality and causally explaining all behavioral
phenomena. But even in the barest essentials universality/particularity still
implies relationship and relativity. The problem is more of a theoretical
difficulty of simultaneously accounting for similarities and differences
between human beings and their phenomenological realities. We all have
fingerprints, faces, similar components of our bodies, and yet these
"things" are all uniquely different in variation. In other words, in
ultimately defining "universal" human reality we can either say it
is essentially one and the same for all human beings for all times, or else
that it is essentially different and variable for each and every human being.
The theoretical difficulty is to reconcile these seemingly inimical and
paradoxical differences and similarities in human reality--an impossible feat
if we hang on to the notions of universality and particularity within an
absolutistic framework of understanding, but possible within a
relativistic context. (Lewis 1985 [unpublished])
There can be little wonder why traditional Western
"Rationalistic" Philosophy has so adamantly attacked the undefined
doctrine of Relativism and yet has consistently ignored or failed its formal,
rational development as an independent doctrine, aside from the noteworthy
exceptions of Spinoza and Hume and Sartre. An unidentified doctrine, only
tacitly regarded or presumed, is that much more indefensible and vulnerable to
the kind of metaphysical assaults Western rationalistic discourse regularly,
customarily takes. Development of a well-defined and coherent Relativistic
doctrine represents a principle threat to the very most basic tenets upon
which Western philosophical Rationalism is founded.
The Doctrine of Relativism has been loosely espoused within the paradigm of
Western Rationalism takes three forms, psychological, philosophical and
anthropological. Psychological "egoism" as it is called is a form of
solipsism which has developed around rather modern psychological conceptioning
of human reality, and from attempts to use this from of conceptioning to
derive ethical systems of human behavior. Psychological egoism states that
people tend to do what pleases them or is in their own interest. On the other
hand, what is termed "ethical egoism" is the belief "that the
only moral valid standard is the obligation to promote one's own well being
above everyone else's". The main criticism of egoism is that its
proponents confuse selfish motivations with self-motivation, and
that the two forms are not necessarily synonymous or even coincidental. A more
elaborate form of psychological relativism is to found in Satre's notion of an
existential dilemma and the need to make an existential choice based upon
rational evaluation of the circumstances attending these dilemmas. Each
individual must make his/her own choice and ultimately make a moral
commitment, or leap of faith. In this version, there are no final reasons or
grounding for morality, only choices particular to the life situation of each
individual.
Philosophical relativism has come under concerted attack by Western
Philosophy itself, because of its "anti-rationalistic" orientation.
There is epistemological relativism already defined as the relativity of
knowledge, and then there is ethical relativism, more accurately divided
between metaethical and normative relativism. Metaethical relativism denies
any valid universal basis by which to construct any and all ethical systems.
Normative, or prescriptive ethics lies in the differences to be fond within
competing or alternative ethical theories and within the operation of moral
systems within different social contexts.
Of most importance to our understanding is what I refer to as the
anthropological forms of relativism. "Historical particularism,
linguistic relativism, and cultural relativism". In a sense Historical
particularism, which specifies contexts of period and place in the
understanding of human reality, is an elaborated, social version of
psychological relativism. Likewise, linguistic relativism contains the basic
theoretical components of epistemological relativism, while cultural
relativity contains within its purview certain presuppositions which are
metaethical and ethical in character. It must be emphasized that these
typological categories are rational constructs as they have been generally
employed within the Western Rationalistic framework, which generally
criticizes and attempts to invalidate, or falsify its different forms. Within
an alternative framework of General Humanological Relativism, all these
"forms" of relativism are to be considered but diverse
manifestations of a central, core philosophical/anthropological set of
relationships. Elements of each form of relativism may be found contained
within, underlying, or in one way or another relating to all the other forms
of relativism.
The largest rationalistic error is the philosophical criticism of
anthropological relativism has been the misconception of the relativists
position as a brand of historical, linguistic or cultural determinism,
that a particular history, language or culture forms absolute and
insurmountable boundaries which social circumscribe all of the common members
of a group, and which isolate them from ever knowing or relating to any other
people. This misconception of relativism is tantamount to a rationalistic
projection by an absolutistic, deterministic closed minded mentality which
does not acknowledge its own weaknesses.
This is the kind of patterning of institutions which we find in all their
many different phases….Patterning, however, is not a straight jacket; it is
not even a high wall that bars wandering in adjacent cultural fields. It is,
as we have noted, a model. It constitutes a pattern in the technical sense of
the term, but with its outlines and contours flexible and alterable,
permitting experience to fall into meaningful forms despite the changes that
continuously mark its expression. (Herskovits 1947, page 207)
The two leading proponents who best elaborated the theoretical
doctrine associated with "cultural relativism" are Ruth Benedict
("Anthropology and the Abnormal" 1932 and "Patterns of
Culture" 1934) and Melville J. Herskovits ("Man and His Works"
1947, "Cultural Anthropology" 1955, "Cultural Dynamics"
[posthumous] 1964). In general this "culture and personality"
position regarded all human behavior as relative to the specific
historical/cultural contexts in which it occurs and "states positively
that no forms of behavior is abnormal in all cultures". Singer (1961) has
most succinctly summarized Ruth Benedict's central thesis:
In every culture there is a wide range of individual temperament
types (genetically and constitutionally determined) which recur
universally.
Every culture, however, permits only a limited number of types to
flourish, and they are those that fits its dominant configuration.
The vast majority of individuals in any society will confirm to the
dominant types of that society, since their temperaments will be
sufficiently plastic to the molding force of the society. These will be
the "normal" personality types.
A minority of individuals in every society will not "fit"
the dominant types, either because their temperament types are too
deviant from the ruling types or because they are "insufficiently
endowed". There will be the "deviants" and "abnormals".
The classification and distribution of "normal" and
"abnormal" personality types of relative to the configuration
of particular cultures which define the criteria of
"normality" and "abnormality".
According to Ruth Benedict, cross cultural surveys demonstrate that
culturally integrated modes of behavior and adaptation widely vary in a range
of different eco niches and historical circumstances, and together form a
relatively broad spectrum of alternative variations far beyond the widest
ranges of any specific culture bound formula. Our contemporary, modern version
of "Western Civilization" becomes not only a necessary pinnacle of
human achievement but only one entry in a long series of possible of cultural
configurations of behavior patterning. Our customary categories of normality
and abnormality, which if not explicitly well defined, are at least tacitly
presumed to be compara-absolute and universal, become questioningly suspect of
ethno-centric culture bias when considered within the framework of this wider
"transcultural" spectrum. Our is not the only civilization possible,
and even though we may wish to deem it the best, nevertheless the fact remains
that the total spectrum of possible human behavioral variations is just to
large to be fully encompassed by any single instance of cultural configuration
relative in space and time. The dynamic aspect of adaptation, determination,
and evolution of cultural patterning, and the essentially unpredictable
character of human behavior renders a virtual infinitude of possible cultural
configurations. Any psychology claiming universality of its definitions of
"normality" and "abnormality" is necessarily in error. The
comprehensivity and relativity of the sources of these definitions must always
be taken into account. Normality/abnormality is, according to Benedict, a
value-laden dichotomy, and only by understanding the inevitability of
intrusion of cultural values upon the definition of this dichotomy "can
we ever hope to hypothesize a validly scientific and humanistic universal norm
of human behavior". According to Benedict, …."the concept of the
normal is properly a variant of the concept of the good…."
It is a point that has been made more often in relation to ethics than in
relation to psychiatry. We do not longer make the mistake of deriving the
morality of our own locality and decade directly from the inevitable
constitution of human nature. We do not elevate it to the dignity of a first
principle. We recognize that morality differed in every society, and is a
convenient term for socially approved habits. Mankind has always preferred to
say "it is morally good" rather than "it is habitual" and
the fact of this preference is enough for a critical science of ethics. But
historically the two phrases are synonymous….
….Just as we have been handicapped in dealing with ethical problems so
long as we held to an absolute definition of morality, so too in dealing with
the problems of abnormality we are handicapped so long as we identify our
local normalities with the universal sanities.
While Benedict's brand of cultural relativism has been referred to as
psychological and as :ethical" relativism by Elvin Hatch (Culture and
Morality 1983), Herskovits version would be more loosely described as a
variant of the "historical relativist" position. Herskovits entire
theory of "Cultural Dynamics" as his central thesis is explaining
how and why cultures change, presupposes a very general and somewhat vague
conceptioning of "Cultural Relativism". Herskovits broadly
interpreted cultural relativism as "in essence an approach to the
question of the nature and role of values in culture". (1964, page 49)
"Judgments are based on experience, and experience is interpreted by
each individual in terms of his own enculturation." Therefore,
"evaluations are relative to the cultural background out of which
they arise". (1964, page 48)
As method, relativism encompasses the principle of our
science that, in studying a culture, one seeks to attain as great a degree of
objectivity as possible, that one does not judge the modes of behavior one is
describing, or seek to change them. Rather, one seeks to understand the
sanctions of behavior in terms of the established relationships within the
culture itself, and refrains from making interpretations that arise from a
preconceived frame of reference. Relativism as philosophy concerns the nature
of cultural values, and beyond this, the implications of an epistemology that
derives from a recognition of the force of enculturative conditioning in
shaping thought and behavior. Its practical aspects involve the
application--the practice--of the philosophical principles derived from this
method, to the wider cross-cultural scene.
Elvin Hatch, in his work Culture and Morality, erroneously
misinterpreted the Relativistic doctrine as it was propounded by both Benedict
and particularly, Herskovits. Hatch mistakenly accuses Herskovits of deriving
"an ought from an is"….in his view, it is an
indisputable fact turned up by anthropological study that peoples across the
world have widely diverse value systems. Therefore, there are no absolute
standards or fixed values. "Evaluations are relative to the
cultural background out of which they arise." (1993, page 3) If one
closely rereads the above passages by Herskovits, then it becomes quite clear
that in no way does Herskovits imply that "there are no absolute
standards or fixed values". If anyone has derived an ought from an is, it
is Hatch, and not Herskovits, which draws the conclusion from Herskovits
actually had to say is quite different. It is a significance difference which
needs reiteration--"one seeks to understand the sanctions of behavior
in terms of the established relationships within the culture itself, and
refrains from making interpretations that arise from a preconceived frame of
reference." Hatch himself notes how, "Almost without exception,
the philosophers are disapproving, for usually they mention ethical relativism
only to criticize it while in the course of a arguing some other ethical
theory." (1983, page 63) Hatch goes on to misinterpret what he considers
to be "historical relativism" as the doctrine that because each
culture is unique, and no regularities or generalities are to be derived from
cross cultural comparison, anthropology therefore is relative to the
historical context of a particular culture. Cross-cultural comparison, in
order to be scientifically valid, require valid categories of thought,
"which transcend a given tradition and which apply to cultures in
general." Yet the only categories we may have are relative to our own
particular cultural context are therefore not validly applicable to other
cultural contexts. Our own interpretations will change as our own culture's
institutions and history changes along with our "categories of
thought". "In the area of human affairs, no objective, detached
observation is possible." He also distinguishes a form of methodological
relativism, which may hold without necessarily believing in cultural
relativism, as "the thesis that one should to shed one's own cultural
point of view in visiting another culture in order to avoid misunderstanding
what is being studied--one's own perspective may get in the way of accuracy
and should be held in abeyance until the research is finished." This is
quite similar to Herskovits interpretation, although quite a bit narrower. He
also distinguishes the "functionalists" version of ethical
relativism--that social institutions normally exist for good reason and
"have unintended and beneficial effects" but this position "
leads to the approval of practices that are patently inhumane.
Yet another seemingly devastating, yet entirely innocuous criticism against
the general relativistic orientation issues from within the anthropological
paradigm itself and concerns the theoretical nature of the debate as opposed
to the normative and metaethical implications. In this misinterpretation,
relativistic doctrine is "diametrically opposed to comparative, cross
cultural theory and methodology. Relativism implies cross-cultural comparison,
if its "methodological thesis" is distinguished from the
"ideological thesis" an analytical dichotomy. The relativist
doctrine claims that the unique "flavor" or "genius" of a
culture is distinct, yet one can only prove or test this hypothesis by
comparison with other culture. Even more, there are degrees of
distinctiveness. "If a phenomenon were wholly unique, we could not
possibly comprehend it. We are able to understand any phenomenon only because
it bears some similarities to things we already know. According to this
misinterpretation, Relativism holds that cultures are functionally integrated
and therefore can only be understood in holistic terms of its own
"pattern, order and meaning are violated if elements are abstracted for
purposes of comparison." (Kaplan and Manners) "The cultural circle
is self contained." On the other hand, comparativists, while supposedly
acknowledging differences of culture, as well as the functional integrity of
each culture, but recognizes "that some parts are more interrelated than
others" and that cross cultural comparison is "not only nonrapacious,
but is methodologically legitimate, heuristically suggestive, and
scientifically fruitful". A comparativist is more apt to accept both the
doctrine of the "psychic unity of mankind" as well as the
comparatability of similar cultural components. Accordingly, "the
relativist is concerned overwhelmingly with the differences. The comparativist
is interested in the similarities as well as the differences." The
relativist is supposed to be aesthetically offended by the comparativists
neglect of the unique, inherent qualities of cultural context, and the
comparativist is offended scientifically by the relativists obsession with
differences"--For while he knows that no two objects or events in nature
are exactly alike, taxonomies, typologies, and processes are defined and
ordered through selection from the less relevant and irrelevant." ( )
While scientific investigation requires removal from its context, the question
becomes "to know how much of the phenomenon's context one must take it
when one isolates it conceptually for purposes of analysis or study."
Clearly, relativism is a useful reminder that in studying culture's other
than our own we must try not to be swayed by our cultural preconceptions.
Looked at in this way, relativism is a methodological precept, not an
ideological position. If there are differences among anthropologists with
regard to the ideological of relativity, all anthropologists accept the
methodological version. But, like Einstein (who actually was an
anti-relativist) we must take a relativistic stand only to enable us to
surmount it. To hold consistently and implacably to a relativist stance would
undermine the whole anthropological enterprise. It would automatically destroy
the cross cultural relevance of all accumulated anthropological knowledge.
That is, all such knowledge--including the doctrine of cultural relativism
itself--would be relative to the culture in which it originated or developed.
And we would thus end up with an Eskimo anthropology, a Trobriand
anthropology, a Nuer anthropology and so on--with a series of cultural
configurations, each of which is defined as unique and therefore not
comparable. (Manners and Kaplan)
The foregoing criticism against the general relativist stand is in the
first placed based upon a false opposition between relativism and comparison.
What is apparent as an opposition is, more accurately, a superficial
analytical dichotomization. "There are degrees of distinctiveness"
and "the Orwellian modifier that some parts are more interrelated than
others" is actually more of a relativistic doctrine than strictly
comparative. Indeed, there is nothing intrinsic to the relativist doctrine
which necessarily or sufficiently precludes or prohibits the possibility of
comparison. While I would agree with the statement that "as one looks
more closely at the relativist comparativist issue in anthropology, one sees
that relativism implies comparison", I would take issue with the
statement that the "relativist is concerned overwhelmingly with the
differences." Though this would seem like a moot point, I would more
likely reverse the order and claim that it is the relativist who is more
interested in both the differences/similarities than the so called but
fictitious comparativist.
Yet another erroneous criticism of General relativism issues from the
ethical philosophers themselves. The doctrine of relativism in general
threatens their concerted quest for a rationalistic, absolutistic, and
universal theoretical system of metaethics as being "an unattainable
ideal". "Yet one main goal of general normative ethics is to outline
a system of moral norms applicable to everyone, independent of special
contexts." Philosophers find relativism "unconvincing" because
it is "irrelevant" to their central, absolutistic goal, "and
because the counter arguments appear to be at least as good as the arguments
defending relativism. Furthermore, there are so many different notions
subsumed under the rubric of relativism that the arguments often seem
undirected and confused." So much for the philosophical maxim,
"divide and conquer". According to this misinterpretation, cultural
relativism is:
This view is put forward on general theoretical grounds as the thesis that
all moral standards are mere reflections of mores or folkways--i.e., behaviors
customarily approved within a particular culture. From this perspective, a
moral standard is simply a historical product sanctioned by custom.
Psychological and historical versions of this thesis hold that the moral
beliefs of individuals vary on the basis of historical, environmental and
familial differences. It is now a generally accepted psychological fact that
moral beliefs, including our sense of conscience, are not innate and so must
somehow be learned in a social context. Moreover, the evolution and
transformation of these beliefs, over time, either in cultures or in
individuals, can often be reconstructed by historians. The weight of
anthropological, psychological and historical evidence thus conspires to
suggest that moral beliefs are relative to groups or individuals and that
there are no universal norms, let alone universally valid ones….
Thus the moral philosophers suspect a conspiracy of empirical
evidence behind the usurpation of their traditional prerogative of
absolutistic metaethics. Even they admit that the power of
"Suggestion" is enough to undermine their rationalistic sense of
universal order. Their arguments in defense of their metaethical position is
to advance arguments, equally if not more suspect, of a "universal
structure" of human nature, or a psychic unity of humankind, or a
"deep structure" or "at least a universal set of human needs,
exist that leads to the adoption of similar or even identical principles of
all cultures". Furthermore, they advance even the more suspicious
argument that even though there might be cultural or individual variations of
beliefs and values, this "reveals nothing about whether people ultimately
or fundamentally disagree about moral standards". This counter
argument is faulty for denying the very empirical base, of cross cultural
comparison of beliefs and values, in order to create an "independent yet
unprovable ideal conceptioning of meta choice".
Even if individuals in the same culture or persons from
different cultures do not actually agree on the same ultimate norm or set of
norms, it does not follow that there is no ultimate norm or set of norms in
which everyone ought to believe….Given anthropological data, one might be
skeptical that there could be a compelling argument in favor of one system of
either religion or morality. But nothing more than skepticism seems justified
by the facts adduced by anthropology, and this judgment would hold even if fundamental
conflicts of belief were discovered. Skepticism of course presents serious
issues, but alone, it does not support relativism.
Western philosophers have a curious habit of unconsciously creating logic
where there really is none--theirs is a lawyer's defense in a court of law,
equivocating over technicalities. This philosophical argument against
relativism misinterprets cultural relativism as a form of "normative
relativism" that "anything is right or wrong whenever some
individual or some group sincerely thinks it is right or wrong"
and "a person ought to obey a particular constitution because most people
in that society believe it is morally right to do so". These are known as
individual normative relativism and group normative relativism respectively.
"What does not seem attractive is to mix the two norms of normative
relativism, for individual beliefs too often conflict with group
beliefs." The ultimate arguments against this version of relativism as it
is interpreted by the philosophers is that the relativist's doctrine of
normative relativism implies or leads logically to seemingly universal norms
of tolerance, or of equality, or at most a live and let live non-involvement
or at most a proscription of physical coercion, then the whole position is
internally inconsistent:
The proposition that we ought to tolerate the views of others, or that it
is right not to interfere with others, is precluded by the very strictures of
the theory. Such a proposition bears all the marks of a non-relative
account of moral rightness, one based on, but not reducible to, the cross
cultural findings of anthropologists. If there can be relativity of belief in
the case of every other ethical issue, then there certainly can be relativity
over whether the practices of another society or person are to be tolerated.
Alternatively, if the relativist holds that a principle of tolerance is
demanded by "morality itself" then other fundamental normative
propositions surely cannot be excluded from similar standing in the
purportedly relativist theory. Indeed, we may suspect that something like a
(universal) principle of respect for person underlies and gives moral force to
the normative relativist's appeal for tolerance and respect. But if this moral
principle is recognized as valid, it can of course be employed as an
instrument for criticizing such cultural practices as the denial of human
rights to minorities and such beliefs as that of racial superiority. A moral
commitment to tolerance of other practices and beliefs thus leads inexorably
to the abandonment of normative relativism.
All these misinterpretations and faulty criticisms have a common ground in
a closed minded projection of a rationalistic world view which cannot conceive
of a human universe in other than absolutistic terms. The basis for the
obvious rejection of cultural relativism in the face of rather bald
anthropological evidence to the contrary is an implicit rationalism which
seeks to rip ethical considerations out of the empirical ground of a cultural
and historical context on the basis that these contexts should at least be, by
their own opinion, irrelevant considerations. Metaethical conceptioning is
idealistically universal in character, and therefore the problematical issues
of context are considered "irrelevant".
The problem with this criticism is not a problem intrinsic to the doctrine
of general humanological relativism itself, but it is rather a problem of interpretation
(and misinterpretation) of what relativism actually means and implies.
To reiterate, relativism has not as yet, to date, been a systematically
formulated doctrine of comprehending reality, thus it has been very vulnerable
to projective prejudice by rationalistically oriented critics. Humanological
relativism is the doctrine of knowing human reality, of comprehending and
interpreting this reality in terms of human interrelationships within it--it
is a theoretical doctrine of understanding human relativity which neither
precludes the possibility of universals or evaluations are rooted in, and not
apart from, the empirical context in which they are to be found, in which they
are made meaningful. Both Benedict and Herskovits have been blamed for both
failing to allow for the possibility of cross cultural comparison or universal
principles, and for failing to be "pure relativists" simply because
they both held out for the possibility of just such universals. What is
actually the case is that both recognized nothing intrinsically incompatible
within the doctrine of relativism with the possibility of cross cultural
comparison or universal principles. They only sought to provide the means
through relativism by which we might arrive at a more empirically valid
understanding of such universals. It is interesting to note in this regard
that Herskovits notion of cultural relativism, though founded upon the basis
of inimical cultural/historical differences, is not synonymous with
"cultural determinism", that such differences are absolute and
preclude scientific understanding, moral evaluation or cross cultural
comparison--but rather, Herskovits posits a common universality underlying the
continuous variability. This is a universality which can be scientifically
comprehended when the principles underlying the processes of cultural change
(Cultural Dynamics) have been clearly elucidated by scientific analysis of the
variances of the forms of cultural aspects in the particularistic contexts of
cultural/historical research.
….To say that there is no absolute criterion of values and
morals, or even, psychologically, of time or space, does not mean that such
criteria, in differing forms do not comprise universals in human
culture. Morality is a universal, and so is enjoyment of beauty, and some
standard of truth. The many forms these concepts take are but products of the
particular historical experience of the societies which manifest the,. In
each, criteria are subject to continuous questioning, continuous change….(Herskovits
1964, page 62)
It is a philosophy based on the facts that throw into bold relief the hard
core of similarities between cultures that have been consistently
overlooked in favor of the emphasis laid on cultural differences. These facts
show that every society has values and imposes restraints that cannot be
dismissed, even though they differ from one's own. Cultural relativism, which
stresses the universals in human experience as against ethnocentric concepts
of absolute values, in no wise gives over the restraints that every system of
ethics of exercises over those who live in accordance with it. To recognize
that right, and justice, and beauty may have as many manifestations as there
are cultures is to express tolerance, not nihilism. As anthropology's greatest
contribution, this position puts man yet another step on his quest of what he
ought to be, in the light of the facts, as we know them, about what is his
unity, no less than in his diversity, he is. (Herskovits 1964, page 245)
A central analytical dichotomy underlies the metaethical rationalism of the
philosophers. This is the dichotomy between an is statement and an ought
statement, or more descriptively an "analytic/synthetic"
dichotomy between, on one hand, "purely" descriptive or factual
statements, and on the other hand, evaluative or prescriptive statements which
are not factual but judgmental. This dichotomy allows the rationalist
mentality to set in motion a syllogistic reasoning processes which allows
deduction of evaluative conclusions from factual and evaluative premises. In a
sense, rationalists philosophers generate ought after and ultimately attempts
to derive the rudimentary, possibly universal "meaning structure"
which underlies all language, thought and culture. Basically it ask the
questions of how much does language influence culture, and how is language
related to the world view of those who speak it. The classical anthropological
example of Eskimo snow terminology, like the demonstration of the cultural
relativity of Eskimo geronticide and female infanticide, is used to
demonstrate one extreme theoretical position of this "world view"
problem, which is commonly referred to as the "Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis" and refers to what is generally called the "theory of
Linguistic Determinism". Edward Sapir (Conceptual Categories in Primitive
Languages 1931) points out that language, "defines experience for us by
reason of its formal completeness and because of our unconscious projection of
its implicit expectations into experience" (page 578). This statement
counters universalistic notions that "reality is the same for all human
beings" and has been interpreted to mean that "people who speak
different languages segment their world differently. Sapir viewed the
relationship between language and culture as different from this relationship
between language and thought. He insisted (Language 1921) that language and
culture are independent of one another without any causal interrelationship.
"Culture is what society thinks and does and language is how
people think." (1921: 218) Language is related to thought in that
"language is primarily a pre-rational foundation. It humbly works up to
the thought that is latent in, that may eventually be read into, its
classifications and its forms; it is not, as is generally but naively assumed,
the final label put upon the finished thought". (page 150) (Carol Eastman
1975, pages 75-76)
Whorf's view is essentially the same as Sapir's ( ) on the basis of a
single is and ought, while they sharply criticize relativists from deriving an
ought from an is, What relativists actually do is not strictly dichotomize
epistemological reality between purely factual and purely evaluative
statements--rather they recognize and acknowledge the excluded middle ground
in which a statement of fact is often colored by evaluative connotations, and
in affect, there can be no completely objective "neutral" statements
without some connotations. On the other hand, they recognize that all
evaluative statements must contain some basis in reality in order to be valid.
It is not true that relativists commit the logical fallacy of deriving an
ought from an is, it is rather they are playing by a different kind of
"metalogic" which never dichotomizes oughts and is's in the first
place. The problems surrounding relativist doctrine are not those
extrinsically ascribed to it by the many critics of relativism. The problem is
rather one of interpretation. It is not that relativists refrain from or are
not allowed by their philosophical orientation to make generalizations which
might have universal validity--as mentioned at the start universality is an
intrinsic component of relativism--it is rather that the form of these
generalizations is entirely different than those regularly recognized by
rationalists--generating a completely different, and irreconcilable mode of
interpretation which is based upon human interrelatedness in human reality.
Considering these matters of alternative methodologies or modes of knowing and
comprehending human reality, the relativist, on the one hand, and the
rationalist-determinists on the other, broaches another brand of relativism
which has become known as "linguistic relativism".
Linguistic relativism deals with the "world view" problem,
involving the nature of the interrelationships between language, culture and
thought. Consideration of Thinking in Primitive Communities (1936) that a
person's language determines how a person will segment his reality:
The forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of
pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived
intricate systemizations of his own language--shown readily enough by a candid
comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of different
linguistic family. His thinking itself is in a language--in English, in
Sanskrit, in Chinese. And, every language is a vast pattern system, different
from others, in which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by
which the personality not only communicated but also analyzes nature, notices
or neglects types of relationship and phenomenon, channels his reasoning and
builds the house of his consciousness. (Carol 1956: 252)
The hypothesis of linguistic determinism may be summarized in saying that
each language embodies a particular world view which it reinforces and
sustains. "The speakers of a language agree to perceive and think of the
world in a certain way--not in the only way possible." (Eastman 1975,
page 78) Reality can be variously structured--different languages operating
with different structures. The "Theory of Linguistic Relativity"
entails a slight modification in that instead of "structurally
determining" our reality, languages simply make it "easier to
conceptualize the world in a certain way than in other possible ways, while
the same sort of conceptioning may be more difficult in terms of another
language. While it is possible to "think" out of a language, the
native language we are "brought up with" acquires a tremendous
degree of apparent "concreteness". This relativist modification was
proposed by the psychologist Roger Brown who stated that "some people need
more than one label for certain things because they require additional
distinctions within the labeled category in order to carry out certain
functions." A perceptual category which is used by people more often than
others is a category which is more "available" than one less
frequently employed. "One categorizes the world by using his language
according to his need."
Linguistic relativity holds that where there are differences of language
there will also be differences of thought, that language and thought covary.
Determinism goes beyond this to require that the prior existence of some
language pattern is either necessary or sufficient to produce some thought
pattern. (Brown 1958: 280)
There is some confusion between the notional terms of Determinism
and Relativism. Often times the notion of cultural or linguistic determinism
is confused with the notion of cultural or linguistic relativism. This
misunderstanding of general notions leads to a misconception of relativistic
theory as being somehow culturally or linguistically determinative--that a
culture and a language determined in an absolutistic way the individual
reality and personality if the participant actor. Nothing could be more
mistaken, as in actuality relativism is a contra-distinction of the notion of
general determinism. While Determinism stipulates the directions of causality
between thought, language and culture, relativism undermines the philosophical
necessity of establishing analytical causality and instead postulates a
processuality of interrelationship between opposed or differentiated domains
of human reality, namely language, thought and culture.
The problem of understanding the doctrine of general humanological
relativism is a problem of interpretation, of comprehending an alternative,
metalogical form of "knowing" of human reality in contextual and
pretextual terms which are every whit as generalisable and universalistic as
any comparable rationalistic terminology. I have already mentioned the
interrelatedness between humanology, human relativity and human reality, and
this quality of interrelatedness is what gives relativistic
comprehension its distinctive, heuristic edge over rationalism. There is also
the key operating metaphor of universal contextuality--that ultimately
everything is reality to every thing else in a Grand Web of Life. The proper
interpretation of cultural relativity requires an appropriate context. This
dictum should read like a general anthropological precept…."Cultural
relativity demands a context!" Relativity depends, indeed, demands
a context. Relativity is context. What is more, relativity is context
dependent, but relative generality is the other side of the coin of the
Relativistic doctrine--Relative generality, our theoretical generalizations
derived from the structural conception of relativity, represents the relative
independence from specific contexts derived from the flexibility and relative
openness of alternative interpretations. The theoretical objective of general
relativity is relative independence, or empirical distance, based upon
multi-focal and multi-dimensional breadth of context dependent
interpretations. From this standpoint, it seems paradoxical to say first that
relativity is context dependent and then is context independent, and this
paradoxically lies at the heart of the meaningfulness of such a general
conceptualization--the root of the dialectical tension of myth and meaning in
human reality.
Traditional Western philosophers has found the general problem of
relativity a much too paradoxical issue to be comfortably fit within its
general paradigmatic framework. It is not because of some kind of inherent
self contradiction in the conceptioning of cultural relativity which makes
this so but is rather because paradigmatic academic philosophy is
fundamentally Platonic in orientation and operates under an altogether
anti-thetical epistemological framework and so has been consistently
interpreted as intrinsically impossible, unphilosophical, anti-rational or
plain irrational, or just plain "irrelevant" to philosophical
inquiry. It seems to inevitably lead philosophical dialogue down a cul-de-sac
of empirical dilemma destructive of its rational fabric. But the fault is to
found in the limiting anti-contextual framework of western traditional
philosophy. Philosophy is ethnocentric (probably egocentric) in its
rationalistic orientation. It cannot deal with the problem of relativity
because it focuses monosemically and monothetically upon rationalistic ideals
divorcible from contextual reality, upon universal meanings and upon
absolutistic notions of final, conclusive truth.
As a theoretical problematic the idea of relativity is actually an
alternative epistemological modality to the traditional rationalistic paradigm
in describing and understanding human reality. Only with the relatively recent
rise of existentialism within philosophy has this alternative conceptual
framework begun to be explored. We speak of a movement between general
relativity and relative generality, but we do not leave the encompassing realm
of relativity and generality as a context dependent/independent mode of
discourse. Relativity is indeed an alternative episteme based upon empirical
and existential experience and is actually inclusive and more comprehensive a
framework for understanding human reality than is rationality. Relativity even
encompasses rationality. We cannot escape this relativism of contexts. It is
both a structural organizational principle for general theory and a contextual
principle of description.
Relativity is the epistemological basis for a descriptive understanding of
human reality--a pretext for humanology. To the extent that anthropology deals
with human reality in some "objective" manner it can claim the title
of science. To the extent that it becomes rationalistic it becomes ideology.
Anthropology is a descriptive science with the concept of relativism at its
base. A rationalistic interpretation of relativity has no option but to view
it as a self contradictory, yet confuses, form of ideology. As a science,
anthropology is concerned with the "relativity of knowledge" and
must feign at least a guarded neutrality of any kind of ideological
commitment. The concept of cultural relativity is necessarily a first
principle in anthropological theory and methodology. The conception of
cultural relativity is not necessarily inherently conservative in its moral
implications. Like any other abstract conceptual system its meaning is
intrinsically neutral with regard to possible extrinsic behavioral and
rationalistic determinations in existential human reality. Like any other
conceptual device it can be used to conservative ends as well as to liberal
one, but such use is always extrinsic to its implicit meanings. It may well
predispose one to conservative conclusions like maintaining the status quo,
but similar over constriction of meaning of any like conception can have a
similar result. Relativity is not absolute. To decry absolute relativity is
self contradictory and anathema to the inherent value of relativity and to
decry the paradox of tolerance of evil and destruction is merely to interpret
its meaning within a comparatively narrow, rationalistic framework of
understanding human reality.
In concluding this introductory chapter upon relativism, it is important to
consider some of the possible meta-ethical considerations which a doctrine of
general humanological relativism might imply or give rise to. Herskovits
recognized a logical and historical eventuality, a "necessity" of
the development of a new moral universe of evaluating human interrelationships
within a framework of relativistic understanding:
In these terms, the three aspects of cultural relativism can be regarded as
representing a logical sequence which, in a broad sense, the historical
development of the idea has also followed. That is, the methodological aspect,
whereby the data from which the epistemological proposition flow are gathered,
ordered and assessed, came first. For it is difficult to conceive of a
systematic theory of cultural relativism--as against a generalized idea of
live and let live--without the preexistence of the massive ethnographic
documentation gathered by anthropologists concerning the similarities and
differences between cultures the world over. Out of this data came the
philosophical position, and with the philosophical position came speculation
as to implications for conduct. (1964)
Noted previously has been the thesis that Eastern philosophy has a more
systematically elucidated a doctrine of universal relativism as compared to
Western rationalism. It is in this eastward direction that may be found some
outlines of an alternative moral order adduceable from the relativistic
framework of understanding human reality, one which is quite outside western
rationalism. In this regard we may look especially to some of the fundamental
teachings of Buddhism, especially the practice of Zen, and the attainment of
satori, or enlightenment, as well as to Taoism, "the Way". In
general eastern philosophies are called religious philosophies because the
philosophical, conceptual components are frequently indistinguishable from the
religious components. These philosophies commonly did not make a strict
dichotomy between preaching and knowing and the practice of the faith and the
paths toward knowing--belief and behavior constituted an uninterrupted
continuum a great Cycle of living in a relativistic manner.
Indian philosophers have always insisted that practice is the ultimate test
of truth. Philosophical visions must be put into practice and life lived
according to the ideals of the vision. The quality of the live lived according
to these ideals is the ultimate test of any vision. The better life becomes,
the closer the vision approaches complete truth.
The criteria for determining the quality of life are, in turn, derived from
the basic impetus for philosophy; the drive to eliminate suffering. The vision
that makes possible a life devoid of suffering is properly called a true
philosophy. Degrees of philosophic truth are determined according to the
degree of alleviation of suffering. But in a positive way, views are true
according to the extent they improve the quality of life. (Koller 1970, page
12)
There is concomitant to this paradigmatic rootedness of a philosophical
validation to existential reality, an orientation towards an extreme
subjectivism, a kind of extreme relativism, which promotes an openness of a
synthesizing attitude:
The emphasis on the subjective, in both senses of that expression, tends to
promote a synthetic attitude. The relevant philosophical criteria are not
quantitative and public. They belong to subject as subject. Therefore it is
impossible for one person to subscribe to one philosophy as alone being true
and to regard the others as completely false. Truth in philosophy depends on
the human subject, and another's experience can be known only as object. There
is no knowing--according to ordinary ways of knowing, at least--the other as
subject. Consequently, there is no rejecting the other's experience as
inadequate or unsatisfactory. Recognition of this has led to a tolerant
synthetic attitude which is commonly expressed by saying that while it may be
that no vision, by itself, is absolutely true and complete, nevertheless, each
vision contains some glimpse of the truth, and by assuming the viewpoints and
experiences assumed by the various visions one comes closer to the absolute
truth and the complete vision. Philosophical progress is not made by
proceeding from falsehood to truth, but by proceeding from partial to more
complete truth. (Koller 1970, page 13)
The subjectivism of this philosophical orientation gives rise to a theory
of suffering of self as the source of unhappiness--of the attachment of false
self, in ignorance, to undue craving to "things". Underlying this is
a theory of "dependent origination" in which everything is dependent
upon everything else--there is no "straight line
causality"--"whatever creates is also created, and the process of
creating and being created go on simultaneously without beginning or
end." Nothing is solely "other created" but everything is
mutually self creating. Ordinary notions of space and time are ruled out by
this line of thought. Space and time fall into the category of abstractions
rather than of realities. Reality is a continuous process, of becoming never
completed--there are not "beings" or "things" existing
independently of reality except as abstractions. Therefore:
….adequate definitions are impossible. If the universe is though to
consist of things, relatively complete and independent, it is possible to
adequately define the things making up the universe. But when the universe is
considered to be of the nature of process, definitions are not possible, for
whatever might be defined would belong to past stages of the process and never
to the present reality of the process. Koller 1970, page 128)
Yet another set of relativistic convictions expresses in Buddhist thinking
lies with the denial of the self as the source of causality. It denies the
false self that is derived through ego attachment to the desires which are the
causes of suffering. This self is one which is created through the illusion of
ignorance. Ignorance and projection are the key elements to a psychological
understanding of prejudice which in turn underlies defensive systems of
rationalization. Ultimately, rationality based upon the definition of the self
in terms of ultimate causality as a projection upon "objective"
reality is derived from a relative condition of ignorance. Nothing is more
relative a state of being than ignorance; out of tuneness, apathy,
antipathetic discordance with reality, a form of repression and neglect upon
which aggression and destructive impulses feed. The worst thing about
ignorance is that it is a condition which cannot know itself--being dependent
upon a relative state of enlightenment in order to reflect upon oneself. Just
as with the relativistic conceptioning of the self, so also was there
expressed in Buddhist though a well worked out metaphysical doctrine about the
relativistic nature of reality. Unlike the doctrine of the self, this other
orientation is a comment upon the rationalistic attempt to define causality in
the relationship of the self to reality:
Thus, even though it is Nagarjuna's view that clinging is the cause of
conflict and suffering, and even though his dialectic is aimed at showing the
futility of clinging to various conceptions of reality because of the complete
relativity of all conceptual systems, still, in consistency with this
relativity, he does not cling to relativity either. That is, it is considered
to be just as perverse to regard relativity as the truth about reality as it
is to consider any other view as the truth about reality. In fact, Nagarjuna
says, "but if people then begin to cling to this very concept of
Relativity, they must be called irreclaimable". (Koller 1970, page 169)
….It is temptingly easy for man to mistake the world he has created in
his knowledge which is merely a world of names and forms, for reality itself.
When he succumbs to the temptation he fixes on the name and form of self, that
he has created in his knowledge, as his own self. He identifies his own being
with this construction of name and form. Then the real self, burdened by the
ignorance resulting from mistaking the self of the real world, gets overlooked
in the struggle that ensues between the false self of name and form and the
false world of name and form. The resulting bifurcation, which underlies this
inauthentic existence, in this inauthentic world, is responsible for the
disease--the Dukkha--that Buddhism wishes to overcome.
Distinguishing between reality and the views of reality, Nagarjuna
apparently desired to show the dangers inherent in regarding anyone view of
reality as being absolutely true. Views are conceptual constructions of name
and form, and to claim any view as absolutely true is to refuse to recognize
the insights of other views, and thus to rule out possible avenues of
illumination. (Koller 1970, pages 167-8)
There is much, much ore to be learned about the relativistic doctrine from
the eastern religious philosophies. Rationalist's notion of a noumenal reality
a thing in itself, as the ultimate ground, is itself directly unknowable and
only hypothetically presupposed to be true, similar to hypothetical "deep
structures" and "collective unconsciousness" remain mysterious
and wholly without explanatory powers. This is not surprising to Yogacara
thinkers. "The whole concept of noumenal reality, which is the final
result of the intellectual search of the underlying principles of ultimate
reality, is simply an abstraction arrived at to solve a problem arising out of
the ignorance of the limitations of the viewpoint assumed by reason."
(Koller 1970, page 88)
The religious philosophical teachings of Buddhism outlined in the preceding
pages have left their mark of much of Asian civilization. Buddhism, much more
so than most religions has permeated the cultures with which it has been
associated. Consequently, in Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia, Thailand and Laos, where
Theravada Buddhism has held sway, and in Tibet, China, Korea, Japan and
Vietnam, where Mahayan Buddhism has been influential, we find rather
distinctive Buddhist cultural traits. Prominent among these cultural
characteristics are the following (1) emphasis on the dignity of man, (2) an
attitude of non-attachment, (3) tolerance, (4) a spirit of compassion and
non-violence, (5) an inclination to meditation and (6) a practical
orientation. (Koller 1970, page 191)
CHAPTER II
Thesis
Toward a General Theory of Metaphorical Symbolism
The wild geese fly across the long sky above
Their image is reflected upon the chilly water below.
The geese do not mean to cast their image on the water
Nor does the water mean to hold the image of the geese.
From: "To a Louse: On Seeing One On a Lady's Bonnet At
Church"
By Robert Burns
O wad some power the giftie gie us
To see oursel's as ithers see us!
It wad frae monie a blunder free us,
And foolish notion:
What airs in dress an'gait wad lea'v us,
And ev'n devotion!
A "symbol" is defined as "1. Something that represents
something else by association, resemblance, or convention. 2.
A printed or written sign used to represent an operation, element, quantity,
quality, or relation, as in mathematics or music." [Gk. Sumbolon,
token for identification] (American Heritage Dict. 1983) or it is
defined--[Fr. Symbole; L. symbolum; Gr. Symbolon, a
token, pledge, a sign by which one infers a thing, from symballein, to
throw together, compare; syn, together and ballein, to throw] 1.
Something that stands for or represents another thing; especially an object
used to represent something abstract; an emblem. 2. A written or printed mark,
letter, abbreviation, etc. standing for an object, quality, process, quantity,
etc. 3. In psychoanalysis, an act or object representing an unconscious desire
that has been repressed. 4. In theology, an abstract or compendium, creed, or
a summary of the articles of religion. Syn--type, sign, image, emblem,
representation. (Websters Dict. [unabridged] 1983) Similarly we may
define "symbolism" as "the representation of things by means of
symbols" (American Heritage Dict. 1983) or as "1. The
representation of things by use of symbols, especially in fine art or
literature. 2. A system of symbols. 3. A symbolic meaning. 4. A group of
symbolists, as in art or literature. 5. The theories or practices of such a
group." (Websters Dict. [unabridged] 19983) We may similarly refer
to symbolic, symbolical, symbolically, symbolicalness, symbolics, symbolist,
symbolistic, symboloistical, symbolization, symbolize, symbolizer,
symbological, symbologist and symbology, which is defined as "1. The
study or interpretation of symbols. 2. Representation or expression by means
of symbols; symbolism. 3. A system of symbols." ( Websters Dict.
[unabridged] 1983)
Likewise, "metaphor" is defined as "a figure of speech in
which a term that ordinarily designates an object or idea is used to designate
a dissimilar object or idea in order to suggest comparison or analogy…. [Gk.
Metaphora]" (American Heritage Dict. 1983) and as "[L.
metaphora; Gr. Metaphora, a transferring to one word the sense
of another, from metapherin; meta, over, and pherein, to
bear.] a figure of speech in which one thing is likened to another, different
thing by being spoken of an if it were that other; implied comparison, in
which a word or phrase ordinarily and primarily used of one thing is applied
to another…., distinguished from similie, to mix metaphors, to
use two or more inconsistent metaphors in a single expression." (Websters
Dict. [unabridged] 1983). "Metaphorical" or
"metaphoric" means "of or relating to metaphor; comprising a
metaphor or containing metaphors; figurative; not literal…." (ibid)
There is also metaphorically, metaphoricalness and metaphorist.
To write 'metaphorical symbolism" is something akin to "mixed
metaphor" but more like "power politics". It is difficult to
say exactly which term, "metaphorical" or "symbolism" is
the more general class. The expression metaphorical symbolism is used here to
suggest more than just a class of such entities--but to emphasis the point
that all symbols are by their intrinsic nature "metaphorical" and
thus to emphasize as well the "something standing for something else
function of symbols". Further, metaphorical symbols expresses, or stand
for, a characteristic feature of human interrelatedness to reality--human
beings define meaning, express significance, relate in reality through the use
of metaphorical symbolisms. In a sense, it is apropos to refer to human
reality, or of human relativity within reality, as irreducibly metaphorical,
or symbolic, in nature.
But the expression, "metaphorical symbolism" implies yet another
important characteristic of human reality, or of human relativity--that
ultimately the structure of human interrelatedness is expressed through reflexivity
of meaning through metaphorical symbolism. Metaphorical symbolisms function
reflexively--and reflexiveness is the principle structure of human reality.
Furthermore both metaphorical symbolism and reflexivity, as basic features of
human reality, also share in the universality of human reality. The reflexivity
of meaning expressed through metaphorical symbolisms is the basic structure of
human interrelatedness within the universal human reality, and is also the
basic structure of our comprehension of that reality through humanological
relativism.
Reflexive has a strictly grammatical definition--1. Reflex. 2. Reflective.
3. In grammar, (a) expressing an action turned back upon the subject;
designating a verb whose subject and direct object are identical…(b)
designating the pronoun used as the direct object of such a verb…reflexively
is "in a reflective manner" and reflexiveness expresses the state or
quality of being reflexive, reflexivity the condition or quality of being
reflexive. Akin to reflexiveness is reflectiveness, or the state or quality of
being reflective which may be defined as "(a) taking cognizance of the
operations of the mind; capable of exercising though or judgment; (b)
exercising thought or reflection; meditative, thoughtful. Reflection
expresses, among other meanings "the fixing of the mind on some subject;
serious thought; contemplation or the result of such thought; an idea or
conclusion, especially if expressed in words." (Websters Dict.
[unabridged] 1983)
Here reflexiveness expresses both its grammatical connotations as well as
the connotation of reflectiveness and reflection--especially the apperceptive
aspect of "the consciousness of mind of its own consciousness; self
reflective perception applied to metaphysical ends. Reality, inescapably
human, universal, relative, symbolic, and metaphorical, also has an inherently
reflexive quality which is mediated through metaphors (symbolic metaphors,
metaphoric symbols, metaphors, and symbols are here considered interchangeable
in usage) As such human always evinces a quality of "turning back upon
itself" and of "being aware, or conscious of itself".
"Reflexiveness" then is the ground of being in human reality--the
ultimate meaning of this reality. But it is an ever receding ground in its
inherent "recursiveness" or reduplicative" character--the well
spring of infinite imagination and the abyss of infinite regress--in short a mise
en abyme:
The paradox of the mise en abyme is the following:
without the production of some scheme, some "icon", there can be no
glimpse of the abyss,, no vertigo of the underlying nothingness. Any such
schema, however, both opens the chasm, creates it or reveals it, and at the
same time fills it up, covers it over by naming it, gives the groundless a
ground,, the bottomless a bottom. Any such schema almost instantaneously
becomes a trivial mechanism, an artifice. It becomes something merely made,
confected, therefore all too human and rational….(Miller, ?????)
Reflexiveness in its "reduplicative" character implies
both a kind of "regenerativeness" of meaning expresses through
metaphorical symbolism and a fundamental paradox in that this regenerativeness
has the potential for both infinite regress and for infinite development of
meaning in reality, and of human interrelatedness within reality.
Though reflexivity takes on different shades of meaning in
various disciplines and contexts, a core is detectable. Reflexive, as we use
it, describes the capacity of any system of signification to turn back upon
itself, to make itself its own object by referring to itself; subject and
object fuse. A long tradition exists in which thought has been distinguished
from unconsidered experience: where life is not merely lived naively without
being pondered but regarded with detachment, creating an awareness that
finally separates the one who lives from his history, society, from other
people. Within the self, detachment occurs between self and experience, self
and other, witness and actor, hero and hero's story. We become at once both
subject and object. Reflexive knowledge, then, contains not only messages, but
also information as to how it came into being, the process by which it was
obtained. It demonstrates the human capacity to generate second order symbols
or meta levels--significations about signification. The withdrawal from the
world, a bending back toward thought process itself, is necessary for what we
consider a fully reflexive mode of thought. To paraphrase Babcock (1980), in
order to know itself, to constitute itself, as an object for itself, the self
must be absent from itself, it must be a sign. Once this operation of
consciousness has been made, consciousness itself is altered; a person or
society thinks about itself differently merely by seeing itself in this light.
(Ruby 1982, page 3)
In describing the ultimate ground of being, the structure of the meaning of
human reality, it would appear as if reality then is only mentalistic
illusion,, and therefore without "real" meaning or
"relevant" or "meaningful" meaning. And yet, because we
never step outside of human reality, except through physical death, we can
never know for sure that the illusions of our life are really so. Meaning is
self evident in human reality. It is also self justifying in its essential
humanness. Reality, whether reflexive, relative, or illusion is universal, and
therefore is "self contained" and "enough in and of
itself". Hereupon we have stumbled, in our "House of Mirrors"
upon the very touchstone of human existence, or of human
"being"--that the meaningfulness of human reality is an end in and
itself, requiring nothing extrinsic to its own being for substantiation or
definition. It is the deluded and absurd Rationalist, the Don Quixote, who
searches for ultimate meaning or purpose of life beyond, or outside of itself.
Existentialism postulates a very pessimistic presumption about human
existence--that life is essentially meaningless. This meaninglessness renders
absurd the whole human drama. But in my own life, in my anthropological quest
for pan-sophistical understanding about human existence and reality, I have
inevitably found this existentialist premise to be quite empirically invalid
and rationally self contradictory. Even if all we have is the illusion of
meaning, mythological in truth and not more, or that we are merely actors in
an existential drama--involved in the tragic comic enactment of our
lives--then this is all we have any ways and so is meaningful enough in
itself. To say that life is meaningless is to express a failure to achieve
some tacit purpose for that life, to compare the intrinsic value of living
with some extrinsic standard. It is to make existence merely the meaningless
means to some other purpose beyond life itself rather than to say simply life
is a meaningful end in itself. Such questioning of the greater reason or
purposefulness of meaning is a self denial of the intrinsic meaningfulness of
existence itself. There is no rational or behavioral need to look for
purposeful meaning beyond or outside of existence itself. Meaning can not be
ever be adequately divorced or separated from human existence--such a feat is
impossible except for the blind philosophical fool who takes a leap of faith
and convinces himself that what is isn't and what isn't really is and so on
and on reduction ad absurdum ad infinitum. Indeed meaning inheres
intrinsically in human reality--it is human reality, and as much as this
reality is rationally and behaviorally purposive, so meaning too is rationally
and behaviorally purposive. Meaning is human rationality and behavior. Meaning
is mythological.
I have arrived at a theoretically important and personally profound
conclusion concerning the4 meaning of existence and the "purpose" of
human existence. Whether it is the quest for happiness, for aesthetic or
religious fulfillment, for self awareness, for wealth, for sex, for prestige,
for truth, for destruction, for eternity, or immortality, for El Dorado or for
the fountain of youth or for paradise or heaven or hell, or for just a little
bit of socio-economic status and modicum of security, such a purposeful quest
for meaning is what it means to be human and alive and the purpose of human
existence is the quest for ever greater meaningfulness of reality,
whatever its relative and relevant form or function. Meaning is like a golden
thread coursing through all the weave of existence, composing the fabric of
the many part and pieces--underlying the reasons and purpose and grand truths
of life. This might sound a bit grandiloquent and reductionist and
tautologically oversimplified, but to say meaning alone is not enough. What is
the interesting and relevant theme is the translation of meaning to and from
the many diverse forms of expression it can take in human behavior. (Lewis
1984 [unpublished manuscript] pages 112-113)
Reflexive meaning is the ground of being in human reality--it is the
essence of what we come to know of ourselves and our world. It is also an
extremely relative, and highly personal affair--meaningfulness being
differently interpreted by different people. There is no absolute fixed
measure or atomistic element of meaning--no life force or pleasure principle
or eros which composes the many variants. "Meaning" expresses a
theme of relativistic understanding of human reality--a universal theme of
comprehension of which there are infinite permutations. In its reflexive
regenerativity, meaning is also not static or unchanging--it is fluid,
dynamic, ever changing. Human beings are actively or passively engaged in
making their own meaning systems, in a continuous process of creation and
recreation of metaphorical symbolisms. Human beings, however unwittingly,
fashion, weave, construct, create their meaning systems through the
manipulation, construction, creations of significant metaphorical symbolisms.
Because reality is fluid and dynamic, ever changing--human beings are engaged
in continuously refashioning or recreating their meaning systems to preserve
and maintain a sense of existential coherence and continuity. Human beings who
fail in this process of meaning creation and recreation inexorably suffer
meaningless--psychological anomie--which eventually destroys them, spiritually
if not physically. There is more than a little implication in this for
psychological theory of health and abnormality.
In its reduplicativeness, the reflexive meaning of metaphorical symbolism
is also of an irreducible, universal, paradoxical nature. There is
an inherent paradoxicalness of the reflexive meaning of human reality. In
the process of creation and recreation of human meaning, as mentioned before,
there is the dual possibility of meaning loss in infinite regress, and of
meaning gain in a regenerative growth. These express the antithetical
possibilities of progress and regress, construction and destruction, creation
and death, inherent without meaning. The paradoxicalness within meaning arises
from the forever momentary indeterminacy of these possibilities--the
relative uncertainty of which direction the meaning of will change toward.
This inherent and universal quality of paradoxicalness of human
reality--expressed as "paradoxicality"--is the source of chronic
anxiety about life, a pan human nervous condition, an all pervasive Cartesian
uncertainty, an expectant anticipation for the chance, the unknown and
unknowable, from which we all seek to escape but from which there is no
escape. The quality of "paradoxicality" is also expressed as a
quality of "liminality"--the sense of disordered confusion, of
communitas and anti-structure, of "betwixtness and betweeness"--a
sort of simultaneously being nothing and something, meaningful and
meaningless, of being "nowhere and somewhere" or an identity of
"nothingness and somethingness" as well as giving rise to the
condition of "antinomality" of our own most fundamental knowledge, a
background condition of our common human experience creating an irreducible
uncertainty in our relative knowledge of human reality--the background texture
of our knowledge, an unresolvable sort of internal psychic conflict
"generated by a proposition that suggests its contradictory (or the
domain of its contraries) as strongly as its own affirmation, at the moment of
its affirmation."
In the experience of the four irreducible qualities of human
existence--those qualities of paradoxicality, antinomality, liminality and
anxiety--as we are thrown back upon ourselves in confrontation with these
realities we have two fundamental alternatives. We can accept these qualities
for what they really are and strive to incorporate them into our lives in a meaningful
manner--creatively allowing them to serve a "negative" motivation,
or else we can continue to function in denial and inspite of these qualities
trying to reduce their effect by escaping from them or trying to eliminate
them by cognitive closure--eventuating in a meaningful behavior and
destructiveness. Creativity is the constructive, active utilization of these
irreducible qualities of existence.
These irreconcilable qualities are at the heart of both rational creativity
and behavior irrationality--an endemic human weakness to affect behavioral
closure (whether cognitive, emotive, or active) within the restricted confines
of a limited and closed system of behavior. "So long as it gives
the promise of relieving the pains of cognitive uncertainty. We are all
vulnerable to the claims of simplistic, reductive, hypergeneral or in other
ways ontology distorting frames, so long as they have the appearance of
"systemacity". (Lewis 1983 {unpublished manuscript] page 140)
The source of the qualities of regenerativity and paradoxicality rooted in
the reflexive meaning of human reality lies in human self consciousness, or
self awareness, in recognition (or "re-cognition") of the self
within the framework of knowing, of meaning of universal human reality. This
recognition of reflexive meaning is not only an act of consciousness
but it is an act of conscious willpower--ignorance is its counterpart.
Psychological therapy and religious enlightenment have their central strength
in this function of recognition of reflexive meaning. This recognition is
called self reflection, similar to and contained within the reflexive meaning
of human reality.
"Reflective" is a related but distinguishable term, referring
also to a kind of thinking about ourselves, showing ourselves to ourselves,
but without the requirement of explicit awareness of the implications of our
display. Without the acute understanding, the detachment from the process in
which one is engaged, reflexivity does not occur. Merely holding up a single
mirror is not adequate to achieve this attitude. The mirrors must be doubled,
creating the endless regress of possibilities, opening out into infinity,
dissolving the clear boundaries of a "real world". Babcock refers to
this as "identity with a difference". (ibid: 2)
Narcissus tragedy then is that he is not narcissistic enough, or rather
that he does not reflect long enough to effect a transformation. He is
reflective, but he is not reflexive--that is, he is conscious of himself as an
other, but he is not conscious of being self conscious of himself as an other
and hence not able to detach himself from, understand, survive or even laugh
at the initial experience of alienation. (Ruby 1982, page 3)
As an act of conscious willpower, our self reflective recognition of the
reflexive meaning of human reality creates both the regenerativity and the
paradoxicality of this meaning. We then enter a mazeway of relative meanings
which we can no longer escape. Human consciousness then can be said to be
metaphorical and symbolic, and is an act of willpower in recognition of the
reflexive character of meaning. The importance of willpower, of essential arbitrariness,
in the meaningful creation of our metaphorical symbolisms of human reality,
cannot be over emphasized. It is the ignorance of this willful
consciousness which leads us into the abyss of darkness and meaning. It is the
difference between a blind leap of faith and a self willed jump. The
paradoxicalty of this fundamental meaning of human reality is part of what has
been referred to in the previous chapter as the "Universal Human
Dilemma".
The universal human dilemma is that in order to define
reality, one must draw a line (an empirically nonexistent abstract
ideational conception--as demonstrated by "Zeno's arrow") by which
reality can be divided into two parts, and these two parts, are then
contrasted and compared and it is in the primary conscious analytic
division and subsequent synthetic relationship between the two parts by
which reality gains uniquely human meaning and definition. The dilemma is that
once we dissect reality by drawing the line we destroy the synergistic quality
and ontological character which gives human existence meaning. Our reality
thus becomes falsely separated from our existence and we alienate ourselves
from our reality in a pseudo objectivity.
It is important to emphasize the importance of arbitrariness of our
analytic logic; that the first line drawn, after which many more can be
subsequently made accordingly, is principally arbitrary. The cosmic egg of
reality may be initially divided in which ever manner we choose, and
subsequent subdivisions depend upon the analytic logic we choose to employ,
but are determined in part by previous and initial divisions.
It is impossible to over emphasize the importance of the first analytic
division in determining the character of the conceptual system, and the fact
that it is an independent and arbitrary act of will. It is the
ignorance of the crucial influence of willpower that is the undoing of the
human sciences and which undermines every tautological edifice of scientific
theorization of human behavior. The element of prediction which is the cause
of control in our inter-subjective physical reality becomes the effect
of control in our objective human reality. The "science" of
economics in our country is basically a study of capitalism. It is taught to
be a workable truth after the fact of its uncontested functional reality
within our own system. The science of economics in the USSR is a study of
communism, because communism in that country is made a reality uncontested by
any alternative within. The "truth" of both these alternative
"sciences of economics" was not existent a priori in theory before
their functional realization and human demonstration in the same way as the
human notion of the planets about the sun might be postulated to be. The
truths were arbitrarily formulated a posteriori to the fact of their willful
demonstration. The same is so with Freudian psychoanalytical theory and
experimental psychology. (Lewis 1983 [unpublished manuscript] pages 3-4)
It is possible that recognition of the essentially reflexive meaningfulness
of human reality forms the basis of Zen teachings of sudden enlightenment, of
"satori" and also of similar Taoist teachings. These "religious
philosophies" are doctrines of humanological relativism par excellent.
"Zen might be called the inner art and design of the Orient"….it
has been described as: "A special teaching without scriptures, beyond
words and letters, pointing to the mid-essence of man, seeing directly into
one's nature, attaining enlightenment."
….Zen presupposes that the ordinary person is caught up in a maze of
crisscrossing ideas, theories, reflections, prejudices, feelings and emotions
such that his every experience is cut up into a variety of segments. These
segments are then taken as parts of experience which can be synthesized into a
whole. Thus the ordinary person does not really experience reality, but only
the network of ideas and feelings he has about reality. These ideas and
feelings always stand between the individual and the reality he confronts,
mediating the experience….
The enlightenment (satori) at which Zen requires going beyond all
distinctions, including the distinction between is and is not,
upon which all thought systems rest. Consequently, no statement is possible of
what enlightenment is, except negatively, by way of pointing out what it is
not. But even this presupposes is and is not and fails to
produce much understanding of this important aspect of Zen. Short of
practicing Zen and achieving some measure of enlightenment, perhaps the only
way to get a feeling for the experience of satori is to talk with or
read the biographies of people who have achieved satori….(Koller
1970, pages 184-185)
Zen Koans, exercises in sudden enlightenment, center around and incorporate
the reflexive principle of the human meaning of reality, and stress the need
for recognition and then "non-recognition"--a kind of direct involvement
with human meaning, without cognitive alienation, but nevertheless an involvement
with a "reflective difference". So far there has been a common,
implicit theme in this discussion of a "symmetry" of meaning, of a
virtual kind of "synonymy" of reflexive understanding. This is
expressed by an equivalence of the terms used, such that universality is
embodied in reflective recognition, reflexive, meaning, metaphorical
symbolism, paradoxically, in relativism, human reality, human relativity, etc.
There is expressed a loose kind of symmetrical association, such that
relativity is reality is human is the meaning of being human is metaphorical
is symbolic is reflexive is paradoxical is universal so on and on. This
expresses a principle I have named holothetic unity--expressing the
universality of the reality, embedded in the very most essential weave, fabric
of this reality, sharing all the qualities of meaning, relativity,
reflexivity, etc. There is a single unity of human reality, nothing excluded.
The wholeness, comprehensive integrity of this reality is the overarching and
underlying theme of this work. This single reality has no ends, bounds, no
beginnings nor endings. It is the Grand Web of Meaning of Human Being, which
is dynamically continuous. This principle of unity is best expresses by the
"Tao":
As the absolutely first principle of existence, Tao is completely
without characteristics. It is itself uncharacterized, being the very source
and condition of all characteristics. In this sense is nonbeing. But it is
simply nothing, for it is the source of everything. It is a priori to all
living things, giving them life and function, constituting the oneness
underlying all the diversity and multiplicity of the world. Lao Tze says,
"The Tao that can be told of is not the eternal Tao; the
name that can be named is not the eternal name. The nameless is the origin of
Heaven and Earth; the named is the mother of all things."
The reason Tao cannot be named is that it is without divisions,
distinctions, or characteristics. It is unified, like an uncarved block, being
without change, knowing neither beginning nor end. But is Tao cannot be
named, what is named, what is named by "Tao"? Lao Tze's point in
saying that the Tao is beyond all names is that the fundamental source
and principle cannot be named, for it is the very source of names and
descriptions. Consequently, "Tao" is a non-name; it does not refer
to any one thing. Rather it points to what which enables things to be what
they are; it is that which gives them existence and allows them to pass into
nonexistence. When it is said that Tao is the source of all being and
non-being, the word Tao functions very much like the word
"that" when it is said the "that" from which being and
non-being proceed:
The importance of Tao lies in the recognition that there is
something which is prior and anterior to the various particular things that
exist in the world, something which gives unity to all the existing things and
which determines the very existence and function of everything that exists.
What that something is cannot, of course, be said, for whatever can be talked
about is limited and determined, for it is the very condition of limits and
determinations. (Koller 1970, page 236)
Just as "Tao" is the name for the nameless source of all names,
the best and worst possible expression for the holothetic principle, so have
the names recurrently employed in this work, "reflexivity",
"metaphor", symbol", "relativity", human
"reality", "universality", to be considered as distinctive
metaphors which distinguish certain qualitative facets of the whole, various
manifestations of the holothetic principle, variants of a common theme. Such
"holothetic" understanding of human reality properly proceeds from
the recognition of the wholeness, the completeness, the ultimate unity of
human reality, the Great Web of Meaning, and then proceeds to distinguish,
cognitively isolate its many, various parts. There is implied in this an
overarching theme of universal integrity of the whole of the human
reality, reflected by and expressed within the integrity of its various
manifestations and "parts". So also there is not separating human
reality from the reflexive human understanding of that reality. Knowing and
known, subject and object cannot be dichotomized in human reality without
destroying the fundamental, universal holothetic integrity. The completeness
of human reality translates into "comprehensiveness" of its
understanding. The grand "interelatedness" of human reality, its
integrity, is known through the doctrine of humanological relativism. Zen
Buddhists and Taoists alike eschewed the use of names, words, thoughts, and
ideas to give form and meaning to this integrity of human reality. Indeed,
once we begin our analytical line drawing, our dichotomization, segmentation
and compartmentalization of reality into many different parts, we can proceed
to delineate whole, complex "thought structures" which rational
destroy the integrity of human reality through its isolation of
"independent" ideals and ideas. The integrity of the whole of human
reality I will designate arbitrarily as Mother Nature--universal, complete all
encompassing. It must be remembered that there is no necessary, intrinsic
reason why the use of words and names, to define symbolically our knowing of
human reality, of Mother Nature, should always be destructive of its original
integrity, of our involvement with nature. Words are key metaphors of human
reality. "In the beginning was the word…." or "In the
beginning there was thought woman…." The use of words and their
language have become the predominant and primary idiom, medium of meaning and
knowing of human reality, such that it is next to impossible to imagine human
reality or even to experience human reality, outside the medium of words and
language. That this can be accomplished is adequately demonstrated by the
intelligence of most species of animals that do not use language. Words, as
our primary symbolic metaphors, mediate our process of knowing reality, and
are ultimately a part of and embedded, rooted in the same Mother Nature which
they seek to describe. For that matter, all symbolic metaphors are ultimately,
no matter how alienated and indirectly, derive from Mother Nature. There is no
inherent reason that our meaning systems must in any way be separated or
alienated from the Mother Nature from which they ultimately originated and to
which they finally refer.
But it is possible, through the arbitrary, willful act of conscious
analysis, to use words to rationally dichotomize and thus destroy the
intrinsic holothetic integrity of human reality. The use of analytic logic,
two value logic based upon the principles of non-contradiction and excluded
middle, is a methodology which creates a false "ideal" reality
separate from, and only deterministically related to Mother Nature. On the
other hand, there is an alternative logical method, a synthetic approach to
comprehending, which remains rooted to and incorporates the holothetic
integrity of human reality. The alternative systems of thinking and writing
about human reality will be more fully dealt with in the third chapter of this
work (indeed delineation of the alternative form of "logical
consciousness" is the main rational for this work) suffice it to note
that such a distinction in human thought processes can and has been made.
The key or master symbol of meaning in existence is the word as metaphor.
Without language human beings would have no culture and no civilization;
language is the principle symboling system of humanity. Meaning is principally
interpreted symbolically; conceptual, logical, rational, mythological,
abstracted from and rooted to irreducible precepts. The word as metaphor
functions as analogy, with generalizable meaning relating and tying together
diverse and differing and seemingly separate and unrelated concepts and
precepts, bridging the differences and resolving the tension, imposing frames
of reference out of original context, upon new subjects. Metaphor suggests new
possibilities of meanings, expanding meaningfulness qualitatively beyond a
mere one to one mathematical correspondence between a name and its immediate
empirical referents. Symboling systems of rationalization, helping to
reintegrate the disparate and analytically dichotomized fragments of reality,
function as myths. All of our systems of rationalization about reality are
mythological including science. Myth as metaphorical meaning sets the tragic
comic human stage for the dramatic enactment of all human behavior. (Lewis
1984, page 116)
Any symbolic metaphor provides a conceptually definitive frame of reference
serving to dichotomously separate and distinguish aspects of
reality--internal/external, subjective/objective, figure/ground. "Outer
forms frame inner meanings". One may refer to alternative symbolic
functions, like "Dominart Symbol", "Master Symbol",
"Key Symbol", or "Summarizing Metaphor" or
"Elaborating Metaphor", but the primary function of all metaphorical
symbols is to serve as a frame of reference for the conveyance of human
meaning. In order to do so, any symbol must have a primary referent which
serves as a "signifier" or a "denotation" which is derived
from Mother Nature. To reiterate, all symbols are ultimately derived from and
refer to nature, no matter how abstractedly or indirectly. This primary
referent may be simple or complex, either taken directly from empirical,
perceptual reality or else composed of many diverse elements drawn directly
from or abstracted indirectly from Mother Nature. This primary referent serves
as a significant marker in that it embodies, incorporates relatively
significant meaning which is recognizable, however unconsciously or
structurally or concretely by the knower. The act of recognition is a form of
humanological involvement, an expression of the interrelatedness of human
reality, bringing meaning to human reality.
The symbolic metaphor is applied, or recognized and created within a
universal reality of human meaning which is both continuous and ever
changing--a dynamic continuum which forms both a relational context which is
all encompassing and within which symbols are created, destroyed and
recreated, reconstituted with new meanings and new relationships. Meaning is
derived from the human interrelatedness with symbolic metaphors. The act of
recognition of a symbolic metaphor as a frame of reference, is properly known
as the function of identification. The marker or primary referent
serves as a cognitive, symbolic boundary which identifies meaningful
differences--defining the identity of human meaning. Identification is a
process of differentiation of meaning inside and outside of the boundary of
the symbolic marker. Differences between relationships, "things" or
meanings outside of the boundary and inside of the boundary are emphasized as
relatively significant, while the similarities are de-emphasized as relatively
insignificant. Attention is focused upon the figure in the foreground,
outlined by the symbolic frame of reference, while the background is ignored.
Furthermore, differences within the boundaries of the symbolic marker become
emphasized, the similarities are ignored, while the similarities outside of
the boundary are emphasized to the ignorance of the differences.
Humans create their meaningful reality through the process of symbolic
identification. Furthermore, as frames of reference, metaphorical symbols also
function as symbolic mirrors of meaning, as a vehicle of both subjective
reflection and of objective projection, of the self. Identification within
human reality is properly a process of self identification through the
reflective/projective process of human interrelationship. Symbolic
identification expressed as a process of interrelationship between external
differences/internal similarities and between subjective reflection/objective
projection, define the secondary referents of symbols and metaphors. The
primary symbolic referent serves as a metaphorical mediator, a medium of
expression, a frame of reference for the identification and recognition of the
relationships of secondary reference.
Of course, there is more than one symbol, or one kind of metaphor, and in
the human process of creation and recreation of meaningful symbolic metaphors
many are created, used simultaneously and destroyed. Symbols are arranged into
groups which form symbolism, which provide a sense of order, of
coherence upon a certain aspect or facet of human reality. Symbols are related
to each other in these groups of symbolism, and in their interrelationships
together form tertiary referents which are at best abstract and generalized
meaning systems. Symbolisms are linked together in a similar process of
combination and recombination to form symbolic chains, which are in
turn interlinked with other symbolic chains to form symbolic complexes
which form a coherent world view and sense of rational order--the "Web of
Meaning" of human reality. Symbols, Symbolisms, Symbolic Chains, and
Symbolic Complexes are all share similar principles of "accretion of
meaning"--centripedally gravitating many relative meanings to their
centers, of "mechanical aggregation" of similar meanings, of
organization by analogical association. The structure of organization of
symbolic complexes is somewhat loose and cyclical, accommodation of many
likenesses and similarities of meanings. The interconnections within symbolic
complexes are variable and change historically over time and place. There are
few sharp boundaries lines within this symbolic universe where one symbol
begins and another leaves off--the boundary marking functions of the primary
referents tend to blend, merge and become confused--everything appears to be
metaphorically connected to everything else. There is almost a kind of simple,
mechanical solidarity of such a complex which is accounted for by its loose,
connotative character, and by its open ended, unexcluded middle ground of
analogical similarities, interrelations, with continuous shades and blendings
of meaning. This is compared to a more rationally organized internal structure
which might have what is termed an "organissmic solidarity" which is
based upon a strict causal and analytical framework, with hierarchical
abstract organization and the employment of "propositional" as
opposed to "appositional" reasoning. There is no beginning and no
real ending of ending this symbolic complex--it is an entangled web--a morass
of interconnections of meanings and relationships diffusing off to open ended
infinity. It is rather a great circle of meaning, of illusion, and deception
as well as conception. It can be entered virtually at any one of its nodes of
symbolisms, with only the promise of pursuing one's own tail (and tale) and
finishing where one began. The chain is not so much a monofilament of
interlocking links, it is rather "chain mail"--a fabric of
interwoven symbolic links, an armor which has been folded upon itself like a
ball.
The structure taken by symbolic complexes is crystallitic, manifest
is a myriad multifaceted interrelationships, meanings and identifications, in
a kind of holothetic multidimensionality. Just as there are many more
than one symbol or one kind of metaphor, there are many meanings which can be
attached to or associated with a single symbol. Symbols are multidimensional
in their referents--often times embodying many contradictory meanings or
contraposed lines of thought. Indeed, the primary function of a symbol, as a
primary referent, is the mediation of differences, the resolution of
opposites. Symbols have many different possible functions, as well,
continuously operating, whether explicit or otherwise, upon several
"levels" or in different "modes" of meaning
simultaneously--whether psychological or social, manifest or latent, concrete
or metaphysical--in all our forms of behavior, whether cognitive, emotive or
active. Just as symbols have a virtual infinitude of meanings, they have, in
their holothetic multidimensionality which is expressive of the integrity of
whole symbolic universe of human reality, so they have a multiple variety of
possible interpretations. The crystallitic structure of symbol systems,
operating upon principles like analogical association, symmetry, or sympathy,
are characterized as holothetically multidimensional in that it resembles a
symbolic crystal, or translucent jewel which captures the light upon its many
multifaceted dimensions and reflects this like a kaleidoscope "Hall of
Mirrors". He holothetic multidimensionality creates symbolic realism of
meaning in human reality.
Together, the synthetic integration of the subjective and objective domains
might be interpreted symbolically as being holothetic in structure, and
it is expressed essentially in holographic symbolism--which is symbolic
realism or realistic symbolism. It is the mentalistic functioning of the mind;
intellection, the meaning of reality. What is reality? Reality is holothetic
in its human meaning; such that any conceptual subsystem which touts any
degree of completeness in truth about reality is
"totipotent"--holothetic in character--a rough, self contained
"complete" picture of the "whole" reality. The integrity
of reality is in a sense contained in a grain of sand. (Lewis 1983, page 18)
It makes sense to define human reality as symbolic, such that one may
define the universal meaning of a human being as a symbolic creature.. We live
embedded within a symbolic universe. Mention of a holothetic
multidimensionality, of symbolic complexes, and crystallictic structure, leads
us to consider the process of symbolic identification as a possible form of symbolic
integration of human reality, and in this regard we may refer to relative
notions of context dependency/independency and the complementary notion
of relative diffusion of contexts. Likewise we may refer to notions of symbolic
concreteness and concretization and to symbolic abstractedness and
abstraction as well as to symbolic simplification and symbolic
sophistication. It must be reiterated that these are all relative terms.
Previously I have mentioned the importance of the relative significance
of a symbol as a primary marker/referent. Relative significance is the measure
of the contextual and direct meaningfulness of a symbol. This meaningfulness
is not only expressed in conscious terms of identification, but also in
structural and other forms of expression. A sign is a primary symbol,
the signification of which is directly attached to its primary referent. In a
sense, sign, signification, and significance is the concrete level of
symbolic meaning. This level of relative concreteness is also a primary level
of symbolic simplicity. A sign is a concrete, simple, primary symbol. Significance
and signification are likewise concrete and relatively simple. A sign carries
a direct concrete meaning, or a message and signs are coordinated into
groups and chains and complexes which form networks and systems of communication
with a relatively context dependent, fixed, content of meaning which is
referred to as information. Informational networks are relatively
disambiguous and are wholly binary and analytical in operation. Relative
context dependency means that the information "carried upon the
marker" is strictly denotation, concisely definitive, monosemic,
monothetic and monothematic in interpretation. The most perfect systems of
signs developed by humankind are mathematical in nature, yet even these
incorporate certain seemingly insoluble dilemmas. But mathematical systems are
not the only kind--logical positivists have for some time now sought to turn
rational philosophy into just such an elaborate game of signs, as have
empirical positivists with science.
Then there is the level of secondary, intermediate symbols, symbols proper,
which are usually, customarily organized into quasi formal
"disciplines" (all of the Traditional Academic
"--ologies") based upon rather strict formularies of hermeneutical
exegesis. The dictionary is the epitomy of this level of secondary symbols--as
language, and its grammatical formalization, are the principle kinds of
symbols occurring at this level. Each symbol, as a work, is well defined,
within the principles of a grammatical structure--with all the commonly
recognized, sanctioned variations of meaning, or connotations, listed. This is
a level of intermediacy in relative terms of concreteness/abstraction,
simplicity/sophistication and especially in terms of context
dependency/independency. Having all the appearances of "systemacity"
and hence of rational coherence, communication which is flexible in
interpretation is the optimum function of this "system" of secondary
symbolization. At this levels symbols cannot be completely divorced from their
primary referents, but the level of secondary referents is given the center of
attention, instead.
There is, then, to be expected a tertiary level of symbolization--this is
not the level of the symbol proper but the levels of "symbolic
organization" or the groupings of symbols, first at the level of symbolism,
and so on up the chain to symbolic complexes and beyond. No longer
fixed or centered by their primary referents, tertiary symbols become context
independent, relatively speaking, and the principles of association
between symbols, of symbolic interrelationships, become the focal points of
meaningful interpretation. There occurs at this level a diffusion of
relational contexts, the boundaries defined at the second level disappear
and the functioning of symbols becomes preeminently one of subjective
reflection/objective projection. The process of identification becomes
indirect, symbolic reality is no longer concrete or even concrete bound but is
abstract, and symbols arrange themselves into quite sophisticated systems,
rather complexes of conglomerations. At this level are to be found examples of
mythology, poetry and literature, art and music. At this level looseness and
flexibility of context gives way to the crystallitic structure of symbolic
interrelationships.
Organization of the presentation of primary, secondary and tertiary levels
of metaphorical symbols might be taken to imply some kind of developmental
sequence in the symbolic integration of human reality. Mathematicians would
surely rage at being called "concrete thinkers" when their systems
of "calculus" are the most sophisticated and abstract symbols
systems ever created by humankind, and logicians would surely laugh quite
loquaciously at the misplaced illogic of all this concrete thinking. But
concrete is used not to mean either empirical rootedness nor logical
primitiveness, nor is "simplicity" meant to imply "simple
mindedness". Surely even the most concrete and simple systems of
symbolization have a knack for complicating themselves to astronomical,
immeasurable proportions, and even the most "sophisticated" of haiku
poems can have the most primitive, empirically rooted, simple minded
similitudes,, and yet remain quite profound. But the main point of this thesis
is offering a sensible reason while the small human mind can still accomplish
things which the most "sophisticated" of computers still cannot do
even with difficulty. Sign systems can accomplish certain mentalistic feats
far easier and better than can the most sophisticated of poetics, and yet even
the most simplistic of fables can express with clarity and utmost concision
the most profound wisdoms knowable to humankind. But as Socrates correctly
demonstrated even the most uneducated Slave boy can logically comprehend the
proof of the Pythagorean theorem if given the opportunity to think clearly
enough, and modern mathematicians have demonstrated that the Theory of
Relativity can be explained by the use of the Pythagorean theorem. All of this
goes to show that even the slowest and dullest witted of boys, if given enough
time and the appropriate circumstances, like little Albert Einstein can solve
the grandest puzzles of the Universe--but none of this goes one step further
towards resolving a dilemma like--"The Man from Crete said all Cretans
are Liars"--or the following Zen Koan:
The Gateless Gate
An instant realization sees endless time.
Endless time as one moment.
When one comprehends the endless moment
He realizes the person who us seeing it.
The question of a possible developmental sequence in the symbolic
integration of human reality necessarily turns upon the notion of relative
context dependency/independency and the related notion of relative diffusion
or fixation of contexts. This whole issue refers us to the idea of
"stimulus generalization" which might be more aptly called
"symbolic generalization". What is at issue here is not a matter of
absolute values--a complex polynomical within an algebraic equation may have
an infinitude of possible real values depending upon the particular
assignation, but its relative significance, within that context of that
particular equation, can have one a single, fixed relational meaning. It
cannot have the multidimensionality within its context, for instance, a
particular symbol may have infinite interpretations contained within a single
sentence of the Tao Te Ching--say perhaps the symbolic metaphor of
"the rough, uncarved block". Context dependency/independency does
not imply a variability of values assignable to its meaning within a specific
context, but rather a relative or relational variability within
the same context. Independence of context refers instead to a infinite
multidimensionality of interpretation of relationships within a single, fixed
contextual relationship. Diffusion of contexts refers to the relative unfixed
nature, the relative looseness or even dissolution of the boundaries of
meaning imposed by the primary frame of reference. In this regard symbolic
concreteness refers to the relatively fixed nature of the significant
relationships involved in a symbolic system. We may refer to symbolic
dependency and symbolic fixation as the relative inability to provide a
flexible or broad range of possible relational interpretations for the meaning
of a symbolic metaphor. Poorly developed symbolic integration of reality will
be manifest by a high level of symbolic integration of reality will be
manifest by a high level of symbolic fixation upon "concrete
contexts" and a relative inflexible level of "context
dependency" for the interpretation of a symbol. We may thus refer to a
kind of "symbolic dependency" which is the relative inability to
interpret beyond the primary level of signification. On the other hand, when
we refer to symbolic generalization we are referring to the development of the
ability to interpret metaphorically the symbolic meaning system beyond the
primary signification, and even beyond the immediate secondary context, in the
consideration of its abstract interrelatedness to other symbolic systems. The
implications of the development if this capacity for relative "Symbolic
generalization"--"thinking beyond contexts" in relational
terms, for the symbolic integration of human reality, will be more thoroughly
explored and elucidated in the fourth chapter.
In concluding this chapter it is worthwhile to consider the possibility of
creating the same meaning systems upon different levels of symbolic
integration--that it is possible to say the same thing in a well developed
signification system, like a mathematical formula expressing the energy
relationships between human beings and a particular ecological adaptation, and
the same fundamental wisdom which has found its expression in
"concrete" metaphorical terms of folk poetry. The question such a
comparison suggests its whether or not the "concrete logic"
developed within a particular cultural ecological context and expressed by the
indigenous system of symbolism,, through many generations of ecological
adaptation and cultural development, be adequately understood and expressed
through a rigid scientific system of signification. In other words, can logic
ever penetrated customary old common sense, rooted as it is in a vast cultural
complex:
….We shall use both a mathematical statement and the most abridged form
of poetry that we know, namely a haiku like statement. Both convey complex
ideas simply. The two kind of summaries differ in their mode of forming a
symbol. A mathematical symbol raises the level of generalization through a
greater abstraction….thereby eliminating all but the essentials. A poetic
symbol often reduces the level of abstraction toward greater concreteness. The
resulting image also stands for the whole….A further contrast arises; in
mathematics the forming of an equation consists in balancing symbols about the
fixed "equals" sign; in poetry the making of a haiku like statement,
after the relevant symbols have been found, calls for selecting appropriate
middle terms to join the symbols. Thus both mathematics and poetry should
enable us to recapitulate briefly and lucidly.
….Our statement then reads:
Societal input of energy = F pt/L
In addition….we write
Societal input of energy = F Cmpt/L
Thereby it may be said: The societal input of energy into a given
ecological holding is a function of the social organization and the mode of
cultivation by a particular working unit of population tilling throughout a
given crop season in fields of a certain size. Yet such a generalization
obscures our major point: Each mode of cultivation is a appropriate to a sense
of varying population with differing economic command and varying availability
of land. While shifting cultivation best fits among scattered people,
transplanting presumes many people working small holdings, while broadcasting
from an intermediate step between the two.
Somewhat the same statement can also be made in far fewer syllables:
Shifting Cultivation
Sun again; the rain
Erased my foot print
In the powdered ash
Broadcasting
The gray rising flood
Has smoothed
The furrows of my plow
Transplanting
From dyked fields
Empty straws have sent
Their tribute to our village
Their Separate Ways
Eyes of plowmen
Cannot see clouds
Wedged between the hills.
(Hanks 1973)
Looseness of metaphor and polythematic interpretation does not necessarily
or automatically preclude the possibility of parsimony of expressive
communication. This is what real Human Intelligence is really about. A haiku
poem can be every whit as revealing as a mathematical equation, to one who
knows how to read it. It remains doubtful whether the theory of General
Relativity can ever be used to explain the Great Cycle of the Tao Te Ching
although the Tao Te Ching has been employed in the explanation of
physics, or that the fundamental land of Thermodynamics will ever explain the
spiritual vitality of Tao.
CHAPTER III
Antithesis
Toward a General Theory of Metalogical Mythology
LIV
Zeno once proved that flat footed Achilles was forever doomed to chase
the tired tortoise. Modern mathematicians have lifted that old sentence by
forever banishing the infinitesimal and fashioning a logic for infinity
peculiarly its own.
This domain for thinking stipulates that individual elements in
something like a straight line, which posses continuity, are infinitely
more abundant than those in something like the realm of rational numbers,
which does not: that the number of odd integers is the same as the number
of odd plus even integers; that there are just as many points in lines of
various lengths; that an infinite set stays the same despite much
thinking; and that there are correspondences among continua. And the mind
boggling goes infinitely on.
(Siu 1974, page 16)
Two Wild Geese
There: wild geese, swimming side by side,
Staring up at the sky!
White feathers against a deep blue,
Red feet burning in green waves.
Lie Chieu and Do Phap Thuan
Home
No color or complexion distinguishes the way
Still its message flares up everywhere:
Of the thousands of worlds, numerous as grains of sand
Which is not home?
Thuong Chieu
"Metalogical" is succinctly defined thus: "1. Beyond the
scope of logic; not determinable by logic. 2. Relating to the metaphysics of
logic." All these connotations relating to logic and meta-logic are
appropriate to this chapter. It is an attempt to go beyond the rational
metaphysics of logic by the use of a meta-logic which is determinable by
rational logic.
Mythology is defined as "the study of myths" and more elaborately
as "[LL. Mythologia; Gr. Mythologia, a telling of tales or
legends, legendary lore; mythos, myth and -logia, from legein,
to speak] 1. The science or study of myths or legends; that branch of science
which investigates the meaning of myths and the relationship between the myths
of different countries of peoples….Parts of mythology are religious,
parts of mythology are historical, parts of mythology are
poetical, but mythology as a whole is neither religion nor history, nor
philosophy, nor poetry. It comprehends all these together under that peculiar
form of expression which is natural and intelligible at a certain stage, or at
certain recurring stages in the development of thought and speech,, but which,
after becoming traditional, becomes frequently unnatural and unintelligible.
--Max Muller…." (Websters Dict. 1983) Similarly,
"Myth" is defined as "1. a traditional story presenting
supernatural beings, ancestors or heroes that serve as primordial types in a
primitive view of the world. 2. a fictitious or imaginary story, person or
thing. 3. A false belief. [Gk. Muthos]" or alternatively as
"[LL. Mythos; Gr. Mythos, word, speech, story,
legend.]" 1. A traditional story of unknown authorship, ostensibly with a
historical basis, but serving usually to explain some phenomenon of nature,
the origin of man, or the customs, institutions, religious rites, etc. of a
people: myths usually involve the exploits of gods and heroes….4. any
imaginary person or thing spoken of as though existing." There are many
interpretations of mythology, professing to explain the origins and purpose or
functions of myth. The definition of mythology can also be expanded upon until
its corpus constitutes virtually the entire body of rational understanding of
humankind. It is not the purpose of this chapter to explain all the many hows
and whys of mythology, but it does aim to demonstrate the way in which its
meaning functions as a key metaphor (a metaphor within a metaphor, so to
speak) or more precisely as an operational metaphor, for the relative
comprehension of the symbolic integration of human reality.
The combination of "metalogical mythology" is meant to suggest
three interrelated aspects; that the study of mythology lies beyond the
purview of formal logic, but involves the metaphysics of logic, that the study
of meta-logic is mythological in character, as is the metaphysics of logic,
and thirdly that the use of both terms in combination implies an inherent
reflexivity between the meanings of both.
Symbolic integration and symbolic generalization function beyond the
purview of logic in the stricter sense, but this might not necessarily mean
that there is not a "meta-logic" to the functioning of symbolic
integration and generalization. On the other hand, it may be found that logic
functions within the purview of the meta-logic of symbolic integration and
symbolic generalization. It is taken as valid that formal logic operates
exclusively or primarily upon the primary level of context dependent
symbolization, and that, on the other hand mythology normally functions upon
the so called tertiary level of symbolic integration, then it seems the case
that mythology is a form of relationally understanding human reality which is
as well beyond the purview of formal logic. But if mythology is not only
metalogical but incorporates as well a kind of "metaphysics of
logic" then it is possible to employ this metalogical metaphysics in
relating mythology and logic.
In the consideration of the metalogical connections between logic and
mythology, the question arises as to whether logic as a complex system of
primary symbols does not "combine" to form a kind of symbolic
integration and generalization of reality, and if so, what marks off this
primary kind of symbol system from the symbolic integration and combination
into "symbolic complexes" upon the tertiary level of "contest
independent" symbolic metaphors. Primary symbols systems such as logic do
constitute complex systems of symbolization in an analogous manner that
tertiary symbols important distinctions which can be made. Remaining context
dependent but "value independent" (the generalization or abstraction
of "absolute" values assignable to the signs--"variables")
such systems of primary symbols build themselves by the use of arbitrary
rules, usually limited in number, of relationship, which are generalistic, and
which are "propositional" in defining the possible number of
permutations and recombinations of relationships which are allowable. Thus
such sign systems are able to be constructed in a quite elaborate manner based
upon a limited number of relational rules which serve the function of
"context--generalization". The rules must be quite strict and
limited, or else the structure of the system would soon break down under the
weight of its own complication. What we have is a "grammar" which
can be seen to be "generative". We have the application of artificial
intelligence as opposed to natural intelligence which functions
under the looser inherent rules of the tertiary, context dependent level of
symbolization. The problem is well illustrated by the forlorn attempts to fit
a "prescriptive" or even a "descriptive" transformational
"grammar" to the definition of natural language system, arising as
it does within a general cultural/historical context.
At this point we are lead to consider what this "looser, more
natural" form of intelligence and tertiary functions of symbolic
combination might consist of--in other words we are faced with a need to
describe the "logic" or more accurately "meta-logic" which
might be intrinsic to the nature of symbolic integration and generalization,
and thus discover a "logic" behind mythologization. What we are
searching for is a form of "symbology" in the form of natural rules
of symbolic combination and interrelation.
There is yet another approach toward the comprehension of this problem--if
it can be demonstrated that systems of primary and secondary symbolization
which I will call "rational systems" or "systems of
rationalization" fall well within the purview of interpretation, or of
relational comprehension, then it is nevertheless possible to use an
understanding of rationality which is metalogical to arrive at the
"natural grammar"--more appropriately known as "structural
grammar" underlying symbolic generalization and symbolic integration of
reality, and by logical deduction, metalogical mythology. In order to
accomplish this, it is first necessary to understand the structure of
rationality, but what is and is not--and as a symbolic system to outline its
contextual scope as it has been historically developed. But first we must
refer back to the notion of structure itself.
Structure is defined as "1. Something made up of parts that are put
together in a particular way. 2. The way in which parts are arranged or put
together to form a whole. 3. Something constructed….[Lat. Structus,
p.p. of struere.]" (American heritage Dict. 1983) or as
"[Fr. Structure; L. structura, a building, from structus,
pp. of struere, to heap together, arrange.] 1. The act of building;
construction. [Obs.] 2. Manner of building or constructing; form, make
construction. 3. Something built or constructed….4. the arrangement or
interrelation of all the parts of a whole; manner or organization or
construction….5. something composed of parts…." (Websters Dict.
[unabridged] 1983) Likewise we may refer to "structural" as
"pertaining to structure; having or characterized by structure", to
"structuralism" as "a movement for determining and analyzing
the basic, relativity stable structural elements of a system, especially in
the behavioral sciences" to a "structuralist" as "a
follower or advocate of structural principles, as in the analysis or
application of social, economic, or linguistic theory", or to
""structuralize"--"to form or organize into a
structure" and particularly, "structural linguistics" as
"language study based on the assumptions that a language is a coherent
system of formal signs and that the task of linguistic study is to inquire
into the nature of those signs and their peculiar systematic arrangement,
without reference to historical antecedents or comparison with other
languages." (Websters Dict. [unabridged] 1983)
Two important features of "structure" are to be inferred from the
preceding definitions. The first is that structure implies relationship or
"interrelatedness" between "parts" or
"components" and that "structuralism" is a form of
relativism which seeks to understand the nature of these relations, which is
rooted in the holothetic principle of comprehending the structural relations
of the "whole"--of how the parts interrelate and integrate in order
to form the whole. Beyond the importance of relationships, structuralism also
looks for relevant or relatively meaningful relations, or
perhaps significant relations, which are generalizable from the many
parts and which underlie the whole. We may thus refer to a symbolic
structuralist as attempting to understand the "general structure" of
a symbolic system, of its relevant interrelationships which are generalizable
as rules of relations, thus defining the structural process of symbolic
generalization and symbolic integration of human reality. To search for
generalizable, essential structural relationships falls well within the
purview of the doctrine of humanological relativism, but to limit such a
comprehension to sign systems, to the level of primary symbols, such as the
structural linguists are purported to do, to necessarily restrict structural
generalization to the level of primary referents, restricting the rules of
relationship to the grammar of an artificial intelligence. As demonstrated in
the conclusion of the last chapter, such restriction of significance can be
used to understand complex, sophisticated natural systems of symbolization,
such as language or mythology, but the interpretations generated will be
necessarily limited, rationally circumscribed and inflexible. In this regard
it must be noted that the system of structural analysis of myth devised by
Levi Strauss is an artificially contrived system of signification which
"works" because of the open interpretability of the mythological
subject matter it deals with--mythology allowing itself by virtue of its
generability to be interpreted by virtually any well worked out system of
signification, but there is nothing intrinsically necessary or sufficient
which makes Levi Strauss's system of signification the best possible, much
less the a priori, symbol universal symbolic structure of all mythology. In
this regard any claim of semiological structuralism to universality is after
the fact of their contribed applicability and from the standpoint of
comprehending "natural structure" entirely bogus.
Symbolic structuralism connotes that the general relativistic effort to
comprehend the "general structure" of "interrelatedness"
by which symbols are generalized from their contexts, combined into
"symbolisms", "chains" and "complexes" in order
to achieve symbolic integration of reality. More formally, we are searching
for a "general theory" of relativistic comprehension, for
generalizable "rules of relationship" by which to comprehend the so
called "crystallitic" structure of symbolic reality, or of
"metalogical mythology" as a special case of reality. Speaking of
formal theory, or of "rules of relationship" or of "general
structure" necessarily leads to a need for understanding the meaning of
rationality as just such formal systems of theoretization which has been
historically derived.
Rational is defined as "1. Having or using the ability to reason. 2.
Of or pertaining to reason. 3. Of sound mind; sane….[Lat. Rationalis]
(American Heritage Dict. 1983)" or as "1. Of, based on, or
derived from reasoning; 2. Able to reason; reasoning; 3. Showing reason; not
foolish or silly; sensible;….(Websters Dict. 1983).
"Rationale" is defined "1. The fundamental reason for
something. 2. An exposition of underlying principles or beliefs." (American
Heritage Dict. 1983). "Rationalism" is defined as "the
theory that the exercise of reason provides the only valid basis for action as
the only authority in determining one's opinions or course of action. 2. In
philosophy, the theory that the reason or intellect, is the true source of
knowledge, rather than the senses. 3. In theology, the doctrine that rejects
revelation and the supernatural, and makes reason the whole source of
knowledge." (Websters Dict. [unabridged] 1983). A rationalist is
"one who believes in or practices rationalism", rationalistically is
"in a rationalistic manner". Rationality is defined as "the
quality or condition of being rational" and as "the power or faculty
of reasoning; possession of reason; reasonableness;" and rationalize is
"1. To interpret or explain from a rational standpoint. 2. To cause to
appear reasonable or rational. 3. To devise reasonable but untrue explanations
for (e.g. one's behavior)" or 1. To make rational; to make conform to
reason. 2. To explain or interpret on rational grounds….5. in psychology, to
device superficially rational, or plausible, explanations or excuses for
(one's acts, beliefs, desires, etc.) usually without being aware that these
are not the real motives." (Websters Dict. 1983) To rationalize is
to "think in a rational or rationalistic manner" or to
"rationalize one's acts, beliefs, etc." A rationalizer is "one
who rationalizes", rationally is "in a rational manner;
reasonably", and rationalness is "the state of being rational or
consistent with reason."
Definition of rationality depends upon the definition of reason--"1.
An explanation or justification of an act, idea, etc., 2. A cause, a motive.
3. The ability to think, form judgments, draw conclusions, etc. 4. Sound
thought or judgment; good sense. 5. Normal mental powers; a sound mind;
sanity. 6. In logic, one of the premises of an argument, especially the
minor" or "to think coherently and logically; to draw inferences or
conclusions from facts known or assumed. To argue or talk in a logical
way" or "to analyze; to think logically about; to think out
systematically. 2. To argue, to discuss. 3. To support, justify, etc. with
reasons. 4. To persuade or bring by reasoning." (Websters Dict.
1983) or "1. The basis or motive for an action, decision, feeling, or
belief. 2. An underlying fact or cause that provides logical sense for a
premise or occurrence. 3. The capacity for rational thought, inference, or
discrimination. 4. A normal mental state; sanity, --v. 1. To use the faculty
of reason; think logically. 2. To talk or argue logically and persuasively. 3.
To determine or conclude by logical thinking." (American Heritage Dict.
1983) There is reasonability, reasonable, reasonableness, reasonably,
reasoner, reasoning, reasonist, which is an absolute term for a
"rationalist" and there is even "reasonless". The
important point of the above definitions is the close connection with the
meaning of logic or logicalness. Reason, and by implication rationality and
rationalism, is to be seen as a form of logical symbol system at the secondary
level of symbolic integration, imply secondary symbols, a looser form of
contextual, relational interpretation nevertheless rooted to and dependent
upon logical symbols at the primary level, which is more precisely called
"ratiocination"--"1. The act or process of reasoning, or of
deducing consequences from premises. 2. In instance of reasoning"--or
"ratiocinate"--"to reason; especially to reason using formal
logic" or "to reason methodically and rationally." From this it
can be inferred that "rationality" functions upon the levels of
secondary symbolization, with greater interpretability of relations within
context, but nonetheless tied to the primary level of logical signification,
and thus is context dependent. "Rationalistic" symbol systems,
"systems of rationalization" and "rationalism" in general
can be shown to operate structurally upon this secondary symbolic level.
Rationality, as a formal system of symbolic generalization, of
theoretization, employs the strict rules of logic and reason, but must employ
them in a more generalized form in order to fit broader, more general
contextual relationships. The basic "rules" while still being
artificial, must be made more "natural" by their general contextual
applicability. Speaking of the rules of logic leads us back to reconsider the
meaning of logic more fully. It is defined as "1. The study of the
principles of reasoning. 2. Valid reasoning, esp. as distinguished from
invalid or irrational argumentation [Gk. Logos, reason]" (American
Heritage Dict. 1983) or as "[L. logica; Gr. Logike,
logic, f. of logikos, pertaining to speech, reason, from logos,
speech, reason.] 1. The science of correct reasoning; the science which deals
with the criteria of valid thought….3. Correct reasoning; valid induction or
deduction. 4. Way of reasoning, whether correct or incorrect….5. The system
of principles underlying any act or science. 6. Necessary connection or
outcome as through the working of cause and effect; (Websters Dict.
[unabridged] 1983) The rules of logic and of reasoning are what are formally
recognized as correct. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to go at length
into a detailed description of these rules, here it simply need to be stated
that there are only a handful of fundamental principles upon which these rules
are based--these principles determine the resulting formal structure which
rationalistic comprehension of human reality takes. The first principle is
that of identity, or of symmetry, and the principle of noncontradiction of
opposites, True is True and False is False but True cannot also be False and
False cannot be True. The ultimate determination of truth value of any
statement might, within this system of rationalization be more appropriately
referred to a statistical problem of probability employing the principles of
syllogistic induction. The important point is to recognize from these
principles the operation of "binary" coding, of an irreducible
"two value" logical system which is based upon the principle of
logical disjunction (either T or F) but not upon a principle of logical
conjunction (both T and F)--any statement made must be either true or false,
but not both true and false. This is formally referred to as the principle of
the "excluded middle ground". What this basic system of formal logic
accomplishes is a dichotomization of reality along the lines of truth and
falsehood--as such it is referred to as "analytic
logic"--"analysis" being a "separation of a whole into
constituents with a view to its examination and interpretation" or
"1. A separating or breaking up any whole into its parts so as to find
out their nature, proportion, function, relationship, etc.….6. In logic, the
tracing of things to their source; the resolving of knowledge into its
original principles. Syn…."a dissection" [Gr. Analysis,
dissolving, a resolution of a whole into parts; ana up, back, and lysis,
a loosing, from lyein, to loose.] (Websters Dict. [unabridged]
1983) In this binary system there is another basic dichotomy which proceeds
from the first which proceeds from the first law of identity and
noncontradiction, and is referred to as the analytic/synthetic dichotomy. An
analytical statement expresses the basic principles of identity and
noncontradiction (a is a, a is not a non-a) even in more elaborated forms of
association. The synthetic statement is the truth value of a statement,
derived from its inductive validation. Where analytic statements are referred
to as descriptive and factual, synthetic statements are called evaluative,
prescriptive. In the sense that synthetic statements proceed from analytic
statements, there is what is known as an "a priori/a posteriori"
dichotomy. From this is derived the principal mode of logical
rationality--syllogistic reasoning--or the hypothetical, deductive syllogism,
or "deduction" in short. The basis of deduction is the conditional
statement (If A then….) which is the direct embodiment of causality in
synthetic relationships, with an antecedent and a consequent. The condition is
employed in syllogistic form as "modus ponens" (If T, then not F, T,
therefore not F). The result of this syllogistic process, which can be strung
together into nice elaborated chains of reasoning, is a sense of a priori
analytical dichotomization and a posteriori synthetic causality (or
"determination"). In this rule of reason there is an on going
process of analytic question, and then synthetic answer--a binary process of
posing a question in terms of opposites, and then answering the question in
terms of validation or falsification. From this it can be readily recognized
that traditional two value logic is simply the formally elaborated
system of signification of what is known as dialectical discourse.
Dialectics is defined as "[Me. Dialatick; Ofr. Dialetique;
L. dialectica (ars); Gr. Dialetike (techne), the
dialectic (art), from dialektikos, dialect]. 1. The art of
practice of examining opinions or ideas logically, often by the method of
question and answer, so as to determine their validity; dialectics. 2. Logical
argumentation. 3. The method of logic used by Hegel and adapted by Marx to his
materialistic philosophy; it is based on the concept of the contradiction of
opposites (thesis and antithesis) and their continual resolution
(synthesis). (Websters Dict. 1983)
What can be inferred from the foregoing description of the basic principles
beneath formal logic and underlying rationalism is that syllogistic deduction
is the primary signification system, the relational structural rules,
operating upon the level of primary symbolization. Rationality translates this
syllogistic reasoning process into a more general formula of dialectical
discourse--of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, by which to describe the more
general structure upon the level of secondary symbolization. The basic
dialectic can be found to be the generalized structure of symbolic
rationalism, or symbolic rationalization. Question arises as to whether this
mode of thinking might not be a universal mode of relational grammar upon the
primary and secondary levels of symbolization. It is possible to transcribe
mathematical logic into semantic/syntactic logic, and vice versa describe
mathematical equations in terms of logical syllogism and logical positivists
have long been attempting to create a single symbolic language and grammar,
for all of the diverse domains of rationality, in an attempt to bring rational
coherence to reality. It remains a possibility that there might ultimately be
only one, irreducible, formal system of rules of relationships operating upon
the primary level of symbolic integration, and that from this one, final
methodology, there might be derivable only one dialectical method of
rationalization upon the secondary level of symbolization, but the question
will probably remain forever unanswerable. Even if such a monothematic system
were discovered (or invented) its creators would be hard pressed indeed to
prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that there might not be another, even more
basic alternative.
The important remains that the fundamental structural rules of
relationships, in the form of dialectical discourse, have been found to be
underlying Rationalism, derived from formal logical principles. The question
remaining to be answered is what are the rules of symbolic generalization and
integration which operate from the secondary to the tertiary level of symbolic
generalization. In order to answer this it is important to reiterate the
meanings of "metalogical"--as being both beyond the purview of logic
and as being a "metaphysics" of logic. It is with the understanding
of both meanings that we are to approach the understanding of a symbolic
structure prevailing upon the third level of symbolic integration. In the
first instance it is to be understood that in the context independence of the
third level, the "crystallitic structure" of the third level of
integration is not like formal syllogistic or even dialectical reasoning,
except by showing what it isn't and what it is independent from, suggesting
the possibility of what it might be like. In the second instance the
examination of the meaning of "metaphysical" and of its corollary
"epistemological" are in order to arrive at a form of symbolic
rationality, or "symbology" which may nevertheless be employed as an
alternative interpretation of the symbolic structure of rationality and by
implication, logic.
"Epistemology" is defined as "[Gr). Episteme,
knowledge and logos discourse] the theory or science that investigates
the origin, nature methods and limits of knowledge." (Websters Dict.
1983) Metaphysics is defined as "the branch of philosophy that
systematically investigates first causes and the nature of ultimate reality.
[Med. Lat. Metaphysica, the title of Aristotle's treatise on the
subject.]" (American Heritage Dict. 1983) and as "[ML. Metaphysica,
neut. pl.; Gr. Meta ta physika, after those things relating to external
nature, after physics; meta, after, and physika, physics.] 1.
The branch of philosophy that deals with first principles and seeks to explain
the nature of being or reality (ontology) and of the origin and
structure of the world (cosmology). 2. Speculative philosophy in
general.3. The theory or principles (of some branch of knowledge). 4.
Popularly, any very subtle, perplexing or difficult reasoning. 5. Occult lore
[Archaic]." (Websters Dict. 1983) Metaphysical is defined as
"based on speculative or abstract reasoning, abstruse" or as
"of the nature of being or essential reality" or "very
abstract, abstruse, or subtle", "based on abstract reasoning"
or "beyond the physical or material; incorporeal, supernatural or
transcendental". In a sense both epistemology and metaphysics as
traditional disciplines of Philosophy, are like two sides of the same
philosophical coin, the one side turned inwards towards subjective
understanding of reality, the other turned outward towards objective
comprehension of reality. This basic "subjective/objective"
dichotomy forms the basic dialectica of philosophy, and gives rise to another
"synthetic" dialectic of a "mind/body" dichotomy. As
mentioned in the second chapter, "subjective reflection/objective
projection" is the principle from of relationships which is to found in
the context independence of the third level of symbolic integration. This
single point has important ramifications for understanding the
"metalogical" "metaphysics" behind the comprehension of
the structural relationships at the third level of symbolic generalization.
Philosophy "the love of wisdom or knowledge" is the embodiment of
both epistemological and metaphysical principles. Defined as "a study of
the processes governing thought and conduct theory or investigation of the
principles or laws that regulate the universe and underlie all knowledge and
reality….". It is the Mother of all formal systems of symbolic
rationalization, of formal rationalism in general, and has as its basis the
ultimate ontological question--the meaning of "God". Philosophy
began with the ontological argument of the "a priori existence of God
based upon the widespread existence of the idea of God" has as its
primary symbol "ontologism"--the doctrine "that the knowledge
of God is immediate and intuitive, ad that all other knowledge springs from
it, and is most generally involved with solving the basic ontological problem
of the nature of being or reality"--"The science of ontology
comprehends investigations of every real existence, either beyond the sphere
of the present world or in any other way incapable of being the direct object
of consciousness, which can be deduced immediately from the possession of
certain feelings or principles or faculties of the human soul.--Archer
Butler" (Websters Dict. 1983)
To approach an understanding of metalogical mythology and its symbolic
structure of integration and generalization is to understand the nature of
philosophical "metaphysics". We refer to "metaphysical
reality" as that reality which is encompassed by philosophical
discourse--it is also known as "rational reality" or better yet
"rationality" as a comprehensive symbolic complex functioning upon
the secondary level of integration. This "rational complex"
discernible boundaries, definitive divisions and structural relations, and
formally includes even the doctrine of Humanological Relativism in as much as
it can be a written doctrine expressed the "metalogic" of words. In
earlier manuscripts I have gone at length into the structure of this
metaphysical universe--here it is necessary to elucidate a few of its more
salient points. The symbolic structure of this reality is determined by
dialectical discourse, as I have mentioned already, and similar to the notion
"crystallitic structure" its basic structural form, I prefer to term
"paradigmatic". Paradigm, most simply, is a model, a pattern
or an example. The structure of rationality is of the nature of a model, a
pattern or an example. Our systems of rational conceptualization about reality
are of an exemplary form of ideal models or patternings by which reality is
given the semblance of rational coherence. There are other connotations of
"paradigm"--we refer to a set of governing principles, written
explicitly or tacitly presupposed and implied by our rational behavior. We
speak of "Kuhnian" paradigmatics and come to realize the
socio-historical processes which underlies our development of rational
reality.
The occurrence, extent and tendencies towards meaningful or a meaningful
thinking will be determined to a large extent by cultural valuations,
ideologies, rationales….orientation of knowledge seeking behavior dominant
in a group, pervading all institutions and agencies that influence
intellectual style, habit and sensibility….
The besetting cognitive problems of a culture, subculture of an era can
thus be very much a reflection of whatever factors lead to the relative
valuation of meaningful and a meaningful thinking. One must even face the
possibility that cultures can arise which place so limited a value on
meaningful thinking that many of its members are deprived absolutely of the
possibility of achieving "high" orders of meaningful thought
relative to their capacities or of discriminating such states, should they
occur, as in some sense valuable or even different from a meaningful thinking.
I believe that something very much like such a culture has arrived and that
the culture in question is the world culture of the 20th century..
Indeed rational reality begins its development with the History of
Civilization--indeed it is the history of civilization, and as such is
without prehistory. For rational understanding proper, of descriptive models
of reality, begins properly with the written word, and thus with the beginning
of history. The so called "evolution of civilization" refers us to
the development of human rational reality. The structural importance of the
"word", its writing, thinking, refinement, and sophistication, is
the precursor of both human civilization as it has come to monothematically
predominate in modern times, and of human rational reality as it has come to
be understood. Our rationality reality has taken on the appearance of a
necessary universality--even if only allowing the only alternative of
"irrationality".
Our rational reality is encompassed by the metaphorical meaning of the
word. The word as metaphor is our emotional access to rational creativity. We
must open up the boundaries of our definition of rationality to include more
than just restricted analytical consciousness--virtually all of the
alternative levels of consciousness. Language is the primary symbolization
system of humanity for the expression and communication of the emotional
meaning of rationality. Language is the beginning of our historical
civilization. The word as metaphor is the beginning and end of both
rationality and irrationality. When words become systematic substitutes for
meaning then the word is no longer metaphorical and the systems of
conceptualization in which they are employed become meaningful and irrational.
(Lewis 1983 [unpublished manuscript] page 145)
The paradigmatic structure of rationality, in creating models and
ideal-symbols, symbols which are nevertheless affixed to reality through
context dependency, creates also archetypal symbols of antithetical
"irrationality" as well. We have the ever present suggestion of
contradictory "anti-models" inherent within our paradigmatic
structure. In our rational modeling of the universe we continually dichotomize
reality along rational lines.
Then, rationality can be construed as a non-real (i.e., ideal) fiction
toward the absolution of all irrationality--towards a state of absolute order
integrity of self/truth, or epistemological/metaphysical unity, towards which
rationally creative behavior strives, and away from which irrational behavior
tends to lead. Rationality is a group myth--an ideal incorporating the
elements of Truth, Love, God and Self. It is the only ideal by which all human
beings share in at least tacitly by their alleged membership to the human
race. The difficulty of defining rationality is that it is knowable only
indirectly by its attainment of lessened irrationality--it is relative to
irrationality, and as such in and of itself, as an absolute form, it is
inherently impossible for human beings to conceive it directly. It is noumenal
and a priori to the consideration of human behavior and as such it harkens me
back to the a priori concepts of metaphysical truth and epistemological self.
These concepts are related to rationality only through the most relative of
human conditions. The human problem is to push backward time and to uncover
space to reveal the true meaning of rationality. I believe I have adequately
demonstrated that traditional rationalism and traditional empiricism, as the
best representative of the most fundamental philosophical schism which divides
all of philosophy down the middle into two opposed and seemingly incompatible
schools of thought, that all pervasive mind/body dichotomy, are not
necessarily naturally, logically or rationally inimical to one another in my
philosophy of absolute relativity. Indeed bringing together these two
traditionally opposed schools of philosophy is the philosophical prerequisite
to the achieving of comprehensive unity of understanding of reality by which
we are then able to bring together in a rationally coherent and empirically
consistent fashion all of the other diverse fields of human understanding. The
contribution of Kant was to reveal to us the a priori noumenal nature of the
rational reality of human existence. (Lewis 1983 [unpublished manuscript]
pages 128-129)
I have proposed elsewhere an underlying "deep structure" of an
"a priori rationality matrix", against which to reference our
relative comprehension of rational reality, demonstrative of the fundamental
complexity rational functioning has developed into, representing perhaps the
most parsimonious possible guidelines by which our rational metaphysical
reality and our empirical physical reality are both interrelated and made
humanly meaningful, by which we gain rational identity, of a sense of
order, purpose, coherence, in human existence, through the elaboration of five
"paradigms", modalities of rational reality. This "rationality
matrix" is metalogical in the elaboration of five
"metaphysical paradigms" which undercut and crisscross conventional
rationalisms. These five paradigms are each comprehensive in that they
incorporate a complete, comprehensive rational world view and sense of
fundamental order to existence, and yet are united and complementary to one
another, and in relation to the whole rationality matrix are in themselves
incomplete and "imperfect". These five paradigms of human
rationality are Philosophy, Aesthetics, Science, Religion, and what I prefer
to call Humanology, after the name humanological relativism. All five
paradigms share in a single criterion of rational validation, a
"fundamental truth criterion" which I have earlier identified as
"The willpower to believe in the relative truth of objective criterion
for openness and communication." This basic truth criterion is
translated differently, methodologically and theoretically within each of the
paradigm.
Even though each paradigm is self contained in its truth criterion and
presents a unified though incomplete version of reality, each in its
alternative interpretation being essentially different in form and function
from the others, all four are interrelated and interdependent and altogether
present a unified comprehension of reality. There is a philosophy of art and
science and humanism, there is a science of philosophy, art and humanism, and
there is a humanism of philosophy, art and science. This is the holothetic
principle of reality. No one paradigm can adequately and completely substitute
any of the other paradigms, and only when all are taken together do they form
a complete totality of reality. (Lewis 1983 [unpublished manuscript] page 21)
In these "metalogical" rational modalities certain characteristic
patterns, "symbolic rational associations" become evident, one
important aspect of which is the general rational approach which is taken
towards knowledge, understanding of reality. The deductive approach is
characteristic of philosophy, induction in science, authority the primary
source in religion, while intuition is the primary source of understanding of
aesthetics. In humanology, relativistic/reflexive knowledge is paramount.
There are many other associations to be found with these modalities, but it is
beyond the scope of this work to delineate them at length.
We have reached the point in this somewhat tedious discourse to contemplate
a little upon the symbolic structure of the mythological mind, and to do so
primarily from the point of view of the rational mind. The propensity of the
rational human mind to draw rational lines through on going phenomenological
human existence, by which to create the illusion of ideal realities, is very
strong. Indeed, it makes sense to speak of a need and a capacity to draw such
analytical lines by which to conceive of the rational meaning of reality.
Related to the notions of "binary opposition" and of the dialectical
process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, it is simply the tendency of the
human mind to analyze reality in terms of difference, and to group things in
terms of sympathetic or symmetrical similarities, and the resultant
predisposition to dichotomize reality ion terms of antithetical ideals or
extremes of conception. Apparent especially within philosophy, it is nearly
universally recurrent throughout our theoretical systems of
conceptualization--replete as they are with such dichotomies as
"mind/body, analytical/synthetic, physical/metaphysical,
subjective/objective, material/spiritual, rational/empirical,
cognitive/behavioral, life/death, male/female, ends/means, etc. The symbolical
generalization and integration upon the tertiary level focuses upon the notion
of reflective and subjectivity and objective projection, all contexts of time
and space, of place and period becoming irrelevant and
"insignificant". Subjective and objective upon this level merge into
one and the same thing, such that there is recognition of Truth in the Self,
and of Self in Truth.
Ultimately the self and truth, as prerequisite ideal fictions to
philosophical problem of the definition of the meaning of reality, are one and
the same thing--the integrity of reality itself. The only difference lies in
the innate, analytic synthetical a priori structuring of the human mind (the
epistemological self) which habitually dichotomizes reality into
separate and opposing forms and then reunites reality into a new integrity on
a transcendent--more abstract--level. (Lewis 1983 [unpublished manuscript page
13)
This dynamic continuum of contextual relativity is symbolically interpreted
in the structural dialectical sense as being the structural continuum
of human reality, with the synthetic meaning of reality being realized
by symbolic interpretation or interpretative symbolism.
Every initial conscious analytic dichotomization must be followed by a
subsequent synthetic integration in order to achieve symbolic realism.
(Lewis 1983 [unpublished manuscript] page 11)
Metalogical mythology is the natural functional structure of the human mind
divorced from relational contexts. At this level of symbolic generalization
the primary relational process is that of "identification"
between the knower and the known, subject and object. The only relevant
relational rules are that of similarity and differentiation. Similar things
are included, dissimilar thing excluded. The excluded middle ground becomes
the focus of attention. What prevails is a synthetic process of mind,
of the comprehension of the continuity of the whole. This is a relatively
loose structure of mind in which symbols are allowed to change their normal,
regular context, to merge with one another, to create imaginary realities the
like of which cannot be found in everyday reality. The great feat is a
tremendous symbolic condensation, as well as universal extension, without the
apparent loss of continuity with rational reality, without the loss of a sense
of coherence and natural order. This is the world of dreams which become
recreated through our aesthetic expressions and through our mythodramatical
performance upon the world stage. The functioning of this process of
identification occurs unconsciously on the primary and secondary levels as
well as upon the tertiary level of symbolic integration. It tends to
unnoticeably, unrecognizably fill in all the gaps between our rational ideals
and ignorances, and smoothes out our communication of our signals, lending
credibility or disbelief to the message which we transmit. It pervades every
system of symbolization, giving it a sense of integrity and human reality,
which humankind has ever created. Metalogical mythology is our leap of
faith through an inherently paradoxical reality. It is properly, logically
thinking, a "non-logic" or rather a temporary suspension of logic,
in order to bridge the gaps which our rational realities, or rather
"idealties" which creep in between the lines and between the pages
of our day to day existence, helping to bridge the tremendous gulf between
said and done, belief and behavior, politician and policy. Wherever and
whenever we find ourselves believing and identifying with some
"thing" wholeheartedly and unreservedly, then we must suspect the
functioning of metalogical mythologization.
All theory is mythological and rationalization--functional for resolving
conflicting and tension causing dilemmas imposed by the cognitive/behavioral
limitations of our rational and behavioral reality. No theory can possibly be
omniscient and absolutely comprehensive. Competing theories offer varying and
differing interpretations and insights into the nature of behavioral reality.
We tend to impose upon our reality our mythological systems of rationalization
and so interpret that reality in such a way as to be consistent and suitable
for our purposive behavior. The manner in which we mythologize about reality
determines our behavior, and our reality is behavioral. We become the way we
think. We create our behavioral reality by our myths. Our past, present and
future become mythically real. Myth becomes metaphysical reality and
metaphysical reality becomes myth. But our myths impose the limitations from
which we cannot but briefly escape and provide the vicarious means by which to
metaphysically transcend behavioral reality. Our metaphysical paradigms,
philosophical, aesthetic, scientific and humanistic are the fundamental from
our mythology takes.
I propose hypothetically that there are six dimensions of tension
underlying all of our mythological theoretization--these dimensions are the
fundamental dichotomies which compose the essential limitations of our
rational and behavioral reality. They compose the differing interrelationships
between the four metaphysical paradigms--philosophical, aesthetic, scientific
and ideological. These six dimensions of metaphysical tension are what might
be referred to as the mythological theory dynamics set by the
interrelationship and tension of opposition and differentiation between the
four metaphysical paradigms of the metaphysical matrix of rational reality.
The six dimensions of dialectical tension are the six dichotomies of
mind/body, nature/culture, male/female, subjective/objective, life/death, and
means/ends. The tension between these dichotomies forms the mythological
limitations from which we derive all of our transcendent meanings embodied as
truth in our theoretical systems. These dimensions compose the mythological
limitations of all theory and the transcendent synthesis of meaning
constitutes the dimensions of possible freedom and truth for any theory. All
theory is modeled from these limitations. All mythological, theoretical
systems of behavioral rationalization about existential human reality may be
reinterpreted and meaningfully reduced down to terms of these six dimensions
of mythological dynamics. Any theory claiming any degree of meaningful
comprehensivity of rational reality must in some manner adequately resolve the
tension between these dichotomic "ideals". Theoretical truth id
movement towards the meaningful resolution of the tension produced by these
conflicting dichotomies. To be considered "objectively valid"
empirical "evidence" must be found to corroborate or to disprove a
theory, but it must be remembered that all such evidence is indirect and
circumstantial to the proof of truth. (Lewis 1984 [unpublished manuscript]
pages 110-111)
Mythological meta-logic is not of form of logic at all--it cannot be by the
formal rational definition of logic. Rather it is a kind of
"non-logic" or a suspension of logic which allows the more
"primitive" pre-logical potentialities of the human mind to take
control. This function of the mind has been called an alternative, "three
value" logic. (T and/or F, or either T or F, or something else) but the
inclusion of the "excluded middle ground" contradicts the law of
non-contradiction of opposites and so therefore cannot be considered any form
of logic at all. It is known as a form of analogic, [L. analogicus;
Gr. Analogikos proportionate, analogous] having analogy; founded on
analogy" which implies analogy, "1. A similarity of likeness between
things in some circumstances of effects, when the thins are otherwise entirely
different…5. In logic, the inference that certain admitted resemblances
imply probable further similarity. 6. In linguistics, the process by which new
or less familiar words, constructions or pronunciations conform with the
pattern of older and more familiar (and often unrelated) ones…." (Websters
Dict. 1983 [unabridged]) Instead of analytical dissection of reality into
its component parts, there is a synthetic integration of symbolic meanings. We
refer to a "synthesizing mind" which overcomes dilemmas, paradoxes,
seemingly inimical conflicts of meaning. We refer to
"analogism"--"[Gk. Analogismis, consideration;
reasoning; from analogizesthai, to calculate, reckon, consider]
investigation of things by the analogy they bear to each other."--instead
of referring to deductive syllogism. We refer to a magical principle of
sympathy, in which like produces like, rather than to conditional, scientific
"if--then causality. Instead of propositional rules of grammatical
transformation, for structural relations, we refer to apposition--"Fr. apposition;
L. appositus, pp. of apponere, to place against or to] 1. An
apposing or being apposed; putting side by side. 2. The position resulting
from this." which is a derivative of "to appose" or "to
put questions to; to examine. [Obs} 2. To put (something to another
thing). 3. To put side by side; place opposite or near."
History is what historians do, philosophy is what philosophers do, art is
what artists do, science is what scientists do. As such all of these fields of
rational pursuit are mythological. The metalogic of the historian is the myth
of the relievable Past, the metalogic of the Scientist is the myth of the
absolute, irreducible Atom, the metalogic of the Philosopher is the myth of
the Ultimate Truth, and the Artist lives and breathes myth into the Perfect
Creation. If there were no such thing as rational mythologies to make a dull
life meaningful, then Historians would soon stop writing histories, scientists
cease scientizing, philosophers philosophizing, artists creating. In fact,
there would be no more meaning in living life, and human beings would cease to
exist. But luckily, symbols will haunt us even to the grave…., and the
enigmatic meanings of sagacious old metaphors will forever slip the grasp of
our tongues. We do not need to worry about the Myths which create our lives,
they will perchance take care of themselves. But we need to be concerned over
the Mythologies which we create, for they might one day destroy us.
CHAPTER IV
Synthesis
Toward a General Theory of Socio Cultural Synergism
I was sent to Fossoli, near Modena…on the morning of the 21st
we learned that in the following day the Jews would be leaving. Our
destination? Nobody knew…And night came, and it was such a night that one
knew that human eyes could not witness it and survive. Everyone felt this; not
one of the guards, neither Italian nor German, had the courage to come and see
what men do when they know they have to die…But the mothers stayed up to
prepare the food for the journey with tender care, and washed their children
and packed the luggage; and at dawn the barbed wire was full of children's
washing hung out in the wind to dry…would you not do the same? If you and
your child were going to be killed tomorrow, would you not give him to eat
today? From Survival in Auschwitz by Primo Levi.
We were separated from our parents; we knew exactly the precise moment when
they were sent to the gas chambers. I believe we could even see them walk
there. However none of us could cry. Something inside of us had broken, we
were transformed. Yehuda Bacon, quoted in Kinder in K2.
Man's extra somatic means of adaptation.
The man made part of the environment, including the nonmaterial aspects,
laws, beliefs, and so on.
Knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and
habits acquired by man as a member of society.
An organization of conventional understandings.
Learned as opposed to innate behavior and products of learned behavior.
Shared ideas and socially inherited assemblage of practices and beliefs.
The definitions may be separated into two major categories: realist
and idealist. The realist approach is through observed manifestations,
behavior, and the products of behavior. The idealist approach is through the
researcher's interpretations of the culture bearer's ideas of societal values
and norms. In brief, by one definition, culture is observable, by the other,
inferred. (Garbarino 1977, page 49)
"Culture" is defined as "1. Development of the intellect
through education and training. 2. Intellectual and artistic taste and
refinement. 3. The arts, beliefs, customs, institutions and all other products
of human work and thought created by a people or group at a particular time.
4a. The raising of animals or growing of plants, esp. to improve stock. (b)
cultivation of soil. 5. A growth or colony of microorganisms in a nutrient
medium….[Lat. Cultura] (American Heritage Dict. 1983) or as
"[Fr. Culture, from L. cultura, cultivation, care, from cultus,
pp. of colere, to till] 1. The act or process of tilling and preparing
the earth for crops; cultivation of soil. 2. The raising, improvement or
development of some plant, animal, or product. 3. The growth of bacteria or
other microorganisms in a specially prepared nourishing substance, as sugar.
4. A colony of microorganisms thus grown. 5. Improvement, refinement, or
development by study, training, etc. 6. The training and refining of the mind,
emotions, manners, taste, etc. 7. The result of this; refinement of thought,
emotion, manners, taste, etc. 8. The concepts, habits, skills, art,
instruments, institutions, etc. of a given people in a given period;
civilization." (Websters Dict. [unabridged] 1983)
"Culture" is the Myth of an anthropologist. It is the key
symbolic metaphor by which the anthropologist organizes his/her comprehension
of human reality--leading to attention paid to some aspects of existence and
neglect of others. Moreover it provides a metalogical idiom for a particular
way of discussing human reality. The myth of "culture" is the
metalogic of the "eternalized present", the "fossil
other", the "primitive mind", the "tribal village".
Open any academic anthropology journal and the language flows thick and
obscure with "professional jargot". Indeed, there are as many
meanings, definitions, interpretations and formal theories of the myth of
culture as there are anthropologists living that myth, and no one particular
viewpoint is the best.
More accurately, the concept of "culture" is an organizing
metaphor for our metalogical meanings which are associated with it--in short
all of the mythologies which compose human reality. Culture is a myth of
mythology, and herein is both its reflexive strength and paradoxical weakness.
"Metaphor is one, if not the, primary mode of human thought, for
in Shelly's words, "(Metaphor) marks the before unapprehended relations
of things and perpetuates their apprehension" (quoted in Arendt 1978:
102; emphasis added), (Wilson page 162). Culture is metaphor like what
Wittgensteing has termed an "odd job" word which "refer to the
relations between overtly dissimilar things among which there appear to be
vague and elusive similarities". Try to put your hands upon a
"thing" called culture and you will only have a slippery
"complicated network of similarities of detail". Culture created a
mythological illusion of being something tangible, touchable, something
"real". This is the power of rational mythology to create meaning in
our lives. Instead of any common trait, or complex of traits common to
"culture", what is revealed are only many "family
resemblances", what Rodney Needham has referred to as
"polythetic" classification.
But being a mythical illusion makes the Conception of Culture no less real
as a phenomenon of our lives. The mythology which is written into the
comprehension of culture is derived from the mythologies which structure and
in part, determine our lives, and in the final analysis there really is no
separating the conception of one Myth from the comprehension of the other, The
structure and nature of culture is metaphorical and symbolic:
We also need a name for the class of things and events that
depend upon symboling considered in the context of the interrelationships
among the symbolates themselves. The term "culture" has
traditionally been used for this purpose. (We are speaking now of actual use,
not definition or conception.) The scientific study of culture then is
culturology. We define culture as that class of things and events dependent
upon symboling, products of symboling, considered in an extrasomatic context. (White
1969a: 234) (White, Dillingham, 1973, page 29)
It is the objective of this chapter to explore the idea of the
"symbolic integration" as well as "symbolic integration"
of "culture" in metalogical terms of its being a mythological human
reality. It will be the contention that "culture" names this process
of symbolic integration of human reality upon all three levels of
symbolization as outlined in the previous chapters, and to demonstrate just
how this symbolic integration of human "cultural" reality proceeds
upon all three levels. In this effort of orchestration of many diverse themes
and thoughts upon the meanings of "culture" in human reality, it is
apropos to begin with a definition of culture in terms of its symbolic
character:
….A culture is a repertoire of symbols that has accumulated as
human beings have tried to cope with their environment….However, in the
process of living, the human beings who inherit access to a particular
repertoire are constantly engaged in the active, self conscious construction
of cultural systems, or organized, internally consistent sets of
symbols for dealing with some aspect of the environment. To construct these
symbols, they draw selectively on their culture's repertoire of symbols; they
never use all the symbols available. (Pandian , page 1)
The term "socio cultural" is used to signify that
"culture" is irreducibly a social phenomenon, as indeed it
can be said that symbolic human reality is irreducibly a social reality.
Eliminate the social context from the meaning of the culture, and isolate the
identity of the individual personality from this context and you have
destroyed that identity. It is the basic error of many "scientists"
who attempt to reduce an explanation of symbolic human reality below the level
of society in purely psychological terms. This is the essential paradox of the
rational understanding of culture--analysis in terms of its individual
constituents undermines the holothetic integrity if the social phenomenon, and
reveals only individual actors playing individual roles. The myth of "the
psychic unity of humankind" founders upon the rocks and shoals of the
facts of this social reality if human culture. This essential paradox of the
understanding of "culture" is an important beginning to the
comprehension and comprehensiveness of its metalogical meaning. Herskovits,
for whom the concept of "culture" was a predominant yet tacit
organizing principle in his general theoretical scheme of "Cultural
Dynamics" and who defined culture somewhat paradoxically as "the
man made part of the environment"…."the essential nature of
culture must resolve a series of seeming paradoxes that are not to be
ignored"…."stated here as follows"….
Culture is universal in man's experience, yet each local or regional
manifestation of it is unique.
Culture is stable, yet culture is also dynamic, and manifests continuous
and constant change.
Culture fills and largely determines the course of our lives, yet rarely
intrude into conscious thought. (Herskovits 1947, pages 17-18)
Herskovits recognized that culture was essential to the meaning of human
existence--that it was universal--"the universality of culture is an
attribute of human existence" (Herskovits 1947, page 19) and "the
fact that man is often spoken of as a 'culture building animal' is a
recognition of the universality of culture; that it is an attribute of all
human beings, no matter where they live or how their manner of living may be
ordered…." (1947, page 19). Relativism of culture and its universality
in human reality are to seen as both sides of the same coin if the conception
of "culture", inseparable dilemmas of one another. Herskovits
fundamental explanation for the meaning of culture was a paradoxically implied
"inter-integration" between human culture and human personality.
Herskovits argued for the cultural integration of the personality as well as
for the psychological integration of culture. On the one hand, "culture
is the learned portion of human behavior" (page 25) while on the
other hand, "culture is meaningful" (page 27) and "Experience
is culturally defined" a definition which implies that culture has
meaning for those who live in accordance with it…." (page 27)
To understand culture rationally is to enter into the realm of the Great
Circle of Culture, confronted by both the mythical illusion of its
objectification as something existent, solid, finite, real, as a projection of
mythological truth, as well as to encounter simultaneously its profound
subjectification as an image, a patterning, an ideal fiction of the individual
mind, a mythological reflection of the self. In its objectiveness we have a
sense of its limited borders, its boundaries in space and time, isolating this
particular village from that tribal center, this "way of life" from
that. As a subjective reflection we review the many tragic comic dramas of
many human beings who exit and enter the stage of culture to play their
individual parts. Either way, the Circle of Culture, in its comprehensive
conceptioning, is quite complete--it is Humpty Dumpty and anthropologists are
all king's men and all the king's horses. Caught inexorably within its great
Cycles, we cannot but help comprehend the great balance of conceptioning it
requires to keep it complete. The conceptioning of culture cannot
adequately be divorced from its human context of meaning, its symbolic
reality, and still remain viable as a scientific tool for theoretical
organization and comprehension of the reality of human culture.
Whether we analyze the objective manifestations of a
culture, or approach it along the broader avenues of its fundamental sanctions
and intent; whatever the terminology we may apply to clarify our data and set
them in a significant conceptual context; the fact of cultural unity, of
cultural integration is established. Its outer forms frame inner meanings;
sanctions mold conduct; and life as a whole goes on, permitting human beings
to seek and find fulfillment.
As a scientist, the student of culture must divide his data into
categories, just as the student of living organisms dissects his specimen.
Culture is not an organism, so that the analogy must not be pressed to far. It
is enough that the ethnologist, like the biologist in his laboratory,
recognize that the subject as he studies it in several parts is not the living
totality….(Herskovits 1947, page 226)
In recognizing the basic myth behind the objectification of
"culture" and in recognition of its relative contextuality in human
reality, Herskovits rejected the notion of
"superorganic"--"above or beyond the organic"--as a
fundamental metaphor for the comprehension of culture. While noting the
usefulness, for certain anthropological problems, of studying culture as if
it had an objective existence. He cautions that this "methodological
need" should not "obscure the fact" that such an
objectification of culture like "superorganic" is merely a
conceptual construct which serves to guide our thinking and analysis of the
subject:
Must we choose the view that culture is an entity in its own
right, moving irrespective of man, and the one that holds that culture is but
a manifestation of the human psyche? Or is it possible to reconcile these two
points of view.
So deeply do the conditioning of the individual lodge in human behavior, so
automatic are his responses, so smooth the historic line to be traced when
changes in a given culture are followed over a period of years, that it is
difficult not to treat culture as a thing outside man, dominating him,
carrying him along whether he desires it or not to he a destiny he can neither
shape nor see. It is difficult, indeed, even to speak or write of culture
without implying this. Yet, as we have seen, when culture is closely analyzed,
we find but a series of patterned reactions that characterize of individuals
who constitute a given group. That is, we find people behaving, people
thinking, people rationalizing. Under these circumstances, it becomes
clear that what we do is to reify, that is, objectivity and make concrete, the
discrete experiences of individuals in a group at a given time. These we
gather into a totality we call their culture. And, for purposes of study,
this is quite proper. The danger point is reached when we reify similarities
in behavior that only result from the similar conditioning of a group of
individuals to their common setting, into something that exists outside man,
something that is superorganic.
Whether one formally accepts it or disbelieves it, the notion of
"superorganic" itself an important organizing metaphor within
general theoretical anthropology, and has an interesting place in the
developmental history of Anthropology as a formal theoretical paradigm. It is
originally connected to Herbert Spencer's universal scheme of "inorganic,
organic and superorganic (or social) evolution)" in which in all forms in
the universe simplicity evolves into complexity, homogeneity into
heterogeneity, and evolution could be used to explain all phenomena, including
culture. He was also responsible for the "organic analogy" of
culture, in which "he compared society to an organism with processes of
integration, growth, differentiation, decline, and with functional
interrelationships of parts in change and transformation" (Garbarino
1977, page 21). Durkheim next took up the theme of the superorganic, in that
he recognized a distinct level of reality, "in shared ways and beliefs of
a society". Through these shared patternings are not independent of the
individual constituents of a society, their explanation could not be in
individual terms. Durkheim created the "social fact", norms, common
beliefs, values, expectations, rules, to be recognized by its widespread
pervasiveness in human societies and by its coercive, obligatory nature.
"Social facts" explain other "social facts" and cannot be
analytically reduced to psychological, or other terms of explanation.
Ignorance of social facts leads to anomie, social meaning loss, or
normlessness. Social facts, for Durkheim, were the concrete units of
scientific analysis:
To explain them by psychology, biology, or environment would be the
equivalent of explaining the organic phenomenon of an animal in terms of its
chemical components. Social behavior to Durkheim was more than the sum of all
individuals participating in society and could not be reduced to the desires
and drives if those individuals; the whole could not be understood by reducing
it to its parts. To do so would be reductionistic. (Garbarino 1977, page 39)
The next advocate, who dealt most directly and conscientiously with the
principle of the "superorganic" was none other than the renowned
Broasian cultural anthropologist Alfred Kroeber ("The Superorganic"
1917). His thesis was similar to Durkheim's in that social understanding was
irreducible to psychological explanations. Cultural change and cultural
phenomena in general were only analyzable in "terms of interacting
cultural patterns and historical events" which in effect controlled
individuals, and not the other way around. Accused of reifying the conception
of culture, he believed that "culture was primarily intelligible
in terms of itself, not only in terms of itself." And then came
the infamous "neo-evolutionist" Leslie White, who propounded that
"culture could be explained only in terms of culture, never by individual
psychology":
….Psychology is an expression of culture, according to White, not its
cause. Human nature is really cultural nature, and any explanation based on
innate characteristics cannot be correct because such characteristics must be
a constant, universal in all human and a constant cannot explain a variable; culture
is a variable. To the Boasians (like Sapir), who cried in anguish that
White had eliminated people, White said that the question of who votes, who
eats, and so on is an unproductive one. Of course it is individuals and not
cultures. But the debatable question is: why does one group eat something
loathed by another group? It is because of cultural conditioning.
To those who declared that his view was fatalistic or defeatist, White
replied that he never claimed people were irrelevant; humans are prerequisite
to culture. But each one is born into an ongoing cultural system and his
choices are the options available within his culture. What he strives for is
culturally determined but he will strive. White's attitude or philosophical
position should not have antagonized the Boasians. They themselves have been
classified as cultural determinists. If White had stated his position
differently--if he had said merely that each human is the product of his
enculturation processes--most Boasians would have found little to object to.
(Garbarino 1977, pages 88-89)
Though unfortunate, there is no necessary or sufficient association between
the notion of "superorganic" and the schools of
"evolutionism" and "neo-evolutionism", but there is a
causal connection with "determinism" which afflicted not only the
"objectivists" of culture, but the extreme "subjectivists"
like Ruth Benedict as well, who ended up reifying Nietschian
"superman" psychological principles like Appolonian or Dionysian
personality configurations to explain whole cultural sequences and who reified
the stereotype "National Character" to explain history. The question
of whether or not "superorganic" in culture is crucial not only for
understanding culture, but for understanding the mythology of understanding
culture--of anthropology itself. In a very real sense, sociologists and
anthropologists and social scientists alike, by virtue of being what they are,
are at least tacitly and inferentially proponents of the
"superorganic" myth of culture--by fact of their mere duplicity with
the conception of "culture"--otherwise they would really be only
glorified social psychologists, psycho-historians, socio-biologists or
"socio-chemists" or "social engineers". There is no
rational way of escaping this imperative imposed by the myth of culture
itself. And so the Great Circle of Culture turns upon itself.
The question of whether or not "superorganic" is the most
enlightening, and the most fundamental in the comprehension of Culture. Its
answer is not in either yes or no, but in both and neither, in the in-between
excluded middle ground of its mythology. The "fact" that human
reality is both social and mythological poses an irreconcilable paradox. To
say that human reality is categorically "social" is to automatically
admit the possibility of "superorganic" "social"
integration of reality, but at the same time to claim that human reality is
also categorically "mythological" is automatically to refer us back
to the notion of the "psychic unity of human kind" and thus by
direct inference to the "psychic" integration of culture. Of course
both answers are equally valid, but the question remains that what is the
third alternative, if neither are absolutely correct and yet both are
relatively correct, and this question refers us back to the notion of the
"symbolic integration of human reality" and by inference the
"symbolic integration" of human culture. In the Great Circle of
Culture, the answer to the question of the "superorganic" is
determined neither by the individual anthropologists choice to believe or not,
nor by the issue of the individual's choice to serve in the social role of
culture bearer, or to find or create alternatives. We all have these choices.
The fundamental issue of the "superorganic" is that culture may or
may not determine the choices we make, if we allow it to, even if by making no
personal choices at all, but it is the deeper existential issue that culture
at least, in its symbolic universality, determines the range and sets
the limitations of options available to us, if we avail ourselves of the
opportunity, through its provision of the appropriate symbolic metaphors,
rational ideals, models, patterns, etc., and is thus more likely to prove the
predominant influence in our lives. In short, culture provides the symbolic
medium, and defines through it the dimensions of possible freedom, through
which we may create, and recreate, our lives. The paradox is that the range of
options allowed within a cultural context, or a continuum, is usually greater
than our needs, or abilities, or choices to exploit. The metalogical
relativism of the "superorganic" metaphor is that it determines the
boundaries of the Great Circle of Culture, and of our symbolic universes,
boundaries which are variable and different with different people and
different cultural contexts. But it is the cultural context, defined here more
precisely as a dynamic relational continuum, which sets the stage and provides
the final, irrefutable backdrop for our individual performances. The Genius,
in this regard, is the right person in the right time and the right place--a
rarity to be sure.
The question of the metaphor of "superorganic" more appropriately
and innocuously refers us to a related metalogical answer of the notion of
"cultural synergism"--and needs to be reconsidered in light of this
alternative, mythological idiom. "Synergism" is defines "the
action of two or more substances, organs, or organisms to achieve an effect of
which each is individually incapable. [Gk. sunergos, working together]" (American
Heritage Dict. 1983) or as [Mod. L. synergismus, from Gr. synergos,
working together] 1. In theology, a doctrine of a faction in the Lutheran
church who, about the end of the sixteenth century, denied that God was the
sole agent in effecting regeneration and affirmed that man cooperated with
divine grace in the accomplishment of this. 2. The simultaneous action of
separate agencies which, together, have greater total effect than the sum of
their individual effects: especially of drugs." (Websters Dict.
[unabridged] 1983) There is in these definitions a subtle difference in
meaning between the metaphor of "superorganic" and the conception of
"synergism" as it is applied as a cultural metaphor in
"cultural synergism". In terms of the definition, the separate
agencies are the individual actors within their relational contexts,
which are to be seen as passive modifiers of the self directed behavior
of the individual actors. The result of the combined actions of these separate
"agents" or "organisms" to produce a combines, magnified
effect which is greater than the mere summation of their individual
potentialities. There is nothing new or esoteric about this wisdom. On the
other hand, "superorganic" implies that the individual
"agents" are irrelevant, whether their actions are combined or
not--but that the cultural/historical contexts is the active agent which works
upon and molds individual actions. The operation of the superorganic whole is
independent of, and determinative of, the individual constituents.
"Superorganic" as "above the organic" nonetheless does not
escape the reference of "organic analogy" in which individuals in
their social functional roles are equated with cells of the tissue or various
institutional organs which together interfunction and integrate into the total
bodily organism. Now the functioning and behavior of a human being is not
directly dependent upon the normal functioning of any one or any number of the
individual tissue cells, which are specialized in function, except when their
number becomes statistically significant, as in an infection or cancer. This
is the "superorganic analogy". The metaphor of
"superorganic" is properly a rational symbol, based upon the
dichotomization of individual self and culture, which functions upon the
secondary symbolic level. The metaphor of "cultural synergism" is
metalogical and functions upon the tertiary of symbolic generalization.
In the metalogic of cultural synergism, individual reality and social
reality merge, integrate, fuse and become one and the same symbolic reality.
These symbolic integration of culture, there is no more clear boundary between
self, other or the greater society--there is effected a kind of communitas
between subject and object, self and other, knower and known. Mythology might
be called a kind of synergism of the human mind. Culture and its counterpart
History, is a mythological synergism of the symbolism of Humankind. In the
myth of culture, cultural synergism refers to the Great Circle which turns
upon itself in repetitious patterns of regularity, a self fulfilling
mythological prophecy in a cycle of thoughts, words and actions. The synergism
of culture finds its expression in terms of a thematic continuity of
individual actions in the eternal present, a continuity expressed in dialectical
forms--mythological antonyms which arrange themselves in contrapuntal
fashion to create a rhythmic harmony, a concord or a cacophonous discord, in
the form of antithesis or a synthesis. The synergism of history repeats itself
in a self fulfilling prophecy---the dramatic self actualization of the
mythological themes, a "creation of historical reality" with all the
power of human necessity.
By mentioning a unique kind of synergism of History, I am
not merely referring to the "superorganic" analogy which is a
"logic" of misplaced concreteness. It is a relatively simple matter
to look at freeways with their intricate interchange systems and to see blood
veins, to look at telephone poles with their electrical high wires and to see
nervous system, to look at police cars and to see white blood cells, to look
at track housing complexes and to see the tissue and to imagine in all this
analogy some larger than life organism, with a computer network for a brain.
But any such analogy can only be carried so far before the overlay of ideas no
longer neatly fits. It is easy to review History and to see the rise and fall
of empires and of societies and to imagine the growth and climax of biotic
cultures in the agar of a petri dish. But this is not what I mean of synergism
of History.
We are not merely witnessing the discrete succession of exits and entrances
of a cast of discrete, individual actors upon the mythological stage of
historical drama, but we are searching with our chronology of the
"past" with our dialectical terminology, with our mythological
structure, to discover, to self realize, a unity in the diversity of
characterizations, a convergence in the divergencies of events, a continuity
underlying the discontinuity of actions and attitudes--in short we are not
merely seeing a play in performance, but we are taking part in its
performance, acting out its mythological reality, from scene to scene, act to
act, production to production. This is the synergism underlying the mythos of
History.
When surveying the stage, we are looking for common elements of the
background, the symbolism, with which the actors pick and choose their ad lib
performances, to define the complete repertory of symbols which can be
combined, and recombined, in an infinite variety of ways, to recreate the
performance. We are looking for the structural rules of recombination, rooted
in the social context, which delimit the actors range of options. And we are
looking for ways by which the actors learn, and relearn these rules of
combination and recombination, culturally sanctioned and in the process of
relearning redefine, restructure the rules themselves. The rules are not
immutable, unchangeable, unless we make them so. They are defined by the
context and boundaries of culture, they are variable with the variability of
culture, and flexible within the looseness of cultural boundaries, and
alterable within the variations of culture--change.
The synergism of History and Culture confers a certain momentum to their
respective Mythological and Ideological operation within the Past and the
Present, or perhaps more aptly, a momentousness which works like a tidal
undercurrent in determining the forward directioning of Historical and
Cultural process. Historical and Cultural Process is the operation of
Historical and Culture, respectively, within their contexts of Past and
Present, in their mythological and ideological idioms. The momentum of this
Process appears as a repetition, a recurrence, a resemblance of patterning of
the dialectical themes of mythology and ideology. (Lewis 1986 [unpublished
manuscript] introduction)
As the metaphor of "superorganic" refers us to formal theories of
evolutionism and "neo-evolutionism", so too does the metaphor of
"cultural synergism", in its metalogical idiom of
cultural/historical momentum, process, patterning refer us to the notion of culture
change, as well as to cultural adaptations to change, and in so
doing provides us with a legitimate, generalistic framework within the purview
of humanological relativism for a transcultural, pan human understanding of
"cultural development" and for "civilization" which
we would not otherwise be able to do so. The fact of change, and its
universality and ubiquitousness, though simply demonstrated by the fundamental
laws of entropy and thermo-dynamics must ultimately be accepted on faith as a
priori givens. A rational theorem for proving this fact is beyond the scope of
this work. Suffice it to say that change is the single most important
contextual metaphor for the understanding of the symbolic integration of human
reality and "socio cultural synergism". The notion of universal
change in human reality allows us to employ the metalogic of general
relativism to speak in terms of pan human, transcultural universals,
structural relationships which underlie all cultures and which form the
structural basis for the evolution of human civilization whichever its
particular cultural guise. In elucidating a meta theory of culture change
various metaphors such as "dynamic continuum", "relational
structure", "levels of articulation", "culture
process", "adaptation to change", "revitalization"
are employed. Herskovits has most elaborately and systematically formulated a
basic theory of culture change, called "cultural dynamics" tacitly
premised upon the doctrine of "cultural relativism", explicitly
premising change as the fundamental focus of the scientific validation
and theoretical unification of culture theory. Change implies continuos
variation of form within culture and between different cultures in time and
place, which in turn presupposes a relativistic orientation based upon
irreconcilable socio historical and socio cultural differences in traits and
aspects. It is interesting to note here that Herskovits's notion of cultural
relativism, though founded upon the basis of inimical cultural/historical
differences, is not synonymous with "cultural determinism", that
such differences are absolute and preclude scientific understanding--but
rather, Herskovits posits a common universality underlying the continuous
variability. This is a universality which can be scientifically comprehended
when the principles underlying the processes of cultural change (cultural
dynamics) have been clearly elucidated by scientific analysis of the variances
of the forms of cultural aspects in the particularistic contexts of
cultural/historical research.
Though cultural change is ubiquitous, and its analysis is thus fundamental
to the study of human group life, it must not be overlooked that, as in any
aspect of the study of culture, it exists in terms of setting and background
and not in absolute terms, by and of itself. This is how we escape from our
second apparent dilemma, and rest comfortably on both its horns. Culture is both
stable and ever changing. Cultural change can be studied only as a part of
the problem of cultural stability; cultural stability can be understood only
when change is measured against conservatism….perhaps the most basic
difficulty arises from the fact that there are no objective criteria of
permanence and change….(page 20)
The essential process involved in cultural dynamics, in the
"integration between culture and personality, is what Herskovits calls
"conditioning"--habituation, imitation, "at best, unconscious conditioning,
which relates this form of learning to the other types, where conscious
conditioning (training) is applied." Specifically he argues for the
process of enculturation as the basic principle involved--"the aspects of
the learning experience which mark off man from other creatures, and by means
of which, initially, and in later life, he achieves competence in his culture,
may be called enculturation. This is in essence a process of conscious
or unconscious conditioning, exercised within the limits sanctioned by a given
body of custom…." (1947, page 39)
"However, the basic principle involved is clear: The enculturation
of the individual in the early years of his life is the prime mechanism making
for cultural stability, while the process as it is operative on more mature
folk, is highly important in inducing change." (1947, page 40)
Enculturation is thus the process which permits most behavior to be carried
on below the level of conscious thought. (1947, page 42)
The adult version of this process, by which cultural dynamics are
articulated in its various aspects, he distinguishes as
"reconditioning"…"Should circumstances force readaptation,
then a process a relearning, or reconditioning, must be gone through to
accommodate one's bodily structure to the new circumstances." (page 26)
What is clear is the emergence of a rational dialectic in this theory between
culture change and conservatism, enculturation and "reorientation",
conditioning and reconditioning, which Herskovits sufficiently synthesis into
a metalogical metaphor for the understanding of "cultural dynamics".
We must, then draw our definition of pattern so as to reflect these two
aspects of our problem. Patterned structure, regularized form, we recognize,
can be described as can any structure, since all structure has form and every
form has describable limits. But we also recognize that patterned behavior and
sanctioned responses, learned so well as to provoke automatic reactions to the
approved cultural stimuli on the part of each member of a society, are the raw
stuff out of which the structured forms are made. We take both these aspects
into account then, when we think of cultural patterns as the designs taken
by the elements of a culture which, as consensus of the individual behavior
patterns manifest y the members of a society, give to this way of life
coherence, continuity, and distinctive form. (1947 page 202)
The patterned designs Herskovits refers to are none other than the
metaphorical symbolisms sanctioned by a culture, and the integration which the
learning of these patterns entails is none other than symbolic integration of
culture and human reality. It is to be seen from the foregoing that the
integration of culture forms the basis of our conceptual organization of that
word--allowing us to speak of the theoretical unity of "culture"
from which differing but interrelated facets, called "cultural aspects"
may be legitimately inferred, and analytically studied. These aspects are the
variable cultural forms which different cultures may take under varying
socio historical circumstances. Taken together, in their appropriate socio
historical contexts, these aspects form collectivities of a particular
organizational structure, around which a culture is historically
patterned--achieving an identifiable "cultural orientation".
Let us return again for a moment to the individual in society. From his
enculturative experience, he has learned a set of socially sanctioned behavior
patterns which, while permitting the play of variables--minor or pronounced as
in idiosyncratic behavior--yet keep his acts within the matrix of his culture….(1947,
page 207)
Because the life of every group is unified for those who live it, it is
essential that we fully comprehend both the need to study how a culture is
synthesized, and the usefulness of breaking down this unity into its component
parts. In considering any individual way of life, we must see it in compass of
the integration of the whole, a whole that is more than a sum of its parts. It
is such unity that the researcher worker, in so far as he observes life as it
is lived, faces as he studies any people in the field. When we analyze social
human behavior, we can isolate form from meaning, action from sanction…."
(1947 page 214)
The important word here is "sanction" by which is implied
the underlying structure that the patterning of social behavior takes in a
given cultural framework. Understanding the sanctioning of a given culture is
the key to understanding that culture within a cross cultural framework.
Sanction is the hidden but universal process by which culture achieve a
patterned integrity. Thus it is by the principle of sanction that coherence is
given not only to our understanding of the rudiments of culture,, but to our
comprehension of the relativity of cultures as well. In place of the word
evolution, with all its controversial connotations, Herskovits prefers the
word development, to designate the general directions of continuous change
which cultural patterns manifest. For Herskovits, change in culture is as
elemental as the understanding of culture itself, indeed they are almost
interchangeable. But the mechanism of change remains unchanged and
unclarified.
We cannot too often emphasize the fact--we might say the axiom--that no
living culture is static. Neither smallness in numbers, nor isolation, nor
simplicity of technological equipment produces complete stagnation of the life
of a people. Rules of conduct may be rigid; the strictest sanctions may be
invoked to enforce these rules; acquiescence in them may be unquestioning, yet
the observer of a society where even the greatest degree of conservatism
obtains will, over a long period of time, find that changes have taken place.
They may be minute, but they will be there. (1947, page 479)
We may say then, that the process of change in culture is universal; that
the significance of change must be faced in any study of the nature of
culture; and moreover, that the analysis of dynamics would patently be
impossible without postulating change. This, however, does not imply that
cultural change can be studied as an isolated phenomenon. It is only one side
of the shield; for change by and of itself, is meaningless, until it is
projected against a baseline, measured in time and intensity and in terms of
its extensiveness. Above all, it must be contrasted to the phenomenon that is
always opposed to it, the phenomenon of cultural stability--a phenomenon
which, in its psychological aspects is called conservatism. (1947, page 483)
Yet conservatism is tagged as "resistance to change" and
thus the explanation of cultural change dynamics) is reduced to a
psychological level. "Yet the student of culture, sensitive to change,
must grasp variations as well as patterns. For at a given moment, the
variations are the expressions of change in process." Individual
differences--i.e., individuality--is the basis of "cultural variations"
which is turn the basis for "cultural dynamics". Even more
explicitly, resistance to change, or psychological conservatism, is a function
of primary conditioning by social sanctioning, or enculturation, by which
social character is determined culturally, while variation is mainly due to
secondary reconditioning which occurs in adaptation and accommodation to
external changes in adult life--thus reconditioning is the central hinge for
cultural dynamics--the pivot point for cultural development (evolution).
Reconditioning yet related to other descriptive notions of cultural
dynamics--in short the process of change by culture itself--namely acculturation,
diffusion, cultural reorientation, and cultural drift and historical accident.
These in their turn, hinge about yet another critical concept--the idea of "cultural
focus". Reinterpretation, based upon cultural focus, can thus
be seen to indirectly relate, yet causally be dependent upon, the notion of
reconditioning.
Herskovits systematic comprehension of culture change remains an important
and profound contribution to our understanding of the myth of Culture, and yet
the contribution of culture change and the mechanisms of this change, and its
internal/external functioning within and without a social group, remains
largely unclear and unexplained. The origins of change in the universe of
human reality remains obscure--it seems the best one can do is to take it on
faith as a "fact" a priori to our understanding of it. And yet
change comprehends all of Mother Nature and all of Human Reality--it is
universal, eternal, inexorable. All of human reality forms one vast, open
ended dynamic continuum of infinite small changes and continuos,
uninterrupted, changing. Within this continuum must be isolated the phenomenon
called culture change, which is also, paradoxically, a universal in human
reality, and which can be said to hinge upon symbol change. The question to be
answered is how does the Great Circle of Culture itself turn. The isolate of
discrete Culture Process is not a simple matter.
As Herskovits noted, change is a relative phenomenon which can only be
comprehended in relation to its opposite, non-change (stasis, stability,
permanence, etc.). Change/non-change is a rational metaphor for direction (and
by implication, reason, purpose, objective) or "directionality" of
reality, which in human reality is always "future oriented" or
"forward oriented". This forward directed futureward orientation is
a projection of the reflection of the past, a sense of
continuity/discontinuity, of change/stability from the past, in the present
and into the future. The metalogic of change/stability refers us back to the
basic relational notions of symbolic identification, that of
internal/external similarities and differences and subjective/objective
reflection and projection. Applied to "culture change" our rational
error in thinking the myth of Culture is our presupposed conception of
absolute fixed boundaries which demarcate a culture unity, and isolate and
separate it into geophysical space and historically, from other cultures. The
notion of the socio cultural group boundary is at best a reflection of our own
age of "modern" nation states that perpetuate their static
boundaries and cultural differences and similarities at the risk of upsetting
a delicate balance of terror and by the millenarian apocalyptic vision of
holocaust. The notion of boundary identification in symbolic reality is
essential to understanding the symbolic integration of individual in society
and of culture itself. Boundary identification is a relative phenomenon,
different for different people and groups of people, being defined by a
passage of being and transformation of being from one state to another through
symbolic integration. Boundaries through symbolic identification provides us
with a sense of continuity between the past and future, a sense of permanance
and order in the present. They are our symbolic comprehension of
differences/similarities through reflection and projection. We internalize
similarities through symbolic reflection, and externalize differences through
projection. It is our means of maintaining a sense of coherent individual
identity, or personality through maintenance of social symbolic boundaries
(i.e., social identity through social differences) and symbolic cultural
identity through group identity and in-group, out-group boundaries. The
boundaries themselves are relative and change over time--it requiring more
energy to perpetuate or maintain boundaries in the face of external changes
than it is worth. Boundaries are fluid and dynamic over time and are rarely
solid and fixed, finite. They are symbolic, and their thresholds for crossing
depend upon the degree of symbolism they incorporate in complexity and
integration. There is no such thing as a cultural isolate as a whole not in
contextual relations with other cultures. There are ranges between cultures of
symbolic transformation--rites of passage which surround and protect and
confer power upon a cultural group. There are cultural levels of articulation,
"sub-cultural groups", cultural groups, and supra cultural
groupings, all varying in size and composition over time.
Change can be defined by symbolic differentials over time; stability as
symbolic similarities over time. It is a matter of relative
continuity/discontinuity of change/stability over time, maintained through
symbolic boundary indentification either personal or cultural. Personal and
cultural process can be defined as adaptations to change over time to maintain
or recreate symbolic boundary identifications. Adaptation to change, either by
accommodation or adjustment of externalized differences, "changes"
over time, for the continuity or change of personal or cultural identity--a
symbolic sense of coherence, continuity, distinctiveness, meaning--in short
symbolic integration of reality through symbolic identification. We may refer
in this regard, depending upon the particular point of view, to any change as
being either "mal-adaptive" or "pro adaptive" and in this
sense "dysfunctional" or "eu-functional" to the symbolic
integrity of the individual or society. Culture, by this sense,
can be defined as an adaptational mechanism of symbolic group
identification to inevitable changes over time.
Consideration of culture change in relation to symbolic boundary
identification and of culture as a symbolic mechanism of group adaptation to
change--"cultural synergism"--leads to consideration of another
important metaphor, the metaphor of "power". Power is defined
as "1. The ability or capacity to act or perform effectively. 2. A
specific capacity, or aptitude….3. Strength or force capable of being
exerted; might. 4. The Ability or capacity to exercise control; authority. 5.
A nation having influence or control over others. 6. Physical strength. 7. The
rate at which work is done, commonly measured in units such as the watt or
horsepower. 8. Electricity….[Ofr. Poeir, to be able] (American
Heritage Dict. 1983) or as "[Ofr. Pooir; Fr.pouvoir,
from an old infinitive podir, from LL. Potere, to be able, used
for L. posse, to be able, from potis, able and esse to
be.] 1. Ability to do; capacity to act; capability of performing or producing….2.
A specific ability or faculty….3. Great ability to do, act or affect
strongly; vigor; force; strength. 4. (a) the ability to control others;
authority; sway; influence. (b) legal ability or authority. (c) a document
giving it. 5. Physical force or energy; as, electric power. 6. The
capacity to exert physical force or energy, usually in terms of the rate or
results of its use….7. A person taking or thing having great influence over
other nations….8. A nation, especially one possessed of influence over other
nations….9. National might or political strength. 10. A spirit or divinity….11.
An armed force; army; navy. [Archaic] 12. A large number or quantity (of
something specified). [Colloq.]….in mathematics….in optics….in theology….in
mechanics….collateral power….etc., etc…." (Websters Dict.
[unabridged] 1983. The metalogical metaphor of power within the doctrine
of humanological relativism comprehends all these connotations of the meanings
of power.
The metalogical metaphor of "power" is the capacity to change
or to control change through symbolic mediation of human reality. There is
dependent forms of power which are primarily context dependent,
relational within a socio cultural context, through authority, sanction,
proscription or prohibition, privilege, license and there are independent
forms of power which are primarily personal symbolic mediation through access
to alternative states of consciousness, or moderation of ego being modalites.
The two forms of power are symbolic integrated in cultural synergism. Power is
symbolic mediation, or control over symbolic integration of human reality--it
does not matter whether it is expressed in real terms of destructive, coercive
force, in social terms of differential access to basic and valued resources,
or socio economic status, or in a more ideal form of officious touting and
flouting of the Holy Cross or the ostentatious display of the biggest or most
yams or the conspicuous consumption of the most copper crests, blankets or
slaves.
The notion of power is of central importance to the humanological
relativistic comprehension of cross cultural and pan human relational
phenomenon. The grand ethical philosophers who equivocate and over the correct
meta ethical theory in a domestic court of rational law, wholly ignore or
eschew the ages old Machiavellian imperative that "might makes
right"--if their ethical systems were really so absolute and non-relative
then why is there so much pan human neglect of these theories and so much
international strife and warfare. The relativity of ethics is the relativity
of power, however it may be expressed. Power is a metalogical metaphor
which allows us to think of the relativity of ethics in terms of the
relativity of power between cultural groupings. Rare do losers in battle
survive to tell their side of the ethical conflict of values--usually we are
left with only the victors values. This is by no means necessarily a
pessimistic interpretation of human reality, but in light of recent events,
WW1, WW2, and impending global nuclear holocaust it is a realistic assessment
of the cultural relativism of values.
The notion of the relativism of power leads us back to the notion of
symbolic boundary identification and the symbolic processes of internal
reflection of similarities and the external projection of differences in the
maintenance of these boundaries. In general internal reflection takes the
symbolic form of religious sanctification of common symbolic forms within a
group which give a sense of meaning and integrity to a group--while external
projection takes the form of political symbolism of power in terms of boundary
maintenance. In the symbolic integration of culture it makes sense then to
refer to the symbolic authority of religious and political power in their
respective functions of reflective internalization of similarities and in
terms of projective externalization of differences, in the symbolic boundary
identification of a group culture. Dr. Jacob Pandian elaborated this essential
theme:
I have defined ethnicity as a conglomeration of religious and political
symbols which embody the cognitive and emotive cultural boundaries of a group.
The symbols serve as vehicles for the conception and dramatization of the
biological/cultural heritage of a group. The religious and political symbols
exist in a dialectical relationship, and are transformed and synthesized when
used to conceptualize and dramatize group identity. (page 6)
According to Dr. Pandian, symbols of boundary maintenance exist in a
dialectical relationship which may possibly be the "opposition and
synthesis of the symbolic representation of the male and female…" (page
9) Depending upon cultural focus, there will result certain combinations of
these political and religious symbols. These symbol, however synthesized,
facilitate conceptioning of group heritage which in turn facilitates
"certain kinds or types of boundary maintenance". "Many of the
symbols are "sacred" in the sense that they are endowed by the
believers with a mystical power, having non-empirical as well as empirical
referents and the attributes of diverse domains of experience." (page 11)
Every group, with its distinctive way of life, is faced with the problem of
preserving that way of life, of protecting it from major changes that can
occur within or without. Every group must evolve symbols of protection and
perpetuation. These are political symbols. The political symbols become
vehicles for mobilizing people to defend or protect what would be defined as
national or state boundaries.
Since humans live in a symbolic universe they are constantly objectifying,
or creating order or models of reality, to deal with subjective experiences.
Religion offers an arena in which these objectifications of the subjective
experiences of suffering, disorder and uncertainty can be shared and accepted
by the group without empirical verification. Every group develops religious
symbols by which its distinctive way of life is sanctified….Every group
passes on the symbols of justification of its way of life as the only true
way, thus helping each new generation to acquire and recreate the style of
life of the group. (page 14)
We have reached the point of needing to address directly the metalogical
conceptualization of the symbolic integration and symbolic generalization of
"culture" in relation to power as the primary symbolic mediation of
this process of "socio cultural synergism" through symbolic boundary
identification. So far we have begged the central, crucial question of the
symbolic integration of culture, impinging as it does upon the metaphor of
power in "cultural synergism". Basically, the symbolic integration
of culture follows the same lines as the symbolic generalization of human
reality as outlined in the second chapter of this work. The first, primary
level of cultural symbolic integration is essentially communicational in
nature. It consists of the elaboration of communication networks along lines
of systems of signification and corresponds to what has been referred to as
concrete level of socio structural communication. This level consists of the
level of ritual religious behavioral adaptations within a social structure.
The secondary level of symbolic integration of reality corresponds with the
secondary level of symbolic generalization, and incorporates rational system
of conceptualization and theoretization, systems of
"rationalization" operating primarily upon the cognitive level of
human functioning, and corresponding to formal ideological systems and systems
of conceptualization within a culture. Where as information was the primary
medium of symbolization upon the first level, rational understanding, or reason
is the primary meaning system upon this secondary level. The first level is to
be seen as thetic and basic in human comprehension and integration of human
reality, and culture integration--the second level is antithetical,
dialectical, rationalizing. The third level composes mythological meaning
systems which operate primarily upon the emotional plane of human
existence--it is symbolically synthetic in that it mediates between the thetic
informational level and the anti-thetic rational level of symbolization about
human reality.
Power as symbolic mediation is expressed upon these three levels in terms
of differential levels of articulation within relational power
structures. There are three levels of articulation corresponding to the
three levels of symbolic integration of reality. These three levels correspond
to a basic class structure of all human societies, the lower, the middle, and
upper classes. The lower class functions upon the primary level of behavioral,
concrete, informational of power articulation, the middle class functions upon
the secondary level of rational/ideological articulation of power, and the
upper class functions upon the emotive, metalogical plane of articulation--the
political religious leaders and myth makers. Relational power structures are
relative to the differentials of symbolic boundary identities between
individuals and between groups. They will be variable over time working at
different points upon different planes of articulation of power. Relational
power structures, however they are symbolically identified, or culturally
defined, are universal to all cultural groupings, no matter the size or
complexity. They interconnect all persons in all cultural groupings, and all
groupings, not only to one another, but to the larger eco systems context of
Mother Nature as well. Analytically, these relational power structures can be
understood primarily in value terms of socio economic, socio religious and
socio political structures. A conceptual framework for understanding these
structures has been elaborated elucidated in an early, unpublished manuscript.
(1983)
"Cultural groupings", large or small, simple or complex,
are nodal concentrations of local complexity within the overarching,
worldwide, relational power structure. Cultural groupings are variable in
extent of complexity and intent of development--they are clusterings of
symbolic aggregations, upon all three levels of articulation and symbolic
cultural integration--about a particular center, a cultural matrix, which
forms what has been termed a "cultural core". This cultural grouping
upon all three levels of symbolic integration forms definition of a "core
culture" which has distinctive trait complexes, and forms what is termed
"cultural complexes" which function upon the three levels of
integration. A cultural complex is the symbolic embodiment of the core
structural power relations about which a grouping identifies. This complex is
to be analyzed upon three levels of its symbolic integration with reality,
which are superimposed upon one another within the same complex. These
cultural complexes exhibit a relative measure of cultural synergism to the
extent that they are able to continuously perpetuate its distinctive symbolic
boundary identities in relation to the rest of the relational power structure.
In the face of external pressures of change its boundaries may fracture or
slowly dissolve, its symbolic elements and human constituents re-aggregating
about another "center".
Herein lies an alternative metalogical framework for the understanding of
culture change phenomenon, as well as the rudiments of a theory of progressive
"socio cultural synergism" . The structural interstices, the
relational power connections between cultural groupings about different
cultural complexes, defined in terms of relative power differentials, have
been termed by words like "cultural diffusion"--"achieved
cultural transmission"--"geographical social mobility and
migration", culture contact or "acculturation"--"cultural
transmission in process" and "historical accident".
Contact, therefore, can result in minimum borrowing, with or without
external pressure, or it can range to almost complete acceptance of the ways
of life of another people. In any given case, the aspects of culture that are
transmitted, or the transfer of the sanctions of an older custom to a new
cultural form are the result of particular historical circumstances which
influence the psychological motivations underlying the selectivity that comes
into play. (Herskovits 1947, page 539)
A cultural grouping exhibits a particular contextual center of balance
about its central cultural complex, which functions as a center of gravity
within the continuum of the relational power structure, and which confers upon
it a certain "snowballing" momentum which gives it its
directionality of "socio cultural synergism". The central cultural
complex is the center of attention of important cultural symbolizations,
around which a cultural ethos, and world view are oriented. This is the
general directionality which Herskovits called cultural focus":
Cultural focus designates the tendency of every culture to exhibit
greater complexity, greater variation in the institutions of some of its
aspects than in others. So striking is this tendency to develop certain phases
of life, while others remain in the background, so to speak, that in the
shorthand of shorthand of the disciplines that study human societies these
focal aspects are often used to characterize whole cultures. (1947, page 542)
For Herskovits, cultural focus is the basis for understanding the process
of culture change. It is a hypothesis similar to the age area principle
developed and validated for the study of culture trait and linguistic
transmission. "The greatest variation in form is to found in the aspect
of a culture that is focal to the interests of a people. This variation, by
implication, suggests that the focal aspect has undergone the greater changes
than other elements.…(1947, page 550) Variation in form in the focal area of
a culture is marked by reinterpretation--the "process by which old
meanings are ascribed to new elements or by which new values change the
cultural significance of old forms"--which functions internally from
"generation to generation" as well as 'in integrating a borrowed
element into a receiving culture."
….The hypothesis of cultural focus refers the dynamics of culture to the
only instruments which change in culture can be achieved--the individuals who
compose a society where a way of life is undergoing change. It is people who
believe in one way at one historic period and in another way at a later time.
The emphasis they lay on the sanctions, the values, the goals that comprise
the motivating drives to their behavior gives meaning to what they do at a
given moment. We must thus turn to these changing emphasis and drives if we
are to comprehend more adequately the changes in the artifacts, the
institutions, the organized systems of belief that characterize a culture at a
given time, and mark it off from what it was at a different time or from the
other cultures that exist coterminously with it. (1947, page 543)
A cultural complex will exhibit a "drift" of gradual change,
developmental or otherwise, through history, as it borrows, accretes, or
modifies its symbolic forms. Drift is a "natural" process of culture
change based upon variation of symbolic forms. Herskovits defined "cultural
drift" as "the process of cumulative variations".
The concept of drift, the piling up of minor variations that are in accord
with pre-existing tendencies, must be considered as associated with the idea
of cultural focus. We have advanced the hypothesis that because there is a
lively interest in the focal aspect of a culture, change is more likely to
occur in the institutions lying here than in those found in other of its
aspects. Granting that change is not haphazard, but directional, then the
increased range of variation in the focal aspect of a culture would not only
continuously tend to produce a wider range of variants in line with the
direction in which the institutions were moving, but would also make for more
decided change than in other aspects. If, further, the focal aspect was the
one which gave a culture its "flavor", then the outstanding changes
that marked the development of cultures in terms of the succession of focal
interests manifested by it over long periods could be referred to the fact
that drift is not a simple unilinear phenomena. This would further reflect the
fact that the broad stream which comprises any culture has varied currents, of
which now some, now others will be the more rapid. (1947, page 584)
Matteo Bartoli first propounded the age area principle. Bonfante an Sebeok
expounded this principle in paradigmatic outline form in 1944. Basically, they
said that "1. Isolated areas….conserve older linguistic features than
others. 2. Lateral areas preserve older linguistic features than central areas….3.
Of two forms, the older one is spread over the larger area, the innovation
over the lesser area….4. Of two forms, the older one is preserved in a
territory later occupied or colonial." (1944: 383-385) The crux of this
principle is the area of greatest variation, innovation, and "culture
contact" is the area designated as "central" and so exhibits
the greatest degree of cultural change.
What is suggested by this theoretical model is an alternative framework for
cultural development or "evolution". From this metalogical
perspective evolution is to be looked upon from the perspective of the total
framework of a dynamic continuum of a relational structure which is both supra
cultural and synergistic (but not necessarily "super organic"
inclusive of the developmental sequences of all "sub-cultural
groupings" down to the individual. This is a model of "evolutionary
development" which is manifested in the cosmo graphical patterning of the
stars, as well as in the patterning of speciation of biological life forms on
earth, but which is in no way associated with the Darwinian model of
"natural selection" based upon the rule of "survival of the
fittest".
Any natural grouping is defined by its most inclusive boundaries of a
"lowest common denominator"--in biological groupings this is in
terms of the genetic boundaries of a process referred to as speciation. These
boundaries are not fixed, but fluctuating. We refer to a relative center of
balance of interrelations within all members of a group, as well as to its
periphery. This center of balance exhibits a central gravitational
"pull" which is expressed in terms of the "totipotency" of
all the possible, potential relationships within the grouping over time. We
refer to a periphery surrounding and isolating this center of balance. The
same is as true for the human species as for any other biological grouping.
This center exhibits a synergistic momentum which carries it forward through
time in a kind of dynamic equilibrium. The center, at any given point in time
the "mainstream" range of a grouping, exhibits both the greatest
continuity of stability and the greatest potentiality for variations of form.
The development indeed follows a course from simple to complex, homogenous to
heterogeneous, as the number of variations and differences within a grouping
become greater than the number of similarities which conferred stability to
the structure. The overall structure grows in complexity until it fractures
internally from its own accumulated weight of variations. The result of the
fracturing is an "atomization" which features a return to a
lesser-complicated state and a restoration of dynamic equilibrium, or
"homeorhesis". Instead of growth, movement towards extensive and
intensive complexity, there is a reversal of the movement in which
"sub-groupings" or "groupings within groupings" are
throwing off, rejecting, ejecting, excluding, projecting or destroying
differences to resurrect an equilibrium of similarities and restore a center
of balance. What is depicted has been called a model of "punctuated
equilibrium" in which there is an " accordion" process of
cyclical expansion and growth to certain contextually and structurally defined
limits, and then reduction, "atomization" once the threshold of the
group boundaries are crossed. This model has been developed for human
populations which undergo stress, and has been referred to by A.F.C. Wallace
in terms of alternating social states of "relaxation and
mobilization" and has been noted by Marshall Sahlins in his "Little
Man, Big Man, Chief" in his comparison of Polynesian and Melanesian
social structures. There is an implicit "totipotency" in the
structural relations of any group, potential limitations of the synergistic
power of any group, which determines the scope and limits of growth and
development of that group. The paradox of any synergistic grouping is that
there is incorporated into its mainstream both the potential for greatest
change through variation and for the stability through dynamic equilibrium.
In "evolutionary" terms development of complexity is a direct
outcome of cumulative variations--groups of an expressed totipotency growing
to their limitations of development, then fracturing into smaller, more
stabile groupings each incorporating new centers of balance in their
structural relationships, each incorporating a new and modified synergistic
totipotency for further growth and development, until again fracturing and
repeating the process with even more "sub-groupings" of new
expresses potentialities. Thus as the total number of "forms" grows,
in terms of "population" of basic organismic units, there is a
continual process of grouping and sub-grouping towards even greater variety.
There is nothing anti-entropic about this--it is a natural outcome of natural
changes.
Referring to the notion of the "evolution" of human civilization,
this model operates in exactly the same manner as with biological speciation.
Human civilization is a relative term which refers to the relative level of
sophistication and complexity of the "mainstream" of the human
species. We refer to particular instances of this overall process of the
"mainstream" in terms of historically isolated "Vietnamese
Civilization, Chinese Civilization, Indian Civilization, French or English
Civilization, American Civilization, and in larger sub-groupings of Western
Civilization, Eastern Civilization, or European Civilization, or East Asian
Civilization. Within these sub-groupings we recognize particular process of
civilization--"Vietnamization, Sinization, Americanization,
Europeanization, Indianization. Civilization, furthermore, is to be understood
in the metalogical idiom of relational power structures within the total
context of human civilization. Within the total context, there are many
various sub-groupings, some more interconnected and interrelated than others
which are relatively isolated. At any one point in time, tracing the
lineaments of structural interrelationships within the whole continuum, there
can be identified "cultural complexes" processing a center of
gravity and a particular patterning of structural growth--as a whole there is
a predominating "mainstream" of these balancing structural
relationships against which all sub-groupings are to be referenced. This
mainstream will exhibit a patterning of growth and reduction in the same
manner described for biological speciation above. At any one point in time,
any one period of its history, it expresses a relative totipotency of its
synergism in terms of its relational structure, which determines the finite
range of variation possible and the development scope and hence its adaptive
stability and internal equilibrium. In reference to cultural sub-groupings of
this "mainstream of human civilization", this mainstream cultural
complex is always "supra cultural" in context to which all cultural
"sub-groupings" are referenced, and in the matrix or context of a
particular cultural "sub-grouping", of its particular symbolic
cultural complex, there are any number and variety of "sub-cultural"
groupings dependent upon the scope and complexity of its structural
totipotency. Thus it can be seen that within each and ever human being exists
the totipotent seeds for a whole culture, and within each and every culture
are the totipotent seeds for human civilization.
In terms of cultural groupings this rise of civilization expresses itself
in terms of the complication of the secondary level of civilization--the
growth and development of a mediating "middle class". The secondary
level of articulation in the middle class is the heart of human
civilization--it is the motor which drives its repetitive, cyclical
patterning. It turns the Great Circle of Culture. The language of a cultural
group is primary mechanism, its symbolic system upon the secondary level, of
symbolic boundary identification. This can be seen even in the development of
highly professional jargon, like in academic anthropology, which serves to
demarcate the "boundaries" of awareness and admission of the
in-group. The elaboration of language systems upon the secondary level of
rational symbolism allows for the development of a middle class which forms
the mediating mechanism for myth and reality, for civilization.
The synergistic process of this middle center level in a cultural grouping
in its elaboration of variations and crystallization into a parasitic
relationship with the lower and upper classes. From its own ranks prophets
issue with a new vocabulary, a new Master plan, a "new maze-way"
which revitalizes the social structure. Cultural groups can be seen to drift
along in its accumulation of a variation of a common theme, drifting toward an
inevitable Historical Accident--abrupt innovations that arise from within a
culture or result from the contact of peoples….Thus the model of punctuated
equilibrium can be seen to be in full operation in the center of any cultural
grouping, which through its primary medium of a language operating upon the
structural level of articulation of the middle class in primarily second level
system of rational symbolization, continuously generates variations, from the
ground up, which eventually leads to its bogging down under its own weight,
and then revitalization of its crystallized social symbolic structure, and so
on and so on, in each round sowing the seeds for its evolution of
civilization.
The neo-evolutionists have hypothesized the measurable "Erg" as
the mythical quantum of cultural evolution, the prime mover of Human
Civilization. But it has become quite obvious to any one not altogether blind,
ignorant, or plain stupid, of the current state of Modern Human Civilization,
that there is something radically wrong with our "energy formula" if
it eventuates in inevitable consequences of Nuclear Holocaust and Global
Climax. Somewhere in the long sequence of events of our evolution of
civilization something must have gone wrong, a stage of cultural development
at which Human Civilization turned against the Great Circle of Mother Nature
and is ending up destroying her in order to dominate her. Solutions suggest
themselves. Indeed, this whole work was conceived and written in a very deep
seated belief that there is something profoundly wrong with our Civilization,
something rooted in its very mythological structure. Indeed ours is a mythical
prophecy of Oedipus, a millenarian vision of apocalypse which is in the
process of self fulfillment, as we have fixated at the level of the third
chakra. This work has been long in conception in the revolutionary spirit of
"Mazeway reformulation" of our basic mythologies. The possibility
that our Energy Consumption Civilization is not the only possible, or even
naturally necessary alternative, or even the most reasonable, suggests itself.
Our capacity to realize alternative human civilizations in the future will be
a direct consequence of our ability to create alternative mythologies in the
present.
In concluding this overwrought work, its realization is yet incomplete.
Many possibilities for an alternative doctrine of humanological relativism
suggest themselves--in terms of new methodologies for the study and
comprehension of human reality, new values for the improvement of the quality
of human life in a more natural ecological framework. This is not a theory
requiring proof or disprove by being taken to the field or the laboratory for
scientific testing. It is rather a self recognized Mythology about Mythology.
Its value will be measured by its heuristic potential demonstrated by
generating alternative interpretations and theories about our Human reality.
It is out of respect for this reality that it was written.