Chapter Six

Human Knowledge Systems

Human knowledge, formal, informal and cultural, have come to constitute a distinctive kind of cognitive-symbolic system that is tied to patterns of language, cognition and cultural patterning. In literate societies, human knowledge becomes encoded and recorded, and such knowledge become stored and retrievable to create a large surplus of knowledge. 

Knowledge in this regard connotes meaningful understanding, and critical information that is tied to such meaningful understanding. It is also tied to those linguistic and iconographic symbols, technologies or material artifacts, that are used in the demonstration and transmission of such knowledge. 

Knowledge connotes ordered cultural patterning and a highly differentiated symbolic relationship to a larger world.

Human knowledge systems are a distinctive feature and outcome of symbolic human intelligence, and they have come to take on a life of their own within all cultural contexts.

The Functional Organization of the Human Brain

The human brain as a system of complex nervous processes and patterns, can be explained in terms of its stratification into interacting functional areas that serve purposes of the cybernetic behavioral integration of the human organism. From this model, the mind can be seen primarily as the "ghost in the machine": i.e., the emergent property of symbolic awareness that is the outcome of the functional organization of the brain. When we figure out this functional organization, perhaps, we may be able then to design soft-ware programs or even hard-ware digital-analog computer configurations that actually replicate in some genuine and realistic way the standard of Artificial Intelligence.

Earlier research in aphasias, particularly among those suffering battle wounds during and after World War II, has coupled with more recent advances in magnetic resonance imaging techniques to reveal with unprecedented detail the functional organization of the living brain and what happens when certain specific sections of the brain are destroyed. We cannot achieve this functional insight into the inner workings of the brain and its behavioral associations in the world by the dissection and pickling of a dead brain. We cannot ethically operate and expose upon a living brain or experiment with a living brain in a manner that would provide us systematic insight into its functional centers of organization.

In the performance of complex operations, like reading a book, or watching a movie, or surfing the web, certain regions of the brain are turned on and utilized in a definite pattern. And the human brain appears to have this remarkable capacity, not only for almost unlimited learning and limited recovery, but for actually improving its skill performance of complex action sets over the structure of the long run, what some have referred to as the "wisdom paradox." 

The mind then, can be seen as the emergent property of the functional organization of different areas of the brain, of which there are many, and we can track long term trajectories in the development of the mind and the organization of the brain as a function of the life-experience and learning that an individual undergoes in the course of a life-time. This calls to question the plasticity of the brain, and, more specifically, the functional plasticity of the organization of the brain, to not only perform certain complex sets of tasks, but in time to develop short-cuts and improvements in this task performance. A modicum of transference of function from one area to another has been noted--for instance in cases of deaf people who lack verbal speech, or people who are blinded.

Two basic processes of higher order brain function appear interrelated--pattern recognition or "pattern formulation" on one hand, and problem solving, on the other. The lateralization of brain function is not completely or well understood, but it has been suggested that the right side is preoccupied with pattern recognition, and the left-side with problem solving. More important perhaps than the mystery of functional lateralization of the brain has been the development of the neo-cortex and its functional differentiation and development on both sides of the brain. The layering and interiorization of brain connections, and the possible differentiation of brain function by layer, brings an added dimension of complexity to the entire problem of its functional organization.

My dog responds to me intelligently in many ways, and can even do simple tasks and tricks when I show and train it. But there are some things my dog just doesn't seem able to do--like see its own reflection in the mirror, as a reflection of itself at least, or recognize on a page a drawing or meaningful representation. I think teaching a dog to read or write has a long way to go. Even Koko, the best known and most successful of the signing Great Apes, appears to have after many years of training and practice, a vocabulary of only about a thousand words. Of course, a thousand word vocabulary is probably the minimum number of words necessary for a basic human language about the world, but the average child achieves this capacity and repertory by about three and a half years of age, and probably sooner.

Learning new behavioral sets or repertories of reaction and habit, for instance, may rely on different parts of the brain than when experience and expertise with an complex task and its performance are well developed. As people age, and as they practice and get better at doing what it is they do, their functional activity and reliance of the brain shifts and changes in its functional patterning. These shifts can relate to alterations of behavior and personality, changes in mood, temperament and emotional response.

Understanding the functional organization of the brain through the consequences of specific aphasias and brain process imaging techniques is an important first step towards understanding the foundations of human intelligence and mind. I hypothesize that there occur central integrative structures in the brain that have general and specialized functions in tying together other areas of brain activity and serve the purpose of binding this activity into a seamless, "filmstrip" whole. I hypothesize that the breakdown of these central structures, and of the functional integration of the brain, can account for various forms of mental illness, especially schizophrenias and I think certain personality disorders and psychopathologies. 

Knowledge Systems and Knowledge Engineering

No one who has a slightest interest in the modern reality of the world can avoid ultimately the question and problem presented by knowledge and information, its engineering, structure and dynamics, as well as its political-economy in the world. All research and scholarship that aims at the preservation, extension and promotion of knowledge, especially of new knowledge, can be thought of as a form of knowledge engineering.

Scientific Definition and the Denotation of Science

Definitions abound in science, and definitions of science also abound. There are as many definitions of science as there are people practicing it and textbooks teaching it. Definition appears to be a key operator in science--definition refers in a strict sense to the kind of careful philological analysis and stratigraphic excoriation of the received meanings of words that are found in good dictionaries. In a looser sense it refers to the establishment of the broader skeletal outlines of a subject or topic, possibly with highlights to the main features of the topic.

Science is about the definition of reality, and this work is first about the definition of science. It is precisely in the dictionary terms stated above that science achieves its clearest vision of reality--definition as a formal process in scientific thought and communication remains a key aspect of its articulation in everyday life.

 The problem of definition points up the language-problem of science and the role of a kind of formal semiotics and semantics in the understanding of reality. Agreement in theory and practice in any scientific field depends upon sharing and agreement between practitioners of its basic terms and jargon, and the definition in a careful, if not completely precise manner, of the reality it represents. The semantics of science involve the use of terms with clear- cut denotative meanings, implying as often as not a one-to-one correspondence with things in reality and the terms that represent those things linguistically. It implies as well a certain realistic kind of logic that, if it doesn't always follow strict logical rules of inference, it at least implies a practical and historically oriented kind of informal logic involving basic statements of determinism and causality.

Scientific reference works are usually clearly denotative in their language and leave little to the imagination. Perhaps boring to the lay reader and to the humanist alike, they are careful and concise in their parsing of reality in a linguistic manner, tending towards exact or precise definition of terms and their correct usage in contextual settings involving scientific problem understanding, analysis and solution. Scientific reference works written in "plain" language often blend into mathematical formulae and texts that is heralded as a true language of science. It is an important consideration to note that next to mathematical formulation of problem sets and their solutions, clear preference in normal scientific discourse is given to restrictive denotative use of terms and terminologies within fairly rigid conceptual frameworks. This rigor of natural language in the sciences is necessary not only to achieve a maximum of signal efficacy of communication, but it is necessary intrinsically for the clear and concise elucidation and linguistic parsing of reality, in a manner that is conceptually clear-cut and subject to reason and critical judgment without the suspension of reality testing or credibility challenging analysis.

Many basic theories in science are indeed formulated in clear propositional terms, and refer to conceptual sets and complex phenomenal patterns that inherently defy our capacity to mathematically model. Propositional thinking, done in a way that precludes value judgment or conclusive statements, forms the basis for scientific theorization and hypothesis formulation and revision. The formal use of language in scientific definition of reality depends upon the careful training of the individual scientist, and the accumulation through research and experimentation of a standard and received terminology upon which there is implicit agreement. It is in precisely those areas where there is little agreement and where uncertainty is high that the propositional use of language breaks down, and instead there is the competition between language models to achieve goodness of fit to the problem sets they define. Language models seldom offer in such contexts little clear-cut semantic understanding of the problem sets they attempt to define and reconcile. Full reconciliation of a problem set that is attendant upon full understanding entails the development of a coherent propositional view of the reality it represents in terms that are precise and coordinate.

Until this happens, scientific inquiry remains as much a problem of language to define reality clearly as it is a problem of observation or experiential perception to "see" the problem clearly, or of conceptual understanding about the problem. "Seeing" a problem clearly is tantamount and synonymous with "defining" the problem in clear and no-uncertain terms. Conceptual understanding is critically tied to language function and use--we cannot derive a clear sense of understanding of complex problems in reality without a fundamental dependency upon language, or what can be called a basic linguisticality of our thought and ideas. Language is not deterministic of such understanding, but it is in the semantic function and application of language in the parsing and definition of reality, perceptually as well as conceptually, that such understanding becomes possible and expressed in a communicable form.

The linguistic definition of reality, which constitutes the basis for sound science, brings us to the symbolic function of human cognition and mental behavior, and to the gestalt pattern recognition of complex phenomenal event patterns, that is the basis for scientific recognition and understanding. Language parses reality for us, and serves to semantically and iconographically reinforce those divisions or distinctions of reality that occur "naturally" for us in the first place. If terms are unavailable to describe an aspect or feature of reality, then either a new term must be invented or a different term borrowed to fill in the "hole" in our representation of reality. Language facilitates normal pattern and process recognition aspects of our mental functioning and perception, and furthermore extends our capacity for pattern recognition beyond the realm of the purely perceptual to the general realm of conceptual models and relations.

Propositional definition of pattern sets in reality are the basis for theory building and general understanding in the sciences, and it derives from the ability to draw conclusions about basic operating rules that underlie and at least partially determine the relationships between different sets of phenomena that we observe in reality. Such propositions specify in precise terms the deterministic or predictable order of occurrence in relationships, or failing this, at least describes the complementary patterning of inherently indeterminant relationships in a sufficient manner. Propositional construction requires extensive use of critical reality testing mechanisms that permit us to refine and possibly to contradict our propositions by the use of counterexamples or non-predictive outcomes. They represent a natural logical extension of the basic definition of terms, to an application of entire terminologies in a manner that is consistent in every case and sufficient in every example.

A greater part of such rule-definition in our propositional construction of reality is in accounting for, discovering and explaining countless exceptions to rules that we formulate. Too many exceptions to our rules implies that we must either expand our propositions with a wide belt until it can take in all anomalies, or else abandoning the proposition for a new set of propositions that better reconcile the contradictions that are known. This is known as a normal process in scientific inquiry and development of theory. Theories become time-tested with the accumulation of a body of post-hoc evidence which may or may not conform to the predictive inferences of the theory in the first place.

Scientific definition of reality is guided in certain ways by the natural features and distinctions that are readily observable, identifiable and thus nameable. Much of the language of science stems from common sense definitions rooted in perception and in the naturalistic description of things or events in reality. Naturalistic description precedes and comes before scientific definition that leads into propositional testing and paradigm formulation. The basis of naturalistic description is the particularistic identification of the distinctive features of a unique "thing" or event in reality, and then its at least implicit comparison to other "things" that are either similar or different. Such description, if done consistently and extensively, will lead to the development of identificational terminologies of description, on one hand, and relational taxonomies of things being described, on the other. Terminologies consist of nomenclature that names things in particular orders or sets, along with the type-traits associated or used in the definition of these things. Taxonomies arrange things in particular orders showing relationship and difference between different sets, and the basis for the distinguishing between these sets.

All sciences are based upon the parsing of a certain topography or landscape of the natural world, and involves first the development of topically specific terminologies and taxonomies through naturalistic description of the phenomena that form the substantive basis for the discipline. Part of the necessary inculcation of a member into a particular scientific community is the mastery through extensive and intensive study of the basic terminologies and taxonomies that are most closely associated with that particular field of inquiry. The greater part of preparatory training in all the sciences is dedicated to just such learning of the basic nomenclature and relational structures occurring in a field, and the common problem sets that are associated with that field. All fields are furthermore based upon a strong foundation in terminology and taxonomy governing a knowledge system relating to a particular area.

The standard definition for expertise, in whatever field we wish to apply this term, is in the detailed understanding of the specific aspects to any possible problem set within the field, and a command of the specific knowledge or information relating to such a problem set. In general, an expert's taxonomic and nomenclatural knowledge within the field will extend to far greater depth and detail than the average knowledge of a non-expert. It can be expected that among a community of experts, there will be much greater communicative efficacy of technical terms, and a greater shared ground or consensus of knowledge and understanding relating to specific topic areas of the field compared to any collection of non-experts. This consensus defines the basis for the development of a scientific culture that is tied to the consistent and reliable expertise concerning a certain realm of knowledge in reality.

Thus scientific definition is not formal or abstract in the manner that we see pure mathematics. It is applied continuously to real world problem sets, and it tends to follow the natural topography and stratigraphy that is found in reality. In fact, it is important that scientific definition must follow the natural order of things, and must always in the final analysis, refer back to the naturalistic description of things in reality, if it is to remain a science.

Scientific explanation is the propositional definition of problem sets in reality that follows and refers back to the naturalistic description of things and events in that reality in consistent and non-contradictory ways.

We may state a second generalization that is broadly applicable to the definition of science: Scientific definition, following natural lines of description, tends always towards isolating specificity, or particularity, and thus tends always towards complication rather than simplification. The central role of propositional explanation, therefore, is the simplification of realities that always tend toward increasing descriptive complexity. This forms a natural based dialectical tension in scientific knowledge between over-complication on one hand that is tied to descriptive realism, and oversimplification on the other, that is tied to explanative parsimony and logical coherence at the expense of descriptive accuracy. Another way of saying this is that there is in scientific knowledge always a trade-off between empirical consistency on one hand and rational coherence and non-contradiction on the other, but seldom can we have it both ways at the same time. Yet another way of rephrasing this problem linguistically is to say that in our description of reality, we can opt for increasing communicative efficacy, or functional reliability, but at the cost only of communicative efficiency or formal signal coherence. The basis for this trade-off refers to the inherent semantic parallax of human language used in the representation of reality, and in the fundamental informational uncertainty in our linguisticality. It is not just that different people may mean fundamentally different things within the same language terms, but the language terms themselves, when pushed to their limits, remain definitionally imprecise and uncertain. The symbolic flexibility that is inherent to human language and is the basis for its adaptability in reality, making it wonderful for scientific application, contains an inherent flaw or imperfection that is tied to a proposition about the inherent and ultimate entropy of knowledge in the world.

1. No communication can be 100% certain or completely without noise or ambiguity.

2. Communicative inefficiency in language has both intrinsic and extrinsic sources.

3. The greater the inherent uncertainty of a domain of knowledge or understanding, the greater will be the ambiguity attached to its signal patterning and transmission.

4. In general, there is a human tendency under highly uncertain conditions, to reduce the signal to noise ratio by increasing the strength of the signal, even at the cost of the fidelity of the signal over the noise.

In other words, in highly uncertain situations, internal coherence of received signals will be overemphasized even to the point of exclusion of incoming signals that result in loss of coherence. In terms of gestalt pattern recognition processes, this results in a tendency to superimposed preconceived models or pattern structures upon phenomenal fields or stimuli, even to the point of misrepresenting the stimuli. We can understand this clearly in regard to the paradigmatics in scientific revolution and the observed tendency, more apparent in recent periods, for scientific communities to close their ranks to new ideas or to new definitions of reality that are based upon the resolution of an accumulation of exceptionable and unaccountable information.

This points up a fundamental and inherent limitation of human language to serve as the primary vehicle for scientific thought and communication. If language were completely rigid and its semantic parsing capacity overdetermined by the linguistic codification, then science would be essentially impossible and unproductive. The price we pay for maintaining the semantic parallax of language in the sciences, by which we achieve alternation of insight and productivity of theory, is our susceptibility to error and misrepresentation of reality in false or incorrect ways.

Scientific definition stems from the denotative function of making explicit in language what normally remains implicit and intuitive to the background of meaning. Thus definitions are in cognitive function symbolic framing devices that serve to delimit the meaning of a specific term within a specific or general context, by the emphasis of distinctive features and the contextuality of the term within a larger frame of reference, either by both its parent/child relations in a hierarchy, by distinguishing synonyms and antonyms, and by exoriation of the general levels of meaning of the term. Definition and meaning of words in a language normally remains out of consciousness and unconscious to the construction of meaning. Familiarity and experience with the significance of terms is probably traceable to root neural memory associations that are elicited by the term and which neural pattern stands symbolically in place of the term in an automatic or reflexive manner. Consciousness is freed from the task of excavating discrete significances in order to give full attention to the ongoing significance of the term within its naturally occurring sentential context, whether this context is fully elaborated as with written texts or remains to some degree contextually embedded as with a great deal of oral discourse. The sentential frame of reference within which a word is used on the fly remains as much as possible an explicit contextual framework--it is a propositional definition that implies a specific action or inference about reality that then requires testing for fulfillment. Thus by situating a word within a specific sentential framework, the word becomes applicable to reality and real situations such that its inferential value is testable or available for validation.

Scientific definition, which is a normal part of scientific knowledge, serves to make explicit the background context those basic elements of any text or discourse that would remain normally only implicit. By doing so it sets these terms as subjects of other sentential frames serving to make their significance testable in either a general or a specific sense. Ultimately, definition of a term is an entirely relative affair, referring to the definitions and meanings of other terms. Linguistic relativity really unfolds on the issue of the semantic parallax of words, and the linguisticality of all meaning that gains verbal expression. In other words, definitions of terms can only refer to other terms, which terms are situated in their own sentential or propositional frames making them available for testing in a general sense. Thus semantic denotation and definition in an explicit sense refers only to relational values within language itself, in terms of other words within other propositional frames of reference. Unlike mathematics, which validation is inherent to the logical structure of the language, and is abstractly independent of actual experience, natural language about natural events lacks any inherent structures of signification. They are symbolic structures which can only point indexically in some fashion or other to external meanings and experience gained from the natural order of patterning in the real world. Ultimately, the only source of validation for terms are therefore by means of the trace memory and experiential associations that such terms fundamentally or ultimately elicit. And these mental patterns are built up from real perceptual and behavioral experience.

Words only gain significance in their application to real situations or reference to things in reality. The capacity for creating fictionalized accounts attests to both the power and essential weakness of language--many accounts are beyond our ability to test them if they are beyond our experience or capacity for validation. We can choose to accept or reject such propositions, but we have no way of independently confirming or disconfirming their validity or credibility. Again, in highly uncertain situations or environments, there is a tendency to accept certain propositions on the basis of blind faith alone, suspending any critical judgment or objective reality testing through experience. In such a case there is a predisposition to impose frameworks of knowledge and meaning upon behavioral experience that is inconsistent or contradictory to this experience, and at time to even force-fit or conform behavior to meet the expectations imposed by our own frames of reference.

It can be said that science serves through its methodology to render explicit and systematic in our behavioral experiences and observations, in our languageandour definitions, what otherwise remains normal and implicit to everyday cognitive processing and reality testing.

It is often the case that a theory may be perfectly logical and acceptable in the treatment and definition of some kinds of problems, or certain major aspects of a problem, on one hand, and yet remain ill fit and insufficient for the explanation of other aspects of a problem that are attached. Such theories are generally revised as partial or intermediate range theories, known as "covering law models." We do not throw out Maxwell's wave-field theories that are perfectly suitable for the description of electro-magnetic properties and fields, because they are found not to be applicable in a direct or necessary way to a general relativistic accounting of physical reality. We assume that Einstein's theory of general relativity is more basic and general and encompasses a broader range of phenomena that Maxwell's earlier equations cannot fully or sufficient explain. At the same time, we accept the limited truth value of Maxwell's equations in the precise definition of certain kinds of phenomena occuring in reality.

We may say in general that all scientific theoretization tends towards over-generalization, or what can be referred to as over-extension of reference, and in the process, all theories, to the extent that they are correct, tend in the long run towards specialized compartmentalization, or a strict determination of reference within a context that becomes bounded by more general statements about reality.

Propositional thinking is therefore the foundation for the formation of paradigms in scientific communities, and for the process of paradigmatic dynamics affecting the acceptance and rejection of alternate theories. Propositions that should permit some degree of reality testing through experience, (in scientific terms, controlled experimentation), by posing explicit inferences within sentential frameworks that are available by means of their communication to independent validation and signification. At the same time, propositions can foster a framework of understanding that invites a sense of security about our knowledge structures that require subsequent reinforcement to maintain. A paradigm can be said to be a body of propostional theory that is built up around an agreed upon terminology that defines reality in a given subject area in certain precise ways.

It is apparent from this digression about scientific definition that science is not just about the saying, but also about the doing, and the dialectic between thought and action in the development and history of scientific research and theoretization is clearly evident in every case of its practice. Science sets about to systematically discover through exploration, or to demonstrate through controlled experientiation, or rather experimentation, the validity of propositional statements made by scientists regarding the phenomenal patterning of reality at whatever level this may be analyzed upon. The doing of science situates the meaning structures of scientific definition within an organic and experiential frame of reference--furthermore this frame of reference has certain standards and measures attached to it that it renders this experience fairly reliable in terms of its replicability and its representativeness of reality, and makes it a fundamental part of the common stock of knowledge. There is perhaps no other field of endeavor outside of science where thoughts and actions, words and deeds, are so closely interlocked and are so studied and carefully coordinated.

Again, though, the behavior of a scientist in terms of research is not fundamentally different from the behavior of an average person who is attempting to learn something not previously known. We test our propositional structures of meaning in reality, especially in a subjective sense, everyday through our conversation with other people and through our interactions with the world as well as through our reading and perception of media. We have an inherent motivation and need to test our propositional inferences, and to construct these propositions about reality. 

These needs are critically tied to our capacity to learn from and adapt to dynamic environments and settings where change is continuous and most often unexpected. Again, the critical difference between scientific practice and normal human behavior is a matter of degree and studied refinement that allows the same basic processes of symbolic reality testing and propositional construction to proceed in a much more explicit and controlled manner than otherwise possible--in a manner that puts a premium upon objective communicability of meaning and upon its testability through independent experience. The constructive semantic and inferential function of language in science is the same function it serves in everyday experience--albeit in a more strictly denotative manner. The consequences in terms of the mapping of reality, of the construction of some sense of worldview that mirrors or models complex realities in the wider world, permitting a symbolic coordination of behavior of a person from day to day and year to year, and between different people over both space and time, are the same with science as they are with everyday common sense. The intuitive functions of embedded meaning are the same for the languages of science as they are for everyday language, except that the former tends to be defined denotatively while the latter remains mostly connotative and defined through use and application.

There is little room for emotional reaction or impulse in scientific work, though we can say that a scientist is a passionate person in the pursuit of new knowledge and understanding, or in the invention of a new device that permits the expansion of reality by some increment. A scientists thus normally sacrifices subjective indulgence of experience for the objective coordination and control of experience by careful and planned ratiocination. When a scientists acts in the field, there is usually a clear accounting for why the scientist acted in terms that are logically tied to some propositional framework. Thus it requires a tremendous discipline to become a scientist--a discipline to control and channel one's emotions and impulsive drives and aggression towards deferred ends.

Understanding the linguistic role of semantic definition in scientific thought and its constraints upon action in scientific method, points up the relationship of scientific thought and activity to normal human thougth and activity in everyday settings. The same basic mechanisms of symbolic framing are employed in both sets of activities--human cognitive functions serve the same interests and function in the same manner in both instances. The critical difference between the two are the degree of elaboration and rigor that is brought to the former and the degree of intuitive contextuality and generality of function that characterizes the latter.

Science can be seen therefore as an esoteric form of symbolic exercise that is more differentiated and specialized in function that normal human symbolic behavior. It is systematically and deliberately controlled to yield consistent results in a regular way, or else to discover exceptional patterns in an unusual manner.

Science as a form of systems theory and operational methodology, whatever form this may take in knowledge domains, is based upon this requirement of scientific knowledge that it is more rigorous and elaborated in the form of expertise than is general or normal knowledge practices. A scientific approach may be systematically applied to any field of endeavor or knowledge--requirements are in its systematicity and, more importantly, in its heuristic success in being able to solve central problems that characterize a field of inquiry.

The basis of scientific research is question asking, and posing a question is a way of drawing a symbolic frame that contains or expresses one or more unfinished inference structures, inviting some solution to this structure. A question is a kind of unfinished proposition, in which the reality testing function implied in all propositional statements is emphasized and made explicit by marking in the question framework. A normal proposition poses an answer to be verified or not on an implicit level--a question posing proposition demands an answer to be given on an explicit level.

The question posing and answer seeking nature of science as a heuristic problem solving system has not been fully addressed in the literature. We abound with questions, but we seldom question our own question asking ability. Questions invite or provoke some kind of complementary response. In science, we do not normally ask questions of one another, but rather we ask questions of our data, and of the reality that lies behind the data and from which the data emerged in the first place. Questions are tied to an innate human proclivity to explore the environment. We have an inherent preoccupation with our life-world upon a basic level. Our existential sense of security rests upon the perception of a world that is ordered and "safe." Our curiosity is a function of our intelligence, and our ability to pose questions, even behaviorally, about our environment is a function of the symbolic structure of this intelligence. The capacity to ask questions, I believe, rests in the ability to transfer meaning from one symbolic frame to another, remote frame, that has no direction connection or immediate, mechanical relation. The capacity to shift frames from one context to another creates on one hand a tendency towards closed-minded superimposition of preconceived stereotypes upon our field of awareness. On the other hand, if this preconceptioning can be suspended, however temporarily, then it is possible to experience reality with a kind of intuitive naivete and unbiased involvement upon basic levels of perception and cognition--under such conditions questions arise almost naturally if we seek to make sense of our experiences.

A question in a technical sense is an inference frame that does not answer itself or does not put forward an inferential proposition about reality. In a sense it is an incomplete proposition, lacking a referential subject or object. Questions are usually marked by some form or word, such as the "wh" words in English. English and probably most Indo-European langauges have some version of the who, what, where, when, why and how questions. On the other hand, the semantic implications of these kinds of questions may vary considerably between languages and cultures. Some cultures may not ask why questions in the same way as we might expect, and if such a type of question were put forward, we might be surprised to receive an answer indicating a what or even a who, where, when kind of frame. This is not surprising if we understand that what may be obvious to us may not appear so obvious to others, and vice versa.

Science is restrictive in a fundamental sense of question asking ability--science does not normally ask or seek to answer "why" kinds of questions. An answer to a why question would be framed in a "how" manner. Answering how something happened speaks to a form of efficient and mechanical causality or determinism that does not provide a full "why" explanation. Ultimately, "why" type questions lead to unanswerable speculation upon another level. I believe it can be demonstrated ultimately and categorically that science is not operationally capable of dealing with why kinds of questions except in a most local and limited way. Instead, a how kind of answer provides a kind of explanation to a problem for which there appears to be some kind of solution. Why kinds of questions again invite a form of rationalization about reality that entails the substitution of some form of symbolic construction or framework for an answer that is more directly rooted in the experiential foundation of reality. In this we may see a simple way for describing the difference between religious leaders, whatever the religion or faith, on one hand, and working scientists on the other.

Scientific Speculation and Empirical Interpretation

Two aspects of the normal affairs of science are not given great attention or credence, but are nevertheless normal and critical processes in scientific method. The first is the emphasis upon individul speculation as a prodctive means of conducting scientific inquiry; the second is the use of interpretation in the analysis and synthesis of empirical information. These statements will be challenged because they seem to contradict a received view of science as rigorous, studied and systematic in every way. Such words like speculation and interpretion become taboo in science because they admit processes that lack the discipline of science and that make scientific inquiry soft and related to other forms of humanistic inquiry.

Scientific speculation can be said to be a kind of informed hypothesis formulation in the fact of uncertain or unknown facts. We are all naturally given to speculative reasoning in situations in which we are unsure of events or outcomes. Such speculation provides us with a means for filling in the gaps of worldview and our cognitive maps when such uncertainty or a lack of knowledge arises. Speculation is really a way of proposing alternative hypothetical constructs, or possible scenarios or frames, within which we can test known realities for best fit. The problem with speculation seems to be that such a method provides no direct means of proof or demonstrative testing of reality. Speculation begins with known facts, and then can grow wilder and wilder with the hypostatization of unknown realities. Speculation can therefore be said to be a form of counterfactual hypothesis generalization that deal with conditional realities.

Interpretation is related to speculation in a manner that deduction is related to inductive inference, and this is more than just an analogy. Interpreting data in the face of possibly unknown facts allows us to think about the data in different frameworks, and provides increased undersanding about the data within the structure of various frameworks. The interpretation of evidence follows an attempt to make facts fit when all the pieces of the puzzle are not available or are missing. It allows us to try to guess the image of the puzzle even if it is only completed by a small percent.

It is found in pattern recognition tasks that speculation and intepretation are basic and natural responses to the presentation of relatively unpatterned or highly ambiguous figure ground relationships. Speculation and interpretation are in these tasks complemented by the superimposition of mental imagery and forms derived from the imagination. Speculation usually involves the entire frame of reference, while interpreation usually at least initially tends to focus upon minor details within the larger framework. Much of this speculation and interpretation appears in the initial stages to be erroneous and purely imaginative, but it tends to lead to a "priming" of the mind to be able to recognize and piece-together slight cues or clues so that, in the case that an image can become even partially more resolved, a more realistic solution becomes available as a result of such studied speculation and interpretation. Only in cases where the superimposition of preconceived forms upon the data, and the perseveration of these forms inspite of the increasing resolution of the image, does such speculation lead to total failure to perceive or conceive of the true form embodied in such amibiguous backgrounds. This is attributable to a kind of neurotic frame dependency that cannot tolerate or play with ambiguity.

There has been much in the development of a metasystemic perspective in natural systems theory that has originated in speculation and interpretation. The process has been repeated and gradually refined around central points, and has led the way to investigation in certain directions that has opened the door to new insights and understanding of such systems at different levels. Speculation in the initial stages at least permits almost a total free play of ideas without constraint or consideration of plausibility or probabilities. The only constraints to such speculation, from a scientific standpoint, is that the plausibility structures of normal reality are not context or strained too far, to the point that we are engaged in the production of science fiction and fantasy, rather than being involved in a critical dialog with reality and facts.

Speculation and interpretation are to be expected in a new and nascent field of inquiry such as natural systems theory. This perspective is in fact relatively new, though it has been built upon the accomplishments of the sciences. It follows that the early stage of the development of natural systems theory should see a tremendous amount of speculative and interpretive activity that would be, if not completely wild, at least not yet fully domesticated.

The basis of informed speculation and studied interpretation is the development of frames of reference and backgrounding of the subject being undertaken. It entails the construction of alternative plausibility structures that permit inferences to be drawn in directions not otherwise permitted. If such and such is true, then this that and the other thing become plausible as well. The construction of such plausbility structures are guided as systematically as possible by the application of sound reasoning or rather a form of possibilistic logic and a kind of mathematical ratiocination.

Informed speculation requires several preliminary conditions. It requires a certain basic expertise and informed knowledge of the facts and field within which speculation is applied. It requires the capacity to temporarily suspend the sense of credibility of certain basic propositions, or the capacity to at least call these basic propositions into critical question. I believe as well that informed speculation requires a kind of intuitive understanding of both the data and of how the data may fit together in previously unseen or untried ways.

Like speculation, accurate interpretation also requires a degree of preparation and preposturing of background knowledge to permit the correct relationships to be drawn from and to whatever limited data base may exist regarding a particular subject. It is a kind of detective work that requires both detailed observation and long-range deduction and the construction of alternative frameworks or scenarios by which to fit the available facts. Parsimony applied to interpretive frameworks would entail the inclusion of as few extra bits or plausible counterfactuals to the interpretation of the evidence as possible--in other words, though the evidence may be incomplete and insufficient, it must be regarded as complete as possible, and the best interpretation would be the one that sufficiently explains the available evidence without the demand for more evidence being made or met by hypotheticals. In other words, the data in such situations should, as much as possible, be self-explanatory. Short of this, the next best arrangement is that the data can be organized in a meaningful manner that allows us to frame new questions and that permits us to conduct explorations or experiments that leads to the acquisition of new data, the discovery of new pieces that fit the puzzle.

We can see that while speculation is allowed to roam rather freely over hypothetical terrain that is bounded only by structures of plausible inference, interpretation is more closely constrained by the available evidence and the fit of the facts to the natural framework in which they occur. Of course, interpretation and speculation can be seen to be mutually and dialectically constraining of one another--speculation is based and defined by the interpretations we give to events and evidence, while interpretation is permitted some degree of freedom by means of a speculative mode of hypothetical construction. It follows that we should not attempt the one without performing the other in the development of new insights or new fields of understanding.

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Creative Problem Solving, Intuition, Imagination and Freedom from Intellectual Constraint

There is a kind of problem solving that I would call creative or innovative, that leads to new insights. This is a kind of problem solving that seems to me rarely taught in schools, perhaps because, given our cultural conventions, it is thought of as being something hard to teach. Most often we ascribe certain people with a knack or a natural gift or talent if they appear to be especially good creative problem solvers. There is a tendency in creative problem solving, somewhat like dreams, to apply alien or foreign forms to the solution of a problem. I believe this kind of problem solving was characteristic of Leonardo da Vinci, for example, as exemplified by his play with ideas and doodles in his note-books. There is a experimental imagination to try new things and to look at old things in new ways. That this may frequently lead to new insights, even as a matter of chance, should be in itself unremarkable.

The qualities that we find in creative problem solving are intuition, or what I would call a non-verbal form of thought and analysis that we bring to the understanding of the world, imagination, including the ability to create alternative constructs and to "mix metaphors" in a manner that would result in creative insight or alternative constructs. Also, I believe, freedom of thought and action, including free play of ideas, seems to me to be critical to the cultivation of creative problem solving, and this is a quality which is perhaps rarest and hardest to find, given the common tendency in society to restrict freedom and even frustrate its expression. I would add a fourth quality to the cultivation of creative problem-solving, and this is a certain inherent sense of interest including responsibility and seriousness that is brought to the problem situation in the first place, and that is necessary to carry the problem through to successful solution in spite of perhaps an endless round of frustration. Creative problem solving may demand a certain kind of freedom from constraints, but it does not mean that it is merely play and anti-structure. It entails a kind of deliberate effort and work, what I would call a focused concentration upon the problem set, that provides the necessary energy to achieve its resolution.

To a great extent, the successful development of metasystems theory depends upon the cultivation of these qualities associated with creative problem solving, and creative problem solving as a general and legitimate methodology is given more credence in this approach compared to the conventional sciences that stress directive thinking and analytical problem solving.

Einstein, in his autobiographical piece, clearly highlights the importance of some of these qualities to the challenge of intellectual problem solving. Mastery of a field of expertise does not preclude interest in other, often related fields of inquiry, and must be accompanied by the capacity to think beyond the constructs and models that inform such a field in a critical and open manner.

These same qualities are those that I have found manifest in the development of metasystems theory, almost without exception, and I believe most of my life has been characterized by this kind of creative problem solving applied to one area of activity or another.

We must inquire a little further into the nature of intellectual constraint. In general I would say that it is a form of limitation that is brought to our thinking, perhaps for a variety of reasons. Belief, superstition, false consciousness, ideology, all present forms of intellectual constraint to our thinking, and I can imagine other forms of symbolic dependency as well. We can speak of various forms of fetishes that we may have, as well as what might be termed obsessive or compulsive fixations. Distraction is a great frustrator of intellectual freedom, and that is why real thinkers almost invariably seek solitude and silence in order to think without disturbance or noise. If people live with behavioral limitations, structurally or socially reinforced in their own lives, then this will translate into some form of intellectual constraint as well. Francis Bacon spoke well of these kinds of constraints when he referred to the different kinds of idols of the human understanding--idols of the tribe, of the den, of the market and of the theater. We must be capable of detaching ourselves from a strong sense commitment to any particular mode or object of interest, and at the same time, of fully and unreservedly involving ourselves upon some focal problem set without a sense of reservation or distraction. This may be harder to accomplish than we think or wish, and we may in the process find ourselves our own worst enemies of intellectual freedom. For the repressions we find and place in other people, are those that come from within ourselves, often in an unconscious manner.

True intellectual freedom entails, I believe, a general nonattachment to material things or circumstances. At the same time, it entails a certain release from concern with petty or day-to-day matters, and thus also some optimal level of material comfort. It is difficult to think clearly if one is shivering from the cold or burning and sweating from the sun's heat. Intellectual freedom entails a detachment from social roles, identities and often even social relations, and thus entails some sense of general withdrawal from the parade and vanities of human affairs. Thus intellectual freedom entails the nurturance of a certain simplicity and, I believe, humility of lifestyle that precludes self-aggrandizement or preoccupation with petty ego-oriented attachments. At the same time, it is equally true that if creative work is to move ahead, the contexts, materials and tools must be available and of ample amount for such creativity to gain full expression.

I also believe that at some level intellectual freedom entails its communication within a larger community that will be minimally tolerant if not supportive of such freedom. That freedom may depend upon communication comes as somewhat of a paradox, as it would seem that communication can be the principle vehicle for the shackling of freedom and its restriction. Thus communication must essentially be open and reciprocally given and received. The communicative aspect of such freedom locates a sense and reality of such freedom in a social landscape, as a social process, in the articulation and advancement of knowledge especially.

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The Two Cultures of Knowledge and Cognitive Underpinnings of Problem Solving

Observational inferences and the result of structured research has led me to conclude that underlying knowledge cultures are cognitive substrates of meaning and order that regulate behavior and belief structures within these fields. These cognitive foundations of knowledge vary considerably between different disciplinary fields, and lead to different kinds of consequences and outcomes. Generally, I conclude that there may be two different forms of problem solving that are based upon the cognitive patterning of the brain that can be utilized in different knowledge systems, and some knowledge systems tend to emphasize one form of problem-solving activity, especially in terms of formal training, than the other. I believe that these fundamental differences may constitute the basis for the stratification of knowledge between C. P. Snow's "Two Cultures" of the sciences and the humanities. To a great extent, these two cognitive orientations can be said to be mutually exclusive, at least in the sense that the success of one kind of problem solving tends to come at the cost of success in terms of the other. This does not mean that people can normally and frequently function in both modes in tandem or simultaneously, but I believe that the interfunctioning of both systems together may result in increased levels of cognitive dissonance that would interfere with the effectiveness of either system.

I would define the two sets of problem solving that characterize and underly the Two Cultures of academia as being primarily the differences between holistic and analytic approaches to knowledge organization, as well as between different levels and degrees of restrictiveness and contraint of the symbolic encoding of the language that is applied to different domains of phenomena. The former, holistic problem solving can be seen as expansive and elaborative, leading to the contextualization and interpretation of information, while the latter form of analytic problem solving can be said to include a systematic restriction and reduction of information to a narrow range. The former can be said to seek resolutions and identification of contradiction and dilemma found in natural patterning, the latter form of problem solving takes the characterization that Thomas Kuhn applied to it, that of puzzle-solving that has a finite, specific solution to a delimited problem set. Differences between the two kinds of knowledge systems can be said to be recognizable in relation to both the organization of knowledge, its disposition and function, and to the application of knowledge to the problem of the unknown and uncertainty in reality.

I have come to recognition of this in terms of my own personal life experiences in attempting to develop natural systems theory and applie various aspects of this work across disciplinary boundaries. It forces me to attempt some kind of formal reconciliation of the two sides of this model in terms of providing a means for both approaches to interfunction effectively and at least interference to one another over time. I am not sure if this is possible in situations where one or the other mode of problem solving has been hyperdeveloped, whether in psychological terms of an individual's habitual cognitive functioning, or socially in contexts where one kind of problem solving or another is expected and contrained in the social patterning. In the best of possible worlds, opening up one or the other form of problem solving to make room for the occurrence and development of the other would be desirable, at least in theory.

It is said that we use only a portion of our brains. I do not know how true a statement like this really is, or if it can be truly proven or disproven. It is possible that we are normally using most of our brains most of the time. If we are to get at the mystery of Einstein's problem solving intelligence, what many consider to be his genius, then I doubt we will find it in the formaldehyde of his pickled dead brain a half century after his demise. We may not even accomplish this if we attached electrodes to the brain during his lifetime.

What seems apparent to me is that we use our brains in a habitual manner on a normal basis, because such habitual patterns are the simplest and most cost efficient patterns for the brain to follow. It strikes me too that in such a case, neural patterns would be laid down or rewired in a manner to reflect as much as possible this habitual pattern, or any alternation from it that may occur as the result of learning or change of circumstances and experience. We fill up our brains with knowledge like so much information on a floppy disk. We must at some point in our lives, perhaps in our middle age when brain cells quite growing so rapidly and begin dying more quickly, reach a stage of cognitive equilibrium of brain function such that our experiences in life and our noetic patterns are fairly stable. Any perturbation of such patterning would be expected to result in compensatory mechanisms serving to reestablish an equilibrium. If we pile more junk information in on some level, then a corresponding amount of old outdated junk information must be recycled back out again. One anachronistic brain pattern must yield to a new and more important brain pattern. Dreaming may have something to do with this, as well as with other cognitive housekeeping functions such as integration and rehabilitation and symbolic evaluation.

The life and inferred existence of the unconscious psyche seems equally important to me in this consideration. Much learning of new information and its embedding into the cognitive substrate of meaning in our existence must occur on a fundamentally unconscious level, and much of this unconscious processing and direction occurs without our own explicit awareness of its happening. I do not know how much we are slaves of our own unconscious psyche. It is clear to me that one manner we have of being duped and manipulated by our psyche is in terms of our self-illusion of our own rational control and intention. It must be wondered how such rationalization of purpose and intentionality in our lives is nothing but an ego-defense mechanism serving to mask our real unconscious intentionalities, which would be presumably more crass and base in desire than we would want others to know or deal with. I do not know if this kind of internal control mechanism can ever be proven or disproven in any clear empirical manner, but it does make for meaty psychoanalytic interpretation.

Another way of putting this is to state that the brain may have multiple control mechanisms that may function frequently only in an indirect and unobvious manner. These mechanisms would serve to organize, order and define brain processes and cognitive function in certain basic ways. Furthermore, these mechanisms may be competing for control in the brain over the life of the mind and its subjective and behavioral consequences upon the body. It is perhaps easier to see such control mechanisms in the brains of non-human mammals and other animals than it is to find it in our selves, so fraught are we with the illusion of our own exceptionality in the natural order of things. Instinctual patterns, obviously brain based, leading to fixed action patterns and predictable response systems, are an example of this kind of control mechanism or system in, lets say, a dogs brain. The fact that most dogs behave in similar circumstances in a similar, often predictable manner, entails that dogs must share similar structures of cognitive control over their behavior, and these control mechanisms are not only to be seen in a Pavlovian manner of stimulus-response conditioning. The fact that dogs do not always behave in a predictable manner tells us as well that control centers in dogs may not be that predeterminative or fully determining at all times as it might be for, say, a rattle snake. Even snakes with relatively small and primitive brains can be seen to behave in case studies in ways that do not preclude some kind of arbitrary self-control in certain situations. It appears under certain circumstances that they may be capable of deciding whether to strike or not, depending upon the assessment of the situation and the response patterning of their intended victim, and even possibly how much venom to release when they do strike.

Humans do of course have self-control, and problem solving demands that this self-control be coordinate to and active in relation to a range of cognitive processes relating to the determination of a solution to a problem. Our own autonomous self-control seems itself to be an emergent property of our overall sense of self as a unique and independent organism in life. In other words, it appears to emanate in our consciousness as a result of our overall organiismic integration and self-awareness. An interest case in this regard is the not uncommon possibility of our rendering our sense of self control to the external social control of another or to a social situation in which we are involved and that we find to be compulsive behaviorally regardless of our psychological reactions to it. Hypnotism and crowd response are examples of this. Self conscious control mechanism, that appear to repress certain feelings or impulses in a normal manner, may be obviated or temporarily suspended in relation to external stimuli or circumstances. There is a sense that field-dependency and neurotic attachment to external stimuli may be related to this process. In any such context, it appears that sense of self as a independent, whole organisms breaks down or becomes lost in relation to a situation or particular behavioral setting.

On the other side of the coin are the obvious instances when self controls are defeated by libidinal impulses or aggressive tendencies that appear to arise internally within an individual, but which are externally referenced and made relevant to external stimuli and response patterns. Conscience, which may involve a sense of responsibility, of respect, of normative valuation, of psychological restraint or repression, of shame or guilt, and possibly also of empathy and concern for others, seems to me to be a basic overall self-control mechanism that some might claim represents a societies internalization into the psyche of social sanctions and proprieties. I believe that Freud termed this the superego, though I belive the term superego has other idealized connotations of an exaggerated sense of self that may or may not be a control mechanism over the psychological integration of the individual.

I suspect that other kinds of internalized control mechanisms may occur as well, which serve to govern many aspects of our noetic response patterning. Thus the content, quantityt and quality of what we think and how we think may effectively be managed in some as yet unknown manner. These may influence both conscious awareness and response as well as unconscious patterning. Control mechanisms may occur in focal areas of the brain, or may be distributed and implicit to the organization of brain function and pattern itself, such as the morphological partitioning of brain function between the hemispheres, intermediated by the corpus collustrum and other nervous subsystems. The brain achieves partitioning of function in a complex manner. It appears that this partitioning is somewhat variable between individuals, and yet also probably genotypically based.

It is beyond the scope of this preface to go into further details of this aspect of human knowledge and its functioning. Implicit to the concept of the two cultures in this regard is the idea that knowledge systems are situated within, and are intrinsic aspects of, larger cultural realities that are rooted in behavior and cognitive patterning that is both shared and interactive. Culture can be defined in this regard as something that exists, at least for the time being, within the brain of the informant, as an organization and summarization of life experience within some social framework. It is not so much a mental concatenation or concoction, so much as it would be the mental machinery for such concatenation and formulation of meaning. To be effective, culture must be active and adaptive, on-going and current, such that there is continuous feedback and reinforcement of the mental patterning, almost on a daily basis.

We can understand therefore the syndrom of culture shock, adaptive response disorders, and other kinds of similar mental dysfunction, as the result of mental-environmental displacement that leads to dissonance and discoordination between the internalized apparatus of the brain and the external world in which the brain is situated. This occurs even on very basic perceptual and cognitive levels of brain function, must less on more abstract or evaluative levels. It is obvious in terms of second-language acquisition and the capacity to recognize and response effectively to new sets of meanings occurring in new kinds of signals.

These are important and vital considerations when it comes to understanding the ontological and epistemological status of knowledge in the world in a manner that can be said to be anthropologically significant and realistic. The concept of mind implies knowledge and the meanings that knowledge encompasses. It does not exist outside of the brain or independently of it, except in the alienated and objectified sense of its social construction and distribution in society. Thus, whether we are interested in the particulars of microbiological research in one place or other or not, we can go to practically any microbiology department in the country and find very similar knowledge models and patterns being articulated in the same basic terms. And these knowledge will not be identical to the kinds of knowledges articulated in relation to any other aspect of biological sciences. To argue for brain based organization of human consciousness, its control mechanisms and its articulation and expression in a larger world, is to impose a certain condition of anthropological relativity upon all such knowledge systems. They are an intrinsic part of the definition of a culture, and they are culturally embedded and embodied in the life-world of the individual culture-bearer. They guide behavioral response patterning and social interaction and process.

The rough relationship therefore between the brain and the mind can be characterized by a digital analogy to the relationship between the hardware and architecture of a computer and its software, or the programming language that is used to encode and organize the functioning of a computer. We can see that a computer does not function without both sets of components, and that a brain without a mind is as if a dead organ. In a similar way, the software of the brains mind can be said to be socially and culturally encoded in such a manner as to allow there to be an effective interface and communication between different minds. Just like computer software, the mind is written in the script of a definite language with its own syntactic rules of ordering and articulation. These scripts are culturally defined.

The Internet as a Scale-Free Infrastructure

The Internet that is free and open can be defined generally as a 'scale-free' network in which every node is essentially, virtually, connected to every other mode, and distance or size of the network makes no essential difference. The behavior of scale free networks tends overall to be very stable in terms of catastrophic systems failure. There appears to be a tendency for such systems to develop key nodal points, "super hubs," that connect a large proportion of all other nodes. There is thus a kind of "winner takes all" long term competition between points for enlarging their scale of network relations. At the same time, such super hubs become more susceptible to attack and failure, leading to critical break down of large areas or regions of the total network.

I think the key value in understanding the potency of this Global network is the realization that potentially any information of any kind or amount, is available to anyone, anywhere and anytime, in the world, at a moment's notice, and without great cost. On top of this, the digital information revolution is also a revolution of information storage, and increasing amounts of information are becoming increasingly available in smaller and smaller packages. The common CPU of today was the supercomputer of yesteryear, and eventually tomorrow's "palm-top" or note-book, or even cell phone, will become tomorrow's wireless super-computing communications center.

Though all the problems of human communication have not been solved, and many more problems appear in the offing, such as the Spam explosion, the central problem of a global Human communications infrastructure has been solved in a basic sense. This must be counted, categorically and unequivocally, as one of the most important technological achievements of human civilization of all time, alongside the wheel, fire, metallurgy and a few other choice inventions/discoveries like human flight, the atom bomb, etc.

The Wireless revolution I feel is the next important advance in this direction, at least as far as communications infrastructure is concerned. With advances in wireless technologies, especially with an enlargement of basic channel capacity and the improvement of the fidelity of signals over vast distances, the problem of distribution of networks will essentially cease to exist, and at the same time, the integration of systems in modular form will, with increased internalized differentiation, will increase as a consequence. We would in other words expect smaller machines that are inherently more versatile and functional and require both less space and less power to operate.

As it has been said, though the problem of communications networking has been solved, the problem of human communication is just opening up.

Human Systems

by Hugh M. Lewis