It makes a
difference; it makes no difference
dao and the grey way of anthropologia
to my turtle whose infinite patience shall win the human race,
for all refugees from human history, and for John's family, may all lost souls find a home
No color or complexion
distinguishes the way,
Still its message flares
Up everywhere:
Of the thousands of worlds,
Numerous as grains of sand,
Which is not home?
--Thuong Chieu
from the typewriters of
hugh and rosie
*INTRODUCTION*
We are all, forever, the children of History, playfully and
seriously enacting its tragi-comical fate which is both its dialectical mandate
and our karma-relation. To envision ourselves as separate from and beyond the
law of irreversible historical process and as immune from the from the
existential responsibilities of its many various human agencies is to perpetuate
a crime against Humanity. It is to close the circle of our collective
understanding as an ideology of the deception of our own immortality, of our own
immortal divinity.
The only genuine History is a human history--the story of
humanity. Anything else is only an ideology in the past tense, a mythology in
the sense of the eternal present moment. Time, however measured, takes its
inexorable toll, and telling all, becomes the measure of all things great and
small down the old, dusty road of Life.
Time quickly dispels the perverse illusions of petty human
power. All human power remains always and only limited, temporary and ephemeral.
The great wheel of turning in History moves with deceptive slowness but with
incredible momentum. The anti-human ideology of Hitler lasted only a single
breath in the long march of History. Hitler's false consciousness of unlimited
power led to his own rapid self-immolation. The inequities of class and caste
status are the only false illusions of petty, momentary power--the self
enactment of the mythological perversity of human history, the trivialized
differences of a perpetual present moment perpetuated unnaturally through time.
To fail to recognize the delusions of power or to desist in
the everyday acknowledgment of the limitations and weaknesses of human power to
create and to control historical destiny is to commit a fateful error which only
history itself will then correct--this is not our divine destiny but it is human
karma relation. The great wheel of turning is irreversible in the many cycles of
its rebirth.
The bottom line of existential human ethics, however egotized
or relativized, is the historical mandate to willfully accept the existential
responsibility for one's own fate, no matter how or if when consumed by the
fires of the forge of history. To neglect this responsibility is to renege the
responsibility for being fully human. It is to neglect and to forget one's own
History.
We are, all of us, still the children of History learning by
our mistakes how to grow up. To forget this or to unlearn this lesson in
adulthood, no matter how old, is to forget and unlearn how to become genuinely
human. The mature human being is the genuine human being, in all the human
strengths and weaknesses, vice and virtues. Human history is an existential
enterprise in which we all share in the making.
In the confluence of the historical streams of collective
consciousness, in the mainstream convergence of different channels of Historical
process, there occurs crucial moments of critical conjuncture of meaning and
being as well as critical moments of sudden and radical disjuncture--an abrupt
parting of the waters of consciousness revealing the bottomless depths beneath
the shallow surfaces of the forces and currents which sweep all of us futureward
toward our common destiny. There occurs reflective ad selective interest
and conspicuous disinterest, the important immediate presence and absence
of human willpower which determines the critical direction in the on-going flow
of historical events. There occurs selective interest and disinterest in the
ways that it makes a critical difference or not in a vitally important or in a
trivial sense of relevance and meaning. This determines our criteria of
historical validity--the acceptance or rejection of human truths and falsehoods.
This difference of importance orients the way we choose to see and to relate to
the larger streams of human history, determining the dialectical development of
historical themes and these recurrence and periodic resurgence. Whatever may
seem to be individually or personally relevant may prove to be quite trivially
unimportant from the standpoint of historically vested or common cultural interests.
What remains of critical importance for the sake of these collective, shared
interests discriminates and predetermines the underlying dialectical structure
and process of action in the development of historical patterning. In the deeper
currents of collective History, the individual role of being human becomes
trivialized and superficial, obscured beneath the weight of the turning wheel of
events, except when an individual stands momentarily in the focal point of
historical conjunction or disjunction as a representative symbol, or archetype
of the collective consciousness of History.
Human beings regularly fashion, employ and refine shared
models of mutual understanding in their karma-relation with human history. These
models, or collective representations are always mythological in their
structure and function in guiding the making of historical process. They embody
and enact the collective consciousness of human history, providing the horizons
for the way we think, speak and act both individual and as a group. In our
deliberate, conscious realization of history, we actively seek to embody and
emulate these mutually understood models for the ordering of our beliefs, our
behaviors and our common sense of belonging in social interrelationships between
one another. The use of these models has a history of its own, as some models
are derived or developed from others which originated beforehand. These models
become historically invested and structurally embedded with cultural importance
as we become historically committed to the process of their fulfillment. This
mythological history becomes the preconscious background from which we configure
our models in the immediate presence, however perpetual seeming. In the
enactment of these configurations, these models become interconnected and
synergistically 'enlivened'--invested with a sense of concreteness, of matter of
factness and taken for grantedness in a kind of historical necessity or
inevitability or destiny as we call Nature. There is a kind of living on
going meaningfulness, of an immediate sense of historical present and moment
which is taken directly from our own sense of self or group importance, of
historical immediacy and emergency which we project upon our
environment. In our involvement with the mythological dialectics of our own
histories in the making, the emerging flow of events catches us up and sweeps us
off our feet, submerging us in our own historical subjectivity or historicity.
Our center of balance lacks a solid footing, a secure place of ground from which
to lift our heads above the surface of historical presence and emergence--we
become free floating, to be carried away by the currents of time into the
future. We must then either learn to swim across its forceful currents or else
sink to the bottom and drown in the abyss of the murky past. Our mytho-historical
models are landmarks along the shore which we pick out in our phenomenological
movement downstream. We are rather moving away from, passing by or heading
toward these markers of our identity. If they appear to be part of the
surrounding landscape or prove to be deeply rooted to the shoreline as we reach
out to hold on to them, then we want to refer to these models of collective
representation as natural--as obeying the law of historical necessity and
phenomenal sufficiency. Otherwise, they will be considered as merely contrived,
man made, artificial, with the connotation of thus lacking in substance of
natural necessity or phenomenal sufficiency, as deficit in historical permanency
or stability of its groundedness in reality.
History is then to be seen as the common stream of converging
and diverging collective consciousness of humanity, of shared models of
collective representations embodying and enacting phenomenal experience of our
movement through time, of our reflective and reflexive awareness of the
encounter with time itself as the process of beingness and becoming, as the
expression of change and difference. Collective representations become the
charter of our historical identities and the license for social action. The
ethereal medium of history is thus human consciousness itself, or a kind of
'collective conscientiousness' as it spreads itself like water along the
channels of common, mutual human understanding.
History in the making is the process of textual inscription
and reiteration of our collective consciousness and conscientiousness, striving
towards the final ultimate realization of our mythological models. It is the
flexing of collective human consciousness and conscience, the apperceptive
recognition of the mind of humanity of its own historicity in the making, in the
subjectivity of its own experience of becoming, through recurrent acts of
believing, behaving and belonging. 'Conscience' here is used both in the sense
of 'active' consciousness--'knowledge of our own actions or thoughts' and in a
sense of 'joint knowledge' or feeling of right or wrong, truth or falsehood,
'the faculty, power or principle of a person which decided on the lawfulness or
unlawfulness of his actions, with a compulsion to do right; moral judgment which
prohibits or opposes the violation of a previously recognized ethical
principle'. The kind of conscience here conceived of is a collective historical
consciousness of the existential reality of humankind. This kind of
conscientiousness is by definition religious, as the human being, the creature
of mythology which places humankind and its own self conscious realization of
history at odds in a struggle against nature's Humanity, then, in its collective
self awareness and collective representations of its common historicity is by
definition religious. There is no such thing as a non-religious human being, for
the mythology of religious experience is what defines the meaning of the word of
being human. People can always go against religious sanction, but must always
ultimately define themselves vis-à-vis some kind of religious realization.
Science, in its secular charter, places itself outside of the purview of any
religious charter in history, but in the process creates for itself its own
false ideology of secular truth as Nature and natural law. People
can seek to escape the dictates of history via their religion, but they can
never completely get away from the historical sanctioning of religion. Religion,
by its historical definition, is the way in which humankind relates itself and
realizes itself in historical process. Religion, in the form of mythology, and
History, are the contraposed elements of the unfolding dialectic of the
collective consciousness and conscience of Humanity.
To neglect the consciousness of History is concomitantly to
neglect the common collective conscience of the cultural heritage of humanity--human
religiosity. Historical tradition is to religious heritage as human
individuality is to social personality, as the probability of being is to the
possibility of becoming. Tradition provides the sanctioning for the realization
of being, heritage provides the legitimate forms, the received collective
representations, for the potentiality of becoming human vis-à-vis a common
collective conscientiousness of humanity.
There is a critically important difference between speaking
of living history in the sense of presence, of history in the making, and of
'History' in the dead sense of History--written in the past tense, just as there
is an important, critical difference between the living religion of humankind in
the everyday existential experience of being, behaving, belonging, in the
sharing of collective representations, and the dead religion which may exist
socially more as a lifeless corpse, a meaningless ritual reiterated mindlessly,
as an empty symbol or slogan or vehicle of meaning which is untranslatable in
any practical, functional way. The difference between these two forms of the
living and the dead, the present and the past, are important to make clear, yet
the boundaries of collective consciousness separating the two kinds of religious
and historical phenomena are scarcely clear-cut or concisely delineated in human
reality. As a result, there occurs a whole gray middle region, a twilight zone
between the living and the dead, past and present, of the mindscape of humanity
which results in a great deal of 'con-fusion' and conflation of understanding
and of crisscrossing of consciousness between the two regions of critical
difference. It is oftentimes difficult in the action or commingling of
historical forces of the present moment of mythico-historical process to make
the critical distinction between the two forms. There occurs in the gray fog of
confusion a mistaken identity and the possibility of false consciousness, a
central indeterminacy of meaning, of substituting the living for the dead, the
past for present and vice versa. There is then no clear way of distinguishing
between where the reality of the former begins and the unreality of the latter
ends.
******
"…for all distancing is…a self distancing, a
distanciation of the self from itself. Thus the critique of ideology can be and
must be assumed in a work of self understanding, a work which organically
implies a critique of the illusions of the subject." (Paul Riccouer; Hermeneutics
and the Human Sciences, 1981: 244)
It is the wisdom of the hermeneutic method to never allow our
pre-understandings to predicate the knowledge of the object of our conscious
understanding, to not allow popular preconceptions or unquestioned pre-judgments
or unrecognized biases to influence the way we choose to believe in a thing, to
suspend however temporarily and superficially, prior beliefs and the attachments
of belonging, involvements and commitments, in order to learn how to see more
clearly the 'thing in itself', to comprehend more undistractedly in terms of the
'thing' themselves outside of our own definitions and preconceived notions about
these 'things' and then to attempt to acknowledge more fully via our immediate
experience our own intimate phenomenal inter-relatedness with such 'things; as
they preexist outside of and before our own conscious knowledge of them. In the
process of our conscious concealment is a simultaneous revealing through the
openness of the experience. In this human capacity for originative understanding
exists the alternative possibility for positive dialectical distanciation, or
what is referred to as the 'objectification' of science.
The hermeneutic enterprise comes full circle at the critical
moment of historical conjuncture between self understanding and knowledge about
the other in which there occurs a brief interfusion of the horizons of the
pre-understandings of the self and the after the fact experiential knowledge of
the other. We cannot see beyond the encompassment of this subjective/objective
horizon and therefore do not really know what may exist beyond in the realm of
the unknown. The mythological other as projection of the self becomes the
embodied expression of unknown. We can only imagine and intuitively guess by our
capacity for question formulation into the unknown region--attempting to reveal
its hidden dimensionally while inevitably covering it over with biased
concealments of the already known--the trite and true. We attempt to discover a
bit of the hidden unknown, thereby enlarging a little bit the total
encompassment of out hermeneutic and historical horizon of consciousness and
experience. At that moment of critical conjuncture there is confected a
simultaneous opening and closing of the doors of comprehension of human reality,
a brief instanciation of human understanding, a sudden awakening of sleeping,
potential consciousness, a comprehension of the encompassment of the 'thing'
before unknown. There is effected with this understanding an irreversible change
of being human, of human beingness, a permanent transformation of experiential
becoming more human than before. Then we have learned something historically
important, apperceptively significant, about the 'before unapprehended'
relations between 'things' in reality.
Our sense of belonging and believing and the wisdom of our
life experiences informs our intuitions and daily decisions. Our sense of
becoming and behaving and the conditions of our adjustments to life changes
influences our premonitions and expectations for the future. These we must
unavoidably and inexorably share together if we are to complete the hermeneutic
circle and to enlarge its compass to include the total conscience of Humanity
and consciousness of Humankind. It cannot be done alone or in the privilege of
inner group security. Only together may we deliberately direct or redirect the
unfolding of historical process and thus achieve a common destiny in human
karma-relation.
MISSING PAGE NO. 8
existence a sumptuary privilege of the elitist few 'haves' at
the expense of the many 'have-nots'. Such freedom is licensed by the state and
harnessed by the authoritarian stricture of the Academic structure. The 'pursuit
of happiness' becomes socially translated into a utilitarian praxis of a 'war of
all against all' in the pursuit of increased status and positional power and
material consumption in substitution for real meaningfulness of existential
human experience. The pursuit of the pleasure principle in quantitative terms
leads to a relatively superficial, transient, vicarious, ephemeral, fleeting,
ameaningful existence which merely disguises the unconsciousness of an extremely
monothetic, monothematic way of human experiencing. There is a vicious cycle of
self reinforcing ignorance and prejudicial projection in this process which
creates a never ending circle of deception--the liar's dilemma of no longer
being able to tell the difference between truth and falsehood. There becomes a
narrowly socially sanctioned way of life and a relative intolerance for
differences or alternative ways of life. The monopolarization of human
consciousness along such a single, narrow continuum of meaning results in the
failure for people to socially recognize and existentially acknowledge
alternative dimensions of consciousness. The loss of freedom results from a
failure to recognize or realize, to learn alternative ways of living which might
be more conducive to a greater frequency intensity of alternative, heightened
states of human consciousness. Poverty, defined as the relative lack of access
to resources and the unfreedom of a lack of vital opportunity to acquire such
freedom, hinders and prevents the realization of a qualitatively more meaningful
life and the associated states of broadened consciousness. Wealth privileges the
few by promoting the sumptuary possibility of access to such qualitatively
superior modes of being and becoming. In a very real existential sense, money
buys freedom.
But the 'System' itself, being wholly human, can only usurp
the privilege of human freedom at the expense of public coercion and personal
denial, and only to a certain rather low ceiling of 'sanctioning mediocrity' of
experience. The net effect of any Parkinsonian principle of the system is the
overall leveling to a 'normal' level, the channeling and normal resistance of a
status quo of consciousness which becomes antithetical and anti-intellectual to
the achievement of human freedom. There is thus behind the deliberate promotion
of the 'System' a kind of negative intelligence or 'non-consciousness' of its
own commitment to the totalitarianism of human unfreedom, of the experiential
totalization of the System itself. There is a conspiracy of the collective
consciousness to usurp human freedom absolutely, totalistically, unconditionally
for the sake of control by the System, for realization of greater power via the
system, and by the false sense of total security afforded by confiliation and
role membership status within the definitions of the 'System'. The false
consciousness of any 'System' is to promote a monothetic, common sense of
logical identity, a kind of centrality or logo-centrism, that there are, or can
reasonably be, no alternative possibilities to believing, behaving or belonging
outside of the System. The functioning of the system by some cooperative social
principle fosters the ideological sense of presence and the presence of the will
to power as a kind of critical, extended historical momentousness or momentum.
There is a tendency for any social system which achieves
relative community closure upon some social principle, whether it is a system of
familial obligation and a-moralism, of ethnocentrism of cultural ethnic
groupings, of the hubris of nationalistic patriotic zeal, to separate itself as
a subsystem over and against the larger, 'natural' system of humankind and the
confluence of human history, and as against the principal agent of this largest
system, the individual human actor upon the quest for spiritual freedom and
historical responsibility for that freedom. When any system closes upon itself
and sets itself at odds against the whole of the rest of humanity, in its
special privileging and usurpation of whatever exclusive privileges for power,
then this subsystem of humankind steps outside of history, taking a path
divergent from the mainstream of the collective convergence of historical
consciousness--eventually leading to an historical cul-de-sac.
There is a close connection then to be seen between the
realization of personal, individual freedom and the realization of the
collective consciousness and conscience of humanity--a pan human consciousness.
Individual freedom can only be more fully realized vis-à-vis the increased
realization of the consciousness of humankind, and vice versa, the pathway to
the liberation of humanity from itself leads through the emancipation of the
individual spirit upon its quest for greater human meaning. With freedom comes
greater historical, existential responsibility--the responsibility of the
individual quest for existential freedom becomes translated into the
responsibility to a collective pan human conscience for the emancipation of
humankind from the totalitarianism and unfreedom of the 'System' in all its
manifestations. The problem in the design of any social system of humanity is
not so much how to control the individual within it, but how to establish
effective controls over the system by the individuals who compose it--'counter
control' such that it protects freedom and does not allow the 'System' to become
larger than life itself.
******
"…the anthropologists should be interesting subjects
for themselves to investigate, no harder no easier, I imagine, then any of the
others." (Ben-Ami Scharfstein; The Dilemma of Context, 1989: 40)
This is an ethnography of an anthropology department with
which I have been associated as a student for over a year and a half. It is an
ethnography based upon membership role participant observation as a student, an
autobiography of a personal/professional odyssey, an historical account of a
series of interviews conducted with the members of the department, several
critical issues have been at stake in the process of finishing this work. How
close to home can an ethnographer bring his/her craft while still maintaining
some objective sense of distance? What happens when the traditional object of
ethnography becomes the subject, when the other becomes the self and the self
becomes the other? What are the ethical and existential consequences of pursuing
such a study? How is the anthropologist within Academia different from the
observer in the field? To my knowledge, an anthropological study and ethnography
of an academic anthropology department has not been done before--what are the
implications, repercussions, and results? But more than just an ethnography and
ethnological study of an anthropology department, this work constitutes also a
critique of anthropology as itself is practiced not out there in the field but
at home. As such it is a sort of critical 'anti-anthropology' which has many
important, 'post modern' theoretical implications for the limitations of the
discipline as it is normally exercised within a depart-'mental' context.
Furthermore, it constitutes also a critique of Academia, especially American
Academia of the late 1980's, especially in how this has come to impact and
influence upon how Anthropology realizes itself upon a day to day basis.
This work has been an 'instant' ethnography, one originally
stamped out in the course of a single unfinished semester, one initially typed
out in the course of a few unfinished days, but one also subsequently revised in
light of several critical events which followed its original production. This is
the third edition, and for myself, the final version. It presents but one
possible perspective from among many other alternatives, based upon only my own
rather limited theoretical orientation and conceptual organization. Other
people, without a doubt, would contest the representation of the reality
contained within these pages--this viewpoint is no more or less legitimate than
any other possible version. But this version is, I sincerely believe, a
relevant, non-trivial, even critical account of modern, everyday anthropology as
it exercises its privileged authority and flexes its academic muscles. It does
not deserve to be ignored.
This has been an unfinished ethnography, completed in its
consummation by being unfinished. It was meant originally to be unfinished. This
ethnography has not been entirely successful, but then neither has it been
completely unsuccessful. Like most real fieldwork, it has had mixed results and
mixed reception and mixed reactions and mixed blessings. It has been an effort
in learning how to work and live with existential limitations and human
handicaps, most of which have been my own as a quite imperfect human being and
as but a 'professional anthropologist to be'. Part of this ethnography is about
learning methodologically how to become a 'professional' anthropologist. But
this is not an 'authentic' ethnography because it has never allowed to be.
Limitations of time, energy, resources, authority, status, and interest have
prevented its full realization as an authentic article of anthropological wisdom
and faith. As it has become instead, it is by forfeit an eclectic hodgepodge of
accounts, a critique of a critique of a kind of ideology which has its own
'false consciousness' because it stands apart from its own existential, everyday
Academic history, a critique of Academic Authority and Authoritarianism, a
critique of Academic Anthropologia as 'spurious' culture, a critique of
professional anthropology as an institutionally embedded corporate establishment
embodying many prejudices and class differences and conflicts of its host
society, a critique of a perspective of a now global 'political economy' and its
related hidden agenda of the religious ideology of 'making money' which has
historically conditional all this into being in the first place, and finally, it
is a critique of an all top childish ego who has refused to let bygones be
bygones and who has selfishly allowed this to come into being in the first
place.
This then is not a typical ethnography. It is rather an
exploratory 'ethno-phenomenological process' which both critically and
creatively 'comprehends' and 'configures' the anthropological praxis of
ethnographic methodologies as these happen within departmental Anthropologia.
This writing of an unfinished ethnography is but one phase of the general
process of my own becoming and being an anthropologist. Formal 'good boy'
ethnography implies a contrived methodical distancing between self and other, a
dichotomic distancing which also marks off the in-between spaces, the
no-man's-land of conflict and arbitration, the distances, barriers and
strategies of transaction between self as subject knower and self/other as
object known, between being in the academic armchair and in the field of
department, between 'doing ethnography' and 'thinking and writing anthropology'.
I have reached the personal conclusion that from a phenomenological perspective
this purposive self distanciation is an arbitrary illusion n the normal process
of 'doing anthropology' disguising what are actually relations of power and
dominance, determining and defining anthropological academically.
The entire process of becoming an anthropologist, of coming
of age within anthropologia, of academic 'socialization' is one of only apparent
discontinuity between the department and the field, between student and
professional, but is one of actual continuity of self definition and selective
experience and status recognition in a relatively uninterrupted, gradual
historical stream of collective consciousness. It is a process which entails
certain predictable critical moments or periods of conjuncture and disjuncture
and of characteriological reorganization and replacement of anthropological
consciousness which has been aptly referred to as 'consciousness awakening' and
which entails certain unpredictable personal transformations which are intended
to unfold according to design but rarely if ever really do except perhaps for
the most 'normal' and mediocre of 'socialized' professional personalities.
If seen from the perspective of overarching continuity rather
than from the radical discontinuity, then the academic process of becoming a
professional anthropologist becomes existentially ethno-phenomenological,
involving a kind of theoretical hierarchization of consciousness, of concepts
and precepts, and a methodological hierarchization of research values, of
precepts in interests which is supposed to become consistent with an
'organization of research priorities' defines methodologically and
theoretically. If this follows a normal academic route to successful completion,
then a transformation of personality is 'con-fected'--the individual then
becomes socially more 'professionally authentic'. This is seen as 'rite of
passage'.
What is more important is to recognize the overall continuity
in the process of becoming and anthropologist and the simultaneous discontinuity
of still remaining a human being--rather than just focusing upon or over
emphasizing exclusively the apparent structural discontinuities and differences
of the transitory states of being or becoming different, successive stages in
the process of becoming. The field experience becomes a kind of 'vision quest'
in search of authenticating or valorizing 'power' of anthropological wisdom and
understanding . the publications are the ritually prescribed acts of revealing
the dreams achieved in the field, the historical inscription of these visions
for the sake of humanity. Actually it is more of a process of accumulation
rather than of transformative replacement of the ego--the actor remains
essentially the same person as before, only the social persona of the
anthropological ego, its psycho-social status-identity, its state of
consciousness, becomes transformed. These transformed states of ego
consciousness are externally reinforced by membership role positioning 'in the
field'. There is 'confected' a net overall rewiring of the anthropological
marionette--the overhauling of the anthropological minded collective
representations of ego consciousness.
I faced in the course of getting to know this department and
the people within it the decision of having to choose between how I should write
this ethnography. Three options seemed open to me. I realized that I could write
a 'good boy' ethnography, attempting to please everyone and satisfying nobody,
or else I could write a fairly standard, by the book 'neutral', hence
'objective' and therefore probably quite mediocre and boring ethnography,
talking about a lot but actually saying nothing of any consequence--this would
not have been so out of order within the paper shuffle one continuously engage
in during the process of obtaining a higher education. Or else I could write a
more radical ethnography, one which may risk being wrong but which is also a
more honest about attempting to be right, if not completely realistic. I have
come to the conclusion that it really doesn't matter what I would write, as it
lacks in any case the necessary official 'valorization' or 'authentification' of
the status of 'professional' which would somehow automatically render it more
genuine and valid. I remain essentially a amateur anthropologist. A handful of
professional anthropologists had the authority to accomplish in a couple of days
what this 'anthropologist to be' student could not finish over a couple of
years. This is the kind of critical social difference which in the final
analysis makes no difference which this ethnography is ultimately all about. If
a qualified (I mean certified) anthropologist wished to conduct a 'real'
ethnography of this department, then its implications would have been much more
powerful, of much greater ideological sense of truth and presence, of much
greater 'dramatic moment' of 'higher, more honorable, hence less suspect and
questionable status', then the enactment of an ethnography by a merely nameless
anthropology student.
What is more anthropologically important is not the
ethnographic experience itself, or the information, wisdom or bit of factual
datum derived directly from the experience, but the process of its
authentification, its enactment, its communication, its inscription, its
valorization and its publication as 'established' and 'received' authority. The
process of academic communication within a select community relatively closed to
the outside world, and the eventual 'empowerment' of its anthropological
knowledge is what is of real critical significance, of paramount importance, of
lasting historical value. This is the real power of the ethnographic encounter
and the process of ethnological inscription which must be seen as structured
within an academic context which is itself structured by an overarching
political economic framework. Social relations of communication and commercial
exchange value become translatable into academic relations of ethnographic
production and anthropological interchange.
We cannot ever fully, finally escape the dictates of the
self, however well stated, however much diminished or glorified, however
seemingly insignificant or detached from corporeal belongings. Our souls can
never attain the perfect freedom from the prison of our bodies, except perhaps
in final death. No matter how high our spirit may seek to soar above the world,
it must eventually fall back toward the earth, brought back down by the
gravitational pull of a common destiny upon the ground, by the unbreakable bonds
of nature. In the dialectic of being and becoming more human, great highs are
inevitably followed by great lows, achievements by defeats, and yet,
paradoxically, always must we seek our spiritual freedom in the skies.
In the historical and existential process of learning to be
and become more fully human, more genuinely human, there occurs with increasing
frequency and intensity qualitatively experienced 'heightened' states of
consciousness which confer greater meaning to life. There are many mechanisms
which may serve as catalysts for crossing the threshold of normal consciousness
onto a higher plane of experience,, mechanisms to a large extent controlled,
prohibited, capitalized or monopolized by the establishment, especially by
Academia. Freedom or the facility of access to higher or alternative states of
human consciousness defines ultimately the subjective dimensionally of human
freedom and phenomenal experience. The concomitant normative freedom for an
individual to choose the pathways to the extension of consciousness is a
critical prerequisite to the enhancement of the quality of life of any and every
human being. These dimensions of freedom may be obtained socially through
religious prescription and proscription of certain forms of collective belief,
behavior and belonging which channels consciousness into certain pre-selected
dimensions of human experience and consciousness. There are also aesthetic and
other avenues to the exercise of such freedom of consciousness of being.
Within the System of the establishment generally and within
the Academic system particularly, there has occurred a kind of 'negative
intellectual' conspiracy of the 'System' to routinely usurp subjective human
freedom of access to alternative and heightened states of human consciousness,
to sanction and legitimate as a sumptuary privilege of the few such freedom, to
render the 'pursuit of happiness' in the form of a more meaningful spiritual
MISSING PAGE NO. 17
The sense of reality which I proffer to the anthropologist,
young and old, amateur or professional, via this study, is ethnographic reality
of the anthropological will to power, a form of intellectual imperialism based
upon the realization and neutralization of difference. It is also an everyday
existential reality which no amount of opportunity, privilege or status can
confer--you have to be there. There is really no other way. So if you really
want to understand better the anthropological experience of human reality, then
just go put yourself there in the anthropological arena, body and soul. And if
you survive, however transformed, then you're moderately successful.
For myself, as long as I must call myself an
'anthropologist', however much incompletely or euphemistically this title may
really be, then this all too human science will remain basically an
'ethno-methodological' vehicle for creative understanding about human reality.
However positivistically systematic or dogmatic we may choose to render it, this
process will always remain irreducibly an interpretative science within
the hermeneutic circle of the historical horizon of the collective consciousness
of humankind and the conscience of humanity. It is a kind of paradoxical
operational metaphor 'participant observation' intuitively suggests the
dialectical combination of seemingly logically contradictory and irreconcilable
opposites. It is basically interpretative because as a way of knowing and
relating to human reality it remains an historically arbitrary project of
language description of alternative possibilities of human reality. It remain
'scientific' because it embodies within its methodological praxis certain
fundamentally empirical and inductive techniques of ethnographic description and
ethnological explanation.
The intrinsic embodiment of paradoxical, inimical self
contradictions with in a single historical moment, is what I refer to as the 'grey'
way of doing Anthropology--of making anthropology happen in an historical and
religious sense. It involves the exploration of the in-between areas of living
and the dead, the past and present, and the delineation of the definite
differences between the two regions of human consciousness--between what are
euphemistically referred to as true and false consciousness, open and closed
consciousness, historical and ideological consciousness, narrow and broad
consciousness, particular and general consciousness, sleeping and awakened
consciousness, and genuine and spurious consciousness within an anthropological
frame of mind, or perspective.
Thus we may refer to a collective sort of common sense kind
of anthropological consciousness and conscience about human reality which may
either or both living or dead, historical or ideological, genuine or spurious,
true or false, open or closed, concealed or revealed, asleep or awakened, narrow
or broad, particularistic or generalistic, relativistic or rationalistic. The
grey area is learning how to read in-between the black and white print of
anthropological discourse, it is learning to live and within the grey in-between
regions of the uncertain excluded middle-ground of black and white
anthropological truth, theory and praxis. In this way there is no clear
demarcation between saying and doing, methodology and theory, since one
preconditions and in turn leads from the other, between doing and thinking
anthropologically, between practicing, preaching and writing and reading
anthropological reality and realism and between believing, behaving and
belonging to an anthropological culture and history which has a common community
with its own religiously sanctioned ways of living, its own unwritten ethos,
nomos and pathos, and between becoming and being a professional anthropologist.
It is to learn how to live with the critical difference which in the long run
make no difference. It is learning to listen to the sound of 'one hand clapping'
in the corridors of Academic Anthropologia and to listen to the silence of the
'System' beyond all the everyday noise and informational rhetoric, surrounding
and framing all the critical dissonance and consonance of the 'field'. The
'field' within Academia or in its anthropological hinterlands channels by its
own models and their geography in a common collective mindscape, the
directionality and course of the historical consciousness of 'anthropological
humankind'. It is the common channel or conduit for the historical development
of anthropological consciousness and conscience about human reality, humankind
and humanity.
Anthropologia must be construed 'tongue in cheek' as a kind
of catch all metaphor for everything anthropological under the sun, for
everything considered anthropological generalia, or 'anthropologia' for short.
The 'Science of Humankind' then becomes a kind of pat definition which may refer
to anything at all and nothing in particular. 'Anthropologia' then becomes
merely euphemistic serving many diverse interests and individual human needs. It
is a convenient turn of phrase disguising a great deal and revealing very little
about genuine human reality. As a perspective and a way of framing understanding
of human reality, all things anthropological becomes a stylistic way of thinking
and talking about human reality, a way of speaking which is defined by
privileged access to its systems of meaning and reiteration which is primarily
'academic.'
I am concerned primarily with how anthropologia routinely
flexes its muscles and reflexes its mind, as an anthropologia of regularized,
routinized academic performance of power--one which has always been and will
probably always remain as long as it exists within the academia a highly
specialized 'mode of information production/consumption' within a predominantly
academic milieu which is itself institutionally embedded within a larger
political economic framework which has been predominantly colonial,
imperialistic and capitalistic in orientation. This kind of totalistic
existential performance of anthropologia--how it becomes enacted and 'embedded'
upon an academic stage for mostly an academic audience, has its own particular
style of life and distinctive kind of professional praxis which forms a
'habitus' of being academic--albeit anthropologically in style. It defines a
specific kind of 'cultural ethos' of the anthropological community which has its
own predominating orientation, models of success and ethics of performance and
praxis. The paradigmatic nomos and norm of professional anthropologia is defined
socially in regard to relative position of status identity within its community
structure, in regard to its members rank role status in terms of ever widening
circles and sub-circles of professional and semi-professional audiences--one's
academic authority and professional sense of being 'anthropological' derives
from this relative status positioning, even though such status and its
consequences may not always be directly present or immediately obvious, but will
always remain at least indirectly alluded to or conspicuously absent from the
everyday existential exigencies of the departmental life on becoming and being
an Academic Anthropologist.
This wider sense of anthropological status reality
overshadows and pre-structures the immediate phenomenological sense of
anthropological consciousness--it forms the hermeneutic horizon of the
preconscious 'pre-understandings' of the collective representations of
Anthropologia. We may refer to the 'Anthropological Mentality" as the
characteristic 'mode of realization' of Anthropologia. The anthropological
mentality is a closed form of consciousness in certain pre-determined ways which
structurally demarcate its disciplinary boundaries and methods. It is unable to
step outside of itself in order to look at itself in any other set of terms or
frame of comprehension than its own. The boundaries of its consciousness are
determined by and in turn determine the limitations of its human will to power
or create or control versions and visions of human reality. The anthropological
mentality is motivated by a particular kind of psychology of anthropological
personality, and is reinforced by a characteristic process of anthropological
'socialization' and 'professionalization' which involves both 'enculturation', 'deculturation'
and 'acculturation' or 'transculturation'. This in turn takes place within a
larger sphere of influence of social structuration or a process of
anthropological 'institutionalization' which becomes historically and culturally
'larger than life', extending beyond the purview and existential boundaries of
control of the individual, and thus extending beyond the boundaries of
historical consciousness and into the unconscious of the individual. As a member
of a particular form of corporate organization institutionally embedded and
empowered within a larger political economic context, the domain and realm of
Anthropologia extends beyond the control and power of the individual 'as
individual' who instead becomes 'predetermined' or 'controlled' and 'empowered'
as a 'member' of the community. Individual identity of personality becomes
usurped and sublimated in transaction for social identity defined primarily in
terms of one's interpositional status within the anthropological community
structure. Thus, as with any human community, implicitly defined and
behaviorally sanctioned norms, connotatively significant, foster the unwritten
ethos for professionally appropriate behavior in conformity to which there are
certain rewards of power, privilege and responsibility and socio-economic status
and reinforcement from the 'field'. Any behavior deemed anthropologically
inappropriate becomes the basis for 'negative solidarity; for the definition,
emphasis, identification and reinforcement of in-group/out-group boundary of the
anthropological community.
In these regards, the community of Anthropologia is like any
other human community. It is not, in view of its own historicity and
religiosity, exceptional compared to any other grouping of humanity. But it is
unique in certain characteristic and characteristically paradoxical ways which
leads to its members to come to believe and behave as if they were indeed
historically and ideologically exceptional. These particular ways need to be
further explored in this work.
'Anthropologia' stands for various and sundry anthropological
'generalia' or 'things anthropological'--a term representing that region of
intellectual mindscape, social space and academic mentality which is part and
parcel of Academic Anthropology and which is not the same kind of anthropology
more formally defined as 'The Science of Humankind'. A critique of anthropologia
is not directly a polemic against formal general anthropology as an intellectual
discipline. The study of anthropologia is the reflexive critique of academic
anthropology--how anthropologists define their special reality within their own
space as a part of and contrasted with a larger reality of everyday humanity.
I
THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL ART OF FISHING
or on the methodology of madness
We are like fish, swimming in a sea of sense, bounded above
the superior element, but unable to breath it or penetrate it. We get our oxygen
from it, however; we touch it incessantly, now in this part, now in that, and
every time we touch it we turn back into the water with our course re-determined
and re-energized. The abstract ideas of which the air consists are indispensable
to life, but irrrespirable by themselves. (William James; Pragmatism,
1943: 128)
…It is computed that eleven thousand Persons have, at
several times, suffered Death, rather than submit to break their Eggs at the
smaller End. Many hundred large Volumes have been published upon this
Controversy: but the Books of the Big-Endians have long been forbidden,
and the whole Party rendered incapable by the law of holding Employments. During
the Course of these Troubles, the Emperors of Elefuscu did frequently
expostulate by their Embassadors, accusing us of Making a Schism in Religion, by
offending against a fundamental Doctrine of our great Prophet Lustrog, in the
fifty fourth Chapter of the Brundecral (which is their Alcoran). This , however,
is thought to be a mere Strain upon the Text: "For the words are these:
That all the true Believers Shall break their Eggs at the convenient End; and
which is the convenient End, seems, in my humble Opinion, to be left to every
Man's Conscience, or at least in the power of the Chief Magistrate to
determine." (Swift; Gulliver's Travels, 1726: 74-76)
A survey was my hook into the reality of the department. What
I did, I cannot be certain about, why I did it or exactly how it was done, I
cannot honestly say--but I did do something,, however unimportant, and
this 'something' must now be elucidated, however obscurely. In true inductive
fashion, my survey can be said to have been a conclusion in search of a
hypothesis. I went fishing and now get to tell a tale of my small adventure.
I have chosen to do a 'fish bowl' ethnology precisely because
it critically makes a disinterested difference while simultaneously making no
difference in an interesting sense. In fish bowl ethnography we are either like
fish swimming through an ethereal subjective medium within the bowl of
consciousness, occasionally rising to the surface, or else we are observers
looking in from the outside at other fish swimming about. Whether we choose to
place ourselves within the bowl and view the world looking out, in a transparent
structure that defines a self contained but limited universe, or whether we
choose to place ourselves as objective observers outside of the bowl but no
longer in the medium, makes a critical difference in the dimensionally of our
perspective of human reality. At the glass interface of the bowl, there is a
certain translucent reflectivity and refractiveness which distorts the light in
strange and disproportionate ways. And, in true Buddhist fashion of remaining
obscure, in the anthropological structure of the 'long run' which defines the
dialectical circle which transcends both our subjective and objective horizons
of understanding, it simultaneously makes no difference and every bit of
difference which perspective we choose--our existence is defined by the presence
and continued existence of that translucent structure of the bowl, whether we
are swimmers or spectators. Both subjectively and objectivity are defined in
relation to the structure of that bowl.
I have chosen to do an account of 'fish soup' ethnography,
because, no matter how systematic, measured, proportionate or methodically we
wish to render the process, the integration of human reality in whichever form
or way is kind of like making and then eating a bowl of fish soup--when we
finally chop, mix and spoon up the ingredients of our concoction, it is all
mixed up in a haphazard fashion, but what matters most is the final flavor and
digestion. The important question is not so much why we choose to add in some
ingredients and leave out others--always the final flavor, unless following the
recipe exactly, will remain unpredictable. What really matters most is the fact
that we would bother making and eating fish soup in the first place. Why?
Because we like it, or because we might be hungry.
Doing ethnography is having to suspend beliefs, question
reality, and rethink old problems. It forces a re-evaluation, or at least is
supposed to. It forces a collision of realities. It entails really getting to
know something, perhaps better than we may really like or that is to our own
private interests to come to know. It also entails an extension of the
responsibility which knowledge itself entails. But nobody, however methodical,
has the bottom line of how or what ethnography is all about. No matter how
carefully constructed, rationally justified, scientifically supported, no
questionnaires, no survey, no series of observations, has a monopoly on
validity. The bottom line is we do not really know what or why we are doing what
we choose to do--if we did, there would be no point in feigning to do
ethnography.
Ethnography is a learning process, however structured. When
and if we forget this, then we are no longer leaving anything but about our
ignorance. All learning is in a crude sense didactic--making mistakes and paying
the consequences, until we no longer make the same old mistake. The methods
which we choose to apply are never foolproof, only possibly foolhardy. If we are
not open to making mistakes in our judgment, daring to risk the embarrassment of
being wrong or the consequences, then we will learn nothing but about our
ignorance.
Interpretation, irreducibly intuitive, must always enter into
the process of science at some point of its methodological praxis, and however
much one may try to systematically reduce its role or factor out its importance
or function by research design, the final critical determination must always
remain basically an intuitive choice, because we do not ever know for certain
the bottom line. The scientific true believer remains existentially insecure in
the face of fundamental uncertainty and ambiguity of the intuitive function in
understanding human reality. There is an effort to design a 'foolproof'
methodological system, which like a computer miracle, will correctly 'solve' the
'puzzle' when simply puts the right hypothetical questions and 'data bits' into
the input slot. The most any computer can do, however advanced or sophisticated,
is to manipulate in a very efficient manner a complex set of information which
has been 'pre-programmed' in a specific computer language. The problematic of
the hermeneutic horizon of 'language games' remains to be discussed. The human
brain, still suffering from the problem of finding the 'correct language' in
which to frame its questions and answers about human reality, seems on the
surface to be much less efficient in the manipulation of information. The memory
or mind 'can't be trusted' and so is inherently unreliable. But the brain is
capable of performing another function which no computer can do adequately, and
that is to think, to make decisions, to make mistakes and to learn from these
mistakes, and understanding upon the basis of past experience, a function of
wisdom and intuition and imagination, to adjust and adapt continuously to
changing existential circumstances. The mind creates its reality. The mind
remains the mysterious magic of the biological machine, a playful manipulation
of and exaggeration of possible impossibilities. It forms the basis of human
creativity, in which the impossible is rendered possible by being miraculously
brought into existence. The basis of the scientific method is scientific
imagination and creativity. Scientific 'truth' claimed man could never fly until
some imaginative individuals created the possibility of human flight (now
scientific positivists would argue that this was not a genuine scientific claim,
but a statement of religious belief not in the purview of genuine science--one
cannot escape the ideological circularity of this kind of after the face
thinking. 'True science' has a marvelous way of appropriate history to its own
purposes.) and now scientific technology has moved to swiftly capitalize upon
the possibilities of this newly realized capability--flying to the moon and
beyond. And so we are left to separate the problems of real science from
scientific truth, without really finally knowing the basis for our separation.
No matter how sophisticated or long and involved our chain of
methodological praxis, no matter how systematic we render our scientific
methodology, at some crucial point in the process, at a certain 'critical
moment' interpretive understanding, based upon existential intuitive decision
making, must come into play, in order to achieve a sense of closure of
understanding, a sense of conclusiveness to our hypothetical questioning and
with this imagination and creative realization of alternative possibilities
which did not before exists, enters the possibility of being wrong, of making a
mistake, of becoming in truly scientific fashion, 'falsifiable'. The use of
statistical measures within the social sciences is a perfect example of how
interpretive intuition enters into the scientific methodology and how the design
itself is presupposed and prearranged in order to 'control' or reduce the
possibility of making a mistake by this kind of 'bias'.
Ethical security, versus the ethical responsibility of
exercising existential freedom by making wrong decisions, is the freedom from
choice, the positive guarantee of reward or punishment, the promise of poetic
justice, of rational justice, the pledge of privilege affirmed or denied.
Existential ethics is the choice of freedom, the declaration of independence
from customary sanctioning of common sense, the acceptance of the responsibility
for being uncertain, openness to possibility. It is the willingness to admit
being wrong. The existential bottom line is facing the unknown. The existential
ethics of being an anthropologist is the irremedial paranoia of being biased and
learning to admit and live with it.
The only rule of thumb bridging existential ethics and
scientifically methodology is to remain honest about not really knowing, about
facing the unknown. To enable oneself to see, is to risk being seen, to expose
oneself, to become vulnerable to making a mistake, to being wrong. To see
closely, one must look the unknown straight in the face, as it were, clearly in
the eye. Methodology creates a contrived distance between self and other,
subject as observer and object as observed. It superimposes a semi-transparent
barrier between subject and object. The greater the distance the greater the
barrier, the greater the difficulty of seeing clearly, but the paradox comes
into being of the seeming possibility of greater 'objectivity'. The
anthropological lens becomes in relation to the human eye, a way of catching and
focusing vision to pinpoint accuracy--either from afar like a telescope or close
up like a microscope--but it also, like the glass structure of the fish bowl,
distorts the light, bending it from natural perspective, and it also
circumscribes the margin of what is visible, eliminating, like the frog living
in the hole, the context of the part in relationship to the whole. This is the
hermeneutic horizon of scientific methodology. What it gains in analytical
focus, it loses in synthetic comprehension. Widening the area of focus loses the
analytical detail.
The rise of anthropological methodology is learning to see
human reality more clearly and concisely, more focusedly, but not without cost
to 'natural vision'. It constitutes an artificial form of unnatural vision. The
power of seeing, of learning to see more clearly, is the power for understanding
experience and learning wisdom. It is not just unselfconscious looking, but
apperceptive seeing. It is a vision, furthermore, of alternative possibilities
of reality.
The process of science is self distancing objectification--a
process which becomes defined through ethnography/ethnology and
participant/observation not as the systematic substitution of methodology for
'truth' in the quest for reality, but of forcing a 'collision' of dialectical
opposites in order to dispel the relative illusions of the self--to make
possible a more disillusioned self in regard to or 'vis-à-vis' some significant
other or set of others in order to better comprehend the shared inter-subjective
human reality of both self and others.
All science is basically description in terms of a language,
no matter how systematically metered or how specific and detailed. All science
is also irreducibly explanation, or abstract simplification, or 'modeling' no
matter how concretely reified, abstracted or metaphorically analogical. Even the
numbers game of statistics, the fundamental tool of positivistic science,
remains essentially a descriptive/explanative language. The real problem is not
the debate between quantifiability and quanlifiability. Description implies
explanation and all explanation is a reduced form of description. An emphasis
upon description begets an inductive strategy of the enumeration of details,
while an alternative overemphasis upon explanation begets what has come to be
known as 'hypothetico-deduction'. Both strategies are of themselves
complementary and are not mutually exclusive. It is only by the overemphasis of
one over the other that the methodical character of a systematic science becomes
the methodology of ideology--'true science'. All description and explanation
involves a necessary human choice, however existential, a decision, however
rational, a commitment to history, no matter how implicit. The purpose of
scientific methodology is to render the fact and act of this willful
determination as explicit as possible, as objectively knowable, an
inter-subjectively understandable, as communicable as possible, as we can
reasonably make it, however arbitrary and evaluatively subjective it may really
be. But this is not to deny the necessity of making an arbitrary choice in the
determination of the success or failure of a research project (if by definition
in the positivistic language of science, all research is inherently successful,
if methodologically falsifiable, and nor research is unsuccessful, then we have
again entered the ideological circle of 'true science' by not allowing the
existential possibility of being wrong. Positivistic falsifiability does not
eliminate the possibility of being wrong, of bias, but only obscures it, and by
obscuring it, indirectly denies it). Our methodologies, however explicit
or systematic, however rationalized in terms of whatever language, do not
serve as satisfactory substitutes for our irreducible human decision making
process, which remains subjective, evaluative, interpretive and didactic.
The dichotomization between description and explanation is a false antinomy of
'descriptive/prescriptive' dichotomization of human reality. Description remains
always implicitly normative, explanation remains explicitly prescriptive, a
matter of choosing the best from among many possibilities. Our
methodologies, no matter how rigorous or seemingly value free cannot be relied
upon to render automatically the correct solution to the puzzle, as the
only 'correct' answer implies a silent commitment to a false sense of reality,
to an ideology of false consciousness, deception. History is the correct choice,
because in its unfolding, it is the only answer. Denial of the normative basis
of the decision making process in the methodologies of description and
explanation results in a programmatic denial of one's own human commitment to
history, of one's own ethical responsibility to the exercise of freedom in the
process of understanding human reality.
The denial of the irreducible subjectivity of the process
leads to a fundamental denial of the responsibility of the self and its role in
the functioning of History, which in turn leads to ideological commitment to a
programmatic, pre-designed course of action, an exclusive reliance upon
essentially 'dumb' methods and spurious systematicity in order to make a
decision, to do the 'thinking', to diminish to the degree of noticeable
elimination the possibility of making a mistake. It is a neurotic effort
to eliminate the responsibility for being wrong. 'It must be so because our
methods make it so.' It is like sitting and waiting for the computer to give one
final answer--wishing it will do the final thinking for us.
Ameaningful
thought or inquiry
regards knowledge as the result of 'processing' rather than discovery. It
presumes that knowledge is an almost automatic result of a gimmickry, an
assembly line, a 'methodology'. It assumes that inquiring action is so rigidly
and fully regulated by rule that in its conception of inquiry it often allows
the rules totally to displace their human users. Presuming as it does that
knowledge is generated by processing, its conception of knowledge is
fictionalistic, conventionalistic. So strongly does it see knowledge under such
aspects that sometimes seems to suppose the object of inquiry to be an ungainly
and annoying irrelevance. The terms and relations of the object of inquiry or
the problem are seen, as it were, through an inverted telescope: Detail,
structure, quiddity are obliterated. Objects of knowledge become caricatures, if
not faceless, and thus they lose reality. The world, or any given part of it, is
not felt fully or passionately and is perceived as devoid of objective value.
Ameaningful thinking tends to rely on crutches: rules, codes, prescriptions,
rigid methods. In extreme forms it becomes obsessive and magical.
The tendency of ameaningful thought to register its objects
as faceless, physically distant--to be, so to say, cognitively aesthetic
vis-à-vis its object--I call 'a-ontologism' (if the term may be forgiven). Its
tendency to subordinate authentic and contextually governed analysis, discovery
or invention to blind application of an extrinsic method, I call 'method
fetishism'. A-ontologism and method fetishism may, in fact, be
regarded as the definitive marks of ameaningful thinking.
On the other hand, meaningful thinking involves a
direct perception of unveiled, vivid relations that seem to spring from the
quiddities, particularities, of the objects of thought, the problem situations
that form the occasions of thought. There is an organic determination of the
form and substance of thought by the properties of the object and the terms of
the problem. In meaningful thinking, the mind caresses, flows joyously
into, over, around, the relational matrix defined by the problem, the object.
There is a merging of person and object or problem. Only the problem or object,
its terms and relations, exist. And these are real in the fullest, most
vivid, electric, undeniable way. It is a fair descriptive generalization to say
that meaningful thinking is ontologistic in some primitive, accepting, artless,
unselfconscious sense. (Sigmund Koch; "The Nature and Limits of
Psychological Knowledge" in American Psychologist, March 1981:
259-260)
The purpose of scientific objectivity is not methodological
systematicity per se, not to avoid the inevitable possibility of being
unpredictable, of making a mistake, but it is to simply narrow the margins for
the possibility for such error. No methodology is foolproof, only foolhardy, and
no computer can actually think--computers only describe--and its only
explanations are only prefabricated descriptions of a fallible human program,
but it entirely lacks a genuine human understanding, the imaginative
understanding of the possibility of being wrong, of making a mistake, of
becoming unpredictable. Scientific objectivity creates a distance between our
understandings and the implicit understanding of our values, it clarifies our
subjectivity, making explicit what would otherwise remain only implicit--it
involves an intentional alienation of our subjectivity in order to become
objectively self aware, more self apperceptive, more reflectively self
critical--it leads toward, not away from an enlightened human understanding of
the possibility of being wrong. The correct strategy of any scientific
methodology is not to directly answer the problem in any definitive manner, but
to indirectly minimize (not entirely eliminate) the possibility of making
mistakes, such that our direct decisive approaches then have a greater
likelihood of appearing correct, of really being better.
Commitment to the methodical systematicity of a scientific
ideology in order to provide oneself with the 'correct answers' involves an
existential commitment to a belief that there really is one correct truth, or
set of truths, a reification of ideals, which can be said positively 'to be out
there'. While this may be held as nominally true in the physical sciences (and
this is only more or less provisionally so) it is much less definitively certain
that this is possibly true in the human sciences. It hardly needs reiteration
that it is precisely the inherent ambiguity of the fundamental uncertainty, or
'relativity' of the understanding of the human science, the very likely
possibility that we may never really know 'once and for all' any final,
complete, total truths, which so many individuals find so difficult to tolerate
and deal with without committing themselves to the 'anxiety reducing' self
distancing of the 'methodological fallacy'. The purpose of genuine scientific
methodology is not to directly alienate the self by denying its role in the
normative decision making process intrinsic to human description and
explanation, rather it is just the reverse, to positively affirm the role of the
self in this process in order to then indirectly 'control' for it. Methodology
must affirm the existential role of human creativity in description/explanation
and not deny it, or minimize it. Objectivity is not license to stand outside of
the circle of our own history, it is not divinity.
There is a close connection between the notions of
subjectivity and objectivity in delineating human reality, and the related
'epistemological' problem of moving from subjectively based 'qualitative'
criterion for evaluation and description to an 'objectively quantitative' basis
for evaluation, or, as Manners and Kaplan might say, the fine point at which
Anthropology moves from being a 'humanity' to becoming a true 'science'. It
seems that much of our 'fallacy' of misplaced concreteness' or reification' of
rational ideals ('norms, averages, intelligence quotient, etc.') is simply a
confusion between essentially qualitative and quantitative domains of knowing. I
believe it can be adequately demonstrated that objectivity is a special case of
subjectivity, in general. In a 'scientistic' sense, subjectivity is the
independent variable; objectivity the dependent; or in other words, qualitative
subjectivity is the cause, quantitative objectivity the effect. This sets in
motion the nature of the relationship between 'qualitative' and 'quantitative'
in that 'quantitative' criteria is a restrictive subset of a larger domain of
qualitative criteria. The problem becomes, then, exactly how and what to specify
numerically in a quantitative fashion, what will be the absolute zero point and
the unit extremes (upper/lower real limits). It seems that the goal of this
fundamental process of making scientific otherwise undifferentiated data is
increased precision and regularization of standard intervals imposed upon real
events in order to make these events seem more orderly and thus more easily
understandable (not to mention the other goals of science, prediction and
control). Here we may note an important difference in direction and emphasis
between the two approaches, in that the former, qualitative approach is
primarily concerned with complicating reality, while the latter quantitative
approach is concerned with the simplification of reality. This is a rather minor
dilemma in the 'hard' sciences whose data seem at least to readily, inherently,
lend itself to simplification through quantification. But there is never any way
of being 'absolutely certain' of the accuracy, even in the 'physical sciences'
but especially in the 'softer' human sciences of human reality. The main point
is that no mater whatever standards for quantification we may arbitrarily
select, these must always be premised upon some, at least tacit, if not
qualitatively well defined (operationalized) criteria of descriptive evaluation.
Another closely related set of problems is differentiating
between 'finite' facts and descriptive/evaluative statements (i.e. the
philosophical 'analytic/synthetic' dichotomy). A science in the tradition of
Western nationalism at least, depends upon such a strict dichotomization of
human reality in order to conceptually organize its theory. Any science not
readily admitting such a dichotomy would destroy the foundation for rational
coherence underlying Western science, and would have to be declassified as
'a-scientific' or rather as part of the domain of 'religion', towards which
sciences is supposedly neutral. I also believe that it can be adequately
demonstrated that in truth no such sharp dichotomy between fact and evaluation
can be made or proven, but far from undermining the validity of scientific
theory, such a primary, a priori non-differentiation allows for a more expanded
basis for scientific validity than reliability of quantified objectivity allows
for. The final 'Truth' is less absolute seeming in appearance, more
qualitatively ambiguous and open to reinterpretation, but nonetheless more
valuable towards a broader, and deeper understanding of human reality.
Another closely related dilemma is that in scientific theory
we are always working with hypothetically open ended systems being applied to
'finite' sets, only 'hypothetically' open ended data. Thus we essentially have
no final means of proving, through falsification, the true value of our
hypothesis. On the other hand, we are always attempting to apply what in essence
are closed systems or conceptioning, in terms of set theories and laws, to what
are in virtue, if not actuality, open systems of reality. The whole problem
seems to be one of commensurability in applying limits to infinity and infinity
to limits. It is, in the last word, a problem of final, unequivocal proof.
There is really no way of escaping this set of related
dilemmas, in our understanding of human reality, unless, like God, we magically
opt to step outside of the human arena, outside of ourselves, in order to get a
'really objective' point of view. But in lieu of this imaginable impossibility,
our 'science' will be forever upset by the lack of clarity, the remnant
unresolvable paradoxicality of apparent contradictions, by residual uncertainty
and ambiguity. And no matter how hard we may try to operationally systematize
our 'science' it will forever remain an 'imperfect' by-product of 'human'
understanding. These are the ultimate limits of human reality. I prefer to call
this variable of remnant subjectivity, itself difficult to define, the general
phenomena of self reflectivity.
This subjective reality of self unreflectivity makes of the
meat-physical understanding of human reality an irreducibly relative affair.
Reality, human reality, is irreducibly relative, a relativity rooted to the
socio-historical context of the space/time continuum of change. in dealing with
the irreducible relativity for self reflectivity, there are three general
directions we can choose to take. The first is the 'scientific' direction of the
attempt to minimize (proportionately) the influence of this form of subjectivity
upon our 'objective' systems of conceptually modeling human reality, through
operational systemization, standardization, routinization, through
regularization of 'controls' aimed to neutralize subjective 'bias' through self
definition or self conscious delimitation, increased self knowledge,
incorporation of distancing mechanism which put a lot of 'space' between self
and object. The second direction is the opposite 'humanistic' direction of
maximization of the relative factor of self reflectivity by exclusive
overemphasis of differences, purposive complication of data, the denial of all
causality, correlationality, regularity as mere analogical similarity,
metaphorical emphasis. The third, least attractive alternative perhaps to most
people is the middle way of attempting to strike a compromise between two
extremes, to 'optimize' the subjective influence. This is the most realistic of
the three alternatives and potentially at least, the most fruitful for a mature
science of human reality. It is, I think inherently wholistic and synthetic in
approach, recognizing both the healthy usefulness and limitations of theoretical
generalization. The first alternative, the scientistic approach, risks spurious
superficiality and empirical over dependence and over complication. The second
alternative, the humanistic, risks empirical consistency for the sake of
parsimony, rational coherence and tends to sacrifice empirical consistency. Of
course going to extremes is never a safe policy in life. In part, recognition of
the role of self reflectivity, and tautologically 'eliminating' the problem it
poses for objectification, through systematic incorporation, for making reality
coherent, this is the role of general Anthropology.
In the ongoing debate between so called interpretivists and
positivists, (a debate, incidentally, which is almost completely academic) it is
not so much that they have engaged in a common dialogue in which both are really
talking and listening to one another, rather both parties of the affair are
busily engaged in talking through and past one another, purely for the sake of
argument. It is not so much a question of being right or wrong as it is a matter
of emphasis and frequently, overemphasis. The interpretivists are 'soft
headed'--down playing the place of positivistic systematization in the routines
of their methodologies. They give a larger role to the 'freedom' of
interpretation and the role of 'intuition' in the creative processes of
description/explanation. For the interpretivists emphasis the descriptive,
inductive side of their science, playing up the intuitive normative role of the
decision making process, while the positivists are equally engaged in
emphasizing the factual, the facticity and the hypothetico-deductive side of
science, playing down the paradoxical intuitiveness of human things and playing
up the systematicity of correct, 'puzzle solving' scientific methodologies. It
might even be argued that both camps come from fundamentally different versions
of understanding human reality which are inimical--hence both are correct in
their own way, if given the validity of the primary philosophical premises about
human reality. But if both really listened to the other side, I think there
would be a dawning of a common realization that both sides are really talking
about the same thing, but in basically opposite ways. Neither side would deny
the basic importance of scientific objectivity, however understood, in the
pursuit of human understanding.
But the continuation of this academic debate within the human
sciences, (anthropology included) is but the manifestation of more important
matters which are not so frequently broached. First, the debate is symptomatic
of a continuing fundamental schism in the oxymoronic metaphor the 'human
sciences' between those who are firmly situated within the more 'natural'
sciences via mostly biological and behavioral approaches and those committed to
more 'cultural' humanities through the critical elucidation of human symbol
systems and the 'structures' and 'functions' of their 'patterning' and
'processes'. The former orientation sees knowledge as progressive,
developmentally directive, immanent process, the latter orientation
'comprehends' understanding as accumulative, dialectical and transcendental.
This dualism leads us to reconsider the positions of 'two cultures' vis-à-vis
one another within a fundamentally Western philosophical-religious
dichotomization between nature/culture or mind and body. There can be no going
outside of or beyond the parameters of this ongoing dialectic as long as we
accept unquestionably the a priori necessity of this fundamental dichotomy of
human reality. Indeed, it becomes doubly difficult not to accept, however
unwittingly in our shared 'pre-understandings' such a duality.
Second, the debate, through primarily philosophical and
western, has very definite existential consequences in terms of academic
professional orientation which becomes 'paradigmatic in both the formal legal-jual
and Kuhnian senses of historicity of science'. There is a deliberate and
conscientious effort to promote within an academic institutional framework of
one orientation on the other, which becomes existentially paradigmatic in the
scientific sense of non-paradigmatic in the sense of humanities. This concerted,
programmatic effort is undeniable and inexorable, even though its denial is
frequent. It results in the institutionalization of methodical ideology, of a
circle of deception which renders the whole enterprise hypocritical and
deceitful.
The nature of this schism may even lead to two different
kinds of academic orientations--the difference between a behavioristic program
and a 'humanistic' one.
…It makes a great deal of difference for policy and
practice whether or not the child is regarded as a creature possessed of an
inner, indeterminate freedom which permits her/him to engage creatively in
adapting to or changing the environment. Bidney's anthropological philosophy
clearly embraces this notion of student freedom; the functionalistic position
advocated by those in the Skinnerian camp just as clearly deny it. (Arthur J.
Newman; "The Affinity Between David Bidney's Concept of Culture and that
Implied by Humanistic Psychology" in Essays in Humanistic Anthropology,
1979: 77)
The indirection of scientific method is the pursuit of the
hunch, the sneaking suspicion, the bringing into being the seeming impossible by
way of direction our attention at the seemingly possible--by keeping our
conscious attention preoccupied, but not completely so, it enables the
semi-consciousness to bring from the unconscious hitherto unexplored, unknown
mindscape. Science creates reality, brings it possibility into being, human
being. This is the power of science. Exactly how creative intuition happens
nobody knows, though we have vague ideas and probably we will never want to
really know, because the it will be corrupted by computer like intelligence.
Statistics is based upon two criteria, two interrelated
presuppositions which are mostly taken for granted and rarely questioned in and
of themselves. The first is the apparent quantitative facticity of the
datum--discretely recognizable bits of information which are accepted as being
relatively identical, hence comparable. This acceptance of the facticity of our
ability to quantify meaning, setting up a one to one correspondence between the
name and the thing, leads to a sometime artificial, spurious spacious
comparability between non-identical 'things'. The second is the inherent two
value dichotomic logic of the null hypothesis designed to reduce the possibility
of error--it leads to a spurious sense of understanding of interrelationships
between things which is only superficial. It systematically excludes a third
value range of alternative relationships which may in actuality exist between
apparent things. The net result is a superficial understanding, an understanding
which does not penetrate the surface relationships between things, resulting in
a kind of obscurity of the real nature of things, and an obfuscation of the
actual relationships which might co-occur between things. We are lead to believe
that statistics creates understanding, that it scientifically 'explains'
something without the human weakness of interpretation, when all that statistics
really accomplishes is an non-arbitrary precision, however illusory, of
description--a quantitative language or coding, which is supposed, if done
correctly, to render the always problematic task of making a wrong decision,
less problematic. As a purely descriptive device, statistics can be extremely
effective and therefore quite valuable, but it should always be taken, accepted
with skeptical caution. It can render quite clearly patterns of
interrelationships between things in reality, things which are not readily
discernible to the 'naked eye' of the mind--it can neither reinforce or negate
the common sense of our basically intuitive understanding of reality, but it is
not a substitute for this understanding.
Statistics has become the main weapons or technology of the
positivist paradigm of the social sciences. It carries the weight and the
authority of a belief in numbers, a preoccupation with procedural routines and a
concern with 'validity' and 'replicability'. Repeatability of experimental
evidence is considered direct inductive 'proof'--an openness to falsifiability.
Repeatability is based upon measurement, the application of some kind of
quantitative scale, which serves as a 'control' for comparison. This direct
proof is a demonstration of the strength of science--its power to enlighten the
unknown, teach the ignorant, question the certitude of belief. Real science, in
its realized way, versus the idealized, abstract positiveness, is actually an
intuitive creative process of methodical indirection--approaching truth
indirectly, as a spin-off of the focus of attention, as a debitage of
objectification, rather than a frontal attack. Whichever direction we focus our
attention, the truth is always evasive, resting just upon the periphery of our
understanding, vague only in outline. To misunderstand this, to neglect it, is
to deny the function of science while affirming its form.
Said the old natives of the young anthropological
fieldworker--"He doesn't seem to really know what he's doing, but there
does seem to be some sort of method to his madness"…"well of course,
he's only an amateur yet."
II.
ALICE LOST IN ANTHROPOLOGIA
on gracefully becoming a professional Anthropologist
O wad some power the giftie gie us The Gateless Gate
To see oursel's as itehrs see us!
It wad frae monie a blunder free us, An instant realization
sees endless time.
And foolish notion: Endless time is an one moment.
What airs in dress an'gait wad lea'v us When one comprehends
the endless
And en'n devotion! moment
(To a Louse: On Seeing One On A Lady's He realizes the
person who is seeing
Bonnet At Church by Robert Burns it.
The raison d'être for this unfinished ethnography is the
forcing into being the aegis of a course structure the entire ethnographic
project, abbreviated, truncated, adumbrated. It was my intention to 'accelerate'
the ethnographic process, to combine an 'annual cycle of seasons' into a
complete academic cycle of a single episode. The result has been piece meal,
erratic, sketchy--forced. The methodology does not begin or end with the 'field'
experience--it continues within academia and does not reach culmination until
the final 'waiting up' and 'publication' and there are from beginning of
deciding to become an anthropologist until finally actually becoming one in any
official sense, many different kinds of obstacles to hinder or prevent this
process from reaching completion, not the least of which is the eventual writing
up of one's field experience, which is not discontinuous from the
phenomenological process of ethnographic methodology, but is a very important
part of that process and praxis. It represents the completion of a
transformation experience of 'ego personality' and its valorization in the form
of achieved status. Until this status is acquired a sense of closure over the
process is not reached--this is part of the academic structuration of becoming a
professional anthropologist--running the gamut from amateur ethnographer to pro
ethnologist. The formation and development of the professionalism, of the status
and habitus, of a sense of being professional, is part of an academic
structuration for becoming a designated expert in a specialized area of
knowledge and understanding. There goes along with this structuration a
mythology of the lone fieldworker, successfully suffering the arduous
deprivations and problems of the field, bearing an onerous burden to find the
small bit of truth about humanity, passing through a self inflicted rite of
passage and remaining scientific in the process, becoming purified after being
passed through the forge, suffering many ego destroying, ego resurrecting
episodes which the achiever views as a trial by fire, a test of authentic
anthropological character. Without suffering it would not be genuine. Without
being difficult and serious, it would not be realistic, without being methodical
it would not be science. It is a task to be dutifully, ritually performed. It is
a task for which one prepares and is prepared by the properly rigorous and
routine exercises within academia--the demonstration of one's strength of
character and intellect to endure in the field. This ethnography is not just a
critique of an mythological image, of a very modern form of mythological
consciousness which passes in the name of science, but it is an effort to
provided, via this incomplete ethnography, an alternative vision of ethnographic
process, and the ethnographic participant who voluntarily engages in this
process, the student of anthropology bent upon a lifetime career of becoming an
authentic anthropologist. It is a vision based not so much upon the individual
egocentric actor--and his/her trials and tribulations upon the vision quest, or
'status quest' but it is focused more upon the membership role of a
socio-centric status seeker who is always circumstantially, situationally
defined vis-à-vis significant others, whether in the academic field or 'out in
the field' of humanity.
Anthropology forms a way of life, one based upon the status
of professional prestige, based upon what Weber might refer to as the
'usurpation' of a special kind of privilege which forms the criteria for a
particular kind of authority--in this case it is the authority derived from the
exclusive appropriation of 'What is human reality?' or variously What is it? or
What does it really mean? or What is the reality of humanity?, which is the
objective basis of anthropology defining itself as a 'science of humankind'. Now
there are many ways to break the egg but depending upon which end one chooses
will determine one's general orientation with respect to this question. With a
world of five billion people, no individual or exclusive club of professionals
has a monopoly or even a corner in the market of the problem 'What is human
reality?' To listen to a casual conversation among different anthropologists at
different phases of their careers or prospective careers is to see the 'pango
pango' principle set in motion, each person throwing in their two bits worth of
exotic experiences 'in the field' of special techniques for explaining these
experiences and of one demonstration of one's 'expertise' with which to polish
one's professional badges. Claiming some kind of privileged knowledge about
human reality.
We have the contest of ego involvement in the effort to edify
a reality which apparently needs reinforcement of a particular kind. In the
course of their careers, which if successful, serve to existentially reinforce
one's sense of ego involvement, we have the building of ego empires in which the
individual is busily engaged in policing its boundaries and asserting one's
highly personalized professional authority. To play up one's equality with
significant reference on counter reference others.
Existential ethnography extends from the thesis that all
human must somehow face and learn to cope with an inexorable fate of existential
loneliness. Certain environments and certain existential predicaments exaggerate
or pronounce this loneliness--the alienation of the crowded city, the isolation
of the middle class suburb, status marginality on the edge of the group, and
other conditions serve to ameliorate this condition a party, being enmeshed in a
web of familial or community obligations. Nevertheless, it is a bottomless
feeling which always returns to haunt and remind the soul of its eventual fate,
of being essentially alone in a lonely world. The existential ego has a number
of options which is to try to break out of this prison of the soul--always
attempting either to escape or to resign oneself to one's fate.
The purpose of this ethnography has been to find the
existential bottom line of this department and those who are members of it. This
bottom line is that no matter how little they may realize it, or act to deny it,
or how much status or reward or how little, they are mostly alone in their
world, and they must learn to live with being alone. Most people are caught up
in doing their own thing--it’s the 'American Way'--and few are really paying
too much attention to what anyone else is doing except in passing interest--via
meetings, casual associations, classrooms, etc. this is in marked contrast to
the hypothetical fieldwork orientation in which the anthropological ego is
primarily, or is at least supposed to be, primarily other involved rather than
self involved. In both instances though, we are inclined to refer to it as
'conducting research'.
The problem of power must be faced within the department. No
matter what an individual may rank it in relation to other schools, this ranking
is most likely a reflection of that individual's personal standing within the
department. The baseline I am taking for this department is that it is average.
There are very few really brilliant, exceptional human beings running about the
place, no matter how most of us would like to see ourselves and others to see
us. It is average, run of the mill and mediocre. Most of the people, myself
included are pretty mediocre. But what does this kind of ranking really mean. Of
course the department is not a clustering of Great Geniuses at the pinnacle of
high civilization. Very few places are.
The bottom line is editorial anthropology, the red line that
streams through all the library books that looks like so much graffiti--we are
all engaged in seeing exactly what we want to see, in making it the way we
exactly want to make it, if only we really could. At every turn of the page,
history creeps in to remind us that we are indeed not infallible, immortal or
even exceptional. The academic anthropologist's primary concern is the control
of history, of keeping historical agency out of his closed circle of interests.
We are involved everyday in editing anthropology, selecting out the interesting
from the uninteresting, the important from the trivial, the factual from the
fictional. We edit without admitting it, then we are doing something unethical,
quite unprofessional--a collusion of conspiracy of private interests, when
primarily interested. Climbing the chain of commands, the ladder of success. It
is OK to be editors in the anthropology section of the academic newspaper, the
travel and information section on other people in other place, this is the
job--but it is not OK to make this into something different or other than or
more than what is. To say that there is not something inherently biased about
the process. Folks I am not talking just biological anthropology--it has its own
mythological history it must face and live down. I am talking the sacredness and
sanctity of modern science, as the end all and be all of humanities problem.
Behind science rests this enlightened ideology of progress, behind progress are
all these private interests and motivations--'getting ahead'
ethnocentrism--ego-centrism.
The parody of biological science is to see human race as an
evolutionary mistakes, a dead end, a cancer upon the body of nature, headed for
extermination. Civilization and progress, in its destruction of ecology and
life, and its substitution of synthetic forms, is in its anti-entropy anti-life,
thereby inevitably self destructive. History learns this out. Our future is not
in the stars but six feet under. It is anti-life precisely because it is
anti-death. Not being able to look death in the face, to square off with the
fate of life, it is the mythology of immortality, eternity, 'learning to live
forever'. No need to grow pessimistic about it all. Behind the existential mask
of loneliness, is the face of death. And death, thanatos, is what we must learn
to live with, to deal with, to cope with. And we can learn to live with it,
longer with it than without it, and life is not automatically rendered
meaningless or purposeless with it, as it becomes more meaningful because of it
and inspite of it, but not in denial of it. And what we deny in ourselves, we
inevitably foist upon others.
Man may not have been the bio-cultural miracle, but the
bionic mistake, the evolutionary oddity, the unnatural cancer. The synthetic
cyborg.
We do not murder the turtle just because it will probably
outlive us all--we respect it, pay homage to it. We do not pull up weeds because
they flourish. One man's weed is another person's flower, just as one
scientist's fact is another humanist's fiction.
"In essence, this is a challenge of anthropology. A
certain loss of innocence occurs as one learns to see other societies (and one's
own) from an anthropological perspective. However, as Herman Hesse wrote 'the
way to innocence, to the uncreated and to God leads on, not back, not back to
the wolf or to the child, but even further into sin, ever deeper into life'
(cited in Matthiessen; 1965, prefatory quote). To this statement may be added
Dante's demand at the entrance to hell (from the Divine Comedy): 'Here
you must abandon all division of spirit, and here all cowardice must perish.' (Prawer,
1978: 301)" (Wessmen; Anthropology and Marxism: 11)
There are resonant phrases and grand ambitions and they are
proper to what is ideally a fundamental intellectual discipline. But the reader
should keep skeptically in mind this express caution: that the entire circuit of
our thought depends on the directions indicated by criteria which are not given
by social facts. The very notion of a fact is tautologically and by definition
factitious, a collective representation may be far from collective; the idea of
a representation, if taken strictly, begs most epistemological questions. In the
use of similitudes everything hands on concepts of identity and difference which
are not a-priori but are more or less defensible abstractions: Bolzano
asserted that identity is not only a special case of difference; Wittgenstein is
said to have remarked that what is or is not the same thing is the hardest of
questions. The sketch of analogical classification proffered below shows that
even the simplest of semantic structures subsumes numerous complexities and that
even the most elementary relational terms are gradually disputable. At every
step, therefore, a critical apprehension could, if nervously acted upon, bring
an advance to a halt: but if we are to go anywhere at all we have to press on,
despite our reliance on suspect instruments and rough bearings. (Rodney Needham:
14-15)
Involvement itself, ego involvement itself is not
wrong--commitment is the process of History and is unavoidable--existentially we
become committed whether we choose to or not, whether it becomes active or
remains passive, progressive or regressive. What is important is 'involvement
with a difference'--reflexive involvement which creates the anthropological
split personality between knowing and being, which eventuates in anthropological
schizophrenia of no longer being able to tell the difference--a 'con-flating' or
'con-fusing' of interests. It is Nargajuna who can remain unattached while
remaining involved. It is being a millionaire without being a pig about it. It
is not an easy feat--it is much more difficult than simply making a million.
Apperceptive recognition of one's involvement in historical process means that
one can monitor one's actions, achieve some measure of control over outcomes,
and learn from past mistakes. It means transcending paradigmatic progress, the
dialectics, while maintaining one's balance within it. Not an easy feat. To see
the forest for the trees is not an easy feat, as we can never get out of and
above the forest--the most is the diminution of perspective on the partial whole
upon the edge. It entails living upon the edge, keeping one's distance from the
centers of power, always resisting the pushing and the pulling. It means a self
induced marginality anthropologists are famous for. A concentric, self centering
system does not really foster such marginality which is so important because
this condition of marginalism, so necessary in effective fieldwork, becomes
anathema of success in one's own field--it is a threat to the sense of
anthropological order, the norms and sanctions of anthropological ethos, which
reigns supreme.
The thesis of existential ethnography is that underlying
'ethnocentrism'--the enemy of anthropological science, there is a motivational
structure of 'ego-centrism'. Ego-centrism and ethno-centrism reinforce one
another in a complementary interdependence. Ego-centrism leads to
ethno-centrism. Determination of an characteriological baseline for
anthropological ego, a kind of academic stereotype, turns upon this existential
thesis. Where one finds ego-centrism, there too shall ethno-centrism be.
Ethno-centrism defines a kind of social horizons of our pre-understandings.
Ego-centrism defines a personal horizon of pre-understanding the self in
relation to the other, primarily upon the basis of difference and superiority.
Ego, the Latin 'I' is defined as the self, or as the 'individual as aware of
himself' with the connotation of narcissistic conceit, egotism. Philosophically,
it is in a sense an absolute spirituality which is the substrate for
phenomenological experience, or 'the series of acts and mental states
introspectively recognized, etc.' in psychoanalysis it stands for that part of
the psyche which consciously experiences the external world and consciously
controls the impulses of the id. Ego-centric refers to 'dwelling upon one's self
or upon one's own personal interests almost to the exclusion of everything else;
viewing everything in relation to oneself; self centered.' It means also
exhibiting an interest in oneself rather than in the group. Egoism is the
tendency 'to be self centered or to consider only oneself and one's own
interests; selfishness. In ethical philosophy egoism maintains the doctrine that
self interest is the proper basis for all human actions, in contrast to a
genuine altruism. Egoism synonymous with self conceit, stressing its expression
of self conceit in words or deeds, whereas self conceit is more of an 'over
weaning opinion of oneself.'
We are hooked here on the horns of an interesting
anthropological dilemma. The egocentrically oriented individual sees the world
primarily in self reference, in one's own terms and therefore relates to it with
personal interests first. The inevitable egotistical rationalization reinforcing
this orientation is the world view that everyone is egotistical and selfish,
naturally so, therefore it is right to behave so. If existential ethnography is
correct in its thesis of the egocentrically oriented anthropological sense of
self as the primary reference for the world of the other, a thesis which is
perhaps reinforced by the very American value orientation of the cult of the
individual, then it is to be suspected that the anthropological ego, to the
extent that it remains self centered, also has difficulty escaping the bias and
prejudice of existential ethnocentrism--a belief in the superiority of one's own
cultural life ways. If this central thesis is valid, then anthropology can be
seen to embody an inherent dialectical contradiction of embracing ethnocentrism
upon the world of the other. This contradiction is expressed by and mediated by
the focus of anthropological attention upon the object-subject relations between
self and other. It is to be suspected that there remains more than a little of
the individual cults of ego-teheism and ego mania among ambitious
anthropologists.
The problem therefore seems not to be so much one of dealing
theoretically or hypothetically or methodologically with ethnocentrism, not that
anthropology has yet mastered this problem nor ever will. It is the problem of
anthropocentrism and ego-centrism primarily in academia. This problem expresses
itself in many ways, not the least of which is an apparent structural make
bias--anthropology being defined as 'the science of fun'. The anthropological
ego faces the existential problems of loneliness, in the field and in academia,
of limitations, of having to learn to live with one's self and one's own
weaknesses and imperfections and of having to learn to live with different
others, and of having different others learn to live with oneself.
Anthropology has a kind of spurious power, a kind of perverse
authority. Like psychologists who psychologize everything and everyone as a form
of power--getting into their heads to figure out what makes them tick violating
the private sanctity of the soul. It is actually an elaborate ego defense
mechanisms to protect the weakness of the self, repressing and projecting
oneself, one's weaknesses, one's insecure relationship with a shared humanity.
The same thing happens with anthropologization of human reality--the blanket
generalization disguising more than it reveals. Anthropology is the power of
being an 'expert' about human reality, of being a knowledgeable bottom line
about human affairs--jumping both literally and figuratively into other people's
lives and to figure it all out. Anthropocentrism is seeing things from the
exclusive framework of human reality based on the thesis that mankind is at the
center of importance of the universe. Reality is a science of mankind. Of seeing
human reality as something exceptional, privileged, important, interesting in an
exclusive sense. Anthropocentrism and anthropologization operates from the
framework that anything not anthropologically related is therefore irrelevant
and disregarded. Aesthetics is not aesthetics in and of itself but becomes
'anthropological aesthetics'. Philosophy has nothing relevant to contribute to
anthropology unless it is philosophical anthropology or anthropological
philosophy. The list is endless. The fallacy of anthropomorphism emphasizes and
imputes human like qualities in non-human entities and non-human qualities in
human entities. The fossilized other, the wild other, the aboriginal primitive
other, is the edge of humanity--the important perspective of marginality.
Ego-centrism and its cult leads into and functionally
reinforces academic authoritarian power structures. The perversity of its power
is that an individual will prevent or control or direct another human being from
fulfilling life possibilities, primarily out of an ego-centric selfishness of
personal frustrations at not having made it as much as one was able. It is
murdering the turtle. This is mostly consigned to the unknown realm of the
'unconscious' even though motivations for compulsions may not be well
understood, the deliberate decisions are fully conscious and arbitrary, the
consequences are very real.
Genuine culture and spurious culture. The cult of
ego-centrism is spurious, not genuine anthropology. Though it may be genuineness
within its closed sphere, in the wider context it becomes very much ingenuine.
It is the cultivation of haute culture to maintain a conspicuous visibility of
superiority of upper class status--the Bach And Beethoven within a cultural
stream of jazz and rock. It is middle class people, foreign or domestic striving
or looking to the upper class--a part of the wish fulfillment of national
bourgeoisie culture appropriating genuine symbols of status to reinforce one's
inherently insecure status. We, by being anthropologists, are not immune from or
separate from the implications of this process of strong ego identification. If
we share in a greater privilege in relation to understanding human reality, then
we also share in greater responsibility not to allow this privilege 'go to our
heads' and infect out over inflated egos. Indeed we are more susceptible and
therefore suspect to this process, because we make it the primary basis for our
privileged authority.
In his seminal essay, Culture, Genuine and Spurious, Edward
Sapir (1924) spoke of the possibility of studying and evaluating cultures with
respect to how well they provide suitable environments for human existence.
Along a general continuum, he saw the genuine culture as one which begins from
the needs of the individual while at the same time functions as an integrated
part and meaningful whole. It is able to strike a harmonious relationship
between the vital strivings of human beings and the cultural soil in which they
are nurtured. According to Sapir, a genuine culture expresses 'a richly varied
and yet somehow unified and consistent attitude toward life in which nothing is
spiritually meaningless in which no part of the general functioning brings with
it a sense of frustration, or misdirected or unsympathetic effort'.(page 410)
The spurious culture, on the other hand, is external to the individual producing
a feeling of subservience to arbitrary demands and fostering an attitude of
non-participation and alienation. While the genuine culture serves to nurture
the creative potential of human beings, the spurious culture is inherently
frustrating, fragmentary and wasting of human endeavor and sentiment.
Reflecting upon Sapir, the author strongly believes that he
was on to something that the subsequent course of scholastic anthropology has
largely neglected. Or at issue is the whole question of human value and the
possible emergence of an anthropology capable of addressing this question both
scientifically and ethically, with an emphasis on the measure of cultural
satisfaction. In other words, cannot anthropology blend its scientific
perspective with some general definition of human value and begin pursuing
research and thought which would be in service to this value? (Bruce T. Grindal;
Essays in Humanistic Anthropology, 1979: 13-14)
Deception occurs when it becomes so important to maintain the
veneer of superiority of authority, of untouchability, at any cost. What are the
stakes in playing this game--of 'making it' as somebody exceptionally important
as 'outstanding' in the classroom, in the corridor, in the field, in the world.
It is what happens to mediocre human beings who try to be what they aren't, and
in the process deny who they really are. The real human cost of this, is that
any potential brilliance is soon frustrated or squashed by the routine
operational demands of maintaining the veneer. There is a net leveling effect
which creates a ceiling to anyone's participation, cultivation of talent, or
ability. We are behaviorally molding 'anthropologists' along a certain model of
'socialized professionalism' which is the white jacketed social scientists or
the 'scholarly researchers'--stamping them out in a cookie cutter that fits a
pre-designed package.
The crudity of suggesting that a student can earn his/her
degree simply by plugging into a computer program or 'taking care of a pile of
papers on behavioral observations' goes unrecognized and uncriticized in its
discouragement of creativity and encouragement of mediocre conformity. The
unoriginality of merely 'getting involved' wherever 'there's money' goes without
notice. There is an obsessive compulsive need to present an image 'that one
knows what one is doing, or at least appears to, at all costs'. Part of becoming
more professional is becoming so good in this command performance, so seemingly
subtle and opaque in one's scholarly presentation of school authority, that one
fools even the foolish. The result is a bunch of proud Anthro youth marching to
the same beat.
This kind of value orientation is very much a part of the
ethos of Amerikana of the 80's--stemming from the American success ethics of
'making it', of 'getting ahead at any cost'. No one would be in education if
they were not at least a little interested in getting there. This is the yuppie
and yippie hypocrisy of the children of the 60's. it is the hypocrisy of the
Marxist's minded liberal who complains of being captive in her $40,000 year job,
or the man into global political economy worried about real estate transactions.
What is seen as a dangerous animal in a zoo, for public spectacle is really the
hypocrisy of an egotistical fool who thinks too highly of himself, and feels
cheated by the system because he can't get any further ahead. The job of a
professor is very comfortable indeed.
Academic achievement motivation is a driving ambition to
increase one's power and one's position of authority within the academic
framework of power and status, whether by role status or rank status. We all
share concern with this form of social mobility--with professional change and
transformation. This process becomes valorized by academic access to power and
resources which are always restricted and limited. The real audience is a larger
milieu of academia--those significant but distant others of the same field who
we must entertain and fool, or convince, sometimes fooling or convincing
ourselves in the process. The immediate colleagues are a direct symbolic
reflection of this indirect orientation--our placement within the department
seems to reflect our overall standing as anthropologists. The objects of our
desires, angers, needs, motivations, devotions, form the basis of the subjects
of our academic interests, serving as models for the structuring of our ego
consciousness which is referenced against a wider, but immediately absent, and
significantly mythological, audience. These are the means and materials for our
own symbolic acting out--of the relationship between self and other that tends
not to be an intimate inter-subjective I-thou, but a 'distant', 'objectified'
'I-it' relationship--as the significant other is the objective basis of the
information used as power in one's own ego-identification process. Feelings of
interpersonal intimacy develop not inspite of the academic milieu, but because
of it.
The point of reference of what has become known as the life
of dialogue is that it presents us with alternative stands: relations and
irrelation. I can, that is to say, either take up my place alongside whatever
confronts me and in Buber's language address it as 'you'; or I can hold myself
apart from it and view it as an object, an 'it'. Furthermore, with each of these
two attitudes I deploy a different I , the I of I-you being
quite different from that of I-it. The first is an I caught up in
an exclusive relation, for a you can never be one 'something' among
others; it must always be this kind of comes between an I and its you;
no anticipations, no preconceptions, no purposes, no aims, no desires. I cannot
say you until these intermediate thoughts and feelings have disappeared.
At the same time, nothing derogatory attaches to the stand of irrelation. On the
contrary, without it I should not survive: it is from the it-world that I
draw whatever knowledge, judgment and progress that I possess and enjoy--as
long, that is to say, as the I-you of relation is the stronger of the
two. It is essential that I have the ability to enter easily and frequently into
relation, even to the extent that my life may be described as one of I-you
rather than I-it. (Pamela Vermes; Martin Buber)
To play up one's inequality from a position of privilege or
authority with significant reference to or counter reference others amounts to a
kind of snobbery, an indirect way but not too subtle way of pointing out one's
own privileged position vis-à-vis that immediate other, even though this status
is derived ultimate from existential inequalities of life opportunities or
screens of opportunity which may not be available to the other. Exaggerated or
pronounced ego equality and ego identification with some significant other
becomes thereby conditional and arbitrary--contrived, set by one's own standards
and set of playing rules, in the denial or self deception of the inherent
existential inequality. It is a way of demonstrating one's authority in defining
the situation of interrelation and in specifying the name of the game. Its
status under emphasis or over emphasis, its emphasis at all, is an indirect way
of reinforcing one's own privileged position. It becomes a means of reasserting
and reaffirming one's privileged authority vis-à-vis some significantly defined
other in situations of perceived threat or insecurity to the ego. It is the kind
of structural relationship which we extend to others in the field as well as to
other colleagues in the field. It is a way of nomothetically defining one's self
in comparison, implicitly normative with others. It thereby becomes a way of
nomothetically relating to significantly defined others--specifying and
asserting a kind of 'privileged' relationship based upon power differentials in
the ability to control the relationships, largely a privilege which is one way,
in which the other becomes implicitly a 'thing' involved in a complex
anthropological 'I-it' irrelationship. It thus frames a way of knowing and of
methodologically relating to others in human reality.
Of course very few of us were born to be great
anthropologists, or even necessarily good ones. We must all learn slowly from
our mistakes. As I was well informed--'you must learn to crawl first before you
can walk'. We must all learn how imperfect we are at the process of relating to
drastically different others. Only a very few anthropologists were ever 'meant'
to be--maybe only a Margaret Mead or a Radcliffe-Brown, and this perhaps only
mythologically. Most of us have to learn the hard way, no matter what our egos
may think or want, that we are fairly average, not too exceptionally special
anthropologists. The basis of differences between people, beyond plain
personality and culture, are primarily due to differences of life experiences,
backgrounds, opportunities, interests, values, priorities, status and authority.
If some people are unable to see through the aura of authority which surrounds
some exceptionally 'strong' personalities, then they are only playing the fool
in a foolish game. But people rely upon authority to manipulate and bias the
system in favor of themselves and their own kind. They use power to create
opportunities for others, to foster privileges, to smooth the way for some,
while making it difficult, denying opportunities for others. Because nobody
within the system dares to call the bluff, to admit to the Emperor's new
clothes, such individuals are able to consistently get away with it. It is the
silent assertion of authority to cow people into conformity in the anxiety of
falling into disfavor. This is reinforced by the social pressures to conformity
which is always apparent in the thick atmosphere of strange looks and quiet
whispers. The bias of human subjectivity and fallacy is hidden beneath the
veneer of cold authority, the mask of shallow smiles, the projection of a
presence of scientific objectivity and scholarly professionalism which seems
somehow confected. The name of the game becomes information control--critical
information is not freely or broadly disseminated, but only general trivial or
officially necessary information is broadly, openly disseminated. It is this way
with all bureaucratized systems. Bias results in discrimination behaviorally.
Communication is what the system is all about--the exchange of important
information, and bias in the communication channels, of who hears what, is
apparent. The net result of this bias is that some individuals consistently
receive opportunities, advantages, and privileges, while others consistently are
denied these things. Characteriological differences, carrying the implicit
connotation of nature, hence racial, differences, are imputed as rationalization
for this discrimination and bias, which proceed originally from an ego-centric
value orientation. Some individuals perennially receive funding in order to
advance up the academic ladder of success, while others don't. there can be no
denying or rationalizing or justifying this 'fact' of History.
But there is an implicit and intentional denial of reality in
which routine operationally efficiency must be maintained at all costs in the
presentation of ego to the review of significant others, even if the cost is one
of purposeful reality manipulation, falsification, deception. Dissonance must be
great indeed to turn deceit into delusion, on everyone's part. An individual is
not actually going to study what his/her examinations are for because the
examiners have already removed the possibility of funding, and inspite of this
fact of history, that person must be evaluated as if he/she really were to
conduct this research. There is a kind of circle of implicit deceit, of inner
conspiracy, of internal collusion, which is reminiscent of Vietnam Era
double-speak news-speak. A great deal of the ritual formality and the cold
informality, of the authoritarian structure reminds me of the USMC. And people
get away with it because everyone respects this kind of ego trip with authority,
because that’s what they're really all about anyway. The problem with this
overall failure to face reality honestly or squarely, is whether such
individuals can really be relied upon to do honest research, or might they sweep
results which conflict with their narrow minded paradigms under the carpet,
fudge here and there with a few 'facts and figures' in order to maintain their
tight veneer of authority. This fact of history must be faced as well, because
it will otherwise undermine the system's efficacy--what goes around will
eventually come around, with rebounding retribution. This is human karma,
because the larger concourse of history is always two way. If nothing else, who
will call the bluff?
The corridors of anthropologia are streams of humanity, the
avenues of academic civilization. They are communication channels through which
thread networks, historical patterns, of communication, of information, and its
control. People whisper in hallways, or whistle loudly to be heard by all. There
prevails an overarching atmosphere of repressive, paranoid control. Someone
might be listening . Or is it only just me. But these channels are two way
channels and open upon broader streams of humanity. Secrets can only be kept
behind petty power mongering, can be allowed to happen without hurting too many
people, but it must answer to history by creating conditions of silence,
conformity, mediocrity and hypocrisy.
To step outside of one's own ego involvement requires a
surrender to the existential horizon of one's own historicity of
pre-understandings, embracing the weaknesses of one's own humanness. It is to
temporarily stand outside of one's own involvement within one's own ego-centric
circle of private, personal interests and values in order to genuinely share the
interests and values of others, however seemingly insignificant. It is the
refrain from the double edged word that one can't help saying, from the slight
and slighting gesture. It is to shed the sheath of one's own ego defenses, the
symbolic vestments of one's own privileged authority of knowledge and
understanding, in order to embrace one's own ignorance, it entails stepping
outside the hermeneutic circle of one's own involvement and the recognition
however relative of one's own history. This becomes much more difficult when the
track of one's success, one's career trajectory, and the positive, tangible
rewards of one's involvement, reinforces one's own ego-involvement and
negatively reinforces, discourages, becoming 'uninvolved'. This kind of value
orientation is clearly 'reinforce' by the reward structures inherent within
academia--students are encouraged and rewarded for their competitiveness and
aggressiveness for outspoken assertive and appearing authoritative. Successful
students make professors feel successful, mutual encouragement which validates
both individual's ego involvement. A kind of 'opportunism' or 'opportunistic
spirit' is cultivated. The system, paradoxically enough, becomes the big breast
of endless gratification which rewards the people. But what happens when the
milk runs dry--anthropological anomies--the external reward structure breaks
down and hierarchy asserts it authority and inequality. Whether one has enough
money to invest in a tape recorder especially after one's had all of this and
then lost it, makes one wary of 'whole hearted' commitment when the promise is
false, the rewards mostly tangible. It fosters an orientation that 'learning to
play the system' is the end all to being successful. Need petty funding for
research, the system can provide it. Need money for a plane ticket and meal
tickets, the system will provide it, if one knows the right strings to pull. The
idea of forking it out of one's own pocket, of paying one's own way, goes
unquestioned. Even the privilege of having a job, so much the boon and bane of
graduate competition, becomes the expectation of structure. The fact of a job in
and of itself becomes unquestioned. But what happens when those external
reward structures are no longer available, when their existence is more a matter
of mythological 'false consciousness' than anything existentially tangible, and
the individual must lapse back upon one's own resources, one's own internal
meanings of coping. One is left to existentially redefine one's status and role,
no longer primarily in terms of the structure of the system in relation to
significant others, but primarily in terms of one's own historicity--commitment
to one's own meaning in life--be it scientific, aesthetic, or humanistic or
anthropological or in whatever combination. The metalogicality of one's
apperceptive recognition. In the surrender to history, in the embrace of the
self consciousness of one's existential historicity, one realizes another kind
of ego strength not defined exclusively in terms of involvement with the social
system, but independent of it, not contra-distinction to it and this is the
strength of one's common humanity shared with other human beings, and the
strength and power, however 'spiritual' of one's understanding of human reality.
One then learns how to relate to human reality, to accept the hidden self in the
exposed other and the exposed self in the hidden other. One acquires 'soul' that
cannot be purchased with money, that cannot be authorized by 'status'.
Money creates its own reality, so does status and privilege,
and too, so does history. Knowing is not necessarily being. Experience is not
necessarily wisdom. History must be embraced to discover its Humanity.
Field experiences, whether a couple, a few, several or many,
no longer are in and of themselves sufficient to account for one's
anthropological reality--it is rather the existential understanding gained from
one's life experiences which counts for 'power'--the power to not need to
'prove' to oneself or others, to stand by one's own words come what may. The
field experience, then, no longer becomes a 'trial by fire' by which one earns
notches upon one's anthropological character, demonstrating the validity of
one's authority which is seen primarily in ego-centric terms of 'paying one's
dues'--earning one's credits for heaven. It is no longer such a lonely
experience, because it becomes a shared experience and an experience of sharing
oneself with others--what is learned is simply not data, knowledge, tricks of
the trade, techniques, skills, methodologies, theories, etc. But one learns a
kind of wisdom--a sagaciousness of human integrity.
These experience of I-it irrrelation becomes consummated in
written discourse, in 'publication' which is the 'anthropological mode of
production'--the causal efficacy of the 'anthropological way of life'.
Anthropologia is a cultural reality all of its own. Suspend the anthropological
imagination for the time being, and while engaged in relating to others, let go
of one's grip upon specious anthropological authority to admit, "I really
don't know what it is really about."
What we choose to remove or put into our bag of collective
wisdom creates the existential reality becoming an anthropologist--conditioned
by what we have had, or haven't, in the bag before. In general there is a
tendency to select on the basis of what was there before, of prior experience,
of previous understandings--our selectivity to be conditioned by prior
selections and our existential histories, or remembrances of these selections,
forms the basis for our pre-understandings in guiding our further choices. This
creates our existential horizon for being and becoming an anthropologist. There
is an accumulative growth of the bag to capacity, gradually over the years--but
there is also gradually diminishing degrees of freedom as our choice become
played out and opportunity costs accumulate, while we leave behind a trail of
mistakes. Whatever existential choices we make, there is a point of no return
and a point of departure and each choice brings in a world of unintended and
unanticipated consequences which in turn will precondition our future choices.
So haute culture, whether anthropological or otherwise, is
spurious, hypocritical, when it happens outside the broader streams of history,
appropriated as symbolic false consciousness by bourgeoisie people. They are the
corrupt citizens of a modern middle class of a global market political economy.
Race, nationality, counts for little--money makes everything, as a colleague who
went out the back door of anthropologia with me later confided to me.
We are left with the problem of identifying what remains
genuine about anthropological culture, what is central and most valuable about
it, distinguishing it from what has been rendered spurious by the futile escape
from the march of history. The core of anthropology which renders it worthwhile
is not its critical lens, not its skepticism of the taken for granted everyday
realities of everyone--it is its marginalism and its reinforced marginality, its
possibility for combining opposites, contradictions, its unparadigmatic
paradigm, its paradigm of remaining unparadigmatic.. it is its possibility for
creating alternative human realities, rather than the one we are not inscribing
for history. It is the anthropological imagination--its genuine human power.
When this finally dies, so will anthropology.
It is to learn that anthropology is not a substitute for
human reality, merely one of many means for relating to that reality and not
necessarily the best way either. It is relearning how to be unanthropologically
open minded and how to unlearn being anthropologically closed minded. There
exist many other dimensionalities for comprehending human reality. In the bottom
line, anthropology remains but a single subset of pieces of a much grander
jigsaw puzzle. When the authority of anthropology becomes tempered by the human
experience of history, by the realization of its limitations of power, it can
then be rendered more efficacious in the service of humanity. But anthropology
must learn to stand on its own--not to need to 'prove' itself so it can tap into
the political economic mainline. Then it will no longer be the marionette of
authoritarian power structures--the academic pawn of power, the priesthood of a
socialized, encapsulated Academia.
III
FATHER KNOWS BEST
On academic authoritarianism: the tradition carries on
"Lets hear it," said Humpty Dumpty. "I can
explain all the poems that ever was invented--and a good many that haven't been
invented just yet." This sounded very hopeful, so Alice repeated the first
verse:--
"Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All minsy were the borogroves,
And the mome raths outgrabe."
"That's enough to begin with," Humpty Dumpty
interrupted: "there are plenty of hard words here." "Brillig
means four o'clock in the afternoon--the time when you begin broiling things
for dinner." "That'll do very well," said Alice: "and slithy
means lithe and slimy." "Lithe is the same as active. You see its like
a portmanteau--there are two meanings packed up into one word."
"I don't know what you mean by glory!" Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously, "Of course, you
don't--till I tell you. I meant there's a nice knockdown argument for
you!"
"But glory doesn't mean a knockdown argument!"
Alice objected.
"When I se a word," Humpty Dumpty said
in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to
mean--neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "Whether
you can make words so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty,
"Which is to be master--that's all."
Alice was much too puzzled to say anything; so after a
minute Humpty Dumpty began again, "they've have a temper, some of
them--particularly verbs: they're the proudest--adjectives you can do
anything with, but not verbs--however I can manage the whole lot of them!
Impenetrability! That's what I say!"
The power of problem in Anthropologia must be faced and
understood, for it influences the way anthropology relates to history--who gets
accepted, what and where one studies, why one studies, who makes the grades, who
gets the job, etc. Not all power is in and of itself necessarily perverse,
although it mostly seems to be. Not all positions of authority are necessarily
filled by authoritarian power structures, though when encapsulated by a greater
power this usually happens. And this problem of power has a very American
character, for it usually takes the form of a Father figure who in his
paternalism knows what is best--he is the bottom line of the ideal, well
managed, successful American family. Father has his routine, his comfortable
armchair, his place at the head of the dinner table, he drives the family to
church on Sundays and says grace at the supper, or else appoints someone else to
do so. He, if democratically spirited may want to hold elections and be the
director of the vote, or else the decisions are too trivial to be bothered with.
But he is the bottom line and no one disturbs his well managed ship. He makes
all the important decisions, and likes to watch the games with the boys on the
weekends. If he is the living fulfillment of the American Success Symbol, like
all the folk myths, then his wife, the mother of his children, becomes the
embodiment of the American sex symbol, the Domestic Goddess. Like all
stereotypes of humankind, wherever there is always lurking in the background a
complementary counterpart of the opposite sex. In the age of modern American
affluence she has made a name for herself--after bearing his children she
honorably goes off and gets a career and shares in more of the decisions to be
made. Scratch a King Tut and you will find a Lady MacBeth, look behind Mr.
Machismo and there is the Lady Machismo, where there is one Oriental Dragon,
there is a eastern Phoenix or flower not far away. And like most myths there is
an inherent ambiguity of sacredness and profaneness--the figure either stands
upon a moral pedestal or else as fallen from grace, into disgrace. Behind the
Domestic Goddess is the office secretary, the myth of the Femme Fatale, the
Bitch in Britches of the office, the Dragon Lady of the office. Behind the Man
of the House, the irresponsible drifter, behind the TV Jock Star is the Fag Rock
Star, behind the Sports Hero is the Nerd Pansy, the whipping boy.
The question is not whether we live in a male dominated
society. It is more of a question of exactly how it is male dominated and
exactly how his historical fact results in a perversity of power. It is as one
preeminent Father Figure of the department tried to patiently explain to me that
the principal problem of becoming a professional anthropologist was to learn how
to be more professional. Because I did not define the terms of friendship in any
precise way in the survey, he did not bother defining exactly his terms of what
professionalism really meant--though he left me with a long lasting impression.
I think the problem is that he did not understand that we apparently do not
share the same models of what being professional is all about. My model is more
subtle and sophisticated, more so than the apparently subtle and sophisticated,
and so more difficult to find and to understand. It is not concerned with
badges, medals, stripes, ties or ribbons hanging about one's chest, or even how
these hang from the shoulders. Rather it is more concerned with the person, the
human being beneath the garish and polish and hence looks for an absence rather
than the presence of such externalized markers. My concern is more whether the
person keeps his/her appointment on time, whether or not he/she offhandedly
behaves like a pompous fool, is willing to have their authority questioned and
with what that person really sees before his/her eyes, another human being or
just a mere child. It is a question of who counts for what, and who's doing the
counting. So far I have been mostly disappointed with Authority Figures, as
their human personalities, well hidden by the guise of authority have not lived
up to their titles and reputations, but then of course I have rarely lived up to
the standards I have set for myself as well.
My father was never around, and my mother was a real working
woman, and so I never managed to embody that American Character or to
internalize that authority complex. Unfortunately, I had it, under psycho-socio
conditions of extreme deindividuation, almost completely externalized--so that
now I have a kind of socio-pathic distrust of all authority figures, a deep
seated paranoia about bureaucratic personalities, 'Systems' and 'Processes'--and
it seems that my paranoia is not necessarily ill founded. It is not necessarily
unhealthy to be paranoid in a paranoid System.
It really strikes me how military like this Academic system
really run. Most people don’t seem to realize it because most people do not
really know what the military is like. Offhand, the best examples, though
exaggerated, that I can think of, are MASH and Catch 22, though where these are
comical in a farcical sense, and satirical sense, the reality is comical in a
tragic sense. People not only accept the traditional order of things, and fail
to question authority--but they actually emulate this unquestioned authority.
And when they do protest and question authority, it seems to be for all the
wrong reasons--the issues that should turn on a dime don’t, while molehills
are made into mountains. Students grub for grades they don't earn, very
aggressively, or take plight mid-semester with their computerized grade options.
Attendance rates tend to only 50% and students make a big deal about getting a B
grade. Meanwhile they don't stop to consider they may really be getting short
changed in their educational dollar because of a professional's or a graduate
assistance's poor lecture style--the tradition carries on. Many students are
here not because they really want to be, but because their suburban bourgeoisie
parents want them to be--they don't know really what they want. And professors
treat them like children, call them 'kids', 'people', the 'children'. Not only
does content and poor lecture style go unquestioned in the classroom, but
students would rather run riot over alcohol privileges than protest to protest
the loss of their right to choose what gets injected into their bodies and the
threat of structural coercion which removed this right to respond like
responsible citizens. The appeal was made to fear--if you don't, you won't get
dessert--than to responsibility and freedom to decide--we have a disease control
problem, we would like your assistance in verifying your shot records…etc. It
is that the appeal was not made to individual integrity--the freedom to choose,
to act responsibly was not granted at all. There is a built in structural
prejudice, people do not have the responsibility to decide what is best for
them, it must be decided by the 'system'. People are not adult human beings,
they are the children of the 'system'--mere marionettes and sycophants of power.
This is only a symptom of the moral disease of the 1980's--the Reagan
mentality--in which the right and freedom of abortion is still a major issue.
What is involved is a kind of distortion of reality, and a kind of corruption of
human values. Academia is no longer an institution of higher learning, but
merely a marketplace where immature students get to shop around to get the best
deal for their parent's educational investments. Its sort of like buying a new
car or a new home. And Marriott-Johnson is allowed to make a killing on
campus--VIP's would rather have a Chenango Room to wine and dine themselves and
their guests during the day while there're at school, then have more space for
working in. just imagine that if everyone consistently boycotted the place,
brown bagging it, then Marriott-Johnson Inc. would not be making a profit from
it. Just imagine.
One thing I really learned to despise about being in the
military, besides the games of petty power, the head-trips of petty egos,
besides the dehumanization of mindless men marching to a single beat, were
Officers. By the time I was through I really hated Officers, young and old, full
birds or butter bars, and all the hypocrisy that they stood for. I do not have
to explain it. I only mention it because it notice an unusually high correlation
between how many people within the department actually were or had come from
families whose parents were officers. I can name five or six offhand, and there
are probably more. There are also a few whose parents come from the halls of
Academia themselves, or who were managerial level as engineers, businessmen,
etc. There are only a few people in the department who come from a lower class
background. We all know who we are. The point is that life expectations and
motivations and interests have been categorically conditioned because of these
backgrounds, or inspite of them. But they do make a difference. What many
take for granted as 'given'--deserved--others may see as an unusual privilege.
But the real point is that there is implicit in the kind of value and behavioral
models of this kind of staff managerial background--a kind of respect for
authority that borders on egotistical pride, and ethnocentric hubris, a
preoccupied class consciousness, which though downplayed or denied, serve as a
kind of reference set of standards against which all behaviors are judged and
evaluated. This is a kind of love for routine operational efficiency, for making
and meeting deadlines, a respect for and reinforcement of a kind of command
presence, a kind of taking charge and becoming a director of the performance.
Officiality, and offices, are highly valued prizes for one's performance. When I
first got to this campus I was standing in line to complete my enrollment form,
and a very official looking anthropology graduate student came up and barked out
an order to disseminate some information in line, to police the line, to keep it
straight. I just looked at this person and smiled. Now that we have gotten to
know one another there is more respect mutually. Another professional person
told me when I first came that I would have to prove myself by my performance to
see if I were worthy. Now that I have seemed to proven myself I think back on
what a pity it was that people can't learn to draw their horns back rather than
project them forward when meeting new faces and encountering new situations.
What are the implications of all this for field research? Little horned R2D2's
running around Africa collecting important details and nosing into other
peoples' business. I presented my thesis to be read by another professional
'colleague' who had the nerve to ask whether or not it was a real
thesis--whether I really 'earned' my degree or not. I think the person must have
been expecting a book report or at best a term paper. Fortunately and
unfortunately though, the signatures are very real, though really only copied,
as so is my degree 'really' a degree, though it is also only a worthless scrap
of paper. This kind of behaviouristic mentality of people who take pride in
routine operational efficiency and middle level management all leaves something
to be desired on the creative and imaginative side of life. Behind that dour
seriousness and those shallow smiles lurks really frustrated little children who
never really learned how to express themselves well emotionally. And here we
have the makings, the rudiments for Academic Authoritarianism. Unfortunately, I
collect and save all little straws that have been spitefully cast at me, though
I hide it.
If what we are really dealing with is a kind of class
consciousness, which when set into the framework of broader historical
realities, amounts to a kind of false consciousness, a kind of dissonance of
snobbery, a kind of pseudo hypocrisy, one which tends to cut across cultural and
political economy, people who tend to seek their own level in whichever cultural
milieu they may find themselves in, then we must see how this kind of class
consciousness plays itself out within the framework of a Department as it is a
kind of marketplace. We must see how achievement motivation become class tied
and how authoritarian character and values are linked to positions of authority
and access to important resources, to preoccupation with particular forms and
functions of power and authority and authority positions and positioning.
Achievement motivation whether academic or otherwise, is conditioned by and
realized through social class. Class created market conditions, critical
moments, through which power can be realized. Authoritarianism is also
conditioned by class consciousness--positions of authority are realized via
class channels. Upward social mobility or high achievement motivation which goes
rewarded, leads to the realization of class tied status. It is erroneous I
believe to see authoritarianism as simply a repression of personality--that the
so called egalitarian personality so resembles the profile of the middle class
Jewish college professor. This is a fallacy that fails to authoritarianism and
its many manifestations, as being essentially a form of class consciousness
conditioned primarily by the exigencies of class status. The Jewish American
Middle Class College Professor can call himself/herself egalitarian simply
because he/she can afford to--it is a privilege of their class. On the other
hand the lower working class WASP male can call himself a bigot because he knows
he probably isn't really going anywhere very fast, because of his class status.
I have met Chinese Vikings, Mexican Macho Men, Tokyo Tyrants, Black Brothers and
Jewish and Moslem Defenders of the Faith who are every bit as bigoted as any
WASP. F-scales are like IQ scores or GRE percentages--they really only measure
the achievement of class consciousness against an implicit set of ideal
standards. They are the reification, the hypostatization, of the Mythology of
the American Middle Class--indices of the achievement of the Absolute American
Dream. On the other hand, I have met more than a few closed minded middle class
Jewish College Professors who preach their egalitarian false consciousness. When
crossing cultural boundaries and national borders, people seek out and find
their own lever, their own kind--whether it is in a university setting or in a
slum. And when people climb the academic ladder of success, they change their
class tied status and class consciousness, no matter what their background or
where they came from. This isn’t bureaucratic, post-colonial co-option or
encapsulation, it is authoritarianism in the making. Power increases with
achievement, ego grows with authority. It is not what people say in this regard,
as words create the possibility for deception, for false consciousness, for
ideology. People will most likely tell you what they think you want to hear and
what they think they want you to know. It is what people do, and even more
important, fail to do, in human interaction and human interrelationship, which
makes for the decisive moment, the criticality of class consciousness. Whether
they have the time of day, or are willing to share themselves or assets, or
insist on their privileged status. These actions, the factuality of History, are
what makes the critical difference. It is not so much who will talk to whom,
though frequencies of transaction, quality and nature are important. It is a
matter of who does business with whom, who confides in whom, who eats with whom,
who sleeps with whom. It is a matter of relative symmetry or asymmetry of
reciprocity of inter-human relationships--who talks to, rather than at or
through whom, who relates with, rather than for whom, who borrows what, who
visits who, etc. It is a matter of an hour of senior professor's time being
worth more, qualitatively and quantitatively than a junior's professor. A
graduate student may be worth US$16-00 an hour, while a TA may be worth only
US$11-00 an hour. And if no one has taken the time to figure out who is who in
the department, there is a very real socio-economic reasons some people's words
carry more weight, have more import, carry more status, than others. Prestige
and privilege are reinforced by class ranking. There is a whole rank hierarchy
of who is worth what--a young Malaysian female factory worker for General
Electric is worth .25c an hour of handwork, a trishaw puller even less, while an
American doctor may be worth 50dollars an hour. A Van Gogh painting one day old
was not worth the canvas and pigments it was made from, now, 100years later, the
same painting may be worth millions. This is achievement motivation. A Van Gogh
is a Van Gogh is a Van Gogh. This makes the important difference. The
bottom line question is how can one human being's hour of lifetime be
intrinsically less valuable or less important than another human being, even
though intrinsically there are vast differences in the marketplace of global
class. Where American citizens are virtually untouchable and sacred in their
individuality, a citizen of Vietnam was worthless cannon fodder.
The external world structures and conditions the internal
world, but in the existential bottom line, does not decisively determine it.
There is I believe, a direct positive correlation this fact of human history,
academic authoritarianism and achievement motivation and the willingness or
emphasis of stress in seeing the world primarily etically,
as externality of material reality, as exogenous causality, which fits within a
positivistic paradigm of science, and a willingness and emphasis to view the
world internally, emically and the result of endogenous, primarily existential,
choices and decisions tends towards an humanistic orientation. The external
structuration of class relations conditions and fosters and reinforces internal
structuration of values, priorities, interests, world views, pre-occupations
with authority, the drive to achieve, etc. differences in class will almost
inevitably undermine human relationships--determining the overall directionality
of the flow of events, the asymmetry of reciprocity. No matter how downplayed,
the fact of class difference will undermine or work to erode human
interrelationships. On the other hand, those who use class difference to
reinforce their self esteem, to inflate their egos, often work in a short
sighted way. The people they shit upon one day, will be there to shit back upon
them next. It conditions internality of feeling of being, but not does not
decisively determine it. However poor and anonymous, Van Gogh was still Van
Gogh, inspite of class, perhaps because of class. Class difference is the tidal
undercurrents, the substratum of social relations. It is the accumulative
'structure of the long run' which eventually makes a difference by not making an
immediate difference. Human internality, the subjectivity of ego identity, is
the 'structure of the short run' which are like tide-pools or small eddies, in a
large historical stream of humankind. Class is always a synchronic structure
without real historical consciousness--it appropriates the diachronicity of
history by the institutional preservation of social relations which are
hierarchically organized into authoritarian power structures. False
consciousness or ideology, is the vehicle of class which carries it, perpetuates
it, through time. Ideology, with its supporting mythologies and traditions, is
the time machine of class consciousness. Ego identity, status symbols, are the
tip of the iceberg of class frozen in the streams of time. To see better the
authoritarian structure of class consciousness, and how this influence human
interrelationships one must look beneath the surface to explore the making of
class itself. There is no such thing as pure economy which is not polluted by
the perversity of power--there is no such historical thing of human economy
which is not by structure, also a political economy. A pure human economy would
be on in a social structure without the important difference--it would be
the ideal social utopia but not in the socialist dream of realized social
equality, of pure socialist, classless economy, but it would be in a sense a
kind of political socialism based upon a relative equality of social status.
Communist nations work upon economic socialism but ignore political socialism.
It becomes important therefore to see how power structures are functionally
motivated by authoritarian values and achievement motivations, and how these
articulate with the ideology of class consciousness and the differences of class
structures. Though they may be strongly correlated, in the structures of the
long run, one does not automatically cause or create the other, and there are
many notable exceptions of socio economic class advantages without equivalent
power, and of power structures without the socio economic class advantages.
Theoretically, we are concerned with the notion of positional
consistency of status honor or prestige/privilege as it is class tied.
Positional consistency results in class stratification, the formation of
crystallization of authoritarian power structures and the rise of a hierarchy of
economic networks. People occupy simultaneously several relative positions
within several overlapping power hierarchies--economic, political, social, and
religious. Inter-positional identity within multiple hierarchies begets
characteristically organic forms of solidarity, a kind of compartmentalization
of values, a kind of encapsulation of power and status, a kind of situational
'modularization' of one's material life and organization. It begets inter-human
social relationships which tend to be 'multiplex' and complicated--identity is
defined by one's specialized function in the service of the marketplace--the
shoe saleswoman may be black, brown red, yellow white or even green, as long as
she remains a good shoe saleswoman. Living takes on a fragmented quality of
moving from situation to situation, event to event, of code switching very
adeptly and swiftly, as one ranges from day to day over a whole plethora of only
seemingly unrelated activities. The basis for the integration of these
hodgepodge activities in the personal ego identity of the individual actor--his
functional membership role status. It comes together in the person, rather than
outside of the person. There is an increased sense of alienation, fragmentation,
of inconsistency, of disintegration of everyday routines and habits. There is
not any single way or style of life which is not highly individuated or
personalized. There is a contrast in the multiplicity of routine functions
performed by the high status doctor manager and the monotonous function of the
factory worker, one is machine like, the other computer like.
Status inconsistency creates a kind of structural
'marginality'--inter-positional ambiguity or discontinuity between different
social structures may result in discontent, dissatisfaction, resentment,
frustration, as well as 'disintegration' of personality--feelings of liminality,
ambivalence, alienation, loneliness, lack of identity, ego insecurity which is
derived from a pronounced, exaggerated form of existential uncertainty and
everyday inconsistencies--multiplex unexpected thing happen everyday--ethical
and professional decisions must be made as things happen, without secure
knowledge that one is doing the correct thing. There is than a greater pulling
incentive power, a greater pushing attractiveness, to routine operational
consistency, to prerogatives of authority, to normalcy of operation--a need to
keep the boat steady and a desire to not have the boat get rocked. Uniformity,
conformity, status quo, and conservative 'traditional' vales are
upheld--'respected', believed in, for the sense, the feeling or order,
consistency they bring.
Law exists when there is a probability that an order will be
upheld by a specific staff of men who will use physical or physical compulsion
with the intention of obtaining conformity with the order, or inflicting
sanctions for the infringement of it. The structure of every legal order
directly influences the distribution of power, economic, or otherwise, within
its respective community. This is true of all legal orders and not only that of
the state. In general, we understand by 'power' the chance of a man or a number
of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the
resistance of others who are participating in the action.
'Economically conditioned' power is not, of course, identical
with 'power' as such. On the contrary, the emergence of economic power may be
the consequence of power existing on other grounds…Nor is power the only basis
of social honor. Indeed, social honor, or prestige, may even be the basis of
political or economic power, and very frequently has been. Power, as well as
honor, may be guaranteed by the legal order, but, at least normally, it is not
their primary source. The legal order is rather an additional factor that
enhances the chance to hold power or honor; but it cannot always secure them.
The way in which social honor is distributed in a community
between typical groups participating in this distribution we may call the
'social order'. The social order and the economic order are not identical. The
economic order is for us merely the way in which economic goods and services are
distributed and used. The social order is of course conditioned by the economic
order to a high degree and in turn reacts upon it.
From the point of view of a larger social structure based
upon the hierarchy of authority, class difference, status honor, and economic
privilege, the department, as a nexus of a larger structural network of
Anthropologia, must be seen as bureaucratically encapsulated marketplace
organize corporately upon academic principles of education. Members of the
department form multiple groupings of multiple hierarchies in the distribution
of anthropological power, social power, along the lines of 'class', 'status
groupings' and 'parties'. Anthropologia form a kind of culture with its own
distinctive way of life. Its members, those who call themselves and one another,
and who are referred to by outsiders, are anthropologists of a single community
made up of many disparate sub-groupings. There is very little overall consensus
or 'community closure' of anthropological status honor because it is
interdependently tied into larger social structures within and beyond Academia
and the state. There is a negatively reinforced community status honor among the
anthropological community--its 'anthropologicalness' is more externally
reinforced and defined from without than from within, vis-à-vis significant
others. The net effect of this anthropologia remains forever and always
'semi-paradigmatic' as a unified Academic discipline--it does not become
completely paradigmatic in the Kuhnian sense and thus evinces little in the way
of 'progressive' development. It remains upon a 'pre-paradigmatic' level of
apparent disunity and disharmony--internally divisive. Anthropologists and
anthropology must be characterized as suffering an identity complex derived from
inter-positional status inconsistency within a local larger socio-structural
political economic framework. They suffer a chronic marginalism of identity
which influences their orientation and directionality towards history. The
divisiveness inherent to the anthropological community was an organissmically
integrated unity, is exogenously to competing class interests and differences
and endogenously to competing status-group and party interests. External class
differences are for this analysis the more important--if anthropologia were
truly able to affect relative community separation and isolation and
independence, within its academic castle, then class differences would lose
their power to influence and then endogenous differences would become less
exaggerated and community consensus more easily achieved--internal differences
would remain, but would become less significant when no longer class tied to a
larger political economic framework. Community closure could be achieved easily
and anthropology, as a 'puzzle solving' science, would become 'paradigmatic' and
progressive. As it is, anthropology remains too tethered to the larger, real
world of humanity. Its major strength is also its greatest weakness--its
Achilles heel. But it is tethered to humanity and to history, in ways that few
anthropologists themselves will readily admit. They want to see anthropology as
the unconcerned ivory tower discipline whose only interest is the pursuit of
scientific truth. This elitist attitude is more easily feigned on the more
biological side of things than on the cultural--the ideological dangers of its
false consciousness have been historically demonstrated.
Classes cross cut communities, anthropologia included.
Classes represent possible and frequent bases for communal action, but they are
not in and of themselves communities. As long as anthropology remained the rich
person's prerogative within a colonial framework, the realm of anthropologia
could achieve the necessary monopolar and nomocular class consciousness to
achieve 'community closure'. It could even be seen to be paternalistically
patronizing and condescendingly cavorting with the native and primitive others.
Then Mankind was Man, and women were privileged males or underprivileged people.
But as soon as anthropology started to be democratized, to open its ranks, to
allow the membership of other classes, it could no longer maintain its mythos
and ethos of the 'white man's burden'. Inferior types have long begun stalking
its corridors of power, privileged 'white men' in white lab coats. When
anthropology became forced by history to let humanity into its privileged
domain, then it could no longer keep the real world out of its privileged world
view--the anthropological mind became electic, 'poly-paradigmatic' and
'poly-ocular' and became internally divided as a community. Now we are in the
framework of the 'ethno self' and the 'ethnic other'--the walls of the culture
gardens of the colonial mentality have crumbled under the mechanical forces of
modern development. Anthropologist now come in all sizes, shapes, colors and the
good old days are gone with the wind. But now we face a greater danger and a
greater peril to our historical consciousness as ego-centrism and ethnocentrism
form horizons of prejudice and pre-understanding which we fail to see over. In
the marketplace of modern humankind, ego and ethnic status become class tied to
a new order, a 'Brave New World' order in which genuineness of being human is
lost to the spuriousness ego identification and ethnic classification. The
soul-loss, the human anomie, is overwhelming.
According to Weber, a 'class' is made up of a grouping of
people having in common 'a specific causal component of their life chances'
which is represented exclusively by in 'economic interests in the possession of
goods and opportunities for income' and is represented under 'the conditions of
the commodity or labor market'. Distribution of resources and property among a
plurality of people 'meeting competitively in the market for the purpose of
exchange' creates specific life changes, which translates into forms of power.
This 'mode of distribution' favors property owners who have a monopoly over the
distribution of resources, which is protected by the legal order. Opportunities
of the critical moment of the marketplace become monopolized, forming the basis
of powerful interest groups. Class situation, the generation of similar mass
reactions, creates the basis for communal action in the direction of interests.
The degree of this linkage is especially determined by 'general cultural
conditions, especially those of an intellectual sort'. It is also linked to
prior historical developments of class contrasts, and to the degree of
'transparency' of the connections between the causes and the consequences of the
class situation'.
…for however different life chances may be, this fact in
itself, according to all experience, by no means gives birth to 'class action'
(communal action by the members of a class). The fact of being conditioned and
the results of the class situation must be distinctly recognizable. For only
then the contrast of life chances can be felt no as an absolutely given fact to
be accepted, but as a resultant from either (1) the given distribution of
property, or (2) the structure of the concrete economic power. It is only then
that people may react against the class structures and only through acts of an
intermittent and irrational protest, but in the form of rational association…
Those who have no property but who offer services are
differentiated just as much according to their kinds of services as according to
the way in which they make use of these services, or a continuous or
discontinuous relation to a recipient. But always this is the generic
connotation of the concept of class: that the kind of chance in the market
is the decisive moment which presents a common condition for the individual's
fate. 'Class situation' only in those cities where a 'credit market', however
primitive, with rates of interest increasing according to the extent of dearth
and a factual monopolization of credits, is developed by a plutocracy. Therewith
'class struggles' begin.
Those men whose fate is not determined by the chance of using
goods or services for themselves on the market, e.g. slaves, are not, however, a
'class' in the technical sense of the term. They are, rather, a 'status group'.
(Max Weber; From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 1946)
What is the relative worth of a human hour of labor, whether
it is a beggar in a third world city or a professor of anthropology? This is the
labor theory of truth. Graduate anthropology students are busily engaged in
trying to accumulate credits, academic credits, and when they frequently fail to
meet academic deadlines, incur academic debits which become real bones of
psycho-social contention. Anthropologists in an effort to define and assert
their professional status, are busy with their 'mode of publication' working
under the survival of the fittest law of 'publish or perish'--they are
monopolizing property ownership of anthropologically defined power, in the
process creating privilege from themselves within the scheme of themselves. The
fact and act of publication is the decisive moment of the anthropological
marketplace. Graduate students are earning credits so that one day they can gain
the privilege of power, property ownership and monopolization--copyrights. They
seek to convert their credits into status of class so that they will improve the
exchange value of their labor--they will become worth $30-00 an hour instead of
just $15-00 an hour.
In the political economy of anthropologia and of becoming an
anthropologist, authoritarian power structure confer status group identity which
is guaranteed regardless of the exchange value of the marketplace. It defines a
master/slave status relationship between professors and graduate students and
graduate students and undergrads. But this status is linked to honor and
privilege and power in only severely limited and circumscribed ways, defined
mostly within the routine ritual contexts of classroom, course outlines and
program structure. Within the department, status honor is 'knit' to class
situation. 'Property as such is not always recognized as a status qualification,
but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity'. This status
honor, conferred by the legal structure of power within the political economy of
the anthropological marketplace, is linked to a particular 'style of life' which
is 'expected' from all those who wish to belong to the circle. Linked with this
expectation are restrictions on 'social' intercourse (that is, intercourse which
is not subservient to economic or any other of business's functional purposes).
These restrictions may confine normal marriages to within the status circle and
may lead to complete endogamous closure. As soon as there is not a mere
individual and socially irrelevant imitation of another style of life, but an
agreed upon communal action of this closing character, the 'status' development
is underway. So much for becoming a 'professional' anthropologist. It is to be
expected that Faculty, Graduate Students and Undergraduates have distinctive
'styles of life' and patterns of between group interaction and restrictions on
interaction within a legal framework. Graduate students go to bed with and marry
other graduate students, so do undergraduates. Faculty marry other faculty, and
go to bed with each other. While faculty may condescend to break bread with
graduate students, on ritually prescribed occasions, ceremonies, dinners, teas,
parties, they do not do so on a regular basis. Few faculty go to bed with and
eventually marry students--this is sanctioned behavior.
In its characteristic form, stratification by 'status groups'
on the basis of conventional styles of life evolves…above all this
differentiation evolves in such a way as to make for strict submission to the
fashion that is dominant at a given time in society…Such submissions
considered to be an indication of the fact that a given man pretends to
qualify as a gentleman. This submission decides, at least prima facie
that he will be treated as such. And this recognition becomes just as important
for his employment chances in 'swank' establishments, and above all, for social
intercourse and marriage with 'esteemed' families…the members of almost
inaccessible sects and all sorts of circles setting themselves apart by means of
any other characteristics and badges…all these elements usurp 'status' honor.
The development of status is essentially a question of stratification resting
upon usurpation. Such usurpation is the normal origin of almost all status
honor. But the road from this purely conventional situation to legal privilege,
positive or negative, is easily traveled as soon as a certain stratification of
the social order has in fact been 'lived in' and has achieved stability by
virtue of a stable distribution of economic power.
Where the consequences have been realized to their full
extent, the status group evolves into a closed 'caste'. Status distinctions are
then guaranteed not merely by conventions and laws, but also by rituals.
This occurs in such a way that every physical contact with a member of any caste
that is considered to be 'lower' by the members of a 'higher' caste is
considered as making for a ritualistic impurity and to be a stigma which must be
expiated by a religious act…
Only with the negatively privileged status group does the
'sense of dignity' takes a specific deviation. A sense of dignity is the
precipitation in individuals of social honor and of conventional demands which a
positively privileged status group raises for the deportment of its members. The
sense of dignity that characterizes positively privileged status group is
naturally related to their 'being' which does not transcend itself, that is, it
is to their 'beauty and excellence'…Their kingdom is 'if this world'. They
live for the present and by exploiting their great past. The sense of dignity of
the negatively privileged strata naturally refers to a future lying beyond the
present, whether it is of this life or of another. In other words, it must be
nurtured by the belief either that in the beyond 'the last will be the first'…
For all practical purposes, stratification by status goes
hand in hand with a monopolization of ideal and material goods or opportunities,
in a manner we have come to know as typical. Besides the specific status honor,
which always rests upon distance and exclusiveness, we find all sorts of
material monopolies…Of course, material monopolies provide the most effective
motives for the exclusiveness of a status group; although, in themselves, they
are rarely sufficient, almost always they come into play to some extent. Within
a status circle, there is the question of intermarriage: the interest of the
families in the monopolization of potential bridegrooms is at least of equal
importance and its parallel to the interest in the monopolization of daughters.
The daughters of the circle must be provided for. With an increased in-closure
of the status group, the conventional preferential opportunities for special
employment grow into a legal monopoly of special offices for the members.
Certain goods become objects for monopolization by status groups. In the typical
fashion these include 'entailed estates' and frequently also the possessions of
serfs and bondsmen and finally, special trades. This monopolization occurs
positively when the status group is exclusively entitled to own and manage them;
and negatively when, in order to maintain its specific way of life, the status
group must not own and manage them.
The decisive role of a 'style of life' in status 'honor'
means that status groups are the specific bearers of all 'conventions'. In
whatever way it may manifest, all 'stylization' of life either originates in
status groups or is at least conserved by them. Even if the principles of status
conventions differ greatly, they reveal certain typical traits, especially among
those strata which are most privileged. Quite generally, among privileged status
groups, there is a status disqualification that operated against the performance
of common physical labor…
The frequent disqualification of the gainfully employed as
such is a direct result of the principle of status stratification peculiar to
the social order and of course, of this principle's opposition to a distribution
of power which is regulated exclusively through the market. These two factors
operate along with various individual ones…
As to the general effect of the status order, only one
consequence can be stated, but it is a very important one: the hindrance of the
free development of the market occurs first for those goods which status groups
directly withheld from free exchange by monopolization. This monopolization may
be effected either legally or conventionally…
With some over simplification, one might thus say that
'classes' are stratified according to their relations to the production and
acquisition of goods; whereas 'status groups' are stratified according to the
principles of their consumption of goods as represented by special
'styles of life'.
Whereas the genuine place of 'classes' is within the economic
order, the place of 'status groups' is within the social order, that it, within
the sphere of the distribution of 'honor'. From within these spheres, classes
and status groups influence one another and they influence the legal order and
are in turn influenced by it. But 'parties' live in a house of 'power'.
Their action is oriented towards the acquisition of social
'power', that is to say, toward influencing a communal action…the communal
actions of 'parties' always means a societalization. For party actions are
always directed toward a goal which is striven for in planned manner. This goal
may be a 'cause' (the party may aim at realizing a program for ideal or material
purposes), or the goal may be 'personal' (sinecures, power and from these honor
for the leader and the followers of the party). Usually the party action aims at
all these simultaneously. Parties are, therefore, only possible within
communities that are societalized, that is, which have some rational order and a
staff of persons available who are ready to enforce it. For parties aim
precisely at influencing this staff, and if possible, to recruit it from party
followers.
…in most cases they are partly class parties and partly
status parties, but sometimes they are neither.
The sociological structure of parties differ in a basic way
according to the kind of communal action which they struggle to influence.
Parties also differ according to whether or not the community is stratified by
status or by classes. Above all else, they vary according to the structure of
domination within the community, for their leaders normally deal with the
conquest of a community…it is impossible to say anything about the structure
of parties without discussing the structural forms of social domination per
se. Parties, which are always structures struggling for domination, are very
frequently organized in a very strict 'authoritarian' fashion…
Concerning 'classes', 'status groups' and 'parties' it must
be said in general that they necessarily presuppose a comprehensive
societalization and especially a political framework of communal action, within
which they operate…(Max Weber, 1946)
Anthropologia can be seen to constitute historically an open
community of the political-economic marketplace of which any single department
is but a nodal point--the immediate concrete representation, of a much vaster
network of interrelations. It is a community made up of a divisive and cross
cutting, overlapping hierarchies of class, status groupings and sub-disciplinary
parties. It is structured exogenously from without by bureaucratic encapsulation
and socio-economic class relations or 'irrelations' based upon class
differences. It is reinforced from within by authoritarian power structures and
status groupings whose power is legitimized via such structures. It is
interesting, as one informant suggested, to see anthropologia as a complex
overlapping networks, of concentric circles radiating from focal points,
clustering about 'core' areas. Status grades are the lines, the gateways of
power. Inner circles represent higher levels of status power. Outer grades are
more open to outside connections, composed of newcomers into the field. The core
areas are more stable pinnacles upon a kind of 'epi-genetic landscapes'.
Positional consistency is greater in these areas. Each successive inner circle
is harder, more difficult to pass into, from outside. Individuals occupying
similar positions in the same grade are involved in a kind of structurally
ambivalent relationship of cooperation and competition, hierarchy of bureaucracy
and the equality of democracy are in continual dialectical opposition upon every
level. Members of different pinnacles may share more in common when of the same
grade than members of other grades. Structural models defining anthropological
power are more stable in the core areas, more conservative and uniform--while
upon the periphery more alternative eclecticism of a kind of anthropological
cultural continuum will occasion more room for individual expression and
creativity. This model can be applied in a paradigmatic sense in order to
understand the social structure and historical dialectic of the anthropological
paradigm.
It is time to reconsider the problem of the perversity of
power. Power is perverse when it results in a form of structural or social bias
which is inherently unfair. Perversity of power presupposes the ideal of human
freedom, in the existential sense, and human equality in the moral sense. Power
is by this thesis inherently perverse because it implies hierarchy, inequality
and unfreedom, or control. There is no a-priori meat-ethical reason that
dictates humankind must be free and equal, and the thesis coming from human
nature would contradict this claim--human beings are not by nature equal and
free. On the other hand, an argument can be made for the necessity and a-priori
givenness for Human Hierarchy, but this argument alone is not enough to serve as
the basis for its rational justification. The humankind should be free and equal
in a real and relativistic sense, even though cannot be an ideal and
absolutistic sense, is one of the principles of historical process. History is
the basis of the ethical argument for human freedom and equality.
The nature and structure of the perversity of human power
resides in the facts of human ignorance, prejudice, discrimination and bias.
Hierarchy is the substitute for human frailty and imperfection. It is part of
the effort to make control or minimize the unpredictableness of human agency in
the unintended consequences of historical change.
The preoccupation of the cult of power within the culture of
anthropologia represents a kind of spuriousness of culture--one inhibiting
paradigmatic progress, creative synergism and the potential historical
development of anthropological culture, the realization of human creativity
which is always the historical high watermark of all human civilizations. It
arises out of an orientation of ego-centrism and a culture of ego-centrism which
stresses status grade achievement at all costs. It arises out of a
bureaucratization of the academic process of socialization or 'societalization'
in which authoritarian power structures take root 'in the name of order and
efficiency'. A kind of conformist routine operational character orientation is
cultivated, the rational ideal of the 'professional' anthropologist, in which
efficiency of routine behavioral praxis, expressed methodologically and
methodically, takes precedence over creative realization. Values of 'precision,
speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, strict subordination, reduction of
friction, and of material and personal costs' are prized and preferred by the
bureaucratic mentality. But the principles of the ideal rational bureaucracy
break down under the Parkinsonian law at precisely the point at which the name,
the method, the routine, the enterprise, the 'corporation' becomes justified in
its own terms of efficiency, becomes a rational ideal end in itself rather than
just a means to other ends. At this point it no longer human purposes, but
humans begin serving inhuman purposes, in the name of 'order'. The computer is
no longer a tool for the human operator, but the human operator becomes the
servant of the computer program. It is a slight and subtle shift in emphasis but
it has dramatic long term consequences for the 'banalization' of the whole
social process.
Spurious culture no longer serves human needs, but serves the
needs of the system. It is like a neurosis or a social pathology in which
individuals are too caught up, too 'involved' in enacting its routine
performance may vaguely or intuitively sense something is wrong, but will not be
able to understand it clearly. There will be selective editing of outside
'threats' who disturb the sense of order, however disturbed. This understanding
of the sickness and dis-ease of the system will be beyond the personal horizons
and social horizon of pre-understanding, the system and its members exist
outside the stream of historical consciousness. Being unable to face it, the
actor is control by it, not in control of his own existential fate. They are
unable to do anything to affect a change.
The alternative to synergetic growth is born in an
environment of frustration and mistrust. Instead of the smooth flow or cathexis
of energy between inner and outer worlds, this energy is frustrated resulting in
repression or 'intrinsic counter cathexis' (Maslow, 1968). Instead of promoting
a feeling of well being, the individual comes to distrust self and to project
upon the outer world similar fear and hostility. To survive, such a person
erects defensive barriers to understanding, denying those parts of self which he
or she fears or does not wish to surface to consciousness and much of his or her
behavior is self defeating and a waste of energy, energy which otherwise may
have been utilized toward a more rational and charitable ends.
This schism between self and outer existence is well
illustrated by the idea of neurosis. As Maslow (1968) views it, neurosis
consists of the defenses which the individual erects, distorts or evade
experience. Its motive force is fear (angst) causing the individual to
impose barriers between self and outer experience, impeding the flow of
communication. Repression, projective distortion, rationalization and regression
are all forms of counter communication which prevent the adequate translation of
experience and human meaning. Neurosis is thus a disease of human interacting;
for the barriers imposed upon self are largely derived from others.
In the context of society, these schisms and barriers are the
myriad forms of human alienation and their pathological consequences. With
alienation the individual is divided from himself and other people. The sense of
active participation and creative involvement with the outer world is stifled,
and the component of self and other are polarized. Thus in any society,
conditions which impose barriers between sexes, generations, races and
socio-economic classes create unsynergetic conditions for human life. For by
opposing groups that they not only erect barriers of mutual ignorance but also
quicken the potential for antagonism and aggression. The sadomasochism of
everyday life is but a microcosm of the institutions of warfare and
socio-economic oppression. In both cases, the mutual transactions of love and
cooperation have failed; and in response, individuals create rigid boundaries
between themselves and others. The institutional expressions of egotism, sexism,
racism and the other varied form of ethnocentrism polarize the 'we-they'
distinction and create human relations which are both fearful and angry. (Bruce
T. Grindal; Essays in Humanistic Anthropology, 1979: 34-36)
The character type serving as a stereotypical baseline for
the academic authoritarian is not too difficult to discern. It is in all of us
and it is a matter of whether we recognize and learn to deal with it. It is part
of the egocentric personality and leads to a sophisticated kind of academic
ethnocentrism which cannot but bias our human 'sciences'. Besides fitting
Weber's description of the ideal rational bureaucrat who is a professionally
specialized expert, an authority in an area of expertise, there are several
other important dimensions. First there is a basic repression of a part of the
self--emotional, unstable, uncertain, intuitive, subjective, weak, empathetic.
What is repressed in the self, becomes projected negatively as a stereotype upon
'counter reference' significant others. With repression/projection there occurs
a need to dichotomize the universe of phenomenological human reality and there
occurs what I have termed symbolic boundary-identification, which is a kind of
obsessive-compulsive form of symbolic fixation or dependency which must be
maintained and reinforced. This fixation results in the reification of abstract
meanings in concrete form, and the rationalization of concrete things and action
in abstract form. With this simple fundamental process, I have by experience
with interacting with professional anthropologists identified two basic forms of
academic authoritarianism. Both forms are linked to a basic sense of existential
status grade insecurity. The weaker form is related to feelings of low self
esteem and status inconsistency, the failure to 'contextualize' oneself
vis-à-vis a significant other. The stronger form is related to the need for
achievement that becomes overriding in importance, domineering. Coincidentally
and paradoxically, the strong form is liked to what I would refer to as simple
form of prejudice while the weaker form is linked to a more sophisticated kind
of prejudice. Both result in forms of professional discrimination and bias, an
emphasis upon authority, hierarchy and a preoccupation with power. It is
interesting in this regard that this form of authoritarianism only occurs and
evinces itself in reference to professionally defined spheres of activity--when
the anthropological ego is turned on and in tune. Human social relationships may
co-occur and be carried on around and inspite of this authoritarianism, but not
in reference to it. Professionally an individual may be obstinately difficult to
deal with, socially and humanly this individual may be a very nice person. I
believe that this indicates that academic authoritarianism is the result of the
socialization process entailed in the characteriological deprivations and
severities of the process of becoming a professional anthropologist. It is
linked to one's status grade and difficulties in its acquisition within the
academic milieu, in which a professional image must be maintained, and human
weaknesses must be covered over or repressed. It is part of the authoritarian
structuration of becoming an 'authority'. In this regard I believe the strong
form is linked to high achievement motivation, while the weak form is linked to
deficiency motivation--to feelings of ego insecurity, low self esteem, etc. the
first form derives from the drive to succeed, the second from the fear of
failure. But both forms are interrelated in another important way--they both
take stereotypical forms of expression in regard to academic value orientation,
world view and methodological approach to anthropology, an approach I will refer
to as a kind of positivistic fundamentalism.
The first, 'simple strong' form is, I believe, founded upon a
simple 'factual' ignorance, which is linked to strong repressions of the self.
In this form there is an unquestioned taken for grantedness about the factual
efficacy of words and numbers, which is a symbolic expression of the factual
efficacy of the rewards of the system. There is a willingness to see only what
one wants to see, which results in an extreme form of fanatical intensity of
interest. There is an extreme unwillingness to see what one doesn't want to see,
a kind of denial of difference which results in a kind of boredom and extreme
disinterestedness. A fact is a fact is a fact. A rose is a rose is a rose…
The second, 'weak sophisticated' form is still based upon
fundamental but one which is self consciousness which results in a denial of
this ignorance and its projection in sophisticated forms upon other people. It
results in a sophistry of prejudice. While not unwilling to look at conflictual
data which may remind one of ignorance and weakness, to consider alternatives,
indeed there can be an almost pre-understandings, ones unquestioned, implicitly
presuppositions, about the hypothetical, the theoretical, rather than a matter
of being honest about the way one relates to the things one sees. One may be
open to facts, but closed to the truth they reveal or conceal. Truth is not
inherent in factuality--truth comes from the existential leap of faith, from the
will to belief, from the groundless ground of being. Factuality as a form of
truth is not given in human reality--one person's truth is another lie, one
person's fact is another fiction. There are not absolute measures or standards
for determining, or predetermining the 'truth' of how one relates to 'facts'.
There are no statistically absolute standards of facticity in human reality.
Fact is an historical document taken on honest faith--a recorded instance of a
phenomenological experience or event measured by numbers or defined by names.
The historicity of factuality is its hermeneutic horizon, its circle of meaning.
What is a fact?--a person is a fact, an act is a fact, an event or situation is
a fact, an institution is a fact, but what is a 'fact' in and of itself, if not
a metaphorical symbol that stands for the 'truth' or the 'will to believe' in
something else--but can a fact really stand for itself as 'truth' without
becoming an ideological fiction, a denial of its reality. A fact is an
ascription of limited importance, of delimited significance, of measured value,
of explicit interest, against an implicit framework of such values, orientation
of such general interests. A fact becomes important by its analogical identity
with something else. It is not the factuality of the time of the clock, and not
the clock itself, the distance of a ruler or mile, and not the ruler or mile
itself.
Positivistic fundamentalism is the 'literal mindedness' of
the word which is reinforced by the bureaucratic importance attached to the
form, the document, the 'proof'. It is the reliance upon the authority of the
text, whether a dictionary or a textbook or a 'bible'. It becomes the
delimitation of the denotative definition of terms--a way of seeming to think
concisely, clearly. It provides something 'clearly self evident' to believe in.
there is a lack of being metaphorical, of being 'figurative' of the appreciation
of the subtlety and sublimity of language and meaning. This kind of positivistic
fundamentalism is characterized by several features--one is concrete thinking
and restrictive imagination, or 'constricted improvisation'. People become acts
and acts become things and things have definite names and names if grouped by
identity can be transformed into numbers and thereby there is a kind of 'logic
of concreteness' which is not too (THERE IS A MISSING SENTENCE HERE: PAGE 68)
(PAGE 69 BEGINS THUS):-
the sole possessors of the rules of the game or of some
equivalent basis for unequivocal judgments. To doubt that they shared some such
basis for evaluations would be to admit the existence of incompatible standards
of scientific achievement. That submission would inevitably raise the question
of whether truth in the sciences can be one. (Kuhn:168)
"A scientific community consists, on this view, of the
practitioners of a scientific specialty. To an extent unparalleled in most other
fields, they have undergone similar educations and professional initiations; in
the process they have absorbed the same technical literature and drawn many of
the same lessons from it. Usually the boundaries of that standard literature
mark the limits of a scientific subject matter and each community ordinarily has
a subject matter of its own. There are schools in the sciences, communities,
that is, which approach the same subject from their incompatible viewpoints. But
they are far rarer there than in other fields; they are always in competition
and their competition is usually quickly ended. As a result, the members of a
scientific community see themselves and are seen by others as men uniquely
responsible for the pursuit of a set of shared goals, including the training of
their successors. Within such group communication is relatively full and
professional judgments relatively unanimous. Because the attention of different,
scientific communities is on the other hand, focused on different matters,
professional communication across lines is sometimes arduous, often results in
misunderstandings and may, if pursued, evoke significant and previously
unsuspected disagreement." (Kuhn: 177)
Though highly regarded, notions of scientific objectivity,
empirical commensurability and observer neutrality tend to inform anthropology
as science as much as any other science, though these are highly tenable notions
in the hard sciences, their clear delineation in anthropological praxis is that
much more indeterminant when viewed against a background of human reality and
the complexity of the interrelationships and multifaceted meaning structures,
the clear, clean concise edges of scientific methodology and instrumentality
dull and blur, and objectivity itself becomes rather nondescript.
The question of anthropology as science, is it really is or
can be a science in the sense of its praxis, is rarely directly addressed by
anthropologists. It is subsumed away as given, it is left as an unfit question
for a good scientist, leftovers for the philosophers to fight over. Being
conveniently discarded as irrelevant, the question of the substantiality of
human reality itself is consequent left unaddressed as well.
But this question is crucial to the scienticity--or
scientific authenticity and authority of anthropological praxis. Anthropology
continually confronts a vast unknown and the scientific tools it has are assumed
to be enough to solve the unknown, as if the unknown were a puzzle
awaiting a final, finite in form and function from 'primitive analogic' in which
'correlations denote causation'.
I believe that the statement 'man is not a thing' is the
central topic of the ethical problem of modern man. Man is not a thing, and if
you try to transform him into a thing, you damage him. "Power is the
capacity for transforming a man into a thing because you transform a living
thing into a corpse." A corpse is a thing. Man cannot be taken apart and
put together again; a thing can be. A thing is predictable; Man is not. A thing
cannot create, Man can. A thing has no self, Man has. Man has the capacity to
say the most peculiar and difficult words in our language, the word 'I'…
I want to mention one more point here which refers to the
difference between knowing things and knowing man. I can study a corpse or an
organ, and it is a thing…but if I want to know a man, I cannot study him this
way…The problem the psychiatrist and the psychoanalyst are concerned with,
however, the problem we should all be concerned with--to understand our neighbor
and ourselves--is to understand a human being who is not a thing. And the
process of this understanding cannot be accomplished by the same method in which
knowledge in the natural sciences can be accomplished. The knowledge of man is
possible only in the process of relating ourselves to him; …Ultimate
knowledge cannot be expressed in thought or words…And you can never exhaust
the description of a personality, of a human being, in his full individuality;
but you can know him in the act of empathy, in an act of full experience, in an
act of love…(Erich Fromm; The Dogma of Christ and Other Essays on Religion,
Psychology and Culture)
There is also a kind of 'data boundedness' of allowing the
'data base' determine the range and limitations of one's paradigmatic
horizons--of failure to see the data as examples of metaphors of meaning, but
rather as evidence of factuality of truth. It is a search for truth in the
concreteness of number.
Proof by falsification becomes a fundamentalist doctrine of
the act of faith, the demonstration of the reality of one's beliefs, to make an
apparently falsifiable statement--'the sky is the blue' or 'this is a rose'
which opens one's faith in the truth of one's scientific language to 'proof'.
There is a need to prove.
This kind of positivistic fundamentalism is characterized by
a kind of naïve, sometimes blind, but never innocent faith in the apparent
factuality of names and numbers--the strength of correspondence, the power of
the connection.
It is characterized by a closed minded orientation which is
unwilling to face alternative systems of conceptioning, to entertain the
free-play of words and meanings, to be critical of one's own presuppositions. If
it is skepticism it is the severe skepticism of the fundamentalist true
believers who adamantly doubts all differences and deviations from one's own
creed. 'Skepticism means Cynicism.'
This leads to a 'closed minded' system of conceptioning which
forms its own hermeneutic horizon. It is the closed mindedness of the computer
mentality, which fails to see the human behind the machine. This is opposed to a
relatively open minded system of conceptioning of human reality.
Knowledge is power
. That
commonplace applies to anthropology as much as to any other field of knowledge.
But commonplaces usually cover up for not so common truths…Anthropologists
claim to power originated at its roots. It belongs to its essence and is not a
matter of accidental misuses…there is no knowledge of the Other which is not
also a temporal, historical, a political act.
Perhaps this covers too much ground: political can
mean anything from systematic oppression to anarchic mutual recognition…Anthropology's
alliance with the forces of oppression is neither a simple or recent one, as
some moralizing critics would have it, nor is it unequivocal…Anthropology may…have
succeeded in establishing itself as an academic discipline: it failed to come to
a rest vis-à-vis a clearly defined other. (Johannes Fabian: 1-2)
…How has anthropology been defining or construing its
object--the other? Search for an answer has been guided by a thesis:
Anthropology emerged and established itself as an allochronic discourse; it is
the science of other men in another Time. If it is a discourse whose referent
has been removed from the present of the speaking/writing subject. This
'petrified relation' is a scandal. Anthropology's Other is, ultimately, other
people who are out contemporaries. No matter whether its intent is historical (ideographic)
or generalizing (nomothetic) anthropology cannot do without anchoring its
knowledge through research in specific groups or societies; otherwise it would
no longer be anthropology but metaphysical speculation disguised as an empirical
science. As relationships between peoples and societies that study and those
that are studied, relationships between anthropology and its object are
inevitably political; production of knowledge occurs in a public forum of
inter-group, interclass and differentiation were the rise of capitalism and its
colonialist-imperialist expansion into the very societies which became the
target of our inquiries…(143-144)
…In order to claim that primitive societies (or whatever
replaces them now as the object of anthropology) are the reality and our
conceptualizations the theory, one must keep anthropology standing on its head.
If we can show that our theories of their societies are our praxis--the
way in which we produce and reproduce knowledge of the Other for our
societies--we may (paraphrasing Marx and Hegel) put Anthropology back on its
feet. (Johannes Fabian; Time and Other,???? :165)
It is not so much what anthropologists say or write except
where this is what they really mostly do, but in what they do, and in what they
might do but don't, that the character of their behavior is to be judged in
terms of praxis.
Sometimes it is not only enough to 'see oursel's a ither see
us' but to try as well to see others as we see ourselves, and to even go beyond
to attempt to see ourselves as we see others. 'Seeing' in such terms between
self and others is the 'self reflexive' starting point for a critique of
Anthropology, but not the end of such a critique.
'Seeing' thus begets knowledge of our social realities, and
such knowledge begets responsibility, or at least some sense of it, in our
inter-relatedness with others.
"…not to have tried to see through the whole apparatus
of mystification--was already criminal…for being in a position to know and
nevertheless shunning knowledge creates direct responsibility for the
consequences--from the very beginning." (Albert Speer; Memoires)
"The development of science and of the creative
activities in general requires still another kind of freedom. It is this freedom
of the spirit which consists in the independence of though from unphilosophical
routinizing and habit in general. This inward freedom is the infrequent gift of
nature and worthy objective for the individual. Yet the community can do much to
further this achievement, too, by not interfering in its development. Thus
schools may interfere with the development of inward freedom through
authoritarian influences and through imposing on young people an excessive
spiritual burden: on the other hand, schools may favor such freedom by
encouraging independent thought. Only if outward and inner freedom are
constantly and consciously pursued is there a possibility of spiritual
development and perfection and thus of improving man's outward and inner
life." ("On Freedom", Albert Einstein)
IV.
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS DARKLY
on learning to see through the department: the view from
without
The Buddha-body is omnipresent.
Each sentient being beholds it
Through aspiration and Karma relation
As it dwells eternally on this seat of meditation.
It is the inherent nature of the Buddha-body that it
individualizes itself in myriad manifestations in the phenomenal world. It does
not stand alone outside particular existences but abides in them, animates them,
and makes them move freely. In this form, it is subjected to certain conditions
such as time, space and causation. Its essence is infinite, but its
manifestations are finite and limited. It is for this reason that the
Buddha-body has to wait until conditions are matured before expressing itself.
Suppose that there is a mirror--the mirror of the
Buddha-body. Anything that comes in front of it is reflected without any
premeditation on the part of the mirror. Beautiful of ugly, high or low, rich or
poor, good or evil, everything is reflected impartially. Wherever and whenever
conditions are correct, all particular things will be reflected in the mirror or
Mind-Essence of the Buddha-body without hesitation, without reasoning, without
demonstration. It is thus that the principle of Karma works. (Nyogen Senzaki and
Ruth Strout McCandless; Buddhism and Zen, 1953: 1)
I approached the department ethnographically from two
directions--etic and emic. The etic side of my study consisted of a survey among
graduate students and a few of the faculty. It was designed on the thesis that
people are generally complex entities with complex realities which tens to defy
spurious analysis. As personalities, they represent complicated 'bundles of
things' and 'interrelations between things'. Everybody is composed of different
kinds of things in different of interrelationships. These things are token from
their past experiences, their present predicaments and future aspirations.
Existential ethnography presupposes that people will see their present
situations and their future expectations upon the basis of a complicated
personal history. I as a supposed ethnographer and as a fellow student also am a
complex bundle of things and interrelationships. When people come into
interrelationships with one another, they related to one another on the basis of
shared things and interrelations. People with more things in common have more to
share with one another. Differences by and large are the basis of an I-it 'irrelation'--the
defining of the other in terms of things which are different, of turning the
other into an object of differences to be studied. As human beings, everyone has
at least something to be shared in common with everyone else, but the more two
people have in common the more stable the basis of the inter-human relationship.
This forms the basis for inter-subjective understanding between people. There
occurs a kind of critical transference or resonance between people when they
share things in common. Two people, in a sense, match up personality matrices
when they first get to know one another, when they open themselves up and each
other to the relationship. The things and interrelationships which resonate do
so in a distinctive pattern which defines the idiosyncratic nature of the
relationship. Different people will relate on different things and no two sets
of people will form the same kind of relationship. This sharing is the basis for
inter-human 'bonding' in which people express and find some kind and degree of
emotional satisfaction from the relationship. On the basis of the shared set of
traits, the relationship itself takes some kind of 'life of its own' which is in
an synergistic ?????? beyond either of the two partners, even though the
relationship will be interpreted differently and mean something different for
each of the partners in terms of their own personality matrix. Sharing in a
relationship tends to 'generalize' into differences--there is a kind of
'stimulus diffusion' in which differences, over time, are brought into closer
alignment between two people, and vice versa. In relationships which are
asymmetrical, this process of 'interchange' becomes more one way in direction,
with one person changing or controlling the direction of change in the other.
This is the inter-human basis for power, in its externalized form. People, over
time, influence others by their actions and reactions in inter-human
relationship. Internal power, the basis for 'freedom' is to seek independence in
the inter-human relationship from influence by another, or over another.
Genuine inter-subjective relations are the basis for personal
and social growth, especially the 'interchange' tends towards symmetrical
reciprocity--mutual sharing upon an equal basis. They are based upon shared
similarities, of mutual identity, between two people. On the other hand,
relationships based upon primarily differences, or in which similarities are
rejected or denied, 'withdrawn' tend to be 'spurious' relationships.
Emphasis upon differences between people tends to result in
asymmetrical reciprocity and I-it interrelationships in which the other person
is made a 'thing' in relationship with the self, an object of learning or
understanding, perhaps, but an 'object' nevertheless. This is the kind of
relationship in which anthropologists are trained to engage in, in learning
about peoples who are very different. In the process of getting to know these
differences, similar experiences become shared and 'I-it' irrelation tends to
give way to more genuine I-thou relation, especially between key-informant or
interpreter who mediates the culture contact situation.
In order to understand the intra-psychic function of this
process, it is important to look to the interrelationships and things thus
interrelated within a personality. Everyone is a unique and different bundle of
things and interrelations--the unique make-up of this 'personality matrix' is
the basis for the synergistic integrity of human beings--it confers the human
sense of being unique in a universal reality. The persons apperceptive, self
reflexive understanding of these things and their interrelations is the basis of
the person's personal 'ego identity'. Sometimes a person embodies things or
relations which seem to be inimically self contradictory, the combination of
opposite tendencies which result in intra-psychic conflict. We all have had past
experiences which seem somehow contradictory--we all have 'things' which we keep
secret, things hidden away in the closet. This conflict between 'intrinsically
different' things is the basis of neurosis. There is a struggle of the soul, a
monster lurking beneath the conscious surface. We have a top-dog and an
underdog. The underdog is the different part of the self that we tend to keep
repressed--those things which cause intra-psychic conflict and neurosis because
they are conflictual, 'different', for some reason unacceptable to the way we
want to become. When a person is engaged in a process of changing ego identity,
of discarding undesirable things, and incorporating new things, there is a
tendency to repress those conflictual differences in the presentation of the
self in interrelation with others. When the relative interrelationships between
'things' within the personality breakdown, perhaps because of conflict , when
out understandings, intuitions, conceptions, perceptions, emotions and behaviors
no longer function to integrate the things of our personality--experiences,
memories, dreams, ideas, feelings, then there is disintegration of the
personality or psychosis. Things are there, but they no longer make sense, they
do not fit together. This leads to dysfunction in interrelationship with others,
as there is an eroded stability as the basis for relationship. The self is
disorganized.
In the tripartite conception of personal psycho dynamics,
there is a continual conflict between the eros and the thanatos of the id and
the moral injunctions of the superego. Ego is the result of the successful
integration between the drives the id and the controls of the superego--it is
the mediation which results in a sense of reality, in an orientation towards
reality which resolves this conflict. Ego identity is the sense of human reality
which gives coherence and consistency to one's being. Ego identity is born in
the interrelation between the personal identity of the self, as the individual
inter-integrates the 'things' of his life and with social identity in
relationship to other people. One's social identity is the necessary
counterpart, the prerequisite feedback, by which ego identity grows and gains a
wider and wiser sense of the self. Human maturity is born through social
identity. Through interpersonal relationship intra-psychic conflict of
contradictory relationships between things of the personality can be resolved on
the basis of sharing.
Differences within the self, if repressed, will become
projected upon others in inter-human relationships. Projection is actually the
recognition of, or imputation of, the 'emphasis' of differences in inter-human
relationships, differences in others which are actually repressed, but shared,
within the self. Ego defense mechanisms, to protect the sense of ego reality, in
the form of prejudicial nationalization and selective perception and cognition,
'ignore-ance' are part of the 'preconscious'--the pre-understanding of the self,
to protect one from threatening, contradictory information. This is the basis of
cognitive dissonance. Differences recognized within one another, are differences
found within the self, or are similar to these differences. These may be
experiences of the past which are normally kept under control. It may be
evidence which contradicts one's sense of order, which is achieved at the
expense of repressing an undesirable part of the self.
In reality, similarities and differences shared between self
and other are not exactly identical things, they are analogical, metaphorical
and metalogically similar or different. The difference by analogy or similarity
is the basis of psychic meaning as it is derived socially through inter-personal
interaction. Difference by analogy is important because it is the basis of the
'sympathetic magic' of inter-human relationships. In sharing related things, the
ego must be able to empathize the meaning of the other. In this sense of empathy
is not achieved or else becomes obfuscated by knowledge about the other, it
breaks down into a spurious I-it irrelation focusing upon differences. To look
only at things which are different, to emphasize these things, to focus upon
them, is by implication to ignore similarities, to disallow the possibility for
empathy--it is to assert one's ego identity, the authority of one's ego, in
comparison or contrast with another. This can be either negatively done or
positive. The other becomes a reference of significance for the self, a symbol
of meaning which is 'ego-centric'--oriented about and for the self. The other is
used as a basis for maintaining ego integrity. The others become 'nomothetically'
framed, 'pigeonholed' within the personality matrix of the self. A negative
reference is one in which negative differences, contrasts are emphasized. This
is the 'counter reference' other which serves as the negative differences of the
self. The 'reference' other is the other seen positively, even though it still
remains an ego-centric I-it irrelation of a focusing upon differences. But this
is done comparatively--the basis of measure for one's self, of what one wants to
be. It is a model of change, to be emulated. But in neither case is the
humanness of the other, the similarities of needs, recognized and shared.
This model is based upon dyadic interaction between two
people. In a very real sense, all interpersonal interaction is dyadic, even in
groups of more than two people. Only in group situations which are centered upon
one individual who is the leader, as in a classroom, is there a kind of oblique
interaction. But even here, at any one instant, each student is either focused
upon the reference other or not. The teacher is a 'thing' to be emulated. If a
student contradicts the teacher then this student nay become a 'counter
reference' for the other students and be isolated or ostracized from the ranks.
at any particular moment the teacher may be focused in attention upon any single
student, no matter how briefly in ranging over the class, or else addressing the
entire class as if it were a single ear, focusing upon nobody in particular. In
this case the class becomes the counter reference other in relation to the
subject of discussion. This is the authority of the classroom. A student who
contradicts the teacher can destroy this process, demonstrating its
spuriousness, disrupting the train of thought of the professor and the attention
of the entire class. I have demonstrated this to myself and others many times in
many classes. As a rule I like to do it in every class, if possible, to test my
hypothesis.
In social psychological terms, to be made into a thing in
inter-human interrelationships is to be made 'subjectively self aware'--it is
suddenly looking into a mirror. Differences within the self are emphasized,
repressions become ineffective, conflicts well up. Ego identity is destroyed. A
person's social identity is alienated. Existentially the person becomes alone,
anonymous. One becomes lost in an uncontrollable sea of subjectivity.
Inter-human relationships based upon sharing threaten to induce this subjective
self awareness which could become out of control--indeed genuine relationships
demand this subjectivity, but demand it with critical difference. As the self
and the other are not 'things' but integrities. One's integrity is recognized
mutually and one may remain 'objective self aware' of the person in
interrelationship with others, while becoming 'subjectively other aware'.
Inter-human relationships between self and other are a kind
of nonzero sum game, nonzero sum game. The only way two people can get ahead is
by both sharing together. If one person dominates at the others expanse, or both
are competing against each other, making each other into 'things' then neither
can get ahead. Both people have to be willing and open to share similarities
with the other. If one person wants to engage in an I-thing relationship, but
the other insists upon making it 'I-it' then the relationship is spurious and
will be undermined.
Focusing upon differences and ignoring similarities maintains
social distance necessary for protecting ego identity, it is necessary for
maintaining a reference relationship in which the other is an object and not a
person, a symbol of the self and not a symbol that stands for itself. On the
other Masks, assertion of authority, of knowledge, enforced anonymity are all
social distancing mechanisms employed in defense of ego identity. On the other
hand focusing upon similarities and the sympathetic resonances which leads to
'understanding' of the other, leads to an ignorance of the differences and to a
tolerance of them. Differences are given time to be worked out or accommodated.
Differences remain but they are not important.
This is the rationale behind the design of my survey. The
human reality of the anthropology department is very complex with over a hundred
'bundles of things and relationships' to be understood. But there is a common
thread shared by all of these people, the formation of the 'anthropological ego'
within a shared academic setting. I wanted to focus upon things anthropological
to discover similarities and differences upon this focal aspect between all the
members of the anthropology department. I had certain preconceptions about what
these things anthropological, but I soon proved myself wrong. They were too
simplistic and superficial. Fortunately I did not want to build this sort of
bias into my research design to go out and test any specific hypothesis based
upon these preconceptions. But they did form a basis for a set of questions. I
kept the questions open ended, because if I hadn't the search itself would have
been 'closed minded' and automatically biased. I adopted in a sense an
'inductive approach' rather than one hypothetico-deductive because I did not
want my preconceptions to influence and become the basis for biasing the things
I would see. I wanted to allow, as much as possible the significant other to
define what these things Anthropological were for themselves. The questions
themselves were tailored to be logistically efficacious. I wanted to share a
little bit with many people and avoid sharing too much with any single person.
The survey can be seen as a kind of general purpose 'bias
screen' which was not too detailed in focus to loose sight of broader things. I
was not exactly interested in how and individual defined friendship, for
instance, rather than if that person needed to define it at all. So I did not
seek to elicit ethno-scientifically the definition of 'How would you defined
friendship?' or seek to pile sorts or any kind. This kind of work would be more
profitable in a follow up survey after the broader outlines and parameters have
been defined, but not before this more general determination has been made. This
points up a very general and relevant methodological bias which is predominant
in this whole 'training program' no student can be expected to know generally in
any unprejudiced fashion what the hypothetical parameters are in the fields,
until that student has first gone to the field hand inductively, 'openly'
experienced it. But within this program this is exactly the reverse of what
happens, as the individual is expected to have a hypothesis and a program for
testing this hypothesis specifically before the field experience. But there is
no possible way that this can be done, without implicit, presumed bias based
upon one's untested preconceptions. If we are into proving or falsifying
preconceptions only, then there is a very good likelihood that the
preconceptions will tend to be proven, regardless of the field reality. But
there is really no way of knowing before the phenomenological experience of the
field whether preconceptions themselves are valid or not, much less the
hypothesis and conclusions which stem from these preconceptions. But this can
only happen the second time around, after the initial experience has been
evaluated. The sad paradox is that there is rarely a real second chance even if
the person gets manages to get back to the field, it may have been too
late--things may have changed in critical ways enough to render the original
hypothesis no longer falsifiable. Anthropologists are renowned for working a
historically, with the externalized other, with the implicit presupposition that
things never change. a person comes back from the first field experience
'unprepared', not with conclusions to preconceived hypothesis, but with an
hypothesis in search of conclusions. This is just the reverse of the
'preparation; here, where the hypothesis is already mandated, all that needs to
happen is to plug find and plug in the necessary data--this is method-fetishism
that misconstrued the problem of original bias. Hypothesis come after, if at
all, but not before. When I did my first fieldwork, my wise instructor told me
to leave the library and books behind, that this might prejudice one's vision,
instead to see the field first then hit the books with a lot of unanswered
questions in one's mind. I like to think that my inductive approach is more
scientifically realistic--avoiding the 'hypothetico-deductive' fallacy. I like
to think of my methodology as conclusions ('preconceptions') in search of an
hypothesis, answers in search need of questions, data in need of frames, rather
than frames in need of datum. I believe this is more scientifically honest.
It was important to ask the same or similar set of questions
from everyone. This was not for statistically significance and reliability per
se, but simply to create a stereotypical 'baseline'--a model of my
preconceptions, from which deviations could be distinguished. It was important
to maintain the aegis of always leading back to the next question after we have
diverged down different paths, until the questions had exhausted itself. Only
two times did I completely lose track and depart from the general question
format more or less completely. This 'bias screen' is applied similarly to
everyone as a kind of 'reference matrix' against which each person, construed as
a 'bundle of things and interrelations' could be compounded and grouped, to find
ranges of variability between individuals, in reference to a focal aspect of
'becoming and being an anthropologists'. I was asking for the elusive
'anthropological ego' character type. I had a stereotype in my mind as to what
this ego was, but this baseline proved simplistic from the beginning. People
became anthropologists for many different reasons, see it in many different
ways, and each anthropological ego, though similar in some ways, is uniquely
different in many others. The questions were doors to my unknown, windows upon
the life of the other. They were not closed doors.
If I were to continue this study, after writing this
preliminary ethnography, I would pursue more 'objective hypothesis'--I would
construct different methodological devices to render more conclusive, more
decisive results. But I could not, nor shouldn’t have thought to do this
before now. Now at least I think I have a more realistic idea of what exactly to
look for. I would only have been deceiving myself beforehand.
I discovered in the course of the interview that I was
sharing a different set of things about myself with each person and as they were
sharing things with me. Each interview was a self exploration as much as it was
an exercise in getting to know someone else. Past experiences and relations were
reawakened in me with different people, and each time I 'grew' a little in my
understanding of myself, of anthropology, and of people within the department.
Everyone has a raison d'être for becoming and being an anthropologist, and this
is both similar and different for everyone.
I was looking for the similarities, I wanted to avoid the
differences. Ranges of variability were established via the open ended
questions. These ranges theoretically have parameters and boundaries. There are
some certain things 'anthropologists' are not supposed to be. Given established
ranges, an outline of anthropological reality can be inferred. This 'outline'
can be subsequently, more precisely investigated in further research employing
more precise methodologies. Exploration must precede hypothesis testing, but
exploration should not stop short of hypothesis testing, if anthropology is to
become a full fledged paradigmatic science.
In the course of my survey, another thing became apparent,
something I expected but was not certain about. Interviews are threatening,
threatening to reveal somethings which the individual keeps repressed. Ego
defenses are in full gear in an interview. There is a need to present an ego
identity which knows what it is about, which knows why it is and who it is,
without doubt or vexation. This is especially so with professors. Graduate
students, most of them, are still exploring. This 'idealized' self is a front,
an armor, a disguise, a distancing mechanism which keeps me the interviewer at
an 'it's' distance. Before the interview many wanted first to know what it was
all about. To see a short set of innocuous questions is more comforting, 'safer'
and the ego defenses tend to be let down a little--at least in most cases to get
a short glimpse of what was on the other side. In fact, only in a few instances,
mostly with professors, were the ego defenses seemingly impenetrable. If this is
what becoming 'professional' means then I suggest anthropology is mistaken about
what its own ego identity. In these few cases there was no exploration, answers
were short and direct. Behavior was defensive and distrustful. There was a
greater 'need to know' what and why I was doing what I was. But this is not
enough basis upon which to conclusively judge--it is only a sketchy suggestion
of an outline for an hypothesis.
The questions I designed were different for different
groupings of people--mostly 'grade' groupings. The question I asked and the way
I asked them, were different for professors, graduate and undergraduate
students, though I did not do the undergraduate one. I found myself hurriedly
making another questionnaire for people who were not part of the department in a
marginal sense but were not anthropologists. I did not want to draw the line
myself on who or who nor to interview, but I wanted to allow the line to draw
itself. This it pretty much did. If I did a follow up survey, I would make up
different questions for sub-disciplines, gender and number of years in the
department, but this I could not do when I didn't even know who was who.
Logistical considerations are important methodological
concerns--vital. It is important to learn to live and work within one's
limitations. This has been a consistent shortcoming of my own life, in the
exploratory phase of inductive, 'phenomenological' research, it is important to
have a research design which is 'general purpose' and 'light'--adaptable and
maneuverable and easy to carry, rather than special purpose and
heavy--cumbersome and weighty. When one enters the field, one quickly learns the
things one can and cannot reasonably do. To put yourself to task to do the
impossible because it was part of the original 'protocol' is cutting off the
nose to spite the face. It is a masochistic form of 'method-fetishism' but who
is the sadist behind the problem? Like carrying too much luggage on a long
journey, one is left to cast off many things. It is best to travel light. Let
the bureaucracy boys bear the burden of methodological protocol. This is an
important aspect of the inflexibility of the 'protocol review' which results in
such hypocrisy. One must learn to move with the flow of events and not worry
about waiting for 'protocol review' to catch up, it never will. Do only what is
reasonably within one's means and let God do the rest.
I had no methodological tricks up my sleeve, I engaged in no
methodological wizardry. People probably thought I didn’t know what I was
doing, tolerating me like a child. And of course, I must admit I really didn’t
know what I was doing, like a child, but though I was feigning innocence , I was
not feigning ignorance. I didn’t know what I was about in my spurious,
'trivial' sense of an exclusive concern for detail--I didn’t run around
watching everybody and jolting down notes, I didn't even use a tape recorder.
But I did know what I was about in an important sense--I have faith in what I am
about, like a rock, that no petty authoritarian anthropological ego can shake.
Come clean and simple, and genuine people will appreciate it, and you will be
able to tell the difference. Be 'chin chai' and the important people will love
and adopt you. Be 'serious' and you will run with thieves. This is the
difference that makes no difference, this is the indirection of dao, the 'gray
way' of anthropological methodology. It is cultivating good Karma relation.
"This was the ceremony, and as I said before, the power
of it was in the understanding of its meaning: for nothing can live well except
in a manner suited to the way the Power of the World lives and moves to do its
work."
--Black Elk Speaks.
Of a possible 107 faculty and graduate students within the
department, 2 faculty and 5 students were inaccessible. Of 34 faculty solicited,
I received 17 responses and 17 no responses, exactly 50%, of these 17 responses,
I received 3 negatives and 14 positives. Of these positives, I managed to do 8,
or roughly 25%. My apologies to the 6 people who gave me their consent but were
left waiting for a reply. Of 73 students, I received 43 responses and 28 no
response and two unaccounted. Roughly 59% response. Of these there was only one
refusal. Of the remaining 43, I managed to do 30 interviews or about 42% of the
total. My apologies to 12 people. My failure to interview more of the faculty
were somehow more inaccessible. Several gave me times which conflicted somewhat
with my own schedule, though as a rule I tried to accommodate for this. I must
admit some people I was less inclined toward interviewing than others--whatever
the predispositions, it was more of an effort upon my part to 'force' myself to
do these interviews. Also I become burned out. I grew tired of asking the same
old questions and bored with the whole affair. My visibility subsided over time,
other people became less inclined to find a convenient time. Interviews tended
to become abbreviated. Towards the end, more interviews were canceled or
post-poned, for one reason or another. Everyone, including myself, seemed less
interested. People tend to keep busy schedules and these get busier towards the
end of the semester. Of the 50% of the faculty and 41% of the students who did
not give me a response at all, I have mixed feelings toward. Many people asked
me how many replied. I felt I had to justify why they didn't bother with it. I
will most of them the benefit of a doubt, but I have residual doubt that there
may have been a few who either 'couldn’t care less' or perhaps thought it was
'wrong' or were 'threatened'. But maybe not. We all know who we are.
Interviews ranged between 16 minutes and 2.5 hours, with the
average being about 45 minutes. Most were between 1/2 to 1 hour in length. Of
interviews conducted in people's private offices, there was on the average 2
interruptions per interview, with as many as five. There was no interview done
in people's office which were not interrupted, with somebody knocking on the
door, or poking their head in to see if the person was busy. Interesting, all
the interviews conducted in a 'public setting' of the Geology lounge or
conference room, were interrupted (10). I suppose people could see what we were
doing and so didn't bother us. But then no one came looking for us either.
GRADUATE STUDENT INTERVIEW
Fortunately, I managed to do 16 women and 14 men, just about
even. I made up two sets of questions, the first being lumped into some kind of
reasonable order and the second set of the exact same questions were
purposefully randomized. I randomized the men and women into two piles, and
randomly assigned each to one or other of the questionnaires. The only
noticeable difference was that those who received the nonrandom set of questions
seemed to achieve some sense of orientation or direction through the interview,
while those who received the randomized questions seemed to be confused at the
end of the interview as to what the interview was all about. My apologies.
1. "Do you believe anthropology to be a male dominated
field?" 4/14 males said yes ( ± 28%) while the
balance, ± 72% said no. 13/16 females said yes (±
81%) while the balance 19% said no. males tended to give ore unqualified and
unequivocal answers, among those answer negatively, but on the whole most
answers were well qualified and equivocal--specific reasons were proffered but
few people gave an unequivocal yes or no answer. If it were male dominated, it
would be on 60/40 or 70/30, or only in some respect but not in others.
Five of the 14 males gave an unqualified no. Of those
answering negatively, reasons were that even if numbers were uneven, this was
not important, "in terms of impact on discipline equally involved." Of
those males answering affirmatively, on one did so unqualifiedly or
unequivocally. Certain areas are, certain areas aren't. "Definitely yes,
not by numbers obviously, certainly there are a large number of women in the
profession. I think structurally men still tend to dominate. Chairmanships of
departments, key committee boards." "Yes, in a sense, there are a lot
of women in it but subordinate. This is a male dominated society, why should
anthropology be different?" "I think in terms of both numbers and
seniority, more men holding senior faculty positions."
No women gave an unqualified or unequivocal response. They
gave longer and I think better answers. Those answering no, 3 did so on the
basis of perceived historical changes, it is less so than it used to be, but it
certainly used to be. They mention equal numbers and fewer 'boys'. Men going
into it less "because it doesn't pay." "Men want higher salaries
so quit anthropology." One mentions consciously taking classes with women
professors, "always seem to read articles by women." Of those who say
yes, they mention numbers, publications, "feeling of it, perception of
it", few tenured female professors, more tenured male professors, fewer
women in charge, embeddedness in theory, macho attitudes related to
sub-disciplines, "power structure definitely male dominated", who's
head of funding committee, statistically and theoretically, types of things
studied, who publishes, meetings, administratively, very strong male bias,
models geared toward a male centered research. "Yes, most of the professors
as well as most of scholars, most of influential males as well."
For me, the question is not so much whether anthropology is
male dominated or not. This point can be argued but not proven one way or the
other. It is a question of what people want to see, of how responses to this
question may be reflective of male or female ego identity. People engage in
interpreting the essentially unknown reality in a way which will fit this ego
identity.
My answer to the question that anthropology is of course male
dominated in every respect, statistically, structurally, influentially,
historically, theoretically and methodologically, but not unqualifiedly or
unequivocally. Women have had strong role models in the fields but not enough.
It is not a question so much of direct domination per se, as it is a matter of
predomination--men have come first. Pre-understandings have in a sense been
implicitly make biased, perhaps in ways we do not readily comprehend. This
general situation can be expected to change too much until we begin to change
our ego consciousness of human reality.
Everyone, almost, who remarked upon this question mentioned
that they thought it was changing for the better, that things were getting
better than before. Everyone seems to see positive change. "Certainly hope
it will become more even, certainly intend to participate in it to make it more
even."
2. "Are you married, do you have children?" Seven
of the 14 male students are married, or 50%. Six of 16 female students are
married, or ± 37%. Among seven married men, there
are 12 children, or 1.7 child per father. There are 8 children among 6 married
women, or 1.333 child per mother. Perhaps the men who have children are a little
older, but I hesitated to ask anyone their age. On the face of it though, men
average more children but not necessarily more child care responsibilities. What
are the implications of older adults going back to school, and of younger adults
postponing marriage and family?
3. "Do you work, if so where, and how many hours a
week?" Seven of the 14 (50%) of the males reported working. Twelve of 16
(75%) of the females reported working. Places where men work included teaching,
PAF, Museum Graduate and Teaching Assistants and 'self employed'. Women worked
in GA, TA, RA, PAF, Part Time Teaching and Library Assistantships. Women report
working ± 250 or more hours per week combined, with
50% reporting less than 20 hours and 59% reporting more than 20 hours per week.
Men report about 150 hours total, with 4 of 7 working more than 20 hours a week,
and 3 of seven less. I think that women actually work more hours than this
figure, or at least report more hours a week averaged. Men and women work the
same kind of jobs, only more women are working. They are averaging, those who
work, about the same number of hours per person.
4. "How many hours a week do you average a week on
campus?" Men report spending over 840 hours a week on campus, women report
over 720 hours a week. One woman lives on campus. If she were dropped from the
list, then women would be spending below 600 hors a week on campus. The men
report spending more than 50 hours a week on campus, while only 3 women
(excluding the live-in) report more than 50 hours. 12 of 15 women report
spending between 20 to 50 hours a week on campus, while only 5 of 14 men report
between these figures. 2 men and 2 women report spending below 20 hours a week
on campus. More men tend to spend the more total number of hours on campus, and
these tend to be unemployed. Of the women's hours of time on campus, more of
these are spent employed. Women are spending fewer hours a week on campus and
working more hours, and more hours on campus are spent employed than men. These
figures could be broken down more precisely.
5. "Where do you come from?" Eight men came from
the Northeast. Three men are foreign. Three came from the central states, one
from the west coast. All except one report a suburban background. Seven women
report coming from the northeast. For are foreigners. 3 from the southern
states, 3 from the central states, and one from the west coast. One reports
coming from the city, 2 from rural areas and 3 from 'small towns' or cities. One
male reports coming from the city, 2 from rural areas and 3 from 'small towns'
or cities. One make reports coming from a 'small city'. 12 of 14 makes report a
suburban background (85%), 10 of 16 females report a suburban background (62%).
6."What kind of work do your parents do?" Fathers
of males include 3 engineers, banker, high school teachers, social workers,
university professors, machinist, electrician, 2 businessmen. Four are deceased.
Their mothers include 7 housewives, I school teacher, 2 secretaries, one nurse,
bank teller, book-keeper, insurance manager, one person is deceased. Of these
parents 4 fathers are retired and 3 mothers.
Fathers of female students include 3 engineers, I doctor, l
lawyer, 3 managerial supervisors, 1 minister, 1 professor, 1 farmer, 1
biochemist, 1 businessman. Three are deceased. Mothers are 7 housewives, 3
school teachers, 1 professional photographer, 1 librarian, 1 farmer, 1 family
therapist, 1 computer research analyst. None are deceased. Of these, 3 fathers
are retired and 2 mothers.
Of the males, six come from upper middle class, 8 come from
middle class or below. Of the females, 12 came from upper middle class families,
4 come from middle class or below. Of all families whose mothers are housewives,
only two came from the middle class or below. All of the females who report
their mothers are housewives come from the upper middle class. 75% of the
females report coming from the upper middle class, 42% of the males.
7. "How long have you been in the anthropology program
here?" Nine males are in the first year. Six females are in their first
year. One male and 3 females are in their second year. One male and 3 females
are in their third year. None are in their fourth year. One male is in his fifth
year. One male and 2 females are in their sixth year. One male and one female
are over their sixth year.
8. "What do you think of SUNY-Binghamton compared to
other schools you were in?" Of 14 male students, 9 clearly expressed
positive regard for the school compared to others. One did not respond, 3 were
ambiguous (all foreign students) and one does not like it. Those who like it,
believe it is academically highly rated, superior to many other schools.
"Academically, it is okay." The department, the university and the
students are competitive. In general people rated it over schools they were
previously in. the environment is seen as lacking. "It lacks a sense of
community." "Facilities, library, pub disappointing." "Town
is a dump."
Eight of the 16 female students expressed satisfaction with
the school, but only 5 were relatively unambiguous about it. One student was
uncertain--"This is the only one I've done graduate work in--hard to
compare." Seven expressed relatively unambiguous dissatisfaction with the
school. Compliments included "It's smaller, more digestible."
"Good school for serious students." "Intellectually has a lot to
offer." "Teaching is much better here." "I like the
atmosphere here, much more open--not competitive, students are much harder
workers, more adult, more grown up." "More diverse." "More
women in positions of authority", "definitely more women
students>" "More minorities definitely by far." "Much
less covert/overt politics, amount of interdisciplinary cooperation between
faculty, less at stake in personal identity."
Complaints included--"An administrative mess,
bureaucracy amazing, paperwork for this, that, lack of communication with
students, here not clearly stated, get the run around, no one seems to
know." Personal experience in a negative way--"U. G. school experience
much better, I had mentors there." "Relatively apathetic, times have
changed from the Vietnam era." "Separation of university and town
population." "Need more involvement of grads. in professor
research--its like its behind closed doors, never hear about it." "I
don’t think this curriculum is as food as some I've encountered. Courses not
as comprehensive as they could be. Half way between best and worst, better than
some, worse then others." "People just don’t facilitate."
"Very little nurturing of students, really my main gripe."
"Students an economic necessity at Chicago, not much better here--benign
neglect." "I think that the majority of professors are not
supportive--students are left to muddle through their own." "Hard, I'm
over critical of it, 80% of the undergraduate students are from the city, rude,
sloppy pigs, materialistic, don’t share a lot of things."
"Definitely more bureaucracy, also inefficient bureaucracy." "A
pretty crummy school--ugliest, dirtiest, not well kept. I don’t deal with
administration, I hate political machines."
Some of these issues are what stimulated me to do this
ethnography in the first place. It seems there are several things working at
once in the formation of a student's attitude towards this department and school
in comparison with a wider arena. Prior experience, present involvement (or
uninvolvement), expectations and standards, all shape a student's attitudes. In
general it seems women are less satisfied than men. The women who have been in
the shortest time have most positive attitudes. Women are more critical and
judgmental than the men. It seems that some attitudes, based upon relatively
limited experience, are not quite realistic--perhaps because these people are
not really familiar with alternatives. There seems to be a great deal of
ambivalence in attitude. Few people liked or hated the school unequivocally or
unqualifiedly. Sometimes statements are made by different individuals are
clearly contradictory of one another--too much research versus not enough
research. The bottom line seems to be that whether or not this is a better or
more worse school is pretty much a matter of opinion which is shaped by the
student's attitude and ego identity vis-à-vis this department. Again people see
what they want to see.
About the library, computers, phones, student organizations.
Information is not available. American academics are interested in statistics,
in records for ranking this department. A very strange place to work. The vision
of anthropologia through a foreign student's eyes is very clear in presenting
the dilemma of the horizon of ego identity in trying to understand an
alternative cultural reality. Different students have different needs and
therefore see things differently, in ways that will be congruent with their ego
reality, even if this is not necessarily congruent with the socio-cultural
structure of their environment. This phenomenon occurs with all of us as in
clearly evident with foreign students, but it is especially relevant when we go
to the field or when we remain in our own.
In general, all of us need to learn to be more careful when
we begin pointing out fingers at other people, not to make out preconceptions
their misunderstandings.
9. "What is the focus of your current research
interests, and how did you come to have these particular interests?"
Unfortunately I cannot risk discussion of individual's particular research
interests without revealing their personal identity. What is most interesting to
me about the nature of the response were with how an individual's current
research interests were due to a number of different interrelated factors,
things that would sometimes be clearly traced back to early childhood. Not
always though, was there such long term continuity of interest. Another
influential factor, was the presence at a critical period of such individual's
ego involvement of a highly significant 'reference other'--a 'mentor' or several
'mentors' who influenced one importantly in present directions. Other factors
which are apparent are the situational factors of family and home life, social
conditions, opportunity 'structures' which may be available. Overall these kinds
of factors combine to 'push' a student in a quite specific direction of
interest. Past experiences, skills, knowledge, all contribute to the
determination of present focus and future direction. Other factors are the age
factor. Older students were either 'burned out' or 'frustrated' with careers and
so come back to school--anthropology provides for these people a convenient
framework within which to create an alternative life. People may be lead into
anthropology by a series of choices which became irreversible. A person with a
background in biology chooses between having to 'deal with botany or culture'
and decides the latter alternative will be more tolerable. Voila, and
anthropological golden boy in the making. Some people have been lead here
through having acquired through work experience specific skills valuable to
specific sub-disciplines. "I mentioned I had this skill…anything
interesting about"…It's like anything else I thought. It became
interesting." I had the opportunity and skills to do it primarily because
someone else was interested. Some people came here by default in previous
situations, others just 'like the subject" or something that is a part of
the thing they study. Some people are brought here in fulfillment of personal
needs that anthropology somehow seems to satisfy, that may have been frustrated
in previous settings. If people genuinely like what they are doing, they seem to
want to do it no matter how adverse the conditions or fierce the resistance or
steep the climb. They refuse to give up no matter what the odds. Sometimes
several sets of interests combine or overlap in a particularly interesting way
which is important for the researcher, even though nobody may share an want to
share these interests. Sometime one area may lose its appeal, become 'dry,
boring' and another area may then seem more appealing--ego identity achieves a
transformation. Some people may have always had a background interest or hobby
in something--always fascinated with 'museums' and cultural stimuli. A person's
background research interests are apt change several times during their school
career, coincidental with changes in committee composition, school setting,
value orientation, existential situation. "It has switched since I've been
here, of course, with professor so and so, interest in this particular time
period is convenient for me." "What lead me into archaeology--an
introductory course. Field school provoked my interest in material culture to
find out about past. What we can and cannot know about a thing. Interest in the
past I think a lot of it comes from my father. On family vacations we would go
to historically relevant sites, roadside stops." A memorable event of the
past, a special project or experience may have helped provoke a whole series of
later decisions which eventually brings a student into the department.
"When growing up I always liked biology and history--I put the things
together and I get biological anthropology. I always watched TV specials."
"I was always interested in history. I had taken an archaeology course on
Europe. Needed to look for people for a project. I remember in high school I
wanted to go into anthropology, but I was told women couldn't do that."
Sometime certain social issues or problems one encounters in one's life lead to
a research focus. Sometimes proximity to a particular area of interest, or
previous opportunities in such an area, leads a student, conditions a student's
interests in a certain focus. Anthropological areas of focus can be a way for
bringing together many different interests in an interesting way.
"Interested in archaeology when 8 or 9. Gods, Graves and Scholars.
My mother was an educator who always got into archaeology. My father was
interested in archaeology, always really fascinated…archaeology had always
been in the back of my mind. I became increasingly dissatisfied with my major,
what I really wanted to do was archaeology…I changed majors cold turkey."
"Combo bigger than that, a combo of ecology, political economy and
development." Sometimes a person's interests come full circle in a very
dramatic or tragic sense. Past traumas may lead to a present preoccupation with
concerns about the world 'ecological disasters, natural disasters'--"maybe
saner ways of where work can go. The subject is always in the background, in
past years time I love, eat, sleep, drink this." Many things interested in
my life related to anthropology, an area I would like to work in."
"One instructor interested in subject…I stumbled on the subject."
"Here's a story, as a kid I did every aspect of science, bug collection,
chemistry, microscope, museums bring it all together. I was enthralled by the
Natural History Museum. Opportunity for fieldwork, I loved it to death."
"Like working outdoors, very interested in working with people instead of
machines. Even if extinct, people don’t change. Wondered in suburban woods and
find little ruins remains." "Bunch of things contributed to it, no one
thing. I guess that’s why I don't have a clear research interest--interested
in too many different things. Haven't found a way to synthesize them all, I
can't be alone." "Who says natural curiosity isn’t a away to come up
with a research question." "I started as a child, my father took me to
many exhibitions, I read many books." "I don’t remember not ever
being interested." "I don’t know where I fit in all of it."
I do not know if any hard and fast generalizations can be
made, whether, for instance, there are essential differences between males and
females in why they are biased towards particular fields of interest within
anthropology or how they are biased. I suspect that the reasons are many and
varied, cutting across boundaries of gender, class, background, culture. And
then, all of this is after the fact retrospection from already being landed here
in the department--these reasons are not necessarily account for the reasons why
individuals actually made important decisions at critical conjunctures of their
life development. Whether they are or not, they do go into enhancing an
individual's ego identity as to why they are here, as rationalization of the
present. I have no doubt that probably other, unrecognized factors have been
involved in conditioning people's choices which led them here, in most people
most of the time. From a personal history of what led (MISSING PART OF SENTENCE.
PAGE 92: PART IV)
10. "What do you think can be done to improve this
department?" Four males made no comment--"I don't think I have seen
enough to have any ideas on it." "Haven't been here that long--it’s
a lot easier to point. We have a void which needs to be filled." Nine men
mentioned social relations in one form or another--"Negligible in social
relationships between faculty and students." "Not real good between
grad. Students." "Students are afraid of faculty--faculty not caring
about the students." "Nobody knows anything, nobody to tell anyone
anything. Need to be introduced to the teachers." "Social relations.
One of the realities of institutions. Don’t expect it to happen. People don't
want to teach. Not much teaching going on with professionals."
"Improve communication between teachers and students…How things are done
in the department is found out through osmosis…probably done on purpose as a
rite of passage. Little direction on the way, need a way of voicing objections,
improvements. No communication on problems students are having."
"Academic discussion very unfamiliar with me, like more practical, easy to
understand style of study." "Need a central meeting place--a
consequence of the physical layout of the building. Need a seminar at which all
students and faculty are required to attend, all members…social relations is
important…have a clear sense of who is responsible to one another…alleviate
the problem of competition…" "Distressed by separation between the
sub-fields." "Now there are too many damned hard working
scholars."
Other kinds of improvements include structural improvements.
"Unequal distribution of funds, arbitrariness of who gets what. Some
consistently not receiving funds." "More computer facilities available
for students." "This is a problem too, I think at graduate level every
student should be about to focus upon his own interests--do not need to be
guided, people are not allowed to learn what they want to learn. Have to learn
this and that, even though they are not a student's priorities. Need freedom to
budget out time, to have much more time for readings, have too many things to
do." "Need to address more technical matters more comprehensively than
in past--more computers is a step in the right direction, lab facilities,
technical gadgets, overall expertise." "The department would improve
if it admits students only if it could support them--need to not accept so many
students."
Eight out of 16 women mentioned the issue of
funding--'handicapped with the budget'. "Received more money from the
state. Need more assistantships that are better paid. It doesn't have to be to
risky for funding." "The funding issue…" "More money,
funding for the students", "TA's and GA's should be awarded funding
not so much for money as for experience. It should be passed around for all
graduate students. The philosophy of handing out should be experience first with
money as a by-product versus money first with experience by-product."
"…Besides the obvious answer of more money…" "should spend
more resources, time and money supporting language study."
Twelve of 16 female students mention improving social
relations. "It's like any place, certain tight cliques make it difficult to
make a friend. I find graduate students somewhat hostile. I am different because
I have an accent, it is like a social stigma." "Should have ways for
eliciting participation, possibilities for discussion…Now I don’t get much
feedback from the professors." "There are no get togethers between
faculty and students. Probably there should be more social parties or afternoon
teas." "I’ll start with a shopping list…more social events. Draw
in students of different sub-disciplines. Foster socializing. I think this can
be accomplished if professors are part of the whole arrangement of planning. I
had mentors and worked closely with a couple of professors. Some had much
influence on students. Students and professors are unique people. There should
be good relationships, plus the classes were really interesting--Is there a
correlation between the two, 'interestingness and professors?' Exactly, that's
how it works. The second thing, I don't know how or if it can be done.
Philosophically, the professors should look at students as colleagues. As
members of a future generation, as scholars, and they should be treated that
way." "What role do you see professors playing?" "They play
an amazing role. They set a model for students. Students are more transient than
professors. It's up to the professors to provide models. They can create a
certain attitude in the department. It is up to them to create this, such that
certain students can follow. This can be done anywhere, in the classroom or
outside of the setting, as in a restaurant. Need to have get togethers, to
foster a loose social attitude." "Attitudes, communication between
faculty and students is a major weakness in the program." "More
interaction between faculty and students. Programs between faculty and students.
Pressure both faculty and students into discussions of research."
"Social life is one of the major problems. Feelings of loneliness,
alienation, separation--how to alleviate it?--Have more social events, including
everyone in the department, such as covered dish dinners, movies, etc."
"If we sat down and talked, with some of the professors about why the
students are so disgruntled--teachers are wet blankets, overly critical. No time
for social life. This is one huge gaping problem." "Social interaction
between students--a lot of students are competitive. They join the rat race to
please student's egos. They are really scared that their life chances will be
cut, their funding will be cut." "Need to improve social interaction
with the faculty, maybe go to more parties." "It's a good question, I
think the communication channels can be more open between professors and
students, and between professors, a relationship somewhat distant at times--Can
you put a finger on it?--my own tendency leads me to think about professor's
egos and competition factor. Distance between graduate students is great."
"It would be more helpful if there were more things where students and
faculty could mix. We need a friendlier atmosphere, more concern in care and
dealings. More social inter-mixing. I've had feelings of depression." Of
all people asked about social relations, only two mentioned this problem of
social relations exclusively, two didn't mention it at all, and one said,
"I have no complaints about the social atmosphere."
Ten of 15 female students mentioned aspects of academic
structure. "Have more faculty and course in archaeology." "Get
rid of two persons in the faculty." "There should be emphasis on
teaching at the grad. level. Explain teacher's outlines…sometimes some faculty
don't take teaching seriously in graduate seminars." "Get more women
professors." "Besides overhaul it, hire more professors…who like to
teach, whose primary interest is in teaching versus research, who have
demonstrated the ability to work with students, who like to teach graduate
students. The other things, at least for archaeology, is to reintroduce the
course 'Teaching College Anthropology' as a real course. It has been on the
books for years but is a 'non-course'. It has never been offered. Reinstate it
as a legitimate offering." "Funding is not fairly distributed--four
whammies against a person--one-older students have a hard time, people over
thirty, two-people who are married, three-people who have children, four-husband
who works. People who get money are people who are pets who speak the loudest.
Should change the distribution for funding so that its not equal number of
funding for each sub-discipline. Physical has only four students. Archaeology
has 30 students. We need more discipline, structure, support…all graduate
students should be involved in some shape in community activities, local
politics, organizations in order to ground theory in practice."
"Content in terms of knowledge they teach…I am not satisfied with the
form, with the structure of the department. I'm not satisfied with teacher
student relationships. They treat you as if you're in kindergarten, not as
autonomous adults. They impose syllabus deadlines on us without ever thinking it
is a communication process. The object of learning is not to accumulate
deadlines. Not grades. Not at all conducive to the process of learning…definitely
the lack of struggle from the bottom. A lot of people just accept the status quo
or are scared shit that something will happen to them. Even though they feel the
problem they do nothing. The whole organization of courses. What matters is
quantity not quality. We somehow end up better for having glanced at Wallerstein
or whatever. We should take a short article, discuss it thoroughly. There is a
lack of knowledge by both students and teachers. They have a very superficial
attitude. If more people are concerned it becomes an issue among students. We
want change. Quality not quantity. Not to be treated as children but as adults.
More quality and more responsibility in terms of knowledge. The same in terms of
human relations. It is so hypocritical, on one hand so liberal, save the world.
On the other hand so authoritarian in imparting knowledge." "I think
we have a certain role, we can't just sit back and watch and describe."
Only one person focused exclusively upon the structural matters, and only one
person said, "I have a skewed perception, I'm not involved in the
department that much, as far as politics are concerned, I'm not sure…"
It was apparent to me, or became so, that initially people
sought me out, thinking my survey was a sounding board for their complaints,
frustrations and suggestions in relation to the department. I believe some had a
preconception that, that was what my study was supposed to be about. This
happened enough that I began to think the interviews had some kind of cathartic
effect within the department in general. Maybe it just broke some of the surface
ice at the end of a cold winter time--maybe it was a bit of warm breath in a
frosty atmosphere. What interested me was the number of people who made
suggestions which were exclusively 'ego-centric'--seen in relation to their own
personal needs. It seemed that most people tended to see the department in terms
of their own ego identity, rather than trying to frame the department as a whole
in its own terms. Most people though, did both. Few did this so exclusively in
their own terms. And this could be quite subtle--easily overlooked if one did
not know other things about the person's life and interests and problems. People
socially satisfied in personal relationship looked to structural matters, if
they were frustrated with their own standing vis-à-vis the department. People
structurally well positioned, tended to be more concerned with social or funding
issues. An TA is more likely to complain "TA workload is a bit steep…I
have an assistantship. I am lucky in this sense…I get angry sometimes…last
semester was a more difficult but I felt more appreciated, the teacher gave more
reinforcements and was more apologetic. Now I don't get much feedback from the
professors. Why teach large course if not able to teach it right? Why aren’t
courses taught in a small level…" a person who has a need for structure
will look for more structure, a person with a need for communitas, will look for
more 'anti-structure'. "This is purely selfish, but get a few more
archaeologists…" Few people actually looked beyond the department t fit
it within a broader context, except in a sense of 'counter reference'--this is
paradoxical with the previous question.
"Other things…continuity of faculty…a problem in
particular of archaeology…the 80's was extraordinary in there being several
turnovers. This had a very disruptive influence on students in terms of
stability, continuity and content--the philosophical orientation of the program.
Some continuity of interests is not answered, students get left behind with the
need to reassemble a committee--a difficult thing to do. The department needs a
clearer sense of where it wants to go theoretically. It
exists in a state of eclecticism at the moment, a problem of the discipline in
general, in what its trying to do. A dichotomy between UG and Graduate levels,
presents anthropology in a way at odds with what's practiced at the graduate
level. Anthropology doesn’t have any unifying paradigm--hyphenated,
particularistic, directions not necessarily parallel. The division is not clear,
over simplified in UG training. Intellectual dishonesty which occurs there. We
need to reexamine which it is to do, why we choose to do it."
"A history of personality/political struggle among
senior faculty…"
It seems in general, that the longer students remain in the
department, the more disillusioned they become about it and about anthropology
in general. Is being disillusioned necessarily an unhealthy attitude or is it
better. Or is better to believe it is all one's own personal problem? A person's
whose interests happen to coincide very clearly with a professor is apt to say
"I never felt suppressed as a student--prevented from personally doing
anything." Of course not.
Foreign students have special problems of language and behind
language, understanding of cultural differences--this inclines one student to
say "Need to be introduced to the American system nobody teaches (THE
FOLLOWING DOES NOT READ RIGHT. A SENTENCE MIGHT BE MISSING) myself here,
discussed in the next chapter, I have a suspicion of what some of these 'other'
kinds of factors might be. History has a kind of funny momentum which catches
most of us up in living, in which we become 'involved' or 'committed'--a
momentum which can carry us forward to our separate or shared destinies whether
we may choose to or not. Some may call this fate--I call it Karma-relation.
There are very good reasons why we decide to do certain things, which only
become cleared after we have finished. Like this study.
11. "Do you expect some kind of assistance/funding for
research?" Twelve of 14 males (± 87%) expect to
get funding for research but only 8 indicated they will 'need' it or depend upon
it in order to finish the work. Many are unequivocal about their expectations
and hopes, but remain equivocal about their 'needs' or vice versa, some are
unequivocal about their 'needs' but remain uncertain in regard about their
expectations. Others are unequivocal or equivocal in both respects. Expectations
do not always coincide or correspond with 'needs'. "I hope so…will
probably depend on it." "I expect to get funding…I have to."
"I don't know if I'll need it." "I do expect to have more money
to play with." "I hope to…will not depend on it."
Fourteen of 16 women expect and depend upon being funded for
research (87%). "When the time comes I will look for that." "I do
anticipate it…""Yes, probably…will not depend upon it."
"Counting on it, couldn't do without it." "I hope so, don't
expect it…I'm very dependent upon it." "I hope…I don't expect it,
I don’t know (if I'll depend upon it). There's always a place to go back to. I
better or I'm not going. Yes of course." "Damn right, I expect it, won’t
be able to do it without it. I don’t see how I could do it without it. To be
perfectly honest, I don’t couldn't afford it." "Yes I depend upon it…I
have always received assistance for field work. I don’t think I'll be
receiving funding, not much, I'll definitely be needing it, in order to finish
my degree." "Yes, Yes expect is, yes depend upon it, I need a lot. Not
now, in future…transportation to and from field." "Sure, depend upon
it, yes, I won't go out and make enough to support my own research."
"Hope so, probably not, I'm working on other possibilities."
Expectations and needs condition one another, but not always
in the same way. Expectations can be molded be perceived opportunities, or past
experiences. Needs can be molded by knowledge of alternative options or
availability of such options--some people are in a sense already 'funded' and
expect to continue to be 'funded' so that they really do not 'need' other
sources of funding. Needs and expectations come together in the recognition of a
range of alternative funding possibilities--there is more than one way to break
and egg. How much money is needed is another important issue--some people 'need'
more than others for a particular set of reasons. Those with less obvious or
less 'needs' seem to be less 'dependent'. How many anthropologists 'earn their
independence' and learn to expect their freedom? Funding has its own kind of
problems--creates its own kind of realities, its own 'involvements' which may
make a 'difference' in guiding 'interests'--very real interests in money or the
freedom money can buy.
12. "When do you expect your degree?" Again I
cannot give data which may reveal identity. Five of 8 male students expect to
complete their MA within 2 years time, the other two are looking at three and
four and six years. Ph.D. males are taking a bit longer time with two
questionable lows of three years and one of four years, from start to finish,
while those who have been a longer time are looking at 2-3 more years time,
three of them, and a total of 7,8 and 9 years.
There were four female Ph.D. students, one was looking at two
years start to finish, two are looking at totals of 5 and 6 years and one is
still not sure, but has been around a while. Female MA students, of 11 counted,
four are looking at two years total, five at three to four years total, and one
at six years. The people in archaeology seem to be taking longer. It would be
interesting to correlate these expectations with opinions and attitudes about
the department--again student's who've been around longer appear less naive and
more disillusioned with things about the department. There are a couple of
missing persons whom I didn’t get around asking during the interview. "I
don’t know, I try to have as few expectations as possible, fewer
disappointments that way."
13. "What are your expectations for employment after you
receive your degree?" six of 14 males indicate they hope or expect to
become university professors. "My chances are as good as any graduating
student from here. Jobs opening up in a few years--Korea, MIT, WW2 era
retiring." "I have no worries about getting a job, I have very much
confidence in myself and the system will hire me. The job market will be there
and will open up in a couple of years. Four are looking for some form of
contract archaeology and two are looking toward work in relation to development,
and two in research."
Of 16 females, two were not sure, eight mention university or
college professors. Other interests include human services, development, health
care and government. About half of all students expect some form of
professorship at a university or college. The rest are divided between different
areas of employment. Good Luck!
14. "What do you believe to be the goals of general
anthropology?" Males said: "Don't have any idea--to make the world
safe for human variation…Pretty good." "I don’t think there is a
goal. We hold up a façade of being cultural. People in the physical journals
are tying in culture very poorly. Diverging grossly, becoming more specialized.
Human biology has split from culture…major split in anthropology." "
Holy shit, in general to learn more about human beings. Our place in relation to
each other as well as our relation to the natural world." " Study of
people's and their cultures. I see anthropology as both unified and divided.
There is much overlap, on the other hand the department is very divided--up to
the individual instructor to make the course relevant to the whole."
"Selfish, only consider my own goals. Find it difficult to see an overall
goal. I can give you a bullshit textbook line…to elucidate aspects of
Humankind." "To try and figure out why people do things in a broad
sense, anything narrower for specific field. To figure out human nature."
"I think anthropology is one part of the social sciences and for me the
social sciences should have the goal to be a critical instrument of society, to
have a critical theory of humankind and the world: part of a larger framework
with no definite borders, emphasis in core of emphasis, go to the periphery to
find differences, not completely shared features undercover of emphasis."
"Anthropology's goal should be understanding social relationships of people
and then try to use it to try to improve things, not just describe, observe but
be critical, suggesting alternatives--where to push the process."
"Maybe to understand more precisely about human nature.. how to define it.
Every human group or society has conflicting interests, conflicting tendencies
within a person. Human nature is a combination of these forces, a conciliation
of these forces within an individual, between people and groups as well."
"Not sure that I know. General anthropology in an academic setting should
have the goal of making a wide audience informed about differences existing in
the world--not just as a strange and different science--to examine validity of
own behavior and beliefs, provide grist for self reflection. What
else?--confused here--people feel it should be enlightening, demystifying,
empowering. I'm not sure about all that. I like the sound of it but not sure
what the practice of it involves." "It has unified goals only in a
very philosophically general sense--striving for a common understanding of what
it means to be a human being on this planet--approaches are all over the map--we
are in a period of 'normal science' that doesn't have an overarching paradigm.
Divergence of directions among sub-disciplines." "Unfortunately,
anthropology is not monolithic. Fortunately there are different ways to see
anthropology and these differences are not anthropological--they are
philosophical, political, everything a human being does is influenced by a
conception. My basic conception I am aiming at is that every single science
should contribute in some way to improve the human condition. Anthropology in
conception is still suffering from previous misconceptions of the exotic and
different. Keep those people like this in their culture gardens, as a biologist
looks after a plant. Help the children to live, instead of dying. Work to
improve agricultural production so people can't get hungry, improve health,
abandon the previous culture area concept. Who gives them the right, even those
who believe anthropology to be neutral, to make their living by studying others.
There is no way for human sciences to be neutral."
Women said: "To educate people so they won’t
discriminate against one another, to clarify prejudices. Anthropology is to some
extent a race issue. More humane and tolerant." "To wreck havoc on my
future. I'm a little sarcastic about anthropology. Disillusioned. Exhausting the
utility of anthropology. It is too Fad oriented discipline--studying one fad for
another. Not that I have no use for anthropology. I'd like to utilize my
knowledge. I wouldn't want to teach it. Let's say we've studied one another
enough." "I probably would have come up with answers as an
undergraduate, but now it's not so easy…I don’t think you can say there is
one goal--there shouldn't be one goal. It is good to have competing paradigms in
an academic setting. Consciousness wakening of undergraduate students. American
standards are not the measures of all other cultures. To burst the plastic
bubble. Don’t know if its possible to come up with generalizations about human
cultures. It's pretty confusing." "Where its heading its hard to
say--it is too chaotic. Cultural anthropologists seem to get the credit for
everything." "Very briefly to explain human phenomena, all humans. How
to define anthropology in general. That’s a hard. You mean a prescription, how
to perceive it. Both? General anthropology should be definitely interested in
looking at human development, whether complex, prehistoric, in a most realistic
way. This means a balance between theory and what's out there. This means longer
fieldwork for students. Teachers with tenure required to go out into field. Well
balanced in all sub-fields, at least in some sub-fields and I think anthropology
has capability to be more applied, more contact with societies interested in
then now." "Hopefully, we're studying humankind. Should be able to
learn something objective about humankind. Anthropology is too broad with too
many sub-areas and interests to have one unified view." "To make other
people's culture understandable to a very limited number of people for suspect
ends." "Understanding of past, present to make a saner world. Diffuse
some of its knowledge through teaching cultural relativism. The old saying
knowledge is power. Anthropology could play a role in that power and how its
distributed." "I don’t know. Its too broad of a field. In the big
sense, I don't think there is a unified goal. Don't believe critical theory of
'making the past relevant' is going to last." "I don’t know if there
are any, it's more all split up. The biggest problem is keeping itself together
as a discipline. Respect as a discipline is rapidly declining."
"Anthropology is a system of knowledge about people. I can't see a single
goal. To understand people, cultures, all human beings as a group, and to make
life for all of us better somehow, which is a value judgment. We also have to
understand different cultural viewpoints, world views." "To enlighten
mankind on how we're all the same, all part of one family. I think anthropology
has the best chance of this realization. Religion divides people, show up
differences." "To raise awareness and respect for cultural diversity,
primary purpose is education, raising level of knowledge and respect for other
cultures and people." "Now academically, other than my personal life,
ideally to try to combine fields and try to understand human reality--social
sciences in general need more unity. Anthropology seems to be a perfect vehicle
in order to do this. Resistance to inter-disciplinary integration is
false." "To make or give people awareness of how their own society
functions, how all societies function, how one's own society is not the best
solution, the only solution. To give an idea of what human is, more open, more
tolerant. I think there should be one goal for anthropology. Different
sub-disciplines approaches from different directions--different sub-goals there
should be one overall goal--try to reach it from different directions."
"My familiarity with anthropology is very limited, very much an awakening.
Goals of discipline--the studies of other cultures--different goals within each
sub-field."
I am sure that each of these people could go home and write
many pages upon this question but when hit by it point blank in the course of a
hurried interview, they either have a cliché answer already well formulated or
else are thrown back upon their ego defenses to quickly find one, to quickly
think about it and toss of a satisfactory answer from the top of their heads.
Among females, I count 9 lumpers and 7 splitters. Among males I recognize four
lumpers and 8 splitters. What this means I have no idea. Few lumped or split
unequivocally--it was more a matter of emphasis upon unity or differences. The
fact of recognized divisiveness among sub-disciplines seemed to cause a few
people consternation. By phrasing the question this particular way, people were
compelled to give a single, unitary kind of answer, even if they really could
see no unity. Again people tend to see from the point of view of their own
orientation. Biological anthropologists were splitters who saw no overarching
unity--cultural predominance, alleged, was seen as not being necessary.
Development people emphasized the need for application and change.
Archaeologists are divided, seeing both unity and disunity. People caught
off-guard typically responded with "holy shit", "don’t have any
idea", "selfish, only consider my own goals", "not sure that
I know", "what is general anthropology", "to wreck havoc on
my life", "where its headed it's hard to say". I probably could
have come up with answers as an UG. "I don’t know. That's a hard
one."
15. "How many friends, professors and undergraduate
students do you know in the department?" Male students reported: 23%
reported having 2 or fewer friends, 38% reported between 2 and 5 friends, 30%
reported between 5 and 10 friends, and 7% reported having more than 10 friends.
Females report: 13% 2 or fewer friends, 53% between 2 and 5 friends, and 33%
reported between 5 and 10 friends, none reported more than this.
Males report knowing professors: 41% know no professors, 25%
report knowing only one, 8% report knowing two, 8% report knowing three, and 16%
report knowing more than three. Females report: 56% knowing none, 18% report
knowing only one, 6% report knowing three, and 18% report knowing more than
three.
Males report: 33% know no undergraduate anthropology
students, 25% report knowing one, 8% report knowing 2,3,4,5,6, and 7
undergraduate students each. Females report: 20% report knowing none, 40% report
knowing only one, 13% report knowing 2, 6% report knowing 3,4 and 5 respectively
and 6% knows more than 10.
The number of friends among first year graduate students is
the lowest. People who have been around longer tend to know more people, but not
necessarily. Other factors are at work in making contacts and friends. Most
people have more than 2 friends in the department. Most people know one or fewer
faculty members. More than half the graduate students know less than one
undergraduate student. Being a TA increases contact with undergraduates, or else
the undergraduates are more highly visible within the department. These account
for most of the undergraduates known by members of the department. 24% of males
and females report knowing 3 or more professors. While only 8% of the males and
no females report only knowing two professors. It seems students either know
very few professors or else quite a few. It seems, to reverse this statement,
that professors know a few students well and many students only a little or not
at all. One wanders if these are the same students. This does not argue well for
student teacher contact, or for grad., undergraduate contact. One must expect
the undergraduate profile in the department to be virtually nonexistent--only
'honorary graduate, undergraduate students' are most visible. These statistics
are quite meaningless and superficial, because each person had a different idea
of what friendship was to the,. One person's friend may be another's
acquaintance. Where does one draw a line, and why does one draw a line? Perhaps
I should have defined 'friendship' or 'know' better for the individuals
interviewed. Generally I left it at casual, or more than just acquaintance,
outside of the classroom, etc. some people had a bigger problem with this than
others. For some definition of friendship seemed less equivocal than for others.
It seems most of the friendships are horizontal, only a few reported knowing
more professors than fellow graduate students. Less than 25% of the graduate
students are known by more than one professor. It seems there may be a premium
on the academic market for professor's time and professor's attention. Most
peoples' complaints of poor social relations focused upon professor student
problems. The few instances where student-student relations were mentioned
tended to deal with 'competitiveness'. This would lead me to hypothesize (not
conclude) that what graduate students are competing with one another most, is
for attention from the professors--for professor time. This academic community
of less than 100 people seems to be hardly a Gemeinshaft type of community
'where everyone knows everyone else'. It is not like a military company where
one learns to live, eat, and sleep with people one would otherwise hate and
despise. It is more like a mini-suburbia, a hyper-suburbia with each person in
his/her own castle, waiting anxiously for some distinguished visitor to come
knocking on the door. Instead it is usually just one of one's peer group.
Within this suburbia social relations are characteristically
on the basis of shared mutual interests where these are cross cutting and
diverse, as well as by social separation and relative isolation and anonymity.
People see others everyday but may never end up saying a word to them. It is
like shopping regularly at a grocery store and getting to know a handful of
'familiar faces and friendly smiles'. One would expect small 'cliquish' peer
groups to form, say between 2 and 5 people, which form little family like
entities. Maybe the Father or Mother is some VIP professor and his children.
Also there are networks based on proximity and neighborliness and propinquity.
People next door sharing similar work office hours meet more often and share
more and become more friendly. Actually, it is more like a work place where
people come for a certain amount of time to do a job, and then go home to escape
the place. People tend to see it as a job, even if they are making nothing for
it. It has a genuine kind of 'make believe' 'lets pretend' for a while quality
about it. Not to imply that no work gets done. Like a miniature suburban
neighborhood, there are people who are more 'regular' than others. Perhaps these
people are thought of as more 'stable' somehow. There are also gossip networks
or grapevines of information control--these can function as a form of social
control--who hears what about whom told to whom what, finally reaches the ears
of the guilty victim--everyone knows one knows that 'everyone' knows that one
knows, etc. It has been interesting to me to see how information becomes
disseminated to whom within the department--who's speaking to whom, and who
doesn’t talk with whom. If there is a premium on professor attention, then it
takes the form of professional authority--they give the grades, make the
syllabus, cancel assignments, make alterations, set deadlines, give advice and
personal instruction, and eventually sign the thesis, if it ever finally comes
to that. The anthropological ego identity is developed in reference to the
authority of the professor--ego identity is structured in relation to academic
authority. This authority is paternalistic--professors are like either surrogate
parents or big brothers, depending on whether they adopt a child, practice
benign neglect, or play the bully. Academic is the power to create and control
change, developmentally related to the student ego. If this really is like a
suburbia, or a mini-mall, then one must expect social divisions of class, party,
and status to run through it, and this seems to be the case, where these kinds
of differences form the rules and sanctions for who talks with who, who eats
with who, who sleeps with who.
16. "If a TA, what do you think of your students?"
"Two groups, one stares and one open their mouths. I get along with most of
them. Some are very bad, not too aggressive, either get on good terms or not at
all." "Good interaction, I think so. For the most part they get along
with me. Not sure I have a clear opinion of students as a group. Individuals
that I know, more benefit of a doubt, broader attitudes about student
population." "I get along with them very well. Very few people I
dislike. Sometimes disappointed by them. A mutual liking, they are very
comfortable, happy with me, very positive." "I like them with the
exception of one fellow. They like me." "Main thing, I was not
aggressive enough." "Like most of them. Some do some are pretty
apathetic. Before I was nervous, now more cavalier just do work, don't put up
with a lot of crap." "Most I get along well with very nice--do a good
job, show respect, mutual feelings. Evaluations are important, to find
out." "Get along well with them. One's getting bad grades usually don’t
get along well. I feel like they get along with me, talk outside of class, not
about class work, how things are going. A lot are freshmen thrown in here. A lot
of cream of the crop out of high school, not receiving attention, expecting
it." "Generally speaking get along very well, we still correspond to
this day. Generally evaluations are very good, honest, excellent. No idea what
they felt about me." "Some utter morons, some utterly brilliant. Some
though vice versa, good evaluations mostly--middle upper class."
FACULTY INTERVIEWS
Of the faculty I interviewed 2 women and 7 men. By my count I
interviewed approximately 22% of the women associated with the department, and
about 29% of the men.
1. "Are you married and do you have children?" 78%
of the faculty members interviewed were married, I counted 10 children, or 1.42
children per parent. Actually most parents had 2 children each or 71%.
2. "How many hours a week do you average on
campus?" Out of eight people they averaged a pretty regular 40 and 22
minute work week. The highs were 60 and 55, and the lows were 20 and 30. About
four people, 50% averaged a clear 40 hours week. Professors indicated mostly
these were invariable over the semester but varied from other semesters and
seasons due to other reasons.
3. "What are your parents' profession?" Fathers
included 2 chemists, 2 university professors, a financial publisher, 2 military
officers, a business accountant, a machinist and a mechanic machinist. Mothers
included 6 housewives (3 part time), 3 high school teachers (1 part time), a
medical secretary, cafeteria bookkeeper, dress shop operator. Of those
interviewed, I estimate 66% came from the upper middle class and 33% came from
the middle class or below.
4. "Where do you come from?" Six of 9 indicate
coming from the northeast, 3 from the south (Virginia, Florida). Approximately
78% possibly 79% come from the suburb. Only one indicate coming from a 'city
neighborhood'.
5. "What do you think can be done to improve this
department?" Women mentioned: "One thing that would help would be a
very specific common social space, a meeting room to have coffee and talk, for
all anthropology students and faculty. The lounge doesn’t serve that purpose,
we can't organize it as our space that would be reflective of our
interests." "An orientation course for graduate students, with each
faculty coming in, so the students can learn the ropes, about the library, book
reviews. All the faculty would come to know the graduate students and vice
versa." "I should have written it down. I think it is good the way it
is. I'm pretty happy here. A real nice community compared to what I've heard
about. Faculty are much more fragmented other places. Complaints here are
"that's not the way it happened to me. There is competitiveness here but it
is worse other places. On this level it is a really good place. People are
really tolerant of each other. Paradigmatic differences becomes personal
differences. We need space that is ours, instead of just standing by the coffee
machine. A nice central place, brown bagging lunch, talking about things. An
example of how space can promote interaction. People working in offices--you
feel like you ought not to be disturbing things. More informal interaction sort
of waxes and wanes--beer socials in the department…people who are available go
to these things on Friday afternoons. This is the best context, people are
relaxed at the end of the week. We don’t have too many faculty who are hard to
get at…ethos research is number one. Teaching means training a small number of
students--teaching is apprenticeship, working on a one to one level--a lineage
level institutional structure. People come in and get socialized. There are not
a lot of rewards for being an undergraduate instructor. Not sure it would be
that different. Students should be more advised to what to expect in graduate
schools of different kinds.
Male faculty members said: "What I really think I'm not
going to tell you." "Expansion of programs where possible. Hiring.
Gradual, noticeable improvement in overall conditions. Things are getting worse,
loss of faculty members, budgetary problems." "Funding is important,
also the development of lab facilities could be improved a lot. It would happen
through active research. In terms of social relations?--I think students are
spoiled in regard to student faculty contact..." "This is not a very
easy question. In Fantasyland, replacement of certain faculty. Improving the
department gradually with outstanding new faculty. Need more resources.
Good social relations with students--working relations. We need to go with the
resources we've got. Problem depends on level of department at any given time.
These are subtle ways. We are not doing too badly at this point in time. A few
more key appointments." "With how much money? The answer is that we
don’t have more money for improvement. Need more faculty lines, positions.
This is one thing. More graduate assistantships, more first rate students here
their first year, more useful students. More communication on a professional
level among faculty, more professional interaction like brown bags."
"Break up cliques, a lot more social interaction. Whether or not people
agree with each other about things, at least they can get together more and be
more active. Spend more time with students. A lot don’t do a darn for them.
More seminars around, for all different facets of anthropology. Informal things
so everybody can get a turn. Things are tight anyway, not only a matter of how
much funding, but of funding for what." "Realistically or in the world
of great others. A good museum facility. Not enough money is the simplest thing
to say. Funding for all students, more publications coming out of campus. A
center for all of the faculty. Additional faculty. A good library. A good
computer center. More university sponsorship of faculty and student
research." "I think this is a good department. A well respected
department. We have done remarkably well. I don’t see the opportunity to
invest in this department to overtake departments like Berkeley, Michigan,
Columbia. Fiefdoms scholarships…nature of difference between state and private
universities. Nature of the time. Alumni not likely to give big bucks. Don’t
see the economy of New York State improving much. Invest more kinds of money, to
build a first rate library, to make major acquisitions. My wish list is not to
be a complaint list, it's a wish list."
I think there is a tendency to interpret the needs of the
department ego-centrically, as a reflection of one's own background, needs,
interests, opinions and value orientations. Unfortunately I did not get enough
interviews to come up with a really good sample.
6. "What is the focus of your current research interests
and how did you come by these interests?" Again I cannot reveal anyone's
identity. It can only be noted the kinds of connections between things in a
person's past which have led them to the present, to present 'involvements' and
'commitments' theoretical and methodological. Some people are led here by a
series of choices in research interests which "developed over time."
"I happened to come up with data relevant to the problem."
"Probably from things reading as I was growing up. National Geographic,
among other things. I don't remember names. Dinosaur books. Paleontology. Things
about humans. What did you find attractive? Curiosity of different places and
times. My grandfather collected journals, travelogues of 19th and 20th
century explorers, mainly in Africa. I inherited his book collection. He had
traveled in Africa. Curiosity about far away places and times, as well as
creativity of trying to figure our how and why people are doing things. Sit down
and provide interpretations." "Some get involved in research which is
going on. Some express always having been curios and interested about a
particular thing." "I don’t know, I've been interested since I was a
small child." "Some had an opportunity which exited their
interest--I've been doing it ever since."
7. "What are your goals as a teacher of students?"
Most professors distinguished between undergraduate and graduate levels.
Comments upon undergraduate level included "I like to do my best to instill
an interest in my field in particular, or at least to impress them with sorts of
enlightenment. Anthropology majors constitute only a fraction of the
undergraduate classes, certainly true in big course, introductory classes. At
this level anthropology is treated as part of general education. I used to keep
track of the undergraduates…" "I guess its different for
undergraduates and graduates. For undergraduates there is a clearer set of
goals. Challenge an American ideology about the world. People are thoroughly
socialized in an American social system, they learn about what a self is. Not
much challenged on cultural level. I'm pessimistic about a missionary set of
goals." "It differs for graduate and undergraduates…for UG create a
few moments during the semester when their lives become disrupted." "I
must get them to really appreciate and empathize with another culture."
"Undergraduates I teach will develop an interest in archaeology…they are
pursuing an a vocational interests, the biggest difference is in depth, degree.
Undergraduates don’t need as much in the way of practical knowledge and
tools." "Grads. differ from UG as undergrads. Try to provide
information about a topic and to inspire students to think…the so called
critical thing aspect, but also to encourage students into a professional mode
of behaving and learning, to try to help them to organize ideas, to try to
inspire students to pursue interesting lines of research--this is done at the UG
but much more at the graduate level." "To get as many people
interested…as I can--to turn them 'on' if I possibly can. Knowledge of how the
subject is used in everything we do, how it works, how it affects people, how it
can lead to a respect for it and possibly might even shed light on related
issues." "I take this as more goals, interests or relevant to most
students. To make students conscious, to inform them of what it means to be a
human being, to make the student aware of him/herself. Things taken for granted
as natural…most are not natural."
For the graduate level, people mentioned: "One assumes
career interests--training, guidance, direction in a more professional sense. To
become paid anthropologists eventually…" :Graduate students are a much
more diverse group of people…graduate courses tend to be right in my area,
than take me beyond my expertise and interest. I don't think I've gotten very
good at this either, giving people a syllabus. I try to communicate enthusiasm
of some theoretical issues, controversies." "For graduate students,
most satisfying to help them discover their own interests. It is most
gratifying. This is the project, there are fewer other rewards, intrinsically. I
work intensively with students to encourage them to make links with personal
lives, politics, many come in with a solid academic plan without really knowing
at heart what they want." "I would like to inspire students to be as
interested in the subject as I am, and to have them learn by asking themselves
what they are interested in--provide tools for development, I have no real
ideological ax to grind. To share a rich experience. Graduate students are
committed to making a living in their field." "To make them question
and think about everything they’ve never questioned before."
"To inspire students to pursue more interesting lines of
research much more at the graduate level…to train them to be professional.
Treat student in a way to enhance professional image--can't treat people badly.
Presentation--professionalism." "It's not presentation, its values and
interests, a fundamental interest in problem solving, doing it because its
expected only, is not going to work. Sub-cultural values coupled with an
interest in pursuing different lines." "Graduate? Yes sure, with
graduates it is much more focused upon a particular field, although I still like
to call these things into questions--that are accepted as tradition. Anything
taken for granted as true--particularly interests in field methods."
8. "What do you believe to be the proper goals and
responsibilities of students in anthropology?" "Spend a lot of time
reading and asking questions." "Their own individual aspirations and
objectives and this is not just incredibly variable, at fundamental level
obligations to faculty to try to do work. Thing most annoying is to try to
motivate students. Self motivated students. It is important to distinguish
between gradate and undergraduate overall levels." "Should be
interested in learning how to be an effective anthropologist. Assumed for an
anthropologist--nothing wrong with an undergraduate taking interest. Obtain a
substantive background to call on and use in solving problems from and
anthropological problems. Learn substance and methods 'facts' in
anthropology--what they do with this. Some students are primarily teaching
others doing research--applied research--not mutually exclusive categories of
course a matter of interest." "If they sign up for a course they
should be interested in the course enough to play around in their heads, to
think about things, not just learn about facts. It is useful to get their brains
working, which can be applied to anything, of course." "Now I think
that, here I speak of a liberal education as opposed to graduate school. Student
goal of a graduate student to develop into a research oriented professional to
contribute--we all should be contributing to. Responsibility of undergraduate
student to familiarize self with enough theory and interpretations in a wide
variety of topics, to become an independent thinker--to be able to evaluate
things rationally and morally, to reach independent informed decisions…I think
also…a lot of informal teaching is very exciting, quite enjoyable…help
students learn to cope with world around them, derive quality life…any
graduate student serious about the program ought to have as a primary goal doing
well and getting through--a pretty general response, some response a chemist or
business instructor would give. I don't think anthropology carries any special
social commitments other students might feel."
9. "What do you believe to be the goals of anthropology
in general?" "More for undergraduate teaching, play a role of culture
at large, shaking foundations of cultural smugness and self assurance. A view of
social change, a critical role." "Right now in terms of discipline a
huge split in terms of people who think of explanations of how culture come
about on one hand, on the other hand, interpretations aren't enough. Or while
interpretations are necessary, can’t really let go of explanations of culture…interested
in social change, how a system works, to tinker with. Is anthropology primarily
theoretical or can foster change. All knowledge we have has an impact, to find
out what that impact will be. Don't like the rubric of 'applied
anthropology'--institutional repressive. The development program is full of
contradictions--gives students a sense of contradictions. Most students really
highly, sincerely interested--really skeptical when working for the US
government." "I think there are overriding themes in anthropology.
Most important for me is human reality. A pluralistic view of human culture, not
just one way of seeing the world. Many factors are involved, none that are
monolithic or correct. I think anthropology can do that better than any other
disciplines, help to situate people in a context." "Study of humankind
in all its manifestations. That's to start with. I tend to favor lumper type
definitions, rather than hair splitting so involved with tree's lose sight of
the forest. Class, the first day, what is anthropology. A number of things
anthropological--too compulsive to lose sight of the forest for the trees."
"My own goals differ, my own are to understand humans in their different
bio-cultural science, at least my own understanding of the human state of
experience is limited, if only defined in behavioral context. If in fact
biological anthropology would be less effective as an explanatory science if it
were just socio cultural, archaeology. A bio-cultural science with pre-historic,
historic with four foci--a bio-cultural explanation explains more, numerically
socio cultural is more dominant. Its true in any democratic system that
numerical dominates, has more control--in absence of socio cultural there would
be a concept of comparative studies, concept of 'culture of relativity' that
really tends to hold." "To understand human variation, biological and
behavioral. This is the general goal, includes understanding why things are the
way they are now, how they got to be the way they are, how they are."
"Anything of course. Work hard, but never forget education is not just
grades or a job at the end. The study of human culture in all its aspects."
"Awareness of the human condition, of human behavior, human plight. I would
play a very important role in simply collecting information, knowledge as an
abstract goal. Knowledge is very essential in what that understanding has made
us what we are and I don’t think this is necessarily practical. Not opposed to
development, doesn’t have to be. Sure I see conflicting paradigms, but doesn’t
hinder unity--conflicting paradigms arguments will--if we don’t disagree then
we’re not learning." "Anthropology is a very diverse discipline. I
can't define goals of anthropology in a very general terms. I have an idea goals
change fairly substantially across different parts of the discipline. History
and evolution inter-function. I don’t think socio cultural anthropologists
give this answer.
Lumpers I count six, splitters 3. 66% to 33%.
10. "Do you believe anthropology to be a male dominated
field?" "Yes, like all social institutions. Much less so than other
academic institutions. Study of citation rates in socio cultural anthropology. A
higher evaluation, access to grants, jobs. Is not as bad as the
evaluation--women handicapped, indifferential distribution to males through old
boy networks." "Yes, although when compare it to other disciplines,
maybe not so bad. Structure for funding, leadership of major departments.
Paradigm. Maybe a slight bias in publishing, real bias in citation rates, some
presses more biased than others, some journals." "Actually
anthropology, no. I don't know. Say yes first of all, more true in archaeology.
I think it is power, most important, powerful members of most prestigious
institutions, predominantly male, will slowly change." "A hard
question. I think in terms of numeric or my perception of just numbers its no
longer in terms of numbers more women than men are going into it. More men going
into specialty areas, more equally divided then when I first started.
Hierarchically it is mostly male. If just a historical consequence of, it may
not be more than ten years. Assistant professor level. A chronological accident.
Protecting their own. Some departments more willing to recruit equal numbers. 12
years ago, did fairly well, according to time UG department. Socio
cultural/archaeology 7-74, one woman in eight socio cultural, proclivity of
men/women predominate socio cultural/archaeology . Lab staff predominantly
female, field crew predominantly male. More so ten years ago--prejudice. I've
been with a crew of women most of the time. I've not noticed any difference in
work they do, never noticed difference in quantity or quality of work they do,
never sort out by gender." "Less so than all the so called hard
science--less so than many social sciences, to the extent that we live in a male
dominated field, society, numerically, anthropologically--as a profession,
relatively open to female participation, relatively comfortable in a lot of
profession." "Yes it is, clearly more in some sub-disciplines more
than others. This doesn't mean they haven't an impact. They made important
contributions to theory almost from the beginning." "Probably is,
though can think about prominent female anthropologists, simply ration of people
in field." "No." "No, I should think of social science one
in which women participate more fully than any of the others. If wanted to
discuss sub-fields, sub-disciplines, seem to be male dominated, others are not.
Particularly paleo-anthropology. I don’t think its true generally."
Both women gave an affirmative, unequivocal yes, although
both said not as bad as other disciplines. Only three males gave a negative
response, only one without elaboration. None of the other males gave an
unequivocal or unqualified response. It seems they tended to play down dominance
rather than emphasize it. Only two gave unequivocal but not unqualified yes's.
11. "How many graduate and undergraduate students do you
know?" two mention only one graduate student whom they 'socialize' with.
One mention six. Two mention 7-8. Two mention 10 and two mention interacting
'socially' with 12. One mentions interacting with 50-60. Others exist along a
'continuum' 'on a more sporadic basis' '7 offhand, had to home, would have, had
have, on a first name basis with.' In regard to undergraduate students one
mentions knowing one, one 'a couple', one mentions 'one in particular whom I
see, one known none, one 'not more than 4 or 5' one 5 or 6, and one mentions 'a
lot, 20 students interact with intensively, 6 or so with social relationship,
usually with some overlap in outside interest.
12. "Do you have any comments, criticisms, suggestions
regarding this interview?" "It's made me think I haven’t really
thought about." "No I'd have to see just what you are trying to do
with it, before. Did you get it cleared through the Human Subjects Research
Review, one thing methodologically, if you really want to do an ethnography of
the department, may run into a sampling bias--get more members more
involved." "No, no suggestions." "No, I'm wandering what to
do." "No, no criticism. I'm not sure I see the point of some
questions." Well. 1. In terms more encouraged when you were writing. 2.
Could ask, what they like, don't like about the department, cases and
preferences, salient events, more than general principles people stress a lot of
things." "No I would be able to comment better if I know what doing
with the information. Hard to say if questions are pertinent, effective or
not." "Aside from the point of trying to maintain neutral stance
rather than offer own opinions, leading the witness, nod agreement is at times
the most one wants to do--as with any kind of open ended interview schedules, so
difficult to interpret and analyze, inclined to go with more specific kinds of
questions."
It would be interesting to come up with some hard and fast
correlations from all these comments that have been made. Some suggestions of
possibilities can be made. There seems to be some important differences
especially between males and females among the graduate students. Females tens
to come from better backgrounds, spend less time in the department , work more
hours, take longer to get through their programs are more concerned with
problems of department structure and especially social relations between the
faculty and students, then males. They are also more 'dependent' upon the
'necessity' of funding in order to do the prerequisite research in order to
obtain their degrees. I do not know how to interpret this, except to say that it
may indicate some important fundamental differences of some kind between males
and females. Exactly what such differences might be I can only conjecture, and
not very safely. This was not something I was looking for when I designed the
questionnaire--I did not pre-select my 'biased sample' in order to reflect this
orientation. Women also tend to see anthropology as being more male dominated
than men do, and give more and better reasons why they think this way. I suggest
that when and if anyone tries to interpret any further these suggestions
possibilities, then one needs to reconsider more generally what we really mean
by the definition of 'male dominance' as it becomes reflected by structural bias
within the department as its own microcosmic system, and as part of a larger
framework of structural bias in a wider sense. The bias maybe fond as much
within certain value orientations and outlooks of females who define their ego
identity anthropologically, as much as it becomes the deliberate bias on the
part of any male to actually predominate or come before women.
I do not think that these are sufficient and necessary
results to render a profile of the basic modal personality of Joe or Jane
average anthropology student, although some strong possibilities do suggest
themselves. One of my biggest preconceptions when I began this study was that
the anthropology department constituted somehow 'one reality'--a single whole
within which there would be one kind of student and one kind of professor, or at
least variations upon a very common anthropological theme. Instead, I soon
realized that there were many different realities for the department, as many as
there are people who call themselves and proceed to define their realities as
being anthropological. There are as many models of the world of anthropologia as
there are personalities within the field, and no one person or single party of
people has a corner upon the meaning, a paradigmatic monopoly upon the whole.
The 'department' as a cultural integrity exists, but only as a structural
background, a commonly shared framework, against which these separate realities
and models of anthropologia can be referenced socially, texted, amended and
altered in conformity or in reaction with the predominantly structural norms of
the department.
I would suggest that there are several co-occurring and
competing personality pre-dispositions which are divided up along several
different dimensions of ego identity. One important set of dimensions is of
course the male-female. Other dimensions which seem to have some bearing are
age, social cultural background an area of expressed interest. When these kind
of dimensions are composed and cross referenced it is possible that students may
come to fall within a single continuum--at one end is a low risk group, at the
other is a high risk group, which defines on one hand any individual's status
rank overall in the department, and which conditions the person's chances that
he/she will receive funding, support or not. There are preconditioning factors
which shape our own preconceptions pre-conceptual horizons of our own ego
identity as it becomes socially defined vis-à-vis the department 'system'.
There are only two sets of uncontrollable and decisive factors which may be seen
to historically determine the cast of the dice. First, are the individual's
willpower and belief in one's own ego identity which will provide the necessary
motivation to push the individual through the program. Second are the
pulling/preventing powers of gatekeepers strategically positioned at each nexus
of the system--people who have the authority to make the important decisions in
the department. This is the way the system is supposed to work, but this
simplistic model does not take into account the possible manipulative actions on
behalf of or by the individual's to create or foster a social environment
conducive to ego achievement. This is done circumspectly behind closed doors,
behind a front of objectivity. As long as it is not publicly visible, it is
possible and effective.
In a sense, the hypothetical little world of the department
is a world of limited good. It is as one professor remarked--"Academic
funds are always limited funds." Within such a social system it is
necessary to promote a 'competitive spirit' of the 'survival of the fittest'
which becomes the selectivity of the system. It is meet deadlines or drown,
publish or perish. It is necessary that everyone comes to believe in this
imperative in order to effect, or confect the sense of immediacy and realism
about the struggle, the ordeal, hence the values and priorities of the system.
This is the subtle indirection about the system, the perversity of its power of
authority, which, in the historical structure of the long run, is not really so
subtle after all. Along with all the written rules, when one accepts to play the
game, are all of the unwritten rules which makes the ideal system workable,
indeed very human system, it is this way with any human system, social or
otherwise, however, 'scientific' it seeks to define itself as. Unfortunately,
not everyone knows or understands or is in position to exercise the unwritten
rules equally or fairly. This confers a special 'players edge' advantage. This
is an anthropological game, a circle of ego consciousness which goes on in our
own anthropologically oriented heads, as well as in the 'mind' of the system as
a whole. In our efforts to define and redefine our own ego identity in
interrelation with significant others within the department, and counter
reference others outside of the department 'in the field' we play a roundabout
game of manipulation and denial. Through this constant play, we condition
ourselves in a way which is 'pre-selected' congruent with the values of the
system. We play games of denial an rejection of who we were and are and of how
and why we came to be that way. As our models of ego identity do not always
correspond well with our actual phenomenological realities, we are left to
manipulate either one or the other, and most frequently, both, to bring them
into congruence with one another. This leads to the 'socializing' of the
anthropological ego identity to meet, even if in name only, the accepted
standards of that grade status. There are several other models which sees the
problem of human reality and its understanding as basically a matter of puzzle
solving. This model is what defines science as 'paradigmatic'--another model.
This suggest that when we refer to the teaching of anthropology as consciousness
awakening, or as, we are implicitly alluding to a model of human development
which might be better defined as 'intellectual/spiritual enlightenment'--(might
add empowerment) in which the self, the superior ego, can hope to one day
finally transcend the dialectical conflict of its own inherent contradictions,
just as the system itself will one day, achieve its own utopia. And we have come
full circle in our expanding consciousness, to not escape the limitations of our
own reasoning. The circle of our own Reason. We are back to the days of
Spencer--we have not broken the chains to our own intellectual and spiritual
fetters, we have gotten no further from the place where we first started.
If anthropology is passing through an identity crises, it is
because humanity is bypassing through a human identity crises, has been passing
through an identity crises, as long as it has known its own history.
In closing it is interesting to me how much or what people
initially thought and said about my study. Once it became formally initiated,
there was no turning back. I sensed defensiveness on some people's part and a
subverted aggressiveness on the part of others. There was a temporary twitch in
the stone face of power. Spurious smiles became glaring stares. People
automatically presumed a critical aggressiveness, a self reflexive orientation
even though I did not necessary intend this kind of approach. People read into
what they wanted to see and no one really bothered asking what it was really
about. After the initial shock dissipated the stone face and the white smile
came back to normal--it did not make any difference, or only a 'disinterested
difference'. It became as consigned officially to the trash-can of trivia, and
quietly passed out of the immediacy of people's critical consciousness. Why I
should be intended a self reflexive, hypocritical ethnography of the department,
trying to spill the gory details of people's petty private lives, I don’t
really know--except it only lead me to see another face behind anthropological
professionalism, one that I have seen before, and am now quite familiar with. It
is a historical fact, the suggestion of insult, that some kind of problem really
does exist which may implicate people's personal lives, within the realm of
anthropologia, a problem which is denied, ignored, neglected, rationalized away,
as so much 'sweet lemons'. And this, ultimately, is the problem of power, and
its human perverseness in history. If there were no problem, it would have been
a different study which made no difference, rather than an indifferent study
which makes, however covertly, a critical difference.
I elicited from a group of graduate students answers to what
they thought my study was all about--"I think it is very interesting to
find somebody asking about institutional issues in the department because
usually Americans don’t question their own academic institution. I'm curious
about the outcome of your research and the possible effect of its
disclosure." "Auto reflexive anthropology at the personal,
departmental and discipline level…at the discipline level: the anthropological
study of anthropology itself…at the departmental level, the study of the
workings of the department itself and relation to discipline and individuals…at
the personal level--an examination and evaluation of your personal role in the
discipline and in the department" "Impressions--taken to mean
opinions. I'll give mine in detail but overall seen as a potentially very
valuable examination of academic culture (what of it is specifically
anthropological academic culture we don’t know) interesting to me personally
because of my interest in sociology of the profession but also as an
insider." Project seemed motivated by strong ideals and I've worried about
openness to different material tat might emerge, less as time goes on…would
have liked to be interviewed more and longer."
The ego reality and the cultural reality in which it is
essentially situated, each from complex inter-functioning systems of stasis and
adaptation. These systems are in their inter-functioning termed 'ecological'.
There is a certain ecology of ego consciousness is which it works to construct a
coherent, consistent conceptual model for the cultural reality which is by
nature ego centered. Within this ego system of ego, be it anthropological or
some other, there is an inter-functioning of belief and behavior such that
internal and external realities become 'harmonized'. A person shape their
beliefs around the existential necessities and choices of their behaviors,,
behaviors become determined by existential. Anthropology is a belief system as
much as it is a 'system of knowledge' or a system of science. Science itself,
and especially 'true science' is a belief system. These belief systems orient
behavior and provide direction and coordination for behavior. In this regard,
they are little different from other kinds of ideological or symbol systems of
meaning and signification which maintain a certain regularized praxis of
behavior. All religions are exclusive, entailing a rejection of other competing
systems, and the belief that there is only one true way. In this regard, true
science, with its bottom line upon facticity, it unambiguous numerology, its
positivistic 'prove it to me' fundamentalism, is every bit a religion. It is
interesting that positivistic methodology excludes the possibility of religious
belief as one of its central tenets and reason for being. Those who exclusively
emphasize this hard line are committing the ultimate coup de grace for their own
belief system. True science is especially exclusive and delusional in its denial
of any belief system whatsoever except its own. Science is raised to a religion,
and in its tyranny over the human soul destroys all contenders. But this
happens, even though scientists themselves cannot agree on what real science is
all about. Our conceptioning of narrow minded science must change if it is to be
relied upon to create a better world, a more human world, a more ecologically
adapted system.
The question becomes whether we can ever adequately escape
the circle of our own ego centered system of belief and behavior, step outside
of our own spheres of influence, to enable us to see a cultural system as a
whole, in 'objective terms' especially one which we ourselves are fully,
existentially involved with. Everyone is operating and functioning within their
own spheres of belief and behavior, ought to see the system as a whole 'in its
own terms' rather than just as a reflection of an ego centered reality. I
believe in a sense, this is what ethnographic fieldwork enables us, more or
less, to do. But in so doing we must step outside of our own spheres and systems
of belief and behavior, and get to know those of many others.
Only then can the broader outlines of the whole become
ascertained. We employ within our spheres of influence, models of understanding
and functioning--which provide meaning and sense of order to our
realities--these models function as symbol systems of signification which become
communicated to others in a common language with whom we interact. These models
are always to some extent both implicit and explicit--they are the greenness of
meaning. We daily employ implicit models, only if these are to be inferred
'unconsciously' or unselfconsciously, through the wider social implications of
our behaviors. Science, in a very real sense, attempts to render implicit models
explicit within a well defined language system, and to be more realistic,
representing the whole which lies beyond the horizon of our own spheres of
belief and behavior, by consistently tying its language system to correspondence
values in phenomenological reality. Scientific models thus become empirically
anchored to human reality in a way other systems of belief and behavior do not
have to be. But in focusing upon the narrower, analytical role of explicating
inter-functional models of reality, it cannot therefore exclude or deny the
complementary, necessary, a priori larger role of implication in all human
understanding of models. There is nothing without unseen, implicit values. To
exclude and ignore the wider role of implication and the pursuit of implication
in human understanding as the ground of meaning, is to restrict ego
consciousness to the narrow horizons of one's own sphere of functioning, system
of belief and behavior, and to commit science as a model of understanding which
transcends the subjective horizon of ego consciousness, to become the victim of
its own methodology. A language of implication is by nature one which is
metaphorical, descriptive, and loosely tied to the data, it begets a form of
consciousness which is open, imaginative, only loosely bound by the data.
Science to be effective, is the marriage to these two language systems, their
complementary dialectic employing implicit and explicit behavioral models in the
understanding of human reality. True science attempts to exorcise unambiguity in
language, inspite of the fact that these people remain, beneath their cool
guise, inherently human unambiguous. The only important questions are not
'answerable ones' necessarily. Indeed these usually turn out to be the most
trivial of answers. The most important questions are those which are inherently
ambiguous and hence ultimately unanswerable. But this does not mean that our
models of science we employ to understand these questions are irrelevant or
impossible, 'fundamentally unfalsifiable'. It means that our answers are never
finally 'correct' and therefore never perfect. But they can be made more
realistic models about the whole. Just as meaning proceeds, consciousness
proceeds from implication towards explication, so to does our language proceed
from description to prescription in a narrower sense. All explicative models are
by implication of their simplification and generalization, by their presumed
validity, models which are prescriptive choices which reflect the value
orientation and system of belief and behavior which creates models and invests
them with importance. They entail a choice as to which, among several
alternative answers, is necessarily the 'best' or 'correct' answer. True
scientists adopt methodological criteria which serve to guide their judgment.
They believe in the truth value of Parsimony or efficiency of explanation. They
believe in truth value of reliability and falsifiability of the model--whether
it can be empirically tested through experimental replication and control. Thus
we have a system of belief begetting a system of ritually prescribed behavior,
one which is complete within its laboratory setting, its purity, its white
robes.
Failure of these true scientists to understand the larger
implicit role of history in human reality is due to their own failure to embrace
the history of their own systems, of their own consciousness. The prescriptive
rules of the game, however proscribed by holy writ, remain a matter of critical
decision making, of choice, which in the final, existential analysis becomes
quite arbitrary and human, and therefore historical in its broader implications.
Decision models are always based upon value orientations of systems belief and
behavior. The evaluation role in prescription stands in contrast to the
interpretive role description. What is the difference which becomes critically
significant in making a decision, ultimately these are guided by one's sphere of
interests. Within the larger structural framework of an overarching political
economy, these differences guided by critical interests revolve around the
significance and importance of Money. It must be seen as part of a larger credit
system, a vicious cycle or regenerative system, in which there is a general
effort to 'materialize' significance--to precipitate and concrete, results which
are quantifiable in terms of their mass which become credits which can be
exchanged upon the academic marketplace for money and the status symbols and
material advantages and emotional/existential security money can buy. This
becomes fairly clear when one sees how systems of true science are linked up to
funding agencies. Symbols and models, become invested with material
significance, they become socially important, and is the real bottom line which
makes the critical difference, empowering status symbols with the feeling of
reality. This is the magic of money in a material culture. The central
existential dilemma to be faced in becoming a 'professional' anthropologist, is
the question of funding, and the production of credits in a credit system, to
perpetuate and augment that funding.
All learning is normative, all questioning is dialectical,
all language is descriptive, all teaching is by definition didactic. But we must
be wary of unquestioned authority which dictates knowledge, which proscribes
understanding, sanctions conformity, represses the asking of questions. Academic
authority invested with the status of power, does not have the bottom line on
truth, or even able necessarily better understanding of the direction to go, on
the kinds of decisions to be made, which will lead to these understandings. We
remain skeptical of academic authority, that what anything anyone might say, is
necessarily correct or true, for some reason, better.
The process of becoming a professional anthropologist
academically is a process of socialization, or 'professionalization' which
teaches quite prescriptive appropriate models of belief and behavior. This
system of instruction and training is to some extent pre-designed and
predetermined around a more or less conventionalized model of belief and
behavior deemed appropriate to becoming anthropological. These models
preconditions peoples' adaptation within the cultural system of the department.
This socialization process involves a repression of aspects of the self, upon
significant reference others positively within the authority system of the
academic milieu and negative upon counter reference others. To turn other people
into a thing to be counted is to turn oneself, in one's own setting, into a
thing to be counted--a thing to be used and manipulated. Both fields of
perception and recognition become 'dumping grounds' of one's repressed ego
motivations--others become the objects of wish fulfillment and ego
gratification, to be used for one's private purposes, then conveniently
discarded. Part of this professionalization process implies a desensitization to
the ethical consequences of repression of aspects of the self in
presentation/performance of the self in reference to significantly defined
others. In learning how to present ourselves and perform routinely, in how to
act and not to act, how to think 'critically' as anthropologists, in modeling
the ego system of belief and behavior about a conventionalized role model of
becoming/being the best anthropologist, we reject and deny the implications four
our own being, the existential responsibility for the freedom of shaping our own
human character. The conventional mold of the professional anthropologist is, I
suggest, not big enough to serve as the best framework for the science of human
understanding. It breaks under the weight of its own authority. We must learn
how to ignore or deny the existential consequences of our own system of
behavior. Anthropology is fun, exciting, as long as we have the 'fly away'
power, the political economic means to remove ourselves at a moment's notice
from the perils and dangers of the existential realities of the people we are
'studying'. We get to share in others lives while always keeping for ourselves
an option of escape, of the back door, when the money runs out, when the seas
become stormy. We suggest that we engage in the existential lives of significant
counter reference others, without accepting the full existential consequences of
such engagement, when the consequences of engagement reach critical points which
come into conflict with out anthropological ego identity, with our 'objective'
interests which are centered in the field of academia, which look toward another
set of significant reference others, for the promotion of our own private
interests. The myth of true science, neutral objectivity and the unquestioned
presumption of the inherent 'goodness' of our science, is only a mythology, an
ideology of false consciousness, a veil of Maya, disguising the existential
consequences of its praxis. As long as we guard for ourselves the privileges,
the monopoly of our own academic powers, self guard the 'fly away' option which
protects of existentially when 'out in the field' then we are refusing to accept
the other 'on their own terms' and making them accept us 'on our terms'. It is
incomplete involvement, half hearted commitment to the understanding of the
lives of others, because it is divided commitment, spurious not genuine
interest, involvement with a critical, creditable difference, because it is
existentially, ethically, irresponsible commitment. It is the perversity of
anthropological power to deny its own history in the making. It could not have
come to pass without the necessary money, the funding, which created its power,
which privileged its way of life with authority, which empowered it. The
hypocrisy is to return from the field 'fulfilled'--taking the other into
ourselves--we become the transformed spokesmen of the best interests of others,
the only interests, the mediators of their differences. The other in us becomes
the legitimacy of our power, our authority--the other has been appropriated for
the private interests of ego identity. The hypocrisy comes with the lack of
reflexive recognition of this historical fact and act of appropriation--when we,
within our own community, become the official representatives, the voice, the
embodiment of the other's symbols, without the incorporation of the other's
existentiality. It is when one anthropologist dares to speak for a whole
culture, a whole people, for all of anthropology, in his own and their best
interests. It is placing ourselves above and beyond the reach of the significant
others we ultimately address in the larger dialectic of history. And we must in
the structure of the long run suffer the consequences of perpetuating in
ingenuous, spurious, true science.
Within this department, there are many different 'competing'
models and many different interests. There are several party lines which are
engaged in promoting their own interests vis-à-vis the department as a whole,
but right now, there is one party line which remains predominate. It is male
dominated. It is a conspiracy to promote their own orientations above all
others. Its scheme is gradual revision--weed out by benign neglect the less fit,
gradually restructure the program, bringing into it 'more useful, more highly
rated, better students'. Generating research in order to make more money is its
primary function. In its monopoly from its corner of the academic marketplace it
is setting the norms and standards of academic professionalization--promoting
'critical thinking', 'framing of answerable questions', prefabricating research
hypothesis, emphasizing competitive performance, presentation. It sticks to a
very behavioristic program of training. It fosters a true science orientation
which is undeniably positivistic, statistical, 'social scientific'. It is intent
on explain human diversity, and change in this diversity, focusing thus,
emphasizing analytical differences between people. It is aiming deliberately for
paradigmatic closure of the anthropological community--a model of normal social
science which is anti-humanistic, and comes straight out of Scientific American.
It is aiming to define human reality as preeminently biological, seeing culture
as adapted to biology, tracking genetic evolution, rather than conferring
biological adaptability, or leading genetic co-evolution. It sees other
sub-disciplines to this overarching goal to explain human biology and behavior
as means to its own ends.
In order to achieve paradigmatic closure as a scientific
community, anthropology must, as a whole be reduced to being a hand maiden of
biology in the explication of 'human nature'. As long as the anthropological
community insists upon defining itself paradigmatically as a natural science, it
has no other consequence but this inexorable 'nothing but' biological reduction.
To pass itself off as 'ecology' is its ticket to the arena, its bureaucratic
label its stamp of approval, in a world of big brother bureaucracy. But it is
more than a mere suggestion, alternative anthropological models exist. This
model is unphilosophical, anti-rational, simply because it is not a genuine
science, but true science in a religious sense of promoting in belief and
behavior positivistic fundamentalism. Evolution is its only response to human
history, and ecology is its synchronic discourse, a historical discourse.
This is not to deny an important place to this kind of
biological science in the understanding of human nature--but it cannot be over
emphasized above other forms and ways of anthropological understanding without
having destructive consequences upon the discipline as a whole. To promote
personal ambitions in the guise of public authority is to deny the historical
consequences for such promotion. Such paradigmatic unity is inevitably bought at
the cost of ultimate moral default. There exists a systematic, equally
scientific 'something more' models which does not deny the consequences of the
power of its knowledge. It is paid for by the opportunity cost of realizing
alternative models of belief and behavior, by the cost of dimensioning degrees
of existential freedom in becoming and being an anthropological professional
which is not so ego centered upon models of academic authority. The shortcomings
of this anti-rational model of true science becomes most evident whenever it
becomes bold, moving from the trivial important questions which are framed in
answerable ways, to the trivial questions which are more essentially ambiguous
and unanswerable--it is an inevitable leap of faith in which this system of
belief and behavior attempts to achieve closure upon the understanding of human
reality. Then it becomes clear what this scientific systematizing is really all
about. The trail of its paradigmatic progress is littered with the carcasses of
its many failures--and they have gotten nowhere, because they are making the
same mistakes they have always been making, for the same exact reasons. It is
not a real science, because it is not open to learning by its own mistakes. It
must deny its own history in the circle of its ideological deception in order to
continue to justify its own 'mode of informant realization'. In its comfort of
material security, professional privilege, scientific certitude, academic
authority, it denies its own essential existential ambiguity.
The black and the white of the paradigmatic sciences and the
anti-scientific humanities becomes the historical dialectic of two cultures in
constant contradiction. To over emphasize the black or the white is to fail to
recognize the greyness of their mutual complementarity dialectical
complementarity. There is a place for science for anthropology, but there is
also an equally important place for the humanities, to deny one or the other is
to destroy the synergy of the whole system of understanding--it is to destroy
its historical dialectic and render its special culture spurious in its
functioning. To see the whole is to see the yin and yang of the whole system--to
focus upon the in between greyness of their dialectical turning through history.
Anthropology has a transcendent more rational model which is both scientific and
humanistic. It can be both paradigmatically and unparadigmatic simultaneously
and be 'a-paradigmatic' in their mutual destruction.
(PART OF THE BEGINNING OF THIS SENTENCE IS MISSING PAGE 126:
CHAPTER IV) on the anthropology department, students and faculty, concerning how
they view the department, and some of the interactions that occur."
"You may want to look at how the students perceive the department of
anthropology works. The student's perception will be used to appreciate what the
department thinks of itself and what is in reality." "I think you have
some personal questions concerning academic bureaucracy, politics, gender bias
in this department superficially and the university in general. Through this
study, you are trying to understand the perception of this problem from a
student's point of view and the point of view of professors." "I
believe you were trying to understand the decision making structure within the
anthropology department to find out whose interests (faculty or students) were
being served." "you're carrying out a study of departmental politics
via in depth interviews with graduate students." "Hugh is examining
this anthropology department mainly by interviewing the graduate students who
are studying in this department. What is the purpose of studying here? What kind
of interpersonal relationship does each student have with the professors or
other students? And so on. He may get the personal network data in this
department. "I think it is important to do this type of study on an
academic department where input and analysis of policies and procedures are
ignored or overlooked." "1. A critical study on the anthropology
department. 2. About students/faculty conceptions of the department, their roles
and their aspirations. 3. How to improve the department. 4. What the
learning/teaching process in this department is all about." The project is
interesting for a couple of reasons: 1. There is an apparent silence to the gap
in communication between: faculty-faculty, faculty-student, student-student.
It'll be interesting to discover if its possible to understand impressions on
the individuals in this department and what is creating the diversity. 2. There
is no reason why not. "Knock 'em dead, Hugh! Anything to shake the dust,
blow the cobwebs away or displace the cornerstones of this hallowed institution
has my vote." "Looking at the neurosis inside the department, possibly
related to types of dominance and submissive relationships of faculty and
students--expressed by lack of accurate information." "I don't know
what you are doing, I guess I missed the day(s) you discussed it."
The 'data' speaks both quite literally and figuratively for
itself, if only one learns to pay attention to 'it'. I am not the model of the
perfect anthropologist--I have more human weaknesses and faults, and have made
more human mistakes than most--but I am not alone.
I haven't yet met anyone who is that good at being what
he/she says they are.
Here already we are encountering a conviction that will be
implicit in my whole lecture. If the definition of what is rational is narrowed
beyond its true meaning until it excludes subjective experience, a great part of
what it means to be a human person, then we are forced into a betrayal of all
that is most distinctive of our species.
I have come to have a distrust of the contemporary worship of
'rigorous objectivity' and the withdrawal of the personal even from human
studies. In my own subject, for example, I have argued that excavation reports
should not be deprived of descriptions of the expedition, the workers, the
surroundings, moments of triumph or disaster and other such relevant human
affairs. It is quite wrong to think that scientific truth will be better served
by treating that highly social and individual operation as though it were a
manipulation on a laboratory bench. The chief result is to make the reports
repulsive to all but the specialist. That perhaps, unconsciously, is the
purpose.
The analytical approach has had a astounding success in the
physical sciences that it has produced an equally astounding hubris among the
smaller minded scientists. What was really a method, one way of turning our
brains upon limited aspects of the universe that has produced them, has tended
to become a view of life, a totalitarian ideology. It has been held that nothing
that cannot be measured and proved experimentally has any validity. Extreme, and
I think we can say extremely naïve, forms of behaviorism and positivism have
captured able minds. Philosophy has been castrated, metaphysics made a dirty
word.
Looked at in terms of being, reductionist thought
suggests that the whole is no more than the sum of its parts and so leads to an
old fashioned mechanistic view. Applied to man this kind of thinking can still
produce painful crudities. For example, that man 'is nothing but a complex
biochemical mechanism powered by a combustion system which energizes computers
with prodigious storage facilities for retaining encoded information'. Looked at
in terms of becoming--that is within the dimension of time, reductionism
suggests that the evolved form is explained by its origins, the fruit by its
roots. This reduction to origins can be stopped at any point that pleases the
reducer. A vast reading public was apparently delighted to be reduced to Desmond
Morris's Naked Ape. Or if we prefer it, we can go back to the assumption,
to paraphrase, that there is nothing in man which was not first in the amoebae.
First of all there will certainly have been a process of self
selection. Many different types of man and woman are attracted to the various
sciences but they will be broadly different from those who are drawn rather to
the arts and humanities. Among them the finest will have the imaginative,
intuitive powers that enable them, as Sir Peter Medawer has admitted, to leap
ahead to fame those bold new hypothesis that can afterwards be tested
experimentally. Scientists of this caliber will never be crude reductionists,
for they cannot forget that this method is only an abstraction from the fullness
of life. But they are always a small minority. The average scientist is liable
to be practical, an admirer of efficiency and soon to become deeply entrenched
in his specialty. Such a man is very ready to forget the fullness of life, to
see it projected in his two dimensional world, fixed like a butterfly pinned out
on the collector's board. It is so much easier to study that way when it is
flitting among the flowers. Then there are the external pressures which may be
greater than we realize. In the final discussion at Alpbach, a venerable
American scientist rejoicing in the degree of unity that members of the
symposium had attained, said "there are so many things that fall into
place, if one is careful to avoid doctrinaire prejudice, and avoids acting the
way one usually does in one's own guild, where nobody in modern society dares to
step out and speak his mind as we have done in this interdisciplinary group,
where none of us gets jobs from the other, and nobody has to worry." If you
feel like that at the top, what is it like when you are far lower down?
It is not, however, the extravagant use of academic resources
for a small return do far as the reconstruction of history is concerned that
appeals to me most, nor even the slight smell of intellectual dishonesty that
arises from the 'scientific' display. Rather it is the fact that if these
methods and this outlook prevail all those elements in human life that are not
amenable to measurement and analysis will tend to be neglected. We are back, in
fact, wit the deficiencies of reductionism at their most extreme, where it is
man's self awareness and its fruits that are lost in the analytical process.
Religious sentiment, the arts, intellectual adventure cannot be expressed in
graphs, tables and histograms; moreover to convey anything about them demands a
high standard of literacy. Better, then, concentrate on technology.
I will end with a few words about the effect of this long
spell of reductionist thought on all civilized societies of this planet, the
East almost equally with the West. I agree with the judgment eloquently
expressed by Victor Frankl: it represents the modern version of
nihilism--nothing-but-ness in place of nothingness. Here we have the amazing
spectacle of men of highly human capacity denying those capacities--so bravely
built up (or unfolded) during thousands of million years. The more extreme
absurdities of behaviorism and logical positivism have died as they deserved
among the elite, but they still spread among the rest of the populace. The mind
is nothing but a computer, love is nothing but a goal inhibited sex and so on.
And still it comes down from above: 'Values and meanings are nothing but
defense mechanisms and reaction formations' some of your value psychologists are
saying. It is a kind of belittlement of man that foes with the breaking down of
the whole person into little parts and finding nothing human in them; the kind
of sub-humanism that sees defecating as being in some way more real and
therefore more important than writing a poem.
Since that time what wonders men have created, what richness
and variety we have known! Essentially all I have tried to say to you is that we
still inhabit a mystery, and that the best of scientific wisdom recognizes that
this is so. Those scientist who live as a whole and imaginative men do not
believe that anyone has proved that their minds, their individual psyches, are
nothing but chance responses to chemical and molecular games played on the skin
of the earth. The degraded masochism of this nothing but does not
represent a rational view of the universe. Let us have the courage to accept the
inner experience that tells us that we are something more--and that we may be
part of a process that is something much greater still. (Jacquetta Hawks; The
John Danz Lectures, 1972)
V
SEEING WITH ROSE COLORED GLASSES
on learning to look beyond the department: the view from
within
the present moment, then, is all important. Mahayana writers
point out that the semblance of unreality in the present is due to its receding
into the past. But existence and nonexistent are not features of a thing but are
the thing itself. The venerable Indian texts have said: "The nature of
anything is its own momentary stasis and destruction." For the Buddha, who
'transcends the eons', 'there exists neither past nor future.' Buddha himself
expressed sorrow for those who fail to risk the moment and allow it to slip by.
He taught his disciples 'not to lose the moment'. In particular one should
respond to the illumination of the 'favorable moment' which projects man into
the eternal. This may be any moment--now. (R.G.H. Siu; Ch'I: A Neo-Taoist
Approach to Life, 1974: 15-16)
in the methodological praxis of the beliefs and behaviors
surrounding the becoming and being of a professional anthropologist, there are
always two sides, two faces of the same coin--the etic and the emic. To
emphasize one and exclude the other are to neglect the historical dialectic
implicit in ethnographic participation and observation. The previous chapter
present an etic approach of a survey which was done in a very 'emic manner'.
This chapter focuses upon basically an 'emic' approach which is attempted very
etically. It covers the same anthropological reality the department, but it does
so from the insider's point of view, look out beyond the horizon of the
department, onto a larger community. It is based upon two semesters of
acquaintance with the 'system' and its people, as an 'observing' participant as
an enrolled member of the department. While I have remained more or less upon
its periphery, looking in, I have occasionally taken the opportunity to look
beyond the department and see it in a larger context.
It is important to anyone within the department to learn to
look out and beyond its doors, for so only by doing so can the individual orient
oneself within a much larger framework, hopefully in a more realistic way. If
the individual did not have this larger frame of mind, then the individual's ego
identity would become exclusively defined within the parameters set down by the
department structure--their sense of identity would be necessarily distorted in
unrealistic ways by the looking glass. I have, furthermore, gone through the
first year's process of initiation and at the end of it I feel a bit ambivalent
about anything. I have suffered through some of the emotions of anguish and
frustration, of ego loss and rejection, of anonymity and loneliness within the
program, and I know from talking with many people that I am not alone. I know
that may of these people who have these kinds of feelings keep it to themselves,
repressing it and putting on a happy face. I know that maybe this is the best of
possible things to do. But also almost anyone must also once in a while look out
upon a larger reality in order to get a better sense of proposition about their
own existential reality. People set deadlines for themselves, to rush through
the program schedule to get to the light at the other end of the tunnel. It is
easier to cope, if one has never really been to live outside of the academic
framework except in the framework of fieldwork, vacation or hiatus. The
existential commitment required by academic standards becomes ended, when one
exits school academically. It takes a little getting used to the 'really real
world' just as when a person reenters the academic structure, it takes a spot of
time to get 'one's feet back on the ground'. Once one's existential ties to
academia are cut loose, then the notion of academic achievement motivation and
intellectual character recedes into the background. One changes existentially.
One's values, attitudes, orientations and life directions change as well, and
often quite dramatically. But if one has never really been existentially
independent of academic structure, then there remains a sort of taken for
granted authenticity of academic values and orientations which are difficult to
objectify or realize outside of one's own ego identity. One's own character
remains rooted to academic soil--without suffering the shock of soul loss. But
there is also a burn out factor to be confronted down the long academic trail.
Burn out happens when an individual peaks out in their inherently upwardly
mobile career. The problem with any hierarchical power structure is that there
is only limited spaces in the upper echelons, and there are always more than
enough people willing to fill them. This means that changes are against any
single person, regardless of how good they are, to make it up to the very top
rungs of success. The higher up the climb, the more stiff the climb, the less
room for maneuvers and the more pressure from your competition. Burnout come
soon gradually when one finds oneself still spinning one's wheels but not
getting further ahead. There is a noticeable lack of social reinforcement
commensurate for one's expenditures and one eventually begins seeing younger,
strange faces in positions of authority and privilege above oneself. At this
point incentive and motivation begin to run dry--no matter how much one tries or
wills, it never proves adequate enough to propel one forward onto the next
plateau. One is left struggling just to maintain the ground one has gained, as a
crowd of people rush by. But burnout is a systemic affliction which becomes
reflected in the changed attitude of the victim--his identity becomes alienated
from its well-spring of meaning and inspiration. One is left to face the
limitations of one's position within the system, as well as a resurgence of all
these compulsive weaknesses which one has kept a handle on for so long. Academic
strength dissipates , vigor wanes, depression sets in, as one find old comrades
and colleagues redefining your ego identity for you, rationalizing away your
shortcomings. The burnout syndrome shows plain as day, and once the hawks and
watchdogs and old cronies turned friendless begin to see the symptoms, they
begin labeling the person. Then the most an individual can do is to make a
lateral move, to reposition oneself in another program, department or school. Or
else to start building up the bulwarks of the ego defense--to become an island
in a sea of anthropologia, to become eventually forgotten and ignored. One has
become committed to fighting a holding action for the entire duration,
restructuring one's ego identity to protect it from any untoward advances. But
even if one manages to gain in time a few inches of advance, it will probably
have been a Pyrhic victory--hardly worth what it cost.
If my thesis that the credibility and validity of academic
authority rests upon the channels of access to limited funding, then when and if
these funding sources become turned off from above or re-channeled into another
academic area, then the seemingly solid foundation of academic authority begins
to break down and crumble asunder. The motivational superstructure remains 'in
name only'. Even more if the promise of future employment remains unfulfilled,
and for the part an empty promise, then disillusionment must either begin to
creep into the seams or else people to alleviate a great deal of existential
cognitive dissonance, entrench themselves in systems of rationalization, of
belief and behavior, which will enable them to make an island of their own ego
identity, seemingly, temporarily cut off from the wider streams of history.
There is gossip which is spread from coast to coast about the anthropology job
market 'opening up in the next ten years' with the retirement of 'WW2 and Korea
Era' professors. I first heard this rumor from an ex-colleague of my own, one
who showed me the back door of friendless smiles. I call it defensive
rationalization about a sinking ship. It is very possibly a rumor instigated by
the triple AAA to prevent a run upon their academic bank of credibility. The
reality of the future remains to be seen, but if one must honestly assess it
from the events of the past decade, it is not a hopeful reality. And yet people
who already have many years of investment need to have something at the end of
their trials and tribulations to shoe for their educational big bucks, something
besides just a piece of paper and a handshake. For most people except the most
privileged dew, anthropology has never been a great investment. It probably
won't be getting any better in a world that is rapidly shrinking. But still
people who already have money riding, hedge their bits and chant little spells
that their gamble will eventually pay off.
I will not hold my breath today in anticipation of something
to happen tomorrow.
But those who exit anthropology leaving it behind
existentially without the expectation of ever returning, find that the world
does not necessarily end upon the anthropological horizon, indeed, it is only
just another new beginning as one discovers a whole world of many 'conscious
awakening' interests. Why anthropologists should believe and behave as if they
have some kind of privileged monopoly upon 'consciousness awakening experiences'
I do not really understand, except that this privilege is bought at great cost
and little beyond extra intrinsic, ego concentric rewards. The awakening of
anthropological consciousness is indeed only just a birth experience--it is the
beginning of a road to human maturity and not necessarily its end. Indeed, one
can learn to live separately, independently from anthropology. And then too, one
begins to learn the real wisdom and value behind the anthropological
perspective. No matter what kind of situation one gets oneself into, one can
always fall back upon a broader understanding which can be appreciated in the
silence of ignorance company. It is learning to listen to the anthropological
meaning of the silence--the sound of one hand clapping in the corridors of human
history, that one gains true transcendental enlightenment. The active
anthropological voice which need to compulsively tell the entire world what its
problem is learns to shut up, and listen to the real sounds of other peoples'
voices. It gives up spurious knowledge of what it thinks about the world, to
better appreciate genuine understanding of what the world itself really thinks
and moves to do its work. Post academic anthropologia is a private, peaceful,
personal realm where one can find solace and comfort of understanding that the
dirty world cannot contaminate with cacophony and noise.
Those who have been brought up within academia have their
authority defined by 'lay' people who tend to treat them respectfully as if they
know what they are talking about. The well conditioned academic authoritarian
comes to believe that he/she knows what one is talking about, and expects to be
treated this way at all times. Snobbery results when their own ignorance bits
their tongue or slaps them in the face. Acting and thinking like you really know
what you are talking about, what you are supposed to know, that you are indeed
an expert and authority upon sacred realms of understanding, leads a person into
a predisposition of addressing other similarly unqualified as if they were
ignorant, and didn’t know what they are talking about. This academic
authoritarianism then learn to address the ignorance of another person, and
finds its main audience among ignorant people, or else among a community of
scholars who play funny games with each others heads and egos.
These are not common sense comments, they are derived from
personal experience as an acting ex-anthropologist and from the observations of
other professionals acting as anthropologists.
The other side of the coin of ego identity is the possible
lose of ego anonymity. The other side of the coin of authority of ego
consciousness is the possibility of the anomie of ego consciousness.
Anthropological anonymity and anomie are threats those well situated in academia
are protected against--but when and if they leave the protection of their
birthplace, they no longer have the ready screens of protection around their ego
identity. Then ego must be redefined as its left to stand upon its own. One
loses one's naïve innocence from existential responsibility, but one no longer
suffers the spell of un-disillusioned ignorance. Respect does not appeal to the
differences or ignorance of others. It appeals to the shared sense of common
humanity, a sense of personal identity, and integrity, found in each of us.
Growing up in the real world anthropologically is not the same thing as being
'brought up' in the academic world of anthropologia. Education makes an
important and intrinsically valuable difference, but in the longer world of
humanity, it is an important difference which is important, because it makes no
difference.
Those securely situated within academic anthropologia like to
take their job seriously, even if a bit routinely, no matter what may be
happening in the larger context. They maintain an illusion that what they are
doing educationally will make an important difference in the lives of their
students--that they necessarily have something which is valuable to be
'proffered' to those willing to pay them some attention. They like to think they
can 'share a rich experience' to needy others, who by some forfeit of historical
happenstance, come seeking their enlightenment. Sometimes, in order to make a
difference, perhaps because it may not really make much difference, they tend to
take their jobs a little too seriously perhaps, and end up expecting everyone
else o be taking theirs seriously, 'as if it made an important difference'. But
as a friend informs me, a professor who is egocentric and preoccupied with power
over others, tend to be 'too serious'. He does not mean by this that the person
is too genuine, too committed, over involved with research, but rather that
person is too selfish, too unfriendly, to unhelpful, biases in his 'objective'
evaluations and cannot be depended upon to help out when the going becomes more
difficult. And one cannot always judge by a book by its cover only--by the way
one dresses or smiles or speaks. It is not always easy to determine the best,
most suitable committee for one's own interests, such that one is not left
spinning one's wheels just to please the beliefs and behavioral interest of a
significant reference other. And if one finds too many who tend to be taking
their own jobs to seriously, then this becomes a critical difference which makes
an historical difference in one's own success or failure.
The paradox of the academic environment is that it is an
artificially contrived environment. It is a hermeneutic utopia of the
establishment, a veritable model city upon the hill. It is the place the outside
world is supposed to look up to, not down upon. Being confected, its sense of
reality is not necessarily proportionate within the larger framework. There is
an important ritual reason for this insulation, this sanction of protection--it
is where sacrosanct values of the system become realized, where an individual's
social character becomes socialized and specialized, to function within a
complex world. It is easy to lose sense of proportionality about things within
academia. Things are made the way they should be but never really ever quite
are. This exceptional environment of conditioning leads to an exaggerated sense
of ego involvement in reality--of the sense of importance and of 'making a
difference'. But the streets in real life are always two way--involving both
give and take, without always fair return. One spin-off of this sense if
privileged insulation is that there develops an academic discourse and dialogue
which is almost totally removed from the everyday existential workings of the
real world. Things which are academic only take on the appearance of substantial
reality--things which are important in a real world get consistently ignored.
But this is a trite cliché about the academic tradition. But academic structure
fosters this sense of insulation because, in order to become successful upon the
academic ladder of success, it requires almost total and complete commitment of
one's lifetime. Other episodes and experiences of one's life record become
tangential to academic just as academic experience and qualifications can become
very easily tangential in another kind of real world situation. It thus become
fairly easy to adopt a distorted sense of larger reality, which is not
existentially commensurate with the larger stream of history. I would suggest
that while academia remains an invaluable life experience enhancing immeasurably
the quality of a person's life, it should never be allowed to become the main or
only experience of a person's existence, then it becomes empty and shallow
indeed. Academia should be protected in its ivory tower armchair, but its realm
is not thereby inviolably sacrosanct, untouchable--its all the more important
that its doors and windows be wide open to a larger vision of human reality,
which the lone academician scholar in his lofty heights can scrutinize more
distantly, and hopefully, more objectively. But power should not be allowed into
the realm of anthropology, for behind power is human perversity. Anthropologia
becomes corrupted by the preoccupation with limited power--it fosters
authoritarian power structures among petty, over inflated academic egos who lack
a real sense of understanding of the broader reality. As long as its
hypothetical discourse remain entirely academic it is safe from corruption--but
when vested interests are intent upon the pursuit of power from within, from
personal aggrandizement and professional glorification, then academia no longer
serves its primary purpose of remaining academic. It becomes a marketplace
encapsulated within the narrow parameters of an bureaucracy, where everyone and
his brother is competing for a monopoly.
Among students committed to an academic course or program,
there is always a constant pressure towards over involvement and subsequently a
continual need, a healthy resistance, 'to get away from it all for a
while'--weekend excursions, locking oneself in one's bedroom and the holiday
escapes homeward--to renew one's sense of perspective. A few days or weeks
suffices for the time being to renew a sense of balance, restore a sense of more
realistic proportion about one's existentiality. Preaching and practicing
academic value orientations becomes a long and tedious, at times quite boring
process. Students come with high hopes and high expectations for future success
and successful adjustment, inevitably are bound to feel extreme let down at the
reality. They are in a sense setting themselves up for let down because no one
but their own naturally vicarious desires promised them a rose garden. This let
down can be quite extremely traumatic for especially sensitive and hopeful
students. It is like training for a good job and then when job hunting, realize
the existential limitations of your own qualifications in securing a job--I have
experienced it with myself, and seen it with others. But when facing existential
reality one usually adjusts one's sights to a more realistic and reasonable
size, and then, given persistence of the pursuit, more tangible, reasonable
rewards are waiting. But at the time of let down depression and rejection,
withdrawal can set in which leads to a vicious downward spiral without a bottom.
People can also be let down existentially when they are informed they are over
qualified for a job--another way of saying one's education really doesn’t mean
anything. And then even more existentially let down when one discovers the only
kinds of jobs available are those for which that person is over qualified for.
But existentially speaking, the real costs of getting an education which
promises not to pay off is that, not of unfulfilled job expectations or
promises, because one discovers suddenly they are the wrong 'type' or fall into
the wrong 'bureaucratic category'. The real heavy costs which weigh upon the
soul like a ton of bricks are the inevitable potential opportunity of suddenly
discovering that the trail one was pursuing led nowhere after all, despite all
the signs along the way. Somewhere one was misdirected, misled, or misread the
road signs. As one progresses down the road one accumulate an ever growing fund
of experiences and mistakes and wisdom of mistakes made and lessons learned but
also uses up one's finite resources of existential options and opportunities and
resources. And while there is no turning back once a critical decision has been
made there is stopping dead midstream and making a radical turn.
It is unfortunate nobody is keeping track of the attrition
rates from anthropologia, to learn better who might fall into the 'high risk
group'--but then there may be a very real need not to know, or to ignore, this
kind of knowledge. It seems to me it would be a matter of professional
principle, if nothing else, for persons in charge to take an interest in those
who choose to drop out and why they choose to do so, in order to alleviate their
stress, if not their own. But the impression to be gained is that because
anthropology is largely an artificial environment--most of the relationships
formed are in principle ad hoc., situationally defined and ephemeral, not
extending very far beyond the bounds of the department, any great distance or
length of time. One is drawn by existential circumstances into association with
others who, through sharing similar interests and needs, may actually be very
different kinds of people with very different value orientations. There is
always thus a superficiality and superfluousness of social relations which
rarely breach the surface appearance. There is a hollowness to people's words as
they echo down the corridors of power. To find a genuinely good friendship that
lasts a lifetime beyond the department is indeed an exception to an academic
rule of thumb--mind your own business. Thus, people come and go with little
fanfare, and only the most farcical and hypocritica, the most 'special' people
have high visibility or maintain a high profile within the department. If people
choose to remain or leave the department, it is of little lasting concern to
anyone else, little mention is made, except for the rumor control circuit of the
grapevine. In the structure of the long run, the academic department is a
corporate organizational structure which extends well beyond the life of any
single member's involvement. It is the form and process itself which makes the
critical difference. If people expect or build up high hopes of forming long
lasting friendships and genuine rapport within the department, they are likely
setting themselves up to be let down again. This too, is part of the learning
process. Occasionally an exceptional person's reputation may outlive his/her
physical and mental presence in the department and by and large people come and
go, put in their time and two cents worth, take their diploma in hand, and walk
off into the sunset. The only physical reminders like tombstones upon a shelf,
are copies of the thesis collected over the years 'for safekeeping'. No single
person within the department, me nor you, makes that much difference in the
larger frame of reference.
So it is wiser to look at the department setting as a job, as
a means of employment and as a marketplace where one bids for one's career
opportunities. To learn to see the department setting as an academic marketplace
is a more realistic adjustment for taking the academic clearing house
existentially for what it really is. One learns the ropes, where the market
opportunities and moments lie. One learns not to feel too disappointed when one
misses one's chances for a market exchange or profitable transaction, because
there will be other opportunities other days. One can then even share a little
bit of the joy in others success and commensurate in others failures. But one
knows that however like an ass-hole a person behaved to you one day, he/she must
show their face to you on the following day, and learn to accept you as a
competitive member in the same marketplace. Shortsighted market strategies of
capitalizing upon immediate rewards may backfire and rebound upon you on
following days. One learns to shop around and seek out more informed advice from
many different people. One never allow oneself to become too bothered or
sensitive to the inanities and subjective un-realities of ego conflict and
games. One learns to keep one's head afloat in rough seas and even to swim a
little more strongly for a distant shore. In the academic marketplace one learns
to get the most for his time, to place the system more effectively--what
professors to concentrate upon, which ones to avoid. One learns to expect from
others a certain market performance that is worthy of one's time and attention.
One can even learn to expect this from professors who somehow seem to know it
all. In the marketplace, people don't necessarily get what they 'deserve' but
what they bid for and what they pay for--it is not 'fair', it is capitalistic.
Thus one learns American citizenship values, of not allowing ones neighbor to
bother one too much.
There is much anguish and mental pain in tearing down ones
old models of reality which seemed so tried and true and comfortable like a
trussed mule, especially if what replaces these models is exceptionally foreign
or somehow seem inadequate replacements. They assist more immediate adjustment
in the existential demands--this is why they are instituted, but their longer
range or deeper value may be quite dubious when compared to previous models
which seemed to be more successful in previous settings or more realistically
adapted to existential exigencies. If what replaces old models is somehow
questionable, seemingly false or superfluous, then there will be psychological
resistance, in which there will occur a kind of syncretic bastardization, trying
the salvage and hang on to the best of the previous world, bringing in the best
of the new world, while leaving out the worst. In the long run these models
might prove to be unsuccessful eventuating in maladaptive behavioral patterns.
This is an intrinsic part of the migration experience, of sojourning at great
distances and for long periods of time, and it applies to sojourning students
who are traveling through anthropologia. There is a failure and refusal to
embrace the whole of the new, or to leave the best of the old--there can be much
internal schism and conflict as these internal differences are forced to fit
together within a single personality. Fear is a very natural outcome of meeting
the strange and the new, as so is an ambivalent kind of excitement and
anticipation--these can become to seem unrealistic if pronounced or focused upon
seemingly trivial or unimportant things. Fears become all pervasive, decenter in
the personality such that the environment seems to be overwhelming like a
tsunami, one loses a sense of environmental and self control--there is
resistance and withdrawal. There is a need to escape to overcome and regain
one's inner sense of balance. There sometimes seems to be a moral deficit of
personality that wants or expects more than it seems to deserve, that 'wants
their cake and eat it too'. If new models which replace or substitute old ones
in the transformation of ego identity and consciousness, prove through time to
be less satisfactory than previous ones, there is always a malingering sense of
dissatisfaction, of estrangement, of unhappiness about one's existential
predicament. This is one of the important risks of exercising existential
freedom. It is a responsibility of facing the future without a guarantee of
success.
Repression of the self in adaptation to an environment is a
necessary coping mechanism for the stresses caused within that changed
environment. It is the existential price we pay for transformation into
something new and different, but not necessarily, not assuredly better. Some
people pay a higher price than others and this is not necessarily because of
mediocrity--it is only a reflection of the mediocre banality of a system which
cannot tolerate the noise or ambiguity of different personalities within a
single 'information' channel. But to pass, transform people must, no matter how
much resistance they may have to finally put away, how much 'sacrifice' they may
feel themselves to be making. If they fail to allow themselves to be transformed
by the demands and imperatives of the system, they will not be successful--the
past has too strong a hold to let go of. This is why there is premium on
younger, 'brighter' students who have essentially no past except academic to let
go of. They are more manipulatable and malleable to the demands of the system.
There are more opportunities and existential choices yet to be made. They do not
yet have to live with the survivalist imperative of 'publish or perish' or even
'pass or fail'--they simply continue not noticeably minding doing what they are
told so that no harm can come to them.
If repression has been usually strong, or traumatic or
dramatic, one can expect the resultant amount of academic authoritarianism to be
high. If no perceived choice or conscientious decision was subjectively
perceived in this transformation process, one can also expect the degree of
authoritarianism to be high. The conflict in the self is great--the walls
compartmentalizing the personal from the public, and the private from the
personally shared, can be quite high and impenetrable. The amount of projection
one must do to keep these walls strong, of 'character displacement' is also a
lot, and this kind of projection upon significant others of internal, inimical
differences, is a way of keeping the walls intact, impenetrable, impervious to
threat or insult. But this projection for the maintenance of ego identity leads
to a prejudicial, ignorant and discriminating perception of a significant other
who lives upon the horizon of one's own sphere of existential belief and
behavior. This distortion and denial of the reality of significant others has
significant, critical implications for the academically authoritarian
character--for it determines the range and objects, characterized by boredom,
intense disinterest or distaste in a topic or person presenting the topic. It
determines the ego identities selectivity of perception and cognition in human
reality, especially in regard to significant others. Only when one begins to
tear down the boundaries in one's own soul can that person become more open
minded and genuinely objective in interest in things. Only then can a person
begin to bring other's into his world, and begin to genuinely enter the world of
others. These are critical periods in the life of a person--the doors of
existential reality suddenly swing open, for whatever reason and a person begins
to be transformed. I have witnessed this with the transformation of refugees and
immigrants--the opening of the doors of consciousness and the windows of
perception and a streaming in of a new, strange and overwhelming world.
This is sometimes preceded by a great lull before the storm,
a great depression of a person's final descent into the maelstrom of inchoate,
misplaced consciousness. The breaking down of the last barriers of the soul, the
dark ages of the soul preceding the renaissance. But other people are unable,
for various reasons of extraordinary strong attachments to things and
interrelations, to give up and break the fetters of the past. The become like
lost little children without a home. They become the homeless refugees from
existence, the vagabonds of freedom.
The view from the inside looking beyond the department
marketplace is putting on and learning to wear gracefully a pair of rose colored
eye glasses which somehow makes the world look happier while hiding the feelings
people can see in one's eyes. It is sweet lemons rationalization which assists
one's capacity to tolerate nonsense and to adapt more efficiently to the
ceaseless demands of the system. There are, in this emic approach towards the
etic, several key features of the academic landscape which are visible through
some of its inner windows. There is the gateway of the past through which every
one entered at some point in time, and there is a doorway opening upon the
future through which most hope to eventually pass. Beyond this, there is no
seeing. There are also several side portholes and several interior doorways
which one must successfully navigate through. The first is that of Time
Management, the second is that of Spatial Allocation, the third is that of
Funding Distribution. Then there are Performance Rating-Ranking and one's own
Ego Presentation. It is also important to see that the pathways which course
through the corridors of the department open onto larger concrete walkways of an
academic institution which open onto roadways of a local community and a larger
university network, which open onto state highways which in turn open onto a
nation and a world of people and differences. Learning to look out emically
through rose colored glasses is an important step in the transformation of one's
ego identity--it brings with it that though one may be existentially lonely
within the strange department, one is not necessarily alone in a bigger world.
This marks the end of the settling in period, and for all students it is a
different length of time, and it is the point at which the individual student
finally realizes that it is not so different, and there really is light at the
end of the tunnel. This is also the period at which the real work begins.
One of the most important values of the system, is the value
of efficient Time Management. People are rewarded or not by becoming routine
operationally efficient in the management of time process. Power is largely
measured by the length of time span which under a person's control as well as
the number of people and amount of time in their lives controlled. It is amazing
how much time remains an important factor in the daily lives of every member of
the department. This might be seen as an all too obvious statement, but I
believe it to be revealing about the fundamental value orientation of our
society. We are trained to be good time managers--we feel guilty when we 'cheat'
time. Our lives are run by the clock, whether we chose to be or not. Time
penetrates in important ways into our consciousness of human reality. One of the
most important aspects of our vaunted Scientific Methodology is
'reliability'--repeatability, controllability, all ultimately determinable by
the increments of the clock. Likewise, negative stereotypes focus upon
connotations of unreliability, unpredictability, idiosyncrasy,
uncontrollability. A person who is difficult to control or manage is deemed as a
threat to the time process of the system. Time can be a statement of social
etiquette or a means of indirectly, perhaps unconsciously, rejecting a person.
Teachers control the weeks, months and semesters. They set the test dates,
research deadlines, they control and dictate the time of the
students--rescheduling classes, letting out early or late. Generally it is
impolite to come late chronically to a class, or to leave before the class is
through. I have noticed some students who do just this, as sort of a rebellious
statement about the control over their lives. Teachers time schedules are
likewise controlled and set by the administrative schedules of events, dates,
etc. Approximately 15 minutes before every hour the campus corridors and grounds
suddenly fill up with pulsating flow of the student body, emptying out of one
class and going to another. Time is important in learning the prioritization of
values--a person on a restricted time framework learn how to best budget
time--what to eliminate and what to focus upon when things start speeding up.
The semester has its own seasonal rhythms. And slowly the years, and the changes
accumulate. In the corridors few of the IBM clocks work properly. Time is kept
in offices and in classrooms--the corridors and hallways are between time.
People become unexpectedly uninterrupted in meeting people in corridors--time
becomes freer, flowing more freely, less structured, between people.
A student largely determines his/her rate through the
program, setting the speed fast or slow depending upon existential priorities
and deadlines--those who want to move on quickly become more time conscientious
and more efficient in the budgeting of their time resource. In a sense, time is
the most important resource. Time is the human resource of phenomenal
consciousness and existence. Money buys time. The essence of a systems control
is over human time. How one manages, budgets or spends time determines and
translates into many other factors of the person's life. We live in a society in
which ego consciousness and identity are time determined--framed by the clock,
by the schedule, by the career. A person's worth per hour is a measure of status
and class. Some people are much more flexible with their time than
others--others are much more time controlled, being so tight as to not even
spare another person the time of day. There is a curious paradox about this
preordinate value of time management--are lives existentially and historically
so controlled, and yet we provide in our mythology and anti-structure realms a
concept of synchronic 'without time' of frozen, eternalized present. In the
hallways of life, time becomes more flexible and more unpredictable. One is less
in control of time there. If I'm in a hurry, I always avoid passing through the
hallways of the department. But if I would like to talk to someone I may take my
time down the corridors, looking in on people. Learning and earning
responsibility for one's time management is part of the whole educational
process. A person who can demonstrate his commitment and capacity for extensive
research, is given independent license to exercise his own time management 'out
in the field'. Time in the field becomes encapsulated only in the most general
sense by bureaucratic strictures. A person is trained to be methodologically
proficient, to think proficiently--maximization of one's time resources is seen
as the necessary prerequisite for production. The person can be officially
trusted to deal with time in a highly controlled way. Playing hooky from the
game is a kind of unconscious rebellion against time keeping. This is
overlooked--rates of absenteeism are expected normally, as a system of coping,
but if it becomes pronounced then there will be negative consequences. Failure
to come to class one day may mean missing important information that's going to
be on a final exam. Time coordinates human activity and interaction in a
systematically productive way. Habituation to a time routine is the end of the
settling in period.
Spatial Allocation is another important existential factor of
the department. It is not a matter of who gets what, or of structured space in
and of itself, but of people in relation to a given spatial environment. A
history of the department reveals that over the last decade or so there has been
a general squeezing in of space in the department. Space becomes important if
the department seeks to grow. Basically, administrated encapsulation has been
the cause of the squeezing--there were offices where the Chenango Room now sits,
then there was enough space to go around. Before that the PAF was situated in
another building, and the geology occupied that space. As people become
squeezed, the relationship to space becomes more important. "The department
never recovered the loss to the Chenango Room." Now there is competition
between students for the need of office space. In general, professors have much
larger, private offices of their own. Their desk sits facing inboard. There are
chairs and a space for students to sit or lounge. Students have shared rooms or
little cubby holes off the main hallways or within some of the laboratories. In
general their desks are facing outboard against the wall--the central space is
open, and the backs of their desks are opened. Whether this is a sign of control
or not, of being seen but not seeing, I do not know. I know professors when
interviewed tend to seek comfort from behind their authoritative seat's of
authority. To not be allotted an office space is to be made to feel like a
pariah, floating around and sitting in hallways. The office for the student is a
big factor of social status and ego identity--a feeling of importance and
belonging to the department. I would say that students who have rooms are
awarded more 'anthropological status' than those who don't--they are accorded
their first badge of status along their road to professionalism. Space situates
and orients a person's ego identity in the department--it becomes the focus of
the student's activities, if they are needed, they can be found there. A person
putting in many hours routinely on campus is making a statement about status--to
be seen as an efficient and dependable anthropologist. It means also perhaps a
statement of social needs. It was clear to me the number of interruptions within
offices as opposed to outside of offices in the course of the interview. I
averaged about 1 interruption every fifteen minutes. It is questionable how much
real work can be done in an office in which there are constant interruptions--a
person is putting in one's time. Perhaps there is a head-trip going on here--a
need to put in the appearance of 'making time'.
Space is important for other reasons as well. There is no
common social place. This became the outstanding criticism about the department.
No space the anthropologist could call their own, that would be conveniently and
situationally located--the conference room appears to be a good candidate. But
here the arrangement of large bulky tables in the middle area takes up too much
space and are inconvenient to move around. It has been suggested to me that
these should be removed from the room and replaced with more comfortable
furniture, perhaps a large round table or a set of round tables. This space
would serve as both a focus for intradepartmental social activities and
administrative/teaching functions. I have also to voice a complaint about how
the allocation of space is deliberately used to set off a status differential
between students--everyone should be found a space, no matter how cramped. Upon
a lifeboat from a sinking ship there is always room for one more. The kind of
mentality which perpetuates this formal discrimination is the same kind of
mentality which would perpetuate discrimination in other ways, and probably
does. It will be interesting to watch the next batch of 'children' who come in
and try to orient themselves in the department, to see who counts and who
doesn't.
Space is important in other ways as well. The central office
is the network, the spinal system of the department--the switchboard for
communication. The head of the department's office adjoins these offices for
efficient monitoring of central departmental activity. The presence of the
Chenango Room also has certain reverberations upon the atmosphere of the
department. It has, for one thing, an exclusive country club atmosphere which
heightens status of members who regularly eat there--its proximity provides a
convenient excuse to dine. It is characterized by high visibility from the
outside. Well dressed groups of strange faces walking through the department
brings a bit of skewed real world into the department. One is constantly craning
one's head to see who or what is coming, or going, whose at home in the
department. There is always a look around, a look back, a glance down the way.
The kinds of advertisements and statements pasted on doors and walls is
interesting. It is noteworthy that the first glass showcase presents renowned
persons who had degrees in anthropology--a writer, a jazz musician, a member of
the royal family.
The Distribution of Funding and research opportunities is
also very critically important--it is directly tied to one's status, if none
other than by a ranking rating system employed by the Faculty to help determine
eligibility and perhaps to weed out undesirables. There have been complaints
that these distribution is unfairly distributed. My own observations would tend
to support this claim, but without critical information, I cannot form a
conclusive opinion about it. No limited funding system can be fair, unless it is
divided up equally and all students had to wait their turn. I favor this idea.
It saves face, on board a sinking ship. There are many complaints that some
individuals consistently receive funding while others perennially suffer from
benign neglect. A differential reward structure creates a hierarchy of status in
which rewards are distributed unequally throughout the department. Favored, low
risk students, whoever they might be, are more likely to receive more better
funding more consistently than unfavored, high risk category of students. It is
unfortunate the system has to feel inclined to think this way. A few
individuals, because of privileged status, are virtually guaranteed both funding
and research opportunities while some others have a virtual unwritten guarantee
never to receive such favors. It is hard to maintain a healthy, positive
attitude when there is no reward structure within the system to socially
reinforce it. I believe, though there are deliberate reasons for this. There are
also complaints that reward decisions, as well as critical information, is
manipulated personally and on a none to one basis to bias who ends up with what,
who gets where how soon, who has to take what, etc. etc. etc. No more needs to
be said. The writing is on the wall, and we all know who we are.
A student's individual 'Performance' is tracked and
monitored--and students are rated by teachers in a rank order of status. This is
done confidentially, of course. I was told when I first arrived here that I
would have to prove myself by my performance, when it was quite apparent that a
whole lot of other people did not similarly need to 'prove' themselves. If my
admission to the program was not proof enough, as it was for many other
students, then I fail to understand the system of rationalization that justifies
discrimination in any form. A word of wisdom from a person who stays angry for a
very long time--I have not forgotten and will never forget. This was very much
like the evaluation system employed by the Marine Corps to create a 'file' on
each enlisted man. Past ratings became the bias for future decisions--a person
should not have to normally e a prisoner of their past. I suggest this system is
a substitute for breaking down barriers between faculty and students, it creates
distance, and creates from the beginning an unfair bias which determines the
member's future live chances. It is interesting that the appeal to this system
is made on the basis of more 'objective' rationalize evaluation of students
needs and rewards. I suggest it is a hypocritical front for blatant subjectivity
in rating others--a front which also obscures the subjectivity in the teachers
grading of individual students. The problem is not grade inflation, it is grade
discrimination--enhancing biases which already existed. If people fail to see
how it can be done differently, then I suggest their vision is quite narrow
indeed. The first thing is to control for subjectivity by being open and honest
about the biases--embracing subjectivity instead of repressing it beneath a
methodological disguise of objectivity is a way of maintaining a more reasonable
handle upon its natural biases. But this argument has really been an underlying
theme of this whole ethnography.
Student's individual presentation to significant others is
another critical factor in the structuration of the departmental ethos. Every
social interaction a person engages in within the framework of the department
results in an assessment of that person's status, abilities, capabilities,
character, etc., if only implicitly. This too becomes an uneven, distorted
system when access to certain status symbols or resources conditions one's aura
and ego identity in the department. I've seen students who consistently failed
to do their work, who consistently failed to be in class, who manipulate the
class interaction, and yet are still treated like God's little children. On the
other hand, I know of earnest, sincere, hardworking students who must compete
even for a word in edgewise in a conversation. A person's aura, command of
presence, sense of security and authority, all go into making up this game going
on between students of who is better than who. It is a child's game, but it
begins with faculty and passes down the chain. To maintain a Great Chain of
Being is to perpetuate a mythology of the past. I am mostly immune to this kind
of social bullshit, though I've had my share of it thrown my way. It is mostly
to petty to care about. It only leaves me feeling very angry about people and
their petty ego identities. Maybe one day I'll slap some special person in the
face just for the hell of it, to give them a better sense of immediacy. But
presentation of ego identity is critical to the process. In general there is a
need to disguise the real, weak self, imperfect, unscholarly, ignorant, bored,
behind a façade of 'too serious'. About mid-semester, as things pace
themselves, the ideal facades begin to break down--if the system breaks down the
real self shows itself in the nooks and crannies of the system. People miss
important classes, conspicuous in their absence. People always have a good
excuse, except the real one. I felt overloaded and needed to take a break or get
work done. Though people fail to do the necessary preparation, they feel
obligated to perform anyway, if even a bit awkwardly and obviously. There is
always a number one priority, to be maintained at all costs, to maintain an
authoritative air of professionalism. I worry what some of the hidden
consequence of this type of preparation are in the field and beyond. I suspect
not very good. We are not great, talented, anthropological geniuses, we are
pretty average in a pretty mundane place--we should start acting that way.
Traditions are admirable, but they can become
straight-jackets for existential freedom. Tradition and consciousness fails to
see beyond its horizon, fails to recognize alternative models of belief and
behavior. Tradition promises authority and hierarchy, and hinders the
realization of equality. In the classroom, it translates into professors who put
down certain students because they fail to see beyond their own ego identities,
so reinforced by the authority of tradition. It also translates into a classroom
full of students who may not really want to be there because they choose to, but
were told to be there by their parents. Traditions are stronger on the east
coast than the west--they are more settled in, tried and true, unquestioned and
untested. I must admit my own subjectivity when I consider my conception of the
'average New Yorker'--ambitious, pushy, impatient, gruff, aggressive and most
important of all, narrow minded. They can blame the south for all the ills of
prejudice and discrimination, yet fails to face the fact of white discrimination
in their own comfortable tow. As one girl blithely told me after she had pushed
in front of me in line--"you have to learn to be more aggressive." I
responded to her laughing--"that's what I came to New York for, to learn
how to become aggressive." She missed the humor in this, and stalked off.
This school opens onto a wider community and university network, which have
their own implications conditioning the atmosphere in the department. Beyond New
York, is the whole world. What goes around eventually comes around. This is not
fate, it is human Karma.
First impressions are lasting impressions, and new
experiences are always inherently interesting ones. What are the implications of
always seeking new interesting impressions?
I have first attempted to describe an etic system emically,
and then attempted to explain an emic way of seeing etically. In systems,
whether emically within, or etically reinforced from without, if in place of
system, order, structure, pattern, sense, context, process, culture, fact,
datum, knowledge, framework, you substitute the word 'thing'--then you will
suddenly see the really real meaning of the words.
Interest and disinterest condition what is selected as
significantly important or trivial in their turn by a leap of faith they become,
in the tautology of our language, truth and falsity--it always makes a
difference but it never makes a difference.
"…when I am faced with a vague concept and feel that
the time is not yet ripe to bring that concept into strict expressions, I coin
some loose expression for referring to this concept and do not want to prejudge
the issue by giving the concept too meaningful a term. I therefore dub it
hastily with some brief concrete colloquial term--generally Anglo-Saxon rather
than Latin--I will speak of the 'stuff' of culture, of 'bits' of culture, or the
'feel' of culture. These brief Anglo-Saxon terms are vague and await analysis.
It is a trick like tying a knot in a handkerchief--but has the advantage that it
still permits one, if I may so express it, to go on using the vague concept in
the valuable process of loose thinking--still continually reminded that my
thoughts are loose." (Gregory Bateson; Steps to an Ecology of Mind,
1972: 83-84)
we walk down the dusty path
hand in hand we pick and smell the flowers
all along the way
and we find rest from the hot sun
beneath this big shady tree
down the road we come to a parting of ways
and though some hurt is involved
there is mutual understanding
there is no turning back
VI
WHITHER ALICE?
Out from the cave and off to Africa: some salty advice for
future fishermen
Of course, the first thing to do was to make a grand survey
of the country she was going to travel through. "It's something very like
learning geography," thought Alice, as she stood on tiptoe in the hopes of
being able to see a little further. "Principal rivers--there are
none. Principal mountains--I'm the only one, but I don’t think its got any
name. Principal towns--why what are those creatures, making honey down
there? They can't be bees--nobody saw bees a mile off, you know"--and for
some time she stood silent, watching one of them bustling about among the
flowers, poking its proboscis into them, just as if it was a regular bee,
thought Alice.
However, this was anything but a regular bee; in fact it was
an elephant--as Alice soon found out though the idea quite took her breath away
at first, "And what enormous flowers they must be!" was her next idea…
"…I know what you are thinking about," said
Tweedledum, "but it isn’t so, nohow."
"Contrariwise," continued Tweedledee, "if it
was so, it might be; and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn’t, it
ain't. That's logic.
"I was thinking," Alice said very politely,
"Which is the best way out of this wood: it's getting so dark. Would you
tell me please?"
******
Within the cave, there were no ticking clocks--a small fire
burns and shadows dance upon the walls. The young female anthropologist,
notebook and pen in hand, asks her next question: "And what is
freedom?"
There was a long and stony silence as the people huddled
around the fire, looked upon one another with seeming askance. Finally a
wrinkled old woman with bright eyes said: "Some people earn their freedom
by hardship and the toil of suffering, while others have it thrust upon them
whether they deserve it or not." After another brief spell of silence:
Homo sarathustra: "No, no, not at all, freedom is
learning to live as no longer the prisoner of the body--liberation is found
through the escape from suffering."
Homo van gogh: "Liberation is the transcendence
of dependency--learning to live with loneliness and death.
Homo sartre: "Freedom is learning to live with
the limitations of living--the responsibility for being.
Homo authoritatus, the leader of the group seemed to
have the bottom line on the truth when he said, once and for all, with a tone of
finality which echoed back through the recesses of the darkness: "There is
no such thing as freedom--it is the illusion of wanton license, the deception of
irresponsibility!"
The small child at the cave entrance, was too busy playing
with a stick in the dirt to care about the adults' conversation. The mother,
fearful of the dangerous wild beasts that stalked the darkness of the night,
suddenly swept the child up in her arms and carried it into the cave. The young
female field-worker was too busy writing in her notebook to notice.
******
When dear Alice finally leaves the cave of infinite wisdom,
she will forthwith embark on a long and perilous journey of a lifetime to the
mysterious heartland of deeper Africa, there to find waiting for her a perusal a
pre-selected band of dark natives in Playtex bras and grass skirts, the chief of
the tribe will pick her up at the air strip in his new Mercedes Benz and they
will drive off down the dusty single land road into the Serengenti sunset. After
about a year of intense, highly productive and promising ethnographic research,
she will be ready forthwith to return to the cave 'transformed' into a tried and
true anthropologist. She will then be busy with another year of writing her
thesis at the end of which a fancy diploma inscribed in gold ink will be handed
to her, and she will forthwith be off to find a comfortable tenured position
with starting pay of US$35,000 per annum. She will get married, to the man of
her dreams, settle down in a house upon the hill, and beget 2.3 children. She
will spend the following years of her life dutifully keeping house, loving her
children and husband, attending lectures and colloquiums and bouncing about the
US in a jet plane. There is a new success story born every minute. Africa will
always remain the seat of her deepest interests and she will forthwith become
the leading US spokeswoman on the culture and life-ways of the ulu-ulu peoples
of deepest Africa' and will travel on several nationwide speaking tours attended
by the bourgeoisie elite of every small city on the itinerary, in their mink
coats and Mercedes Benz cars. She will return on several occasions to Africa, to
renew old acquaintances and get a fresh update on the goings on. She will fight
for their rights upon every campus that invites her to speak. She will even be
invited to give a lecture tour abroad. Meanwhile she will have spent her leave
time and sabbaticals carefully writing and publishing journal articles, books
and book reviews and she will become an outstanding authority in her own field.
If, in her middle age, she may make a stab into more political or administrative
arenas, trying her hand at now this, now that. Her renown in the local community
will have increased by several hundred increments, and she and her family, with
teenage children, will now move to a nicer house with a pool in a more exclusive
community. As the youthful appearance on her face begins to wane beneath her
make-up, she can take satisfaction in the fact that she earned a name in
anthropologia. She has become the living embodiment of the American Dream
anthropological style. In her dissatisfaction and frustration that she was not
able to reform the world into utopia, she will begin to preach Marxist theory in
her courses, taking her entire seminar classes out to dinner at a nice
restaurant, charging it upon her Golden Card Account, tax deductions at the end
of the fiscal year. She will also become a leading spokeswoman for women's'
rights. As she approaches her golden years, she will get regular physical
examinations and have a small operation to remove a benign tumor. She will begin
to make plans for a comfortable retirement, looking for a place in a warmer
climate, perhaps even in a foreign villa. She will wither away quite gracefully,
like a beautiful flower that's seen its glory.
******
We would all like to be like Alice, men and women alike, and
if we are handed the opportunities and make the most of them, then chances are
good that we can become like her, and we would be crazy if we choose not to, for
one reason or another. When we meet Alice, we admire he for her aura of
solidarity, her command presence, and her strength of anthropological character.
She can talk pango-pango with the best of them. If we had the opportunities,
most of us would become like her. But this is a big if--as for every success
story who gains renown, there have been many who have tried but failed, to
become forgotten by history. Alice is the Horatio Alger version of the American
Dream, anthropological style. Work hard, save your credits, be frugal with your
time, burn the midnight oil all ploughing through a pile of books, and maybe
someday, the dream will be fulfilled. Your family and friends who never heard of
anthropology before respect and admire you for your early achievements--your
high grades, your scholarships, your invitations to the field. But they do not
understand anthropology and still question what kind of income all this effort
will finally bring. Alice is a 'superwoman'--the counterpart of the American
mythology of 'superman'. And if we look closely we can see that this mythology
is an ideal role model of the American Character--the baseline value orientation
underlying the American success ethic which drives the capitalist dynamo.
Witness Superman, born of extraterrestrial Gods but raised humbly as a good farm
boy in a small mid-western farm town. He grows up to be a soft spoken team
player, a secret hero when he goes home to change his clothes. He is the living
embodiment of many contradictions, of superhuman strengths and visions, but
meek, unpresuming and mild mannered. Faster than a speeding bullet, he gets
about with a casualness and careful nonchalance that tricks his foes and saves
his friends--his hair is always pasted back upon his scalp in perfect condition.
'The little boy haircut'. It is interesting that this same value orientation
underlies the rating scale of 'adaptive functioning' used to measure an
individual's mental health. This rating scale is based upon a normative
framework which prioritizes existential values--this rating scale is a
reflection of the American work hard/play hard ethic. Interestingly enough these
priorities of values ultimately have to do with how we choose to spend our time.
"…I have found it to be pretty much the case that the
real division of our culture is work and play, and that whether we try to fill
up our leisure with others or by ourselves is a choice we have to make--rarely
can anyone have the best of both worlds and even more we had better not get our
work and play ethics confused--to try to make play our work or work out play.
Why is there so little originality among socialites?
Furthermore in a rating scale it becomes evident that a
person's values must be social relations and occupational functioning first and
foremost, while leisure time activities are second rate--even negligible. You
have a choice of being a good worker (a garbage man or a university president),
a student, or a housewife. But what about a starving self employed artist or
musician or writer? The rating becomes how much money 'do you earn and how
difficult is the work you do?' I am an artist who inspite of my 'full time'
commitments of much money, time and energy, and just because I have earned very
little money, my ultra conservative neighbors still only perceive my activities
as being demeaning leisure time hobbies--"Are you still doing your
hobbies?" You have another choice between being a highly sociable
individual (how many friends, superficially, and how good friends, in depth) or
else being considered 'impaired'. Does it matter who your so called friends
are--whether the love is genuine or hypocritical? What about availability,
opportunity, shyness or social disillusionment? A Chinese individual born into a
larger, over extended family, might be considered more socially healthy than an
only poor WASP child of divorced parents or whose Father had died.
The three categories are anthropologically wise, but the
stress of which are to be considered more important and the qualitative
evaluations are culturally biased. I have a book entitled 'Leisure: A Basis
of Culture' by Joseph Pieper, which might refute this cultural orientation
of values. Why must Parkinson's Law continue to enslave Homo ludens to
the work/play ethic?
The rating scale is another matter. A person is doing good if
he is only slightly 'impaired' but to be really mentally healthy he must be
better than average without any impairment at all--while the ideal is the
unusual 'superior' personality. I believe this to be particularly revealing of
cultural values and an underlying ambivalence--one I prefer to call the
Apollonian 'Superman' myth. The ambivalence is trying to be a good worker with
team spirit and a modest unpresuming profile, while at the same time feeling the
compulsion to become a superstar, a veritable dynamo with inexhaustible energy
(what kind of food does he eat?) with more than the average amount of time (70
minute hours, 25 hour days, 8 day weeks, etc. etc.) who is machine like in
efficiency (swift and accurate without many errors) who always has a new dynamic
idea which solves the problem (where does he get all these ideas) and who is
preferably a male (definitely not a homosexual) but not any more as things are
changing a bit, and maybe money is an important factor also. True to Christian
form, we must become Godlike (God is a white male) we must somehow be something
better or 'more' that what we are now, and yet we can never upset the natural
chain of order with our secret fantasies. Somehow, being just simply ourselves
(merely human) is never quite good enough. But human beings are usually
'impaired' (imperfect) and only Gods are superior (unimpaired). Of course God
does not defecate, but that there is always a human being around to clean it up.
'He is so blessed, talented, gifted--or maybe just rich.'
The composite ideal of this Apollonian superman myth of our
culture is an emotionally, moderate, stable, temperate (flat) individual
integrity who can skate through life relatively unaffected, 'unnerved' by the
turmoil and strife and stress, he/she supposedly encounters along the way, a
highly motivated high achiever, who has high critical intelligence and who is a
highly 'rational' (very well ordered, almost like an automaton) but who
nonetheless does not work too much, but who is always clean cut and beautiful (a
true socialite) whose teeth are white when he smiles and who has never had acne
or cut himself with a razor--a person unbeset by with any anxiety and who does
his duty with self justified impunity and immunity. This is the 'norm' as ideal.
The reality is quite a different picture. Personally I am wary of such
personality types whom I meet that fit such description. In all their superhuman
superiority I sometimes wonder whether they don't pay to great a personal price.
I can even be moved to pity them if they weren't so self righteous. I see a
potentially dangerous super egoist at work--a virtual sociopath fulfilling his
Godsend role without doubt, uncertainty, without question, without remorse. I
see them as being cold and insensitive and out of tune with their own inner
feelings and with the feelings of others. They invariably 'appear' highly
successful but for all their touted success, I wonder whether they are really
any happier or healthier than a more average person beset with disorder,
anxiety, impairment and lower class status." (Lewis; Philosophy,
Irrationality and Ideology: An Anthropological Synthesis, 1983: 76-78)
Superwoman/superman is secret model of our collective
imagination. Everyone has secret desires to become someone exceptional, some one
better, superlative, but we must always observe a taboo which keeps these
feelings from view in our everyday activity. It is our alter ego which comes to
our rescue when events conspire against us. The antithesis of the archetype of
the American Character is in its most extreme from the 'Nightmare on Elm Street'
demonology of the psychopathic mass murdering homosexual child slayer. The less
severe form, the more common garden type variety can be found congregating in
the local bars during the day and night--they are the sociopaths who can be
found in any peaceful neighborhood setting. They are the repetition compulsion
frustrated overachieving husband and father who beats his wife and children when
he comes home from a hard day at the office. They are the family man who at work
becomes the obsessive compulsive little Tyrant who gets elected to public
office. These are models which are in all of us, to greater or lesser extent.
Repression of parts of ego which comes with the territory of
becoming a professional anthropologist, cannot have some kind and measure of
rebounding consequences upon one's personal integrity and behavioral repertory.
Perhaps, if we really got to know dear Alice a little better, she may not be
that special of a person after all.
This superman/superwoman mythology is supported by another
kind of American Character Archetype--that is the model of the 'Beautiful
People'--this model is all about us in the status symbols and media which we
cannot get rid off even if we wanted to. The beautiful person is the naturally
special, the superlative person who is qualitatively better or 'best'. It is an
attempt to hide flaws, repress weaknesses, disguise imperfections. Nose is a
little too long, Dr. B can take care of that. A little too much cellulite around
the hips, the beautiful person spa can take care of that. The Beautiful People
model clearly tied by conspicuous consumption of sumptuary symbols which is a
way of buying status--perhaps, as Weber so astutely saw, buying credits to get
into heaven. The clothes one dresses in, the car one drives, etc. etc. etc.
Maintaining and reinforcing the Beautiful People models keep the whole
capitalist system turning in its production cycles. There is nothing that modern
science cannot take care of or cure. If your suffering from a case of low self
esteem, then go have a permanent and buy inexpensive modish wardrobe on credit.
Come from the lower class--you too can have the luxury symbols that will hide
your class status--just shop at K-Mart--America's saving place.
What is insidious about this pervasive promotion of the
beautiful people model is its inherent implication of social race. Racism doesn’t
necessarily begin on the other side of the town, in the city ghetto, or in the
deep south. It begins in one's own neighborhood, in one's own backyard, in one's
own bedroom and bathroom. Race is the belief and behavior system that one group
is naturally superior than an apparently different group. Class prejudice
becomes tied to social race by means of upholding Beautiful People models.
Scratch the cosmetic, silicon surface of a beautiful person, and one will find a
true blue Racist pig. Social race is a set of status symbols which serve as
social distancing mechanism to maintain class/caste boundaries. Differences
which are wholly contrived, synthetic, unnatural, are passed as evidence of
natural differences, innate superiority, etc. between people. There is a kind of
mythological inversion in which natural differences are substituted for
artificial ones. The power of enchantment, the sucking in power of the
boob-tube, the appeal to the represses unconsciousness of the self so
overwhelming and strong, that there is a trick of the eye--one sees natural
beauty in a pair of jeans, a permanent, a mass of mascara.
So Alice, as an American anthropological success model, holds
membership to the exclusive club of the Beautiful People, whether she rejects
the privilege or not, it remains her privilege to choose. And it really makes no
difference whether she consciously accepts the ward or refuses it ever nobly,
for in her eyes she becomes in her success the embodiment of beauty, the model
of emulation which so many adopt as they are trying ever so vainly to achieve
the same status and success. Success buys status, and status buys success--and
money is what makes the critically important difference. Anyways, to step down
gracefully from the pedestal of success is highly unlikely and foolish, perhaps
even very difficult. The driving ambition, the achievement motivation and the
opportunities and money well spent which got her there in the first place all
contrive to keep her there to form systems of rationalization about it all. The
system seldom rewards or reinforces losers who will cop out. It is difficult
because it would be to run entirely against the grain of the ethos of the
society which put here upon the pedestal in the first place. Nobody likes a
loser, nobody loves a fallen hero or heroine. Look around do you see anyone else
doing such a silly thing? Anyways, with rising social status and income, there
is an almost automatic rise, need inflation within the capitalistic system. One
becomes attached to the security and conveniences, the privileges which money
can buy.
But Alice is the living exception of representation of an
ideal exception to a normative rule and is not the rule itself. Everyone knows
that Alice is an ego trip through life--she can afford to be. But most of us can’t.
most of us are average, mediocre, usual types don’t even really want to be.
The rule is another, more modest and moderate model of the same kind of value
orientation--it is scaled down and tempered by life's limitations and
weaknesses. The average American goes to work during the week, and plays Rambo
on the weekends. He is a low profile team player who likes to drink beer and
watch the 'Superbowl' on weekends. The wife has her own network, does the
shopping, gets her hair fixed or cut off and buys clothes for the family at the
mall. The average American is not looking to get above the boulevard--he just
wants to escape his neighborhood once and for all. He is satisfied with a few
lifetime promotions, a few pay increases to keep up with the cost of living, and
if he really wants to see his four children off to college, then maybe he has
his own business on the side.
If Alice is the anthropological exception to the mundane
rule, then we need to find that other, more common archetype--the average
American anthropologist, or AAA for short. No, it is not American Automobile
Association. The average member of AAA subscribes to the journal of the American
Anthropological Association, keeps up with its most recent publications and
occasionally attends its annual conventions to participate or perform in
mainstream anthropology. This member of AAA is a pretty WASPy fellow. Of course
he has the accouterments which serve as badges, marking his membership to such a
prestigious bunch of boys. If he has really 'been there' then maybe he has some
genuine articles which distinguishes him/her as an 'authentic anthropologist'..
and of course what vintage are you? What school did you come from, where did you
go to do fieldwork, what about, where do you teach…and the pango-pango
principle is set to motion. If you go to these parties they are for the most
part pretty boring affairs. If one lingers around long enough, there might even
be a first flight or mud slinging match in the backyard. But this archetype is a
stereotype anyways, and is quite unfair to al whose who take their job seriously
and do a good job inspite of handicaps. It was like that in the Marine Corps
too. Draftees 'serving their countries' were just trying their best damnedest
'to make the best of a messed up situation in Vietnam.' But Vietnam was still
Vietnam, and Anthropologia was still Anthropologia. There is another fitting
appellation--AAA--Alcoholics Anonymous--no one said anthropology was a ticket to
stardom. The average American anthropologist is a pretty anonymous fellow--no
one reads his/her books collecting dust on the shelves. No one asks for their
autograph. And many are probably moderately alcoholic. But the greyness of being
an authentic anthropologist is not completely black--there are occasional
moments which really make an important difference, just as there are many
differences which really make no real difference.
The average American anthropologist will, in the course of
his/her career, have 1.4 lateral career moves, 1.5 divorces (.75 of which were
with fellow anthropologists), have been abroad 4.5 times (not always to the same
place), will have published 1.3 books, 3.4 journal articles, and a forgotten
number of book reviews. He/she may have owned 2.5 homes, had 2.5 children and
hosted 4.7 anthropology parties in his/her new home. The list carries on. Not
too impressively. In the course of a full 30 year career, he/she may instructed
a total of 150 graduate seminars and undergraduate seminars, in 6.7 different
topic areas, may have signed a total of 50 thesis, and shaken hands with 130
graduating anthropology students. He/she may have seen 4.5 department heads come
and go, attended 60 colloquiums and symposiums and given 7.5 addresses before a
large crowd. He/she may have been in the newspaper 3.4 times, etc. etc. The
point has been made. He/she may have shown Trobriand Cricket, Dead Birds or
Nanook of the North, 68.5 times each, splicing the films 84 times.
It is anthropologically wise if the thesis is true that we
all live within a single political economic world system, to recognize one's own
place and position and future within such a world wide order. To under-emphasize
one's first world status vis-à-vis a third, fourth and fifth or sixth world
refugee, is the equivalent of over-emphasizing it. The closeness gained via such
under-emphasis is a false distance closeness, the relationship formed are
spurious relationships. To over-emphasize one's superior status would be more
honest, direct and better understood vis-à-vis the significant counter
reference other--in the anger there would be mutual understanding of inviolable,
inconsolable differences. To go 'native' is to make a mockery of one's own
heritage and to shit all over the heritage of those with whom one is living and
'studying'. I have seen ugly Americans many times, who in the course of burning
their bras, taking their shoes off, 'hanging out' with the natives--become the
worse hypocrisy of all. It is the critical difference which makes no difference,
the critical indifference which makes a difference. The person is only fooling
the self, and probably being fooled by the 'natives' around who see through the
disguise as plain as day. On my last night in Penang, I treated my Chinese
friends to a nice dinner to a club, an exclusive, ex-colonial club afterwards.
It cost me more than any of them could afford. In the club there sat a rich
American family. The man glowered at me that I would invade his sacred space. I
waved to him but he did not have the nerve to confront me. The band played a
song for us and we danced. Outside there were 'hippies' being cool with the
trishaw drivers. I has the extra American money and I wanted to treat my friends
to a bashing good time. They had an experience they not I will ever forget. The
next day, as we got on the plane, everyone cried. This is the difference, the
critical difference which makes no difference.
The money was the critical difference that made no
difference, it was the indifference to the money which made a critical
difference in out inter-human relationship. If a 'native' student craves and has
designs upon your only field typewriter--put your money where your mouth is and
give it to him/her, and however used you may feel, you may also have made a
genuine friend of an entire family for life. When you come back to the area, if
you ever do, you can visit these people and they will treat you royally. Money
does not buy or substitute for human relationships--money should not matter as a
means toward achieving this inter-human relationship. In the course of your
anthropological career, you will have many options to pick up another better
typewriter.
Underlying this didactic lecture is a central thesis about
inter-human relationships with significant counter reference others. Just as we
live in a cultural medium which certain kinds of archetypical models are
implicitly, behaviorally believed in, models which form the horizons of our own
ego identity and ethno-centricity, so too will the significant others be living
existentially in a realm of archetypical models. These models will likely be
very different--they will have a different history. But there will likely be
some common basis of similarities between the two sets of models which can form
the basis of mutual understanding and growth. These may be things which are
negative or repressed within one's own models. Not all people value hard work
and economic achievement like Americans do--not all peoples have the same
superman or beautiful people models we share, though in a single world system,
this has become a predominantly archetype. The peoples, in spite of their
differences, will likely have had enough contact with the prestige symbols of
America to learn to recognize them in you as their embodiment, whether they get
played up, like a trashy culture shocked expatriate, or get played down like a
dirty 'hippie' who shows no respect for the people's traditions. Their models
may be so different that there may seem to be no common ground for
understanding, until one learns to recognize in one's own realm of
possibilities, the basis for such a common sharing. Though they may be trying to
figure you out too, don’t expect them to reciprocate with the kind of
understanding you anthropologically command. Put the anthropological ego model
aside. Once the common ground is fathomed and determined, one can begin to
construct in one's own reality and ego identity a facsimile of it, and from this
reconstruction, however imperfect or bastardized, will come the genuine
understanding for the models of another culture--as they are existentially
lived. The world order and style of life will gain better sense and the old
American models will lose their meaning or values. At first, the other's model
being stereotypically a misunderstood baseline, will see, to be merely
superficial prejudice hiding or masking the genuine cultural meaning system. But
as one makes the transition to the 'inside' one will begin better to see the
model as it is lived, as it makes sense to those who share it. It will become a
part of your personality model too. Subtle variations, critical differences
which from the outside seemed to make no stereotypical difference, will become
more apparent. The why and the how of what they say they are doing or what they
seem to be doing will make a difference. You will have your foot planted however
precariously one in each world. You will be trying to translate one model into
the other, and vice versa, even though they do not often seem to match. But,
unless you're special like Alice, you cannot have your cake and eat it too.
There will come a day, soon, all too soon, at which you will have to make a
critical decision of which set of models you will choose. This is an
irreversible existential decision to be made, like all of history. It is in a
sense a question which has already been answered for you, one which the larger
stream of history answers by the strength of its currents. To make a complete
transition, to effect the fall from anthropological grace gracefully, is very
difficult if not impossible to do completely. The odds are riding upon a
traumatic withdrawal, a dramatic reaffirmation of one's newly achieved
'anthropologicalness' which now seems to fit so naturally. The Alice's of the
world and the average American anthropologist will most likely choose the latter
alternative. The drama and trauma will be cathexsis and catharsis of the
'writing up' the fictional reliving of the experience, no matter how
'facticiciously' inscribed for American consumption. One's brothers and sisters
in the field become distant kin instead. But the trial by fire has been
completed--one is anthropologically 'transformed'--you have withstood the pull
and currents of an alternative history and lived to tell all about it. You have
not copped out or become a traitor of your own people, you are not, from a
social racist point of view, trying to 'bastardize' the h and 'mongrelize' the
human race--you have met the other on his ground, and you have triumphed. Veni,
Vencii, Vendi, long live Pax Amerikana.
There is, upon a more open cultural continuum, the
possibility of biculturalism or even of 'multiculturalism'--this is perhaps, in
a world system, an ideal we should be striving for. But like our American born
and bred Alice, the true bicultural, like the true bilingual, is a rare sort
indeed. To have the best of both or more worlds, is to be fortunate enough to
have your cake and eat it too. My acquaintance with multiculturalism is that it
is a political hype to fool the American tourist, an ideological smokescreen of
a socially plural society hiding blatant ethnic, racial differences. I suspect
the bicultural model too, is where it is promoted, more preached than actually
practiced, hiding in inimical and inconsolable ethnic differences. It is
possibly a privileged form of ego identity in which the individual is indirectly
emphasizing one's privilege vis-à-vis significant others. But this is a
worthwhile ideal which maybe ought to be striven for nonetheless. But it can
only be achieved when ethnic differences are no longer the basis of identity,
when the differences created by a political economic hierarchy become 'evened
out' between differences groupings of people--when peoples many separate
histories, becomes genuinely, existentially, a single common history.
"Biculturalism is essential to those individuals who live in such
bicultural communities…the detrimental effects of acculturation can be
ameliorated by encouraging biculturalism…" "The mature bicultural
individual may rise above both cultures by following superordinate social
prescriptions that serve to integrate the individual's behavior relative to each
culture." If 'passing' between cultures in a global political economic
hierarchy is 'biculturalism' then I suggest it is only a spurious
'biculturalism' which is ahistorical, i.e. ideological.
The biocultural model proposed here holds that if the
cultural context within which acculturation takes place is bicultural, then the
acculturation process will tend too take place along two independent dimensions
(e.g., Lasaga et al., Note 1). The first dimension consists of a linear process
of accommodating to the host culture; the second dimension consists of a complex
process of relinquishing or retaining the characteristics of the culture of
origin. This acculturation/bicultural model further suggests that the most
important variable influencing the individual's accommodation to the host
culture is the amount of time a person has been exposed to the host culture,
while the most important variable influencing the individual's retention of the
characteristics of the culture or origin is the degree and availability of
community support for the culture or origin. In both instances, the age and sex
of the individual may be related to the rate of change along these dimensions.
…it would appear that some of the findings on acculturation
and adjustment can be best explained by using a model of biculturalism.
According to the bicultural involvement model of adjustment, individuals living
in bicultural contexts tend to become maladjusted when they remain or become
monocultural. Individuals who live in a bicultural context and who either under
acculturate (fail to learn how to, or do not want to interact with the Anglo
American context) or over acculturate (reject the skills necessary to interact
with the Hispanic American context), do not have the flexibility necessary to
cope with their entire cultural milieu. This state of disequilibrium between
individuals and their context is maladjustive. In this regard, the data are not
entirely clear as to whether lack of biculturalism is a contributing factor to
maladjustment or merely a symptom of it. It may be possible that individuals who
tend toward the acculturational extremes may have certain traits that are either
pathological per se or become maladaptive when confronted by the additional
demands placed by a bicultural life context.
The acculturation/biculturation model presented here proposes
that acculturation is a multidimensional process that functions differently
depending upon the cultural context. Under certain conditions (i.e. a
monocultural context), the model holds that acculturation will be basically a
undimensional and linear process moving from the culture of origin to the
host culture. Under other conditions (i.e. a bicultural context), the
biculturation model holds that acculturation will be two dimensional, involving
an accommodation to the host culture as well as retention of the culture of
origin. Furthermore the model explicitly recognizes a normative component of the
acculturation process which is closely related to amount of exposure to the host
culture, and a pathological component which deviates from the normative
component and is reflected in over-or-under acculturation. What makes this
deviation from the normative maladjustive is that it renders the individual
inappropriately monocultural in a bicultural context. Thus, the component of
monoculturalism/biculturalism provides a more parsimonious and heuristic
explanation of the relationship of acculturation to adjustment.
The Zeitgeist of past decades has encouraged a melting pot
philosophy of thorough acculturation on the part of immigrant groups. More
current views tend to value cultural pluralism which encouraged maintenance of
ethnic identity. The mounting evidence concerning the nature of the
acculturation process and its implications for adjustment--some of which have
been revised in this chapter--suggests that in bicultural
communities--exaggerated acculturation or exaggerated maintenance of ethnic
identity (one to the exclusion of the other) is detrimental to the mental health
of immigrant groups. Biculturalism implies that the individual can participate
in two cultural contexts. Immigrants living in bicultural communities…must be
able to effectively interact with both of these contexts in order to avoid the
detrimental effects of acculturation such as psycho-social or behavioral
disorders. Clinically, this model of biculturalism acculturation/biculturalism
would suggest that the detrimental effects of adaptation to a new culture for
individuals living in cultural communities can be ameliorated by encouraging
biculturalism. ("Acculturation, Biculturalism, and Adjustment Among Cuban
Americans" by Jose' Szapocznik & William Kurtines: 144-157 in Acculturation:
Theory, Models and Some New Findings, edited by Amado Padilla, 1980)
If biculturalism is an ideal model, one which anthropology
and anthropologists might strive for, then it is a healthy alternative to the
acculturative American heroine model of dear Alice. In the study of culture
school, adaptation, acculturation, the experience of the biculturally oriented
anthropologist is essentially in elucidating a new kind of understanding for and
of humankind. If taken in this vein, anthropology has much it can contribute to
the understanding and resurrection of a new kind of bicultural or multicultural
model. But as it stands today, if the anthropologist seeks to stand between two
or more cultures which are very distant or widely divergent, if they are
essentially two relatively different courses, separate histories, then the
anthropologist must face the risk of becoming a 'double identity' or a 'split
personality or multiple personality' or of becoming a chameleon and the
possibility of anthropological schizophrenia. As it stands today, for Alice and
the AAA member, the counter reference significant other is an appropriated
other, or misappropriated other, that serves anthropological purposes in an
academic framework. The acculturation remains undimensional--the anthropologist
remains a tried and truly tested American, whether he/she say it or not. We are
living in an age in which the long separated streams of history are coming
together into a convergent confluence. History remains strongest near its
central concourse--people are drawn centrifugally into its mainstream. The view
from the middle of history, from its center, is not like the view from the edge
of history. Time may seem to stand still upon the edge, but the center rushes on
with ever greater speed. To be in the center is to be immersed in its
confluence, to be behaviorally existentially living in the models which are
current and predominant--to move to the edge is to escape the immersion process,
to be left outside of history, to be able to look at the models from a distance
which the swimmer cannot ascertain or manage.
The Chinese have their own superman model which is similar in
some respects to or own in the prioritization of essential existential values.
But their dragon/phoenix has important differences coming from a different
historical origin which makes it very different and distant from our own western
superman/superwoman mythology. But in this case to over-emphasize the
commonalties and neglect the critical differences is to run aground in seeing no
difference which does make an important difference. They value leisure time less
than we do, and for them socializing is more or as important as the work
ethic--work by itself makes no difference if it is not somehow linked up to
viable social network from which rewards will be forthcoming. To work hard and
pay no attention to important social relationships will be to run quickly afoul
of Chinese ethos.
Emphasizing and focusing upon differences between people is
to create boundaries. Seeing the role of anthropology as a positivistic science
is to adopt the American Hero ideology in support of capitalist interests--to
study human diversity and variation, is to create concomitantly and implicitly a
world of differences which make no real difference. Theoretically,
methodologically, existentially, ethically it is to foster models of social
racism which will lead to the artificial perpetuation of ethnic racism.
To achieve a cultural continuum of multiculturalism,
different kinds of models must be constructed and historically realized. In the
global hierarchy of political economic interests, money makes the important
differences. Money creates artificial differences between people, which in a
more natural world would make no essential differences. To 'naturalize' these
differences is to perpetuate and perpetrate a belief system and set of models
which leads to social racism and eventually ethnic racism. This is what the
positivistic sciences have been up to. Anthropologists stand in a curious kind
of relationship with money. They enter as beginners in anthropology and find
anthropologia a friendly realm in which a world of differences made no important
difference. When and if they progressed through the hierarchy of anthropologia,
they find that anthropologia becomes an increasingly less friendly and more
hostile realm--more competitive by private interests. They certainly didn't come
into anthropology with the idea of realizing from it directly a lot of money--no
one comes into anthropology because they expect to make it rich. But they
change, as they 'professionalize' to become increasingly more concerned and
preoccupied with the differences money makes, to the point that money becomes
the primary and final objective of a whole vicious 'publish or perish' mode of
production cycle. The true science of positivism stands as an American Ideology
in reference to the significant counter reference other. It exists because of
the differences which money makes in the field or out--it enables the field
experience in the first place and determines the overall directionality of the
flow of acculturation. Intrusions disruptive for native peoples are minor for
the intruders. Anthropologists serve as change agents in a world of change
whether they accept it or deny it. Money makes the difference of social race,
the 'fly away' difference, the difference of how one can make only US$3,000 last
a whole year in a poor country, the difference of the buying power of the US
dollar--look at all the nice things I was able to buy for just US$100. In this
regard, then, the US anthropologist is no significantly different than the US
tourist--only perhaps more influentially.
If I have to distill out of this a kind of ethical plea, if I
should risk it, a plea for human equality, real and relative human equality in a
multicultural continuum, then the advice I would give to future Alice's and AAA
members is that Money is a kind of difference which does not, or should not, be
the critical anthropological difference. The difference which Money creates are
contrived, artificial, hierarchical and unequal. Science, in its positivistic
ideology, emphasizes and 'naturalizes' these differences which money creates,
serving as a system of social race, which becomes eventually ethnic racism.
Differences of money or nature should not be the important differences which
make the critical difference. These are differences which in the historical
structure of the long run, make no significant difference. The significant
differences, the cultural differences, are the ones which should be the basis.
The significant indifferences, the cultural and natural similarities, are the
basis of the important differences which should, historically, be allowed to
make no difference.
Humankind need models to integrate a personal and cultural
reality. Models of scientific positivism are models useful not for the majority
of humankind, but for a small minority who wish to capitalize and predominate in
a world wide political economic hierarchy. To be significant, to make the
important difference, models must be effectual--effective in integrating
together into a consistent coherent unity, psycho-social realities--the
realities shared between self and others. No model which is based upon
difference can achieve this kind of integration. Alice will leave the cave, go
off to Africa and then come back again, and go on to pursue a successful career
in Academia. She is the representative of a model based on emphasizing
differences between people. The AAA citizenship of Anthropologia are, in their
comfortable academic armchairs in America, not the correct models to achieve
this kind of integration. The kinds of models needed on the historical
convergence of human civilization, is essentially a model of human equality--one
which emphasizes the similarities between many different cultural models and
plays down the differences. If models become historically ineffectual in
mediating change in human reality, then they must sooner or later be discarded,
but not before more effectual ones have arisen to take their place. If this is
Mazeway reformation, then we need desperately new models. Models we need are not
ones that emphasize difference which make no difference, but one in which no
difference make an important difference.
The old gray-haired Indian man dancing wildly in the crowded
streets
To a rock and roll song only he can hear
Barefoot, bare-backed, black skinned with blue shrunken
tattered blue jeans on
The passers-by look on and joke and laugh at the poor old
oblivious fool
The young male anthropologist, camcorder on one shoulder, lap
computer slung from the other
hedges in for a closer look
He impolitely bumps into the by-standing gawkers, would be
hawkers
"I'm sorry, please excuse me," he says with serious
sincerity
Too politely the lookers on just nod, thinking to themselves,
whispering to themselves
"Isn't he a selfish pig?"
"He can’t help it, he's an American"
"Yes, but he's rich!"
You lick this hand
This hand pats you
Ticks in your ears, sores festering your belly
Black dog, so young and beautiful
This hand releases you off the cruel short chain
I paid an Ang Pao of a pound of sugar
To the indifferent old patriarch
I let you run in freedom you've never before had
Only to run wildly in madness
This hand constrains you by a leash
As I carry you to meet the dog shooter
This hand sadly strokes the soft fur of the rigid flank
In a final gesture of goodbye
VII
REDEFINING ANTHROPOLOGIA UNPARADIGMATICALLY
deconstructionism deconstructed, ad finitum, ad absurdum, ad
nauseum
Zeno once proved that fleet footed Achilles was forever
doomed to chase the tired tortoise. Modern mathematicians have lifted that
old sentency by forever banishing the infinitesimal and fashioning a logic
for infinitely peculiarly its own. This domain for thinking stipulates that
individual elements in something like a straight line, which possesses
continuity are infinitely more abundant that those in something like the
realm of rational numbers, which does not; that the number of odd integers
is the same as the number of odd plus even integers; that there are just as
many points in lines of various lengths; than an infinite set stays the same
despite much thinking; and that there are correspondences among continua.
And the mind boggling goes on infinitely on. (R.G.H. Siu; Ch'I: A
Neo-Taoist Approach to Life, 1974: 16)
The concept of sakti in the Tantric sacred texts
is the projection of the 'energy' of the male as the female. Male and God
are the passive polar manifestations of a single transient principle, while
the female and the Goddess are the active. In this manner, said Heinrich
Zimmer, "the male is identified with eternity, the female with time,
and their embrace with the mystery of creation." Time and eternity are
two aspects of the same. By abolishing opposites, the static and the fluid
are viewed as a single entity. This can be imagined through the use of
symbols and their opposites, such as a door through which a person cannot
pass. (R.G.H. Siu; Ch'I: A Neo-Taoist Approach to Life, 1974: 15)
In approaching for an effective alternative model for
anthropology, it is necessary to reconsider anthropology from the point of view
of whether it is or is not paradigmatic in the Kuhnian sense. The
reflexivo-critico critique of scientific anthropology which stems from the
appreciation of the humanities, and especially from de-constructionism as a form
of literary criticism, it is necessary that a critique and polemic leveled
against scientific anthropology, an anti-anthropology from the humanistic side
of the coin, does not end in and of itself provide an alternative useful model
from which to reconstruct an alternative anthropological model. Such
reconstruction must begin from the anti-scientific critique, but it does not end
there. Such reconstruction must involve redefinition of essential concepts and
meanings within anthropology in a way which would render its models more
theoretically, methodologically, existentially, ethically and historically
effectual in the integration of human reality.
Anthropology is inherently divided between 'two cultures' (I
would claim multiple cultures) it has one foot in the sciences and one foot in
the humanities. I believe this schism is itself a reflection of a prioritization
of values in which there is a dichotomization of work and play--the sciences
work hard, the humanities, in being pursuits of leisure, play softly. This
results in an inherent fundamental schism between biological sciences and
symbolic--between nature and culture. Where one rationalizes the other
relativizes. When the other relatives, the other rationalizes. But this
fundamental dichotomization is inherent reverberating throughout the many fields
of academia, is intrinsic to the dualistic nature of structure of academia as
traditional--they must be seen not so much as contradicting opposites of one
another but as complementary counterpoint in an dialectical circle a dance of
opposites--in conflict they separate, in synthesis they come together. Only by
seeing the whole as a dialect of anthropology as a whole can one step outside of
the hermeneutical circle in which its participants are caught. Outside of this
circle, the field is more of a unity rather than a duality--to learn to see the
reality as an undifferentiated, unanalyzed whole. The dialectical dance itself,
its every thesis, anti-thesis, re-synthesis, becomes the paradigmatic parameters
of its praxis. It becomes historically defined as paradigmatic, as a 'culture'
inherently dichotomic--this is the basis of its dialogical discourse. Every time
a new true believer movements synthesis is achieved, it becomes shattered again
by the embodiment of contradiction. But there is an alternative path, an
alternative way of proceeding. As soon as it seems to become a 'unified
paradigm' a new school comes along which destroys the serenity of peace.
Anthropology is born of discord, of dissonance, and noise. This alternative way
turns the tables by stressing balance and symmetry rather than dominance and
asymmetry. In this approach neither system of conceptioning is better than the
other, but both are mutually necessary. On the other hand, where there can be no
analysis, there can be no synthesis. Where there is no paradigm, there is no
'progress'. It becomes no longer pre-paradigmatic but un-paradigmatic.
Anthropology, as any of the traditional academic disciplines,
can become both paradigmatic and un-paradigmatic and neither. It can come to
embody and transcend contradictions while allowing the dialectic to continue to
play itself out. But by becoming both and neither, anthropology no longer has to
be bound to history, bound to the structure of paradigmatics. Only by divorcing
oneself from this paradigmatic structure is their hope for making anthropology
something 'different'--independent of power, and thus an alternative way for
humanity.
******
In redefining anthropology unparadigmatically, it is fitting
at the outset to proffer working definition of key terms (operationalization)
and a broad description of overarching themes (contextualization) in order to
provide a general rationale and sense of purpose. To propose a new way for
'seeing' an old reality requires much rethinking old thoughts and reinventing
old schemes for organizing such thoughts. It is necessary to proffer new
meanings to old 'things', new definitions for old 'terms' and even to devise a
new idea for an old way of talking about such generalia (old things and the new
relations between them). This alternative idiom is the formal expression of an
alternative frame of 'mind' in the broad sense. Idiom here refers to a
characteristic or stylistic pattern of language of a particular class or group.
A new idiom refers to such a patterning as it is different from a previous way.
A new idiom refers to an alternative language for describing reality, one whose
rule structure begets alternative explanations and prescriptions for reality. It
begets alternative system of belief and behavior. It is necessary to recreate
a new idiom of 'things' and their 'relations' by which framing an alternative
mind about human reality becomes possible. This new idiom must meet certain
conditions of systematicity and organization--it must be internally coherent,
making sense in its own framework of meaning and be non self contradicting, and
it must be extrinsically consistent in achieving a certain general equivalence
or correspondence between the thing and the meaning of the term. Most of
anthropological methodology concerns the problematic of first hand recording of
'information'--marking or framing, selectively. Recording can be accomplished in
a variety of ways which ranges along a continuum from purely object and
quantitative to purely subjective and qualitative. There is a hidden tautology
in any recording methodology--the methodology employed forms the parameters of
description, the language for framing 'information' in some coherent
way--interpreting or reinforcing significant differences in the recording is the
second step of the ethnographic process involving translation of the first
language in terms of the second. This translation into one's own, becomes very
problematic and obscurely self reflexive when both primary and secondary
languages are the same.
Rethinking, reinventing, recreating, transforming an old
idiom into a new one is referred to as re-synthesis, defined as 'the combining
of separate elements or substances, previously and differentiated in order to
form a coherent whole'. This work has followed a synthetitistic methodology
towards understanding human reality--it is a dialectical methodology which is
not mutual exclusive of either deduction or inductive analysis, but rather
incorporates these as necessary prerequisites of the entire process. In this
mode it is a logical form of question and answer argumentation, of the
analytical contradiction of opposed meaning (thesis and antithesis) and rather
than a true or false decision made between them, as in the positivistic
methodology of science in framing an analytical 'either-or' type of question,
the resolution (re-synthesis) involves the incorporation of both into a single
understanding of interrelationships. Here re-synthesis also refers to the fact
that the substance of the reconstructed whole is not the same ass the substance
of the previous a priori undifferentiated reality from which it has been
analytically, dialectically derived. Synthetic realism models the really real
after the fact of its experience, a posteriori to its deconstruction and
reconstruction, which emphasis must be distinguished from the tendency towards
reification of the model as if it were real, of imputing substantial reality to
mere ideas of the mind, of hypostatizing abstract thoughts as if 'they were out
there'. This is easy enough to accomplish when one's language quantitatively
'materializes' reality in its description in the first place--that historically
one person's suicide could ever be the same 'thing' as another person's act of
suicide--'facts'. The avoids the problem of investing re-constructions with
misplaced concreteness, a false sense of realism, and then of attempting to
methodically, behaviorally, 'recreate' this realism, avoiding this tendency of
human belief and behavior, by preliminary acknowledgment of the artificiality of
the reconstruction. Re-synthesism also refers to the fact that we are dealing
with more than a mere single instance of reconstruction, but with an ongoing
set, indeed a continuous dialectical process of reconstruction without end. More
so re-synthesis reflects in a limited and cautious way the use of the term by
Herbert Spencer who referred to synthesis as the attempt 'to fuse all sciences
into a coherent whole'. Each scientific discipline and sub-discipline has its
own theoretical, its own territory of the human mindscape--these areas of the
mind are not discontinuous, but articulate upon the margins of each focal area
of understanding. Uniting alternative paradigms into a general framework
requires much re-translation by metaphorical means. But the key metaphor is not
evolutionism which implies an a priori sense of purposefulness, a sense of
'progress--it is another Historicism in which development is dialectically
cyclical and change is mostly unpredictable--the by-product of unintended
consequences. This throws a mental monkey wrench into the whole orderly and
mechanism machination of positivistic Scientism.
We must broadly survey the contiguities of the
anthropological realm as it presents itself to the rest of humanity in a more or
less united front--the guise of a single anthropological face. This approach to
anthropology by an anthropologist is not completely unthinkable--it requires a
certain measure of 'marginality' from the field as well as an intimate
acquaintance within it, from the inside. As I felt myself becoming excluded from
what proved to me to be a relatively tightly knit, closed, self enclosing circle
of anthropologists, I lapsed into an liminal lacunae of anthropological anomie.
Also I went outside of the whole of the culture and social framework, in which
anthroplogia is institutionally embedded, as an ex-anthropologist. I no longer
had a reputation to live up to, or as soon became evident, to live down, in a
bigger world. Though I have sneaked back into the Anthropological Mansion via a
side door, I have since remained a 'professional stranger' who has resisted
being completely reintegrated into the old way. It is from this vantage point,
gained not without much turmoil and distress that I can better understand an
American Engineer who finds anthropological literature unnecessarily obscure and
obtuse, or a brilliant French ex-pat who has distrusted and disliked
anthropologists in his past, or local inhabitants who complain of being used by
an anthropologist just in order for that anthropologist to achieve status in
their American university--what does writing a book in English do for them? Thus
more than a modicum of disillusionment goes into what constitutes an 'informed'
outsider's point of view. I have only been able to do this study because I have
been beyond anthropology the anthropological horizon.
More and more what impresses me is how much of what
anthropology studies and the ways it studies can be turned upon the study of
anthropology itself as a sort of anthropology of anthropology. How much like
small tribes anthropological departments become--how much daily ritual and
regular rites of passage obscures academic pedantism and authoritarianism as
something 'genuine'--how dependent anthropologists are upon their own
sub-cultural style of life, upon sources of funding, upon a 'reputation'--how
much social distancing mechanisms are operating in including/excluding
novitiates from the tribal ranks. there is a preoccupation with border patrol,
boundary policing when there are no a priori clear cut boundaries. Educational
anthropology becomes academic scientific anthropology in similar way that
academic experimental psychology is scientific psychology--both come from an
American tradition of biological biologism and behaviorism--trying to figure out
human nature and in the process 'naturalizing' humanity, and human differences.
The quest is for the spurious and elusive 'universal'--the ground law of human
nature. Even after the prerequisite year, the bourgeoisie guilt complex cannot
simply be washed clean by any amount of academic literary
achievement--"What do you know of our lives when you are a mere child, a
stranger who cannot even speak our language very well. What right do you have to
study our way of life when you know nothing of our lives, of our
histories?"
How like priests and spirit mediums they behave in
classrooms, how like regular human beings, they become behind the closed doors
of their homes. How like Americans, so typical--a poor cross between a dirty
hippie, a foreign tourist and an official diplomat they appear to poor ignorant
people who have difficulty with the enlightenment attitude of the intrinsic
value and extrinsic payoff of higher education when they are struggling just to
feed and clothe their children--much less to provide them with even a
rudimentary education. They do not need another American baby to take care of,
especially when it is a strange American adult acting like a baby who is
obviously better off then they are.
More than just an anthropology of anthropology, we must see
the ultimate embeddedness of the values of anthroplogia in the historical
civilization and socio-cultural life ways in which it took shape and flourishes
today. It must be viewed in terms of its praxis, its total praxis, in both an
academic milieu and in the field, in relation to a larger socio-cultural and
historical framework from which it derives its existence. To the outside
anthropology presents a complicated but still contiguous front--its internal
divisiveness and dissension melts into sheer confusion and misunderstanding from
the uninformed outsider, preventing entry into its inner complexities by an
'lay' or casual onlooker.
First and foremost, anthropology must be regarded as a
'science' (just exactly what kind of science it is another matter). Whatever
else it may be, most anthropology courses are conducted in buildings designated
as 'science'. There are anthropology 'laboratories' where methodical science is
rigorously conducted. There are of course heretical anthropologists who dub
themselves humanists, but these are by and large within American Anthropologia,
a pariah group. All classes require pariahs, just as all courts must have a
jester or two to be complete. As a 'science' anthropology is cast in a
particular frame of mind which is characteristically 'scientific'. It must first
be seen as a western rationalistic/empiricist frame of mind. Secondly,
'nature/culture' is the fundamental dichotomization of reality which informs
this 'most human of sciences'. Nature is always taken as the antecedent, a
priori, culture is always the a posteriori consequent--Nature leads culture,
culture tracks nature. As a science formulated in a traditional western
framework it can be nothing else except philosophically and mentally tied to
this framework--it cannot think 'scientifically' outside of self. This is not to
say that in the historical dialectics of anthropological development, there have
not been frequent rebellions and defections, but by and large these are minor
variations upon a major theme of scientific discourse. Contrapuntal exceptions
to the paradigmatic rule of scientific anthropology must be seen as part of an
ongoing dialectic about a major central axis of the question 'what is human
science?'. By continually revolving and unfolding around this central axis of
the nature/culture dichotomy, it is never really able to assert its own sense of
independence of 'mind' outside of a scientific framework which had a western
origin. No matter how unscientific or soft or thick any particular
anthropologist or part of anthropologists might become, in relation to a larger
scientific community, almost always a debt and allegiance is acknowledged that
anthropology as a whole must remain true to scientific discovery of human
reality, anchored to formal, methodological fieldwork, to systematic principles
of organization and praxis which define the boundaries of any science the core
of any scientific 'discipline'. By continuously revolving and unfolding around
this central axis of the nature/culture dichotomy, it is never really able to
???????Philosophy too has had its minor counterpoints of variation about a
central 'rationalistic' axis of development. The implications of science, and of
a philosophy of science, are crucial to an understanding of an anthropology of
anthropology. In terms of self identity anthropology maintains allegiance to
'science' which puts it into an uneasy and strained, distanced relationship with
both history and philosophy as these have fallen for the most part within the
academically contraposed camp of the humanities.
Whatever the track record and history of anthropology in its
development as a science, one which has been by any means smooth and singular,
anthropology remains today more tightly tethered to conventionalism than it had
been at any time previously in its past, inspite of the identity crises of the
reflexive criticism which is a self conscious readjustment to a more normal
scientific modus operandi, as anthropology 'comes home' to academia, no longer
being able to practice it scientific methodology 'abroad' with the freedom and
impunity it had long enjoyed within a neocolonial framework. Anthropology turned
reflexive turning its mirrors upon its own consciousness vis-à-vis the other,
at precisely the historical moment when anthropology had to seek refuge in its
academic armchair. The image of the anthropological lens is but the image in the
crystal, the reflection in the looking glass--its essence is without the
substance of the real 'thing' it is meant to depict. As such its content aims
always to go beyond itself, but in the process it never really gets outside of
its own boundaries of existence--always bringing itself further afield, always
in the process bringing a little bit more of human reality into clearer focus,
bringing a little bit more of the outside world within the purview of its own
scientific boundaries--appropriating a bit more of human reality and in this
gradual cumulative at best piece-meal process of anthropological acquisition and
appropriation enlarging its conception of itself and its realm of scientific
importance in human reality, exchanging a bit more of its smaller, pre-developed
self, for a bit more of a larger human reality.
From the insider's perspective, the divisiveness of
anthropologia is legend. Anthropologia is like the eastern philosopher's
elephant--spectacles blind, limit and distort the vision of paradigmatic
anthropologists, obscuring what they 'see' only touching the parts and trying to
relate the whole in terms of its individual parts. No wonder one touches the ear
and feels language, another touches the leg and sees ecology, another the turn
trunk and thins symbol. The realm of anthropologia is a Wonderland--a
'wilderness of mind' which so far has few clearly recognizable boundaries. There
are maps leading in different directions, delineating different pathways which
lead everywhere and nowhere, but none so far has led beyond, outside of the
forest itself. And none ever will. Anthropology cannot know itself for the many
trees. Anthropologist cannot see the whole forest for the many trees. But it is
almost as if anthropologists surreptitiously delight in disorder, in haggling
amongst themselves about which road to take leading out of the forest, making
muddles of each others models.
And yet, from the outside looking in, inspite of all the
apparent divisiveness of anthropological praxis, in its own elephant likeness it
nevertheless exhibits a certain broad sense of order all its peculiar own, and
there are identifiable traits, like the nose, foot, ear, trunk, which outline
its distinctive form in broad fashion. Anthropologia occupies a particular
terrain of mindscape--it has its own definite sense of territoriality over which
it can become quite protective. Its apparent disorder defines its first
characteristic--its breadth, scope, broadness which lends itself well to
confusion, struggle and conflict and a disordered sense of purposefulness
"what's it all about, any way?" what is most obviously distinctive and
defining is its inherent complexity and vastness of subject matter which it
purports to comprehend--virtually the whole of human reality. This is no doubt
contributes to the appearance of anthropological disarray and disorderliness.
Anthropology defines itself most broadly by its cross-cultural diversity and its
broadness and variability of interpretation.
What distinguishes anthropology is indeed its peculiar kind
of eclecticism. Beyond its 'organization of diversity' it has no overall
centeredness or sense of complete, overall balance. But we are not so much
interested in every detail of anthropological generalia, all things
categorically anthropological but more expressly in anthropology in terms of
general theory and in terms of total everyday praxis as an academic institution
embedded within a larger societal matrix. But even from an informed insider's
point of view, general anthropology and anthropological praxis is no less a
seeming muddle of diversity--of partisan camps protecting their own turf, of
contradictory words uttered in harsh criticism or defensive aggressiveness.
Nevertheless, beyond its broad scope, other characteristic
features delineate and demarcate the mindscape of anthropologia. Though an
insider's perspective is the only one which counts in Anthropologia, an
alternative outsider's frame of reference mustn't be to hastily discounted as
inauthentic.
There are several interrelated characteristics of
anthropological praxis and generality. First, most anthropologists identify
themselves as professional scientists. To the extent that anthropology is
recognized as a science, it shares certain formal affinities with other
scientific fields of inquiry--'family resemblance's'. It's 'scientificity' also
renders it more or less paradigmatic in a sense that Thomas Kuhn has
framed it. But it is and cannot be strictly a science, as much s the 'hard'
sciences are so construed, and its 'approximate' only character of being 'more
or less' like a science, its indefinite paradigmatic structure as a scientific
community, renders it a problematic paradigm, inherently, from first to last, in
a distinctive way all its own. Its problematicalness must not be
underestimated as a central distinctive defining feature of anthropology. Being
self redefined as an extremely problematic scientific paradigm, it is important
to identify and elucidate the sources of its problematic character in its own
praxis and theory. Its problematical character is fundamentally dialectical in
character, set up and made realistic by the inherent rational dichotomization of
its domain--there occur several cross-cutting essential dichotomies which serve
as parameters of praxis and theory. They are not strict dichotomies, but operate
upon the boundaries of the anthropological realm in a loose, metaphorical
way--constituting the pre-logical, metalogical foundations--the
pre-understandings underlying the scientific understanding of human reality.
They become posited or deposited as systematic analogies, analogues precipitated
out of theory making up a disposable polythetic class sharing a diverse set of
uncommon attributes along lines of family resemblance's.
The first and foremost, if only, consensus is that
anthropology must be regarded as a 'science' (an inexact science perhaps, but
still a science). Most (but not all) anthropologists prefer to think about what
they do in terms of being good science. Some prefer a stricter definition of
anthropological scientificity than others, but most will agree that anthropology
'thinks' and 'speaks' sound science. There are of course a few heretical
anthropologists (like myself) who dub themselves spineless humanists, but these
represent a minority 'pariah' group. All artists need critics to make the world
go round, all scientists need humanists to maintain a sense of balance.
Anthropology then, construes itself reflexively, as existing
somewhere within the more general science--it strives to gain recognition as a
formal and respectable scientific discipline. Thus it interprets itself, when
and if it ever does, in a scientific idiom and programs itself in its praxis to
some version or other of a scientific model.
The main aim of anthropological praxis has been to situate
and orient itself securely in the land of science. This anthropology has grown
within academia, come into its own, somewhere amidst the sciences. There have
been vigorous efforts to rigorously and repeatedly apply some form of scientific
methodology of descriptive, quantitative empirical inductivism and hypothesis
testing to the comprehension of the reality which is creates for itself. This is
not to say that in the dialectics of anthropological emergence there have not
been frequent heresies, variations upon a major theme of discourse. No matter
how allegedly unscientific or 'soft' or 'thick' or 'deep' any particular
anthropologist may fancy him/herself becoming in the perennial peregrinations
mental meandering through the flower gardens, almost always some kind of debt is
acknowledged in the name of general, respectable science, that anthropology must
remain true to scientific discovery, to formalized fieldwork methodologies of
one brand or another, to more or less formalized principles of general
organization and praxis which defines any discipline as a science.
To the extent that anthropology has shaped itself in the name
and image of science, it has come to share certain definitive affinities which
characterize all sciences. Its normal dialectic is carried on in a
characteristic idiom of professionals which requires years of education to
master and which is mostly inaccessible to the untrained or outside its own
borders. Its community is comparatively small and well circumscribed within
academia. The primary forum of the professionals are journals which are highly
technical and remote--inaccessible to the average reading public.
…A number of characteristics for membership in a
professional scientific group must already be strikingly clear, the scientists
must, for example, be concerned to solve problems about the behavior of nature.
In addition, though his concern may be global in its extent, the problems on
which he works must be problems of detail. More important, the solution that
satisfy him may not be merely personal but instead be accepted as solutions by
many. The group that shares them may not however be drawn at random from society
as a whole, but is rather the well defined community of the scientists'
professional compeers. One of the strongest, if still unwritten, rules of
scientific like is the prohibition of appeals to heads of state or to populace
at large in matters scientific. Recognition of the existence of a uniquely
competent professional group and acceptance of its role as the exclusive arbiter
of professional achievement has further implications. The group's members, as
individuals and by virtue of their shared training and experience must be seen
as ????????(MISSING SENTENCE)
(MISSING SENTENCE) solution. But it is highly questionable
for in reality whether the kind of reality anthropology addresses can be thusly
explained away at all, whether anthropology can sort out what is merely unknown
from what is ultimately unknowable.
"A paradigm is what the members of a
scientific community share, and conversely a scientific community
consists of men who share a paradigm…" (Kuhn)
To the extent that anthropological praxis defines as normal
science, then it makes sense to think of anthropological praxis in a Kuhnian
sense as being paradigmatic. As much as anthropology is or can become
scientific, in its character structure, to that same extent it might also be
correctly regarded as paradigmatic into the extent that anthropologists share in
a common consensus of how anthropological praxis scientific, then to the same
extent they share in a paradigmatic organization. To the extent that the
boundaries of scientific anthropology are non-discrete, ill defined, shading off
into the realm of the unknowable, then to the same extent its paradigmatic
character will also be problematical.
Like everything else in anthropologia, whether 'social
sciences' like anthropology are actually 'authentically' paradigmatic has been
the subject of a heated, ongoing debate. The position adopted by the
anthropologist in this matter seems to a large extent to depend on that
anthropologists professional position within the realm. It is suggested that
those closer to the academic armchair would be more likely to regard
anthropology as essentially non-paradigmatic in character, because it seems
completely lacking in consensus of what about itself is supposed to be
paradigmatic. Again the former is a closer ' insider's viewpoint', the latter a
distant 'outsider's perspective'.
There are sciences whose 'paradigms' blocks of theoretical
precepts and precedent that define the orthodoxy of what Thomas Kuhn calls
'normal science' maintain a frozen immobility until their underpinnings are
melted by the heat and pressure of accumulated evidence and a plate tectonic
revolution results. Anthropology is not one of these. As a discipline, a history
that, indeed manifests a certain logic or order (which is discusses in Chapter
6). For all the unanimity it commands, however, this flux of ideation might as
well be described as a pure dialectic, a play of exposition (and denial) by
desperate voices or an electic accretion of all and sundry into textbooks. What
is remarkable about this is not so much the persistence of theoretical fossils
(a persistence that is the stock in trade of academic tradition) but the failure
of anthropology to institutionalize this persistence, or indeed, to
institutionalize a consensus at all…(Wagner)
Thomas Kuhn at least implied that the social sciences were
paradigmatic though he characterizes them at perhaps a pre-paradigmatic
state--in which its central normal features are not completely resolved its
central groundwork or paradigmatic foundation has not yet been
laid--"during which individuals practice science, but in which the results
of their enterprise do not add up to science as we know it…" (page 163)
"…in parts of the social sciences they may well be
occurring today"…to a very great extent the term science is reserved for
fields that do progress in obvious ways. Nowhere does this show more clearly
than in the recurrent debates about whether one or another of the contemporary
social sciences is really a science. These debates have parallels in the
pre-paradigm periods of fields that are today unhesitatingly labeled science.
Their ostensible issue throughout is a definition of that vexing term. Men argue
that psychology, for example, is a science because it possesses such and such
characteristics. Others counter that those characteristics are either
unnecessary or not sufficient to make a field a science. Often great energy is
invested, great passion aroused, and the outsider is at a loss to know why. Can
very much depend upon a definition of 'science'? Can a definition tell a
man whether he is a scientist or not?…These are not, however, questions that
could respond to an agreement or definition. Furthermore, if precedent from the
natural sciences serves, they will cease to be a source of concern not when a
definition is found, but when the groups that now doubt their status achieve
consensus about their past and present accomplishments…(Kuhn: 160-161)
others primarily insiders have referred to anthropology as
being fully paradigmatic and even 'poly-paradigmatic' in the sense that
anthropologia shares several overall communities which look to separate realms,
in different directions and contain their own scientific praxis--at most these
communities overlap and often conflict.
This view sees anthropological praxis as being fully mature
in its own self recognition as a science--this would mean that the field has
progresses remarkably and is in a post paradigmatic period of greater breadth
and specialization. Something like this seems to have been happening in
anthropology. There exist separate communities, each sharing in a broad paradigm
of science, but also not sharing their own special case versions of the
paradigm.
"Though science surely grows in depth, it may not grow
in breadth as well. If it does so, that breadth is manifest mainly in the
proliferation of scientific specialties, not in the scope of any single
specialty alone." (Kuhn: 170)
The notion of progress somehow informs a science of its own
identity and being or becoming pre-paradigmatic implies some form of progressive
evolution if not toward some future word vision, at least in a retrospective
sense, of the separation of the significant from the trivial, unknown from the
unknowable, the emergence of the known from the unknown, of from the firmless,
of choate mind primordial inchoate. Progress is equated by paradigmatic in the
sense that scientific knowledge is cumulative, deepening, more exact,
specialized.
…We must learn to recognize as causes what have ordinarily
been taken to be effects. If we can do that, the phrases 'scientific progress'
and even 'scientific objectivity' may come to be seen in part redundant…Does a
field make progress because it is a science or is it a science because it makes
progress?
…Viewed from within any single community, however, whether
of scientists or of non-scientists, the result of successful creative work is
progress. How could it be anything else? …No creative school recognizes a
category of work that is, on the one hand, a creative success, but is not, on
the other hand, an addition to the collective achievement of the group. If we
doubt, as many do, that non-scientific fields make progress, that cannot be
because individual schools make none. Rather, it must be because there are
always competing schools, each of which constantly questions the very
foundations of the others. The man who argues that philosophy, for example, has
made no progress emphasizes that there are still Aristotelians, not that
Aristotelianism has failed to progress. (Kuhn: 162-163)
Of course, seen from the outside, so may anthropological
schools are not necessarily mutually antagonistic to one another except perhaps
in as much as one might deny the theoretical foundations of another as pseudo
scientific, proclaiming 'there is no such thing as social evolution' thereby
denying the foundations of most of cultural biology and another might just as
well declare 'all culture is adaptation' thereby destroying the preeminent
procreativity of the human mind. Actually, what is to be seen is the
contradiction and dialectic of overlapping, competing and often mutually
complementary schools, or communities, each pursuing its own direction, each
regarding a different aspect of human reality, each occupying a separate niche
in the evolutionary ecology of the anthropological mind. When these perspectives
are considered together they form a pretty coherent body of knowledge. In
anthropological dialectics there is quite a bit of overlap and interplay between
the old and the new, the right and the left. One is then led to wonder about the
inherent dialectical structure which is focused upon argumentative
schismogenesis in the development of the discipline, and to what extent this
form of development might not be recapitalize in the ontogenic unfolding of the
anthropological mind itself. What is of value is that certain notions do finally
become discarded as patently false, untenable and unrealistic prejudice, or as
dangerous, or merely fall by the wayside as trivia--notions of race,
enlightenment, social Darwinism, notions of the fossilized primitive, etc. In
the course of their dialectical development anthropologists do eventually move
on to bigger and better questions, refining and re-defining their arguments,
eventually learning something more about anthropological reality, if not exactly
human reality.
It is my central thesis regarding the structural character of
anthropological praxis is that it is best thought of in terms of being
'semi-scientific' and in terms of being thus 'quasi-paradigmatic'. Kuhn's
original conception of what is paradigmatic was much broader based then the
single case which he so aptly illustrated in the natural sciences. Something
similar to what he construed as the process of scientific paradigmatics is
probably going on in most fields of organized social endeavor. The real issue if
concern is not really whether or not anthropology is good science, but how and
why anthropology is good anthropology.
…It may, for example, be significant that economists argue
less about whether their field is a science than do practitioners of some other
fields of social science. Is that because economists know what science is? Or is
rather economics about which they argue?
To the extent that different anthropologists can share the
same scientific paradigms, believe and behave something like science, and strive
to create for themselves some kind of scientific frame of mind, then
anthropology has at least and perhaps at best only approximates the paradigmatic
character of the natural sciences, and thus must be construed as being of a
similar, analogous character as science, but still it is not precisely the same
thing. It shares certain family resemblances in terms of functions of its
paradigmatic character, but it also has distinctive traits all of its own which
differentiates it as something other than strictly natural science. If
anthropology is indeed paradigmatic, then it is still not paradigmatic in the
strict sense. If anthropology is really scientific, then it is perhaps so in a
sense that is not strictly paradigmatic as Kuhn applied it to the social
sciences.
Whether construed as scientific or not, the structural
character of anthropology is a little different than say biological praxis or
the praxis of the physical sciences or of chemistry. The nature of the unknown
which anthropology confronts is different than the nature of the unknown which
informs the meaning of biology, chemistry or physics. The form of knowing which
delineates the unknown is of a different character in anthropology than it is in
other sciences. The ways of knowing whether ethnographic, ethnological research
or anthropological discourse and dialectic is distinctive from a biological way
of knowing. To the extent that biological science informs anthropology about the
physical nature of human reality, then perhaps anthropology shares in a similar
scientific paradigm, say evolution, genetics, etc., which is inherently
biological in character. In a similar way, scientific psychology and social
science informs anthropology at least in part of what is essentially
psychological or social in character about human reality. In a similar way
anthropological praxis informs paradigmatically other fields of intellectual
discourse. What is important then is to elucidate a bit more carefully exactly
what the structural character of the anthropological paradigm really is. If
there can be identified any central characteristic of the anthropological
paradigm, it must be that it is distinctively problematical in nature.
Exactly how and why this is remains to be explained, but it is important that at
the outset the radical problematicalness of the anthropological paradigm be
emphasized. All sciences, no matter how hard or exact, share in some measure a
problematical character, at least to the extent that the nature of the unknown
they confront informs and misinforms and creates paradigmatic process in
peculiar ways. The measure and nature of problematicalness is intrinsic to the
understanding of the paradigmatic process of delineating the known and the
unknown, the knowable and the unknowable, the significant and the trivial.
The divisiveness of anthropology as total paradigmatic praxis
reveals its control aspect of being 'problematic' in the sense that it poses
different and similar problems for solutions, looks for 'puzzle like' problems
to solve, and creates problems which need solution.
General anthropology is an extremely 'problematic' subject to
broach. The fact of this radical problematics is intrinsic to anthropology in
general. Its problematic nature is inescapable, in alienable at times, at times
very confusing and sometimes highly rewarding. As one field of inquiry into
human reality, its problematics are its greatest weakness and also,
paradoxically, its greatest strength.
Practically everything about the general subject of
anthropology is problematic from beginning to end. No single name, concept,
theory or myth that is entertained within anthropology is free from problematic
connotation or immune from multiple reinterpretation. Everything from the
definition of culture and human nature to the ethnographic description of a
particular rite or custom to the elaboration of general theories about human
evolution, mythological structure, political, economic or religious process to
theoretical and philosophical discussions about anthropology itself is fraught
with highly problematic difficulties. Even the inherent problematic character of
general anthropology is itself a subject of intense problematic debate.
This intense and extensive problematical nature is the key to
understanding the unusual beauty and sublime power of anthropology as a PAPL
science. Its problematics is its greatest vice and greatest virtue--keeping
it comparatively clean from programmatic ritualization and bureaucratic
institutionalization which is an ever threatening academic trap. Yet it is not
entirely 'auto immune' to its own problematical self contradictions or to the
dishonest egos of its own practitioners. It tends to be so often self
contradicting, diffuse, and indeterminate--so fractionated and disparate as a
systematic discipline, that sound and timely programmatic initiative is often
thwarted and general theoretical comprehension precluded.
Only an insecure egoist in dire need of simplicity would deny
this difficult yet enlightening face of unforegoable and automatic problematics
about anthropological reality. But being fundamentally by and 'irreducibly'
problematic does not by any measure deny a general comprehension of
anthropological problematics as itself an isolatable phenomenon of
existential anthropological reality, capable of being to some extent
accurately modeled within a reductionist theoretical framework.
Like an artist stepping back from his canvas, if we are able
to distance ourselves enough to acquire at least a quasi-objective if not an
optimum view of general anthropological problematics, then we might be capable
of noticing a general outline of the whole of anthropological problematics, not
unproblematical in and of itself, but referentially figured against a large yet
more obscure background--a more general 'paradigmatic framework'--and once we
have convinced ourselves of its broad and most general outlines, perhaps in the
process also revealing heretofore unnoticed shapes and unusual 'moiré'
patternings, then once again we might move in closer to refocus our attention
upon at least some of its more prominent features and its more apparent
problematical particularities. The purpose of this work is to discuss a few of
the many important problems of anthropology in a generalist manner, in order to
demonstrate clearly that although generally problematic, anthropology is not
without an inherent general order and ostensible 'table of organization' which
is generally comprehensible--albeit problematically.
Anthropology is a problematic paradigm as both the
starting and finishing point in a general discussion of anthropology as theory
and reality, fact and fiction. This work also is a generalist approach,
such that no necessary boundaries between its many varied sub-disciplines are
recognized as being anything more than convenient methodological programs and
labels within which to frame a disparate and competing theories about various
particular anthropological data and themata. It recognizes anthropology as a
primarily paradigmatic in the general Kuhnian sense that as a
general phenomenon of social discourse and instruction, it is as susceptible to
the labels and ego limited prejudices as it is actually grounded in sound
empirical reality, which any 'normal' delimited 'science' is supposed to
demarcate and define. Like any other social paradigm, anthropology is as subject
to the same vicissitudes and constraints which hinders and promote scientific
realization and advance finally this work approaches general anthropological
problematics as if these are existential problems of human reality
distinct and unusual perhaps, but nevertheless ongoing concerns relevant and
realistic to everyday human existence both within and outside anthropological
praxis--and not as primarily an esoteric academic concern mystified by
professional and technical jargon and commonly nonsensical double talk.
In approaching the problematics of anthropology as a general
problem in and of itself, in some vague sense isolatable from its multifaceted
particulars, and somehow relatable to the more general problems of existential
human reality, it is crucial to recognize that anthropology is most generally
concerned with comprehending human reality but not just any and every portion of
the whole of human reality, which is universal, but more specifically and
importantly that general portion in which human beings look earnestly and
honestly at their brothers and sisters and at themselves through other's eyes,
as unique and different individuals and as more than mere reflections of their
own ego identity, in order to see more clearly the meaning of their own 'human
beingness the purposes and reasons and functions for their behaviors, in
whichever made or fashion or level it is manifest and to be formally defined.
The perpetual condition of anthropological problematics is
the source and symptom of a peculiar kind of paradoxicality about general
anthropology as an existential humanistically oriented science seeking to
comprehend existential human reality through the greater and better realization
of human possibility. This paradoxicality gives anthropology its distinctive and
characteristic flavor and is true cutting edge in the investigation of an
inherently paradoxical human reality. This essential anthropological
paradoxicality is a 'meat-phenomenon'--at once the control subjective problem to
'objective' anthropological investigation and simultaneously the central
problematical objective of general anthropological investigation. This
paradoxicality arises from the problematic character of the innate and immanent
meaning of being 'human' itself.
The inherent problematic and paradoxical nature of general
anthropology poses a kind of minimum theoretical paradigmatic threshold--a
social hurdle and a barrier of communication to any person seeking to enter and
comprehend general anthropology. Those people incapable of dealing with its
intrinsic problematic paradoxicality or who seek to reduce its problematic
nature to a simplified, essentially unproblematic, metaphysical version of
reality are merely dishonest anthropological egotists lacking the intellectual
integrity to partake of its enlightening communion. From the general
anthropological point of view we are all possible anthropologists, some more
than most, a few irretrievably so.
Finally, it, is not really worthwhile arguing for or against
the professional neutrality of anthropology as a 'scientific' discipline. It
must at least feign a guarded neutrality at all times in order to protect its
professional integrity as a legitimate 'objective' discipline, like any other
honest science, but putative and superficially purported 'scientific neutrality'
does not necessarily imply reneging moral responsibility or automatically
preclude humanistic commitment to a better human reality--the realization of
greater and improved human possibility of being and meaning. In such beliefs in
moral neutrality exist only a naïve and irresponsible self rationalization
allowing anthropologists to hide from reality behind their professional raiment
and officiality and allowing anthropology to become a dangerous instrument of
any state in the oppression of its own and other people.
Such 'Truths' ought to be 'self evident' enough to require no
further mention except where this general ethical issues plays upon the general
problematics of anthropology. If the many unique and important insights to be
found within the anthropological realm cannot be broadly disseminated to all of
humanity by general yet relatively unbiased and open interpretation, if not
hopefully to effect in some esoteric kind of manner changes for the better
somewhere and somehow in someone's lifetime, then at least to make a valiant
effort toward such realization of higher humanistic and naturalistic ideals,
then the general purpose of anthropology is self defeating. Anthropology must
become something more than an ornate and exclusively academic paradigm as an end
in itself--it must be made the practical and teleological means to the salvation
of a humanity from its own seemingly inevitable species suicide and ineluctable
mass biological extinction. The realization of its fullest humanistic potential
demands just such a general humanological movement in order to counter and
overcome the worldwide stranglehold of the 'civilized' tyranny of nuclear terror
and the menacing modern threat of global holocaust.
There are many interrelated reasons why anthropological
praxis is radically problematical. Where to begin unraveling this Gordon knot
composed of so many diverse threads of logic is well neigh impossible to
determine, so perhaps it is best to just slice cleanly and through the heart of
the matter and examine some of its more central interconnections.
Anthropological praxis and mentality is dialectical in
character, in the sense that it is composed of ongoing question and answer
thesis and antithetical discourse between different acting anthropologists. This
is, in and of itself one of the normal modes of anthropological praxis, but it
must be seen as a continuous, never ending dialectic which revolves and resolves
itself perpetually about certain central issues, issues which together make up
the distinctive features of the anthropological paradigm, both similar and
analogous to other paradigms and yet in its own idiomatic organization different
from many others.
There occurred throughout history of both western and eastern
philosophy a very similar dialectical emergence, a movement which balances
itself in its movement, gains its centeredness about a single axis of human
reality. Here it is important only to recognize that the dialectical structure
of philosophy which is usually found within the humanities and is regarded as
above and beyond the normal structure of a scientific paradigm, in the sense of
dealing with 'knowable' questions, is very much akin to the dialectical
structure of anthropology. "But there is always some men who cling to one
or another of the older views, and they are simply weed out of the profession
which thereafter ignores their work. The new paradigm implies a new and more
frigid definition of the field. Those unwilling or unable to accommodate their
work to it must proceed in isolation or attach themselves to some other group.
Historically they have often simply stayed in the departments of philosophy from
which so many of the special sciences have been spawned." (Kuhn: 19)
We have already seen, however, that one of the things as
scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion for choosing
problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have
solutions. To a great extent these are the only problems that the community will
admit as scientific or encourage its members to undertake. Other problems,
including many that had previously been standard, are rejected as metaphysical,
as the concern of another discipline, or sometimes as just too problematic to be
worth the time. A paradigm can, for that matter, even insulate the community
from those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle
form, because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental
tools the paradigm supplies. Such problems can be a distraction, a lesson
brilliantly illustrated by several facets of seventeenth century Baconianism and
by some of the contemporary social sciences. One of the reasons why normal
science seems to progress so rapidly is that is practitioners concentrate on
problems that only their lack of ingenuity should keep them from solving. (Kuhn:
37)
Anthropology has something of a schizoid nature of a split
personality, a double identity that speaks of its uncertain place somewhere
between the sciences and the humanities, of its crossed and confused and often
contradictory loyalties.
Eric Wolfe once responded to the question of what is
anthropology with the provocative statement that it is "the most scientific
of the humanities, the most humanist of the sciences" (1974: 88).
Anthropology is, he said, "in part history, part literature, in part
natural science, part social science…" it represents both a manner of
looking at man and a vision of man (ibid). this dual orientation of
anthropology, somewhere between or at the margins of the sciences and the
humanities, is a source of inspiration and of paradox. (Wessman: 1)
To the extent that the sciences and the humanities have
become more or less entrenched and segregated into two coexisting worlds,
founded upon fundamentally different world views implicit to each, there is very
little interchange or cross over between them. History, religion, philosophy,
literature and philology are part of the culture of the humanities.
To the extent that anthropology is tied to history for a
diachronic dimension of human reality, and to the extent that it falls back upon
philosophy for formal legitimation, its center of gravity pulls it away from
being narrowly and strictly in the scientific camp to occupy a more interstitial
position in the academic realm.
To define anthropology as simply being "What
anthropologists do" is merely to beg the question with a self evident
tautology, but in its tautological truth such an answer is not far removed from
anthropological reality. To give the whole body of anthropological action a
sound hearing in a few brief pages is almost (but not quite) an absurdity from
an insider's standpoint. And as far as most acting anthropologists are concerned
it is the insider's frame of reference which matters most (but not completely).
Ultimately, anthropology is a tautology. In its own action,
its self definition, its delineation of its domain, in its total praxis, its
actors recreates its everyday reality as something significant, nontrivial,
meaningful and important. As an anthropologist, there really is no going outside
of its own parameters of praxis, of thinking outside its own frame of mind, or
of speaking outside of its own distinctive idiom.
Consideration of the problematic nature inherent to
anthropology as a central characteristic and of its underlying paradoxicality,
leads to consideration of the nature of anthropological paradoxicality as a
central characteristic itself of anthropological discourse of human reality.
Whatever the ultimate origin of this essential paradoxicality
of human reality, it takes essentially two defined forms in general
anthropological discourse, neither of which are necessarily a priori to the
human reality which anthropology seeks to comprehend, but both of which are
centered, a posteriori and after the fact, if you get yourself consciously, upon
the derived meanings about human reality. Anthropology faces in its deepest
philosophical sense, certain fundamental questions about the human reality which
are existentially universal to all humankind and which seem universally
essential to the meaning of being human. These are essentially unanswerable
antinomies of the human condition. The first of these antinomies is derived
directly from anthropological praxis, as inherent to the theoretical and
dialectical structure of this praxis and concerns the dichotomization of human
reality in terms of 'universality/particularity'. This forms the fundamental
rational 'scientificity of anthropological praxis, the quest for fundamental,
irreducible universal 'law' of human nature which explains all variety of human
'behavioral' phenomena, and which supposedly will render the unfolding of human
history predictable in at least some probabilistic sense. If these are not the
stated explicit goals of scientific anthropologists, they remain philosophically
their implicit purposes, which cannot be denied, or gotten away from. The second
basic antinomy is derived indirectly from the first to the extent that 'normal'
anthropological discourse is construed as basically scientific, that the central
dialectical themes around which anthropological definitions of meaning revolve
and resolves themselves as normal science is the dichotomy of nature and
culture. There are two other sets of dichotomies by which the anthropological
dialectic informs itself as normal science, these are the subject/object or
self/other dichotomy, the mind/body or real/ideal dichotomy which becomes linked
to the national/relative duality and finally the male/female dichotomy--there is
also the time/space duality. Each of these dichotomies will be considered in
turn, and then the overarching characteristics of anthropological praxis must be
construed as normally scientific in character, made up by these dichotomies have
further implications for the comprehension of anthropology as praxis.
It must be reiterated that none of these dichotomies nor the
kind of scientific mentality by which they are framed are a priori or in and of
themselves inherently necessary to a formal, general comprehension of human
reality, but they do form the point of departure and the ultimate point of
return for most of what is idiomatically characteristically distinctive about
anthropological discourse. They are the problems of which end of the egg to
break, of Tweedle-dee and Tweedle-dum, of the hen or the egg in anthropological
dialectics, only when seen together as a dialectical system of the
anthropological mind as inseparable elements of an irreducible unity, can the
character of the inherent paradoxicality of anthropological problematics be
better understood.
General anthropology and anthropology in general, a major
position of its spirit, its motivation, its tonality, and its justifications is
founded upon the belief in the reality of some kind or form of irreducible human
universality--something isolatable which can be sifted out from the superfluous
and noisy myriad of triviality and made to stand alone as the essential core,
the original cause, the ultimate reason, the fundamental atom, the primary
element of all anthropological theory. The problematic of universality, in
whichever manner, shape or form of its conception, has long been perhaps the
single most important and most perplexing unifying principle of the
anthropological paradigm. It and its opposite organizational conception of
empirical or phenomenal or historical particularity have been the overarching
governing metaphors of reductionistic atomism framing the anthropological
mentality.
There are several redefining characteristics which mark out
anthropology as a distinctive paradigm--sharing family resemblances with some of
the sciences and with humanities. 1. First, it is distinctively what I refer to
as inherently problematic in character. 2. Second, it defines itself as a
science, being a science it shares many affinities with most other sciences.
Being a science, it is tied to an empirical domain of human reality. To the
extent that it redefines itself as science, it functions more or less along the
lines of Kuhn's notion of paradigm. From a paradigmatic point of view it informs
itself dialectically about human reality in terms of several central rational
dichotomies. These dichotomies are universality/particularity, nature/culture,
etic/emic, self/other, ideal/real, male/female, time/space. These dichotomies
are not strict, but operate in a loose metaphorical way and are posited as
systematic analogies, these analogies make up a polythetic class sharing a set
of attributes. They confer meaning which is considered 'truth' in
anthropological discourse. Seeing human reality analytically means dichotomizing
it along lines of one or several of these dualities which have their origin in
the existential paradoxicality of human reality. Emphasis upon one of these
dualities, upon one side or the other of a dichotomy, leads to reification or
anthropomorphism, or to idealization or overemphasis of one to the under
emphasis of the other--it results in a distorted perception of human reality, no
longer whole but fractured, split down the middle. This is the basis for all
'explanation' within anthropology.
The terms etic and emic, derived from the words phonetic
and phonemic were introduced and became popular in anthropological
literature. Etic, from phonetic (a standardized system of recording voice
communication understandable to anyone trained in its use) signified a
scientific judgment that can be verified by any other trained observer. An emic
point of view (from phoneme, a sound unit meaningful only to speakers of a
particular language) is one from within a particular culture--the view of the
culture actor in terms of his conceptual categories. (Grabarino; 1982)
The definitions may be separated into two major categories: realist
and idealist. The realist approach is through observed manifestations,
behavior and the products of behavior. The idealist approach is through the
researcher's interpretations of the culture bearer's ideas of societal values
and norms. In brief, by one definition, culture is observable, by the other,
inferred.
Is culture real or merely an abstraction from reality? Does
it exist or is it only in the mind? The ethnographer's definition of culture
affects the way he does his fieldwork and interprets his data later. For the
idealist, culture is the ideal of an artifact, but not the artifact itself; it
is the design or mental code for proper behavior. It has been argued that
culture by the idealist definition is practically impossible to verify since it
is ascertained not by observation, but only by inference. On the other hand,
observed patterns are always filtered through the observer's own enculturated
perception and thereby distorted…(page 49-50)
There are two other basic dichotomies by which anthropology
redefines itself as a science, the first preceding from the second. Broadly the
first dichotomy is that between self as subject knower and other as objective
knowledge or alternatively defined as etic-emic. This dichotomy within
anthropologia is a form of self identification is more apparent then real. Etic
and emic, self and other, are largely methodological/theoretical issues within
the realm of anthropological praxis. Largely it becomes an issue of participant
observation in which either participant or observer roles are stressed. They are
based upon a deeper philosophical dichotomization between subjective and
objective knowledge, or between mind/body, or ideal/real, which will be dealt
with later. But anthropology as praxis will be interpreted on the basis of
self/other dichotomy now.
A valid outsider's perspective goes beyond merely an
anti-anthropological critique from the humanistic standpoint. A humanist
anti-anthropology only goes partially outside of scientific anthropology,
because the self definition of anthropology is as much as it is a denial of its
own rootedness in discourse, incomplete as a science. It is in itself a biased
criticism which fails to go beyond the boundaries of its own academic
embeddedness.
To the extent that anthropology as total scientific praxis
process as 'normal science' within academia, it is amenable to a Kuhnian
conventionalist interpretation as being paradigmatic. To the extent that its
self denial of its rootedness to the humanities as an essentially
non-paradigmatic form of knowledge, it is rendered as one professional has
described it 'poly-paradigmatic' from an insider's perspective.
Anthropology construes itself reflexively within the realm of
science--it strives to gain recognition as a formal and respectable scientific
discipline. Thus it interprets itself generalistically and programs itself in
terms of its everyday praxis to the philosophy of science, whether positivistic,
realistic, empirical or Kuhnian.
The nature/culture dichotomy is the essential problematic
which frames the anthropological mind as being 'scientific' in a human sense.
Whatever else it may or may not be or attempt to achieve, anthropology is in the
first and final analysis informed by a fundamental schism between nature and
culture. On one hand we have physical or biological anthropology which sees
itself as being strictly positivistic, methodologically the most scientific of
the sub-disciplines. On the other extreme is the broad discipline of
socio-cultural anthropology which again tends from one extreme of socio-biology,
ecological anthropology and social evolutionary theory to the other extreme of
symbolic anthropology and cultural history. Even on the other extreme it can be
shown that most anthropologists seek either some form of biological
reductionism, Victor Turner's or Levi-Strauss's brains, or admit some form of
superior super organic analogy still rooted in a naturalistic, biological
substrate. As key organizing metaphors the notions of human culture and human
nature are fundamental to any understanding of human reality, but nobody has,
nor ever will, a bottom line upon their redefinition--they are theoretical
baseline models.
Nature is usually construed as the antecedent, and culture as
the manmade, consequent, a posteriori.
The notion of progress somehow informs a science of its own
identity and being, for becoming paradigmatic implies some form of progressive
evolution, if not toward some future vision, at least in a retrospective sense
of separation of the unknown from the unknowable, the signification of the
important from the trivial the emergence of the known from the unknown, of form
from the formless, the choate intellect from the primordial inchoate. Progress
is equated with being paradigmatic in the sense that scientific knowledge is
cumulative, deepening, more exact, specializing, diversifying.
The etic/emic dichotomy is the starting point for such a
comprehension. In the self identification process of anthropology, etic-emic is
largely misconstrued as inimical complementarities of anthropological
methodological fieldwork. This has implication both for ethnographic fieldwork
and ethnological textuality derived from such fieldwork. An insider's point of
view, even when self aware and self reflexive of the world outside the
boundaries of the academic castle, as a bit different from an insider's point of
view looking in.
More and more, with my acquaintance with an insider's
perspective and an outsider's perspective with anthropology it impresses me how
much anthropological praxis, of what it studies and how, can be turned upon the
study of anthropology itself as a sort of an anthropology of anthropology, or
the ultimate anthropological, reflexive anthropology. But this does not really
go beyond the anthropological maze of mirrors, self neurotic onaticism. More
than just 'observes observed' by another anthropologist the observing
participants participant observer, but we must reverse the entire relationship
in order to get some idea of a non-anthropological view of anthropology--of an
observer participant. I can only partially accomplish this, as I am partially
new to academic professionalism, but it is most interesting to take into
consideration 'outsider's' accounts of anthropology.
From the outside looking in etic/emic are rather
complementary rather than seen as inherently inimical standpoints. The
methodology of participant/observation 'in the field' is viewed as the
dialectical methodology overcoming this dichotomy. It is interesting that 'in
the field' is construed as the outside realm of anthropologia, as distinct from
the academic armchair. Etic defines the attempt to define the unknowable other.
To the extent that anthropology is scientific it is thought to render emic
objectively knowable, hence etic, in its scientific analysis of human reality.
They are the poles of a single dialectical continuum with participant
observation being the praxis ranging between them, integrating, mediating the
dialectic. Etic is distance in time and space--ultimately the horizon. Etic is
close, familiar, well mapped out, some would say culturally reconstructed.
The open and closing criticisms of an authentic anthropology
is an ethical question which so far anthropology has by and large failed to deal
with. To the extent of this failure being related to the notion of scientific
neutrality and objectivity, as it defines itself in the cloisters of academia,
it is rendered safe, non-threatening. Renewing anthropology scientifically
'non-relative' has not changed the inherent ethical issue of anthropological
praxis. To what extent is this praxis determined in form and function by the
state, and even as antithesis, to what extent does this become only state
co-option an internal segregation of potential threatening
elements--antithetical themes, confined to the extremes of anti-structure. It is
OK to be a self proclaimed Marxist in academia. A certain percentage of
academicians are expected to be, as representatives of 'human reality' one which
is in theory supposed to be politically varied and in theory and practice
democratic. Being a Marxist within academia does not affect the upper middle
class positioning or the paycheck, as long as Marxist attitude is
compartmentalized and safely 'encapsulated' within academia from the rest of
behavioral reality and not brought into the marketplace except through the
mediums of speech, publication, etc. The other side of the anthropological coin
is the criticism of the studied other. The criticism of the 'observed' goes
something like this--"you use us for your own professional profit, but what
good does this really do for us."
By bureaucratic compartmentalization, a potentially dangerous
threat is rendered neutral, safe, controlled. Thus we see the role of
scientization in anthropologia a bit more clearly. It merely renders
anthropologists hypocrites and anthropologia a realm of hypocrisy. No one really
believes a hypocrite. No one in the 'real world' pays much attention to what
anthropologists are about in their ivory towers, except when they themselves
become the objects of anthropological power--when they are put under the
anthropological lens of the magnifying glass.
Specialized knowledge is the eminent domain of the state.
Professors, sanctioned by the state, become the high priests in charge of such
knowledge. Knowledge eventually translates into state power, appropriated by
academia and controlled by the state. To the extent that professors successfully
compartmentalize private and public lives, they can foster 'anti-structural'
values in academia and standard middle class values at home. But to the extent
of being existentially dependent upon jobs, their conventional values
behaviorally contain any other 'anti-structural' values they may entertain. Much
of the existential insecurity underlying their personal lives becomes worked
into their academic performances in terms of the 'scientization' of normal
anthropology.
The question of anthropology as a science is rarely
indirectly addressed by anthropologists themselves, it becomes subsumed away as
a given, left as unfit problems for philosophers hounds to fight over. Being
conveniently discarded as trivial or irrelevant, the question of the
substantiality of human reality is itself unaddressed as well, even though this
question is crucial to the scientificity of anthropological praxis--it is
assumed to be enough in the confrontation of the anthropological unknown to
merely solve the unknown as if it were a set of puzzles awaiting the proper,
correct pieces of information solicited by the right questions. But
philosophically, this naïve presumption of human reality is highly questionable
itself.
Distinguishing between description and explanation or between
primary phenomena of reality and secondary phenomena of rationality, is to
fallaciously promulgate an unnecessary dichotomization of human reality by which
our anthropological dialect can begin. No such dichotomy preexists but is only
the residuum of the dialectic itself. Thus the possibility of the inversion of
the order exists, between primary and secondary, between perceptual and
conceptual and though not construed as 'normal' order of 'events' their analysis
remains an alternative and necessary reordering.
Its semi-paradigmatic structure as a social phenomena of
'science' as social scientific praxis, is never quite complete in its being
fractionated by competing 'sub-paradigms' with each striving against one another
for dialectical preeminence as an authentic 'science'. This renders it
dialectically 'paradigmatic/non-paradigmatic' as normal praxis. What remains is
a dialectical struggle of two competing, essentially complementary world views
within academic anthropologia, the 'paradigmatic' and the 'non-paradigmatic'.
These are the general differences between scientific anthropology and
anti-scientific, humanistic anthropology, which in its most extreme form
constitutes an 'anti-anthropology' as critical polemic against anthropological
activity.
But always, by one's sub-paradigm or another, there is a self
defeating drive towards predominance of some form of scientific normality.
Scientific normalization always remaining incomplete, turns into neurotic self
perseveration.
But being partially self determined as a normal science, we
must construe anthropologia within a semi-paradigmatic framework, not only in
its embeddedness as a system of social praxis within academia but in a wider
academic context embedded in a larger framework.
Franz Boas (1940: 468) and Stith Thompson (1929: xiii)
observed long ago that there seems to be almost no 'true creation myths' in
North America by which they apparently meant origin myths on the metaphysical
model of Genesis I, John I and for that matter, Aristotle's Metaphysics.
But Boas did note that there are in Northern California, myths in which
'creation by will' takes place (1940: 468) when we reread the Maidu and Kato
versions of these myths, it turns out that there are two creators, male and
female, and that they are present in a world that already has physical existence
at the very beginning of the story. (Thompson 1929: 24-37) The changes that then
take place in the world cam about when this man and woman engage in a
dialogue--there is no solitary male nude saying "let there be this and
that." A similar dialogue is at work in the Popul Vuh, and it constitutes
the Popul Vuh's profound rejection of Genesis (Tedlock; 1979). To argue that
'underneath the veneer' of myths such as these lie the workings of a single
universal logos is to cast a vote for the western metaphysic and against
dialogue. But the Popul Vuh ask to be approached dialogically, and the way to
write about the Popul Vuh might be to set down the opening words, Are uxe
oher tzih varal Quiche ubi, and then to go from there quoting and
questioning all along the way.
(Dennis Tedlock; "The Analogical Transition and the
Emergence of a Dialogical Anthropology" in Journal of Anthropological
Research; Vol. 35, #4, 1979.)
HUMPTY DUMPTY THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS STRANGELY
On relearning to reconstruct destructionism, ad infinitum, ad
absurdum, ad nauseaum
The paradox of the mise en abyme is the following:
without the production of some scheme, some 'icon' there can be no glimpse of
the abyss, no vertigo of the underlying nothingness. Any such scheme, however,
both opens the chasm, creates it or reveals it, and at the same time fills it
up, covers it over by naming it, gives the groundless a ground, the bottomless a
bottom. Any such schema almost instantaneously becomes a trivial mechanism, an
artifice. It becomes something merely made, confected, therefore all too human
and rational…(Miller)
Two Wild Geese
There: wild geese, swimming side by side,
Staring up at the sky!
White feathers against a deep blue,
Red feet burning in great waves.
Lie Chieu and Do Phap Thuan
A critique of anthropology can come from many different
angles within academia--from philosophy, from history, from hermeneutics, from
sociology, from literary criticism. Not the least important contributors to such
a critique are the people whom anthropologists have traditionally studied, but
whom, outside of anthropologia has not had a voice of their own to stand up with
against the scientific measurements made by western anthropologists. There can
be no doubt that with the best of intentions and the most careful of efforts,
anthropologists have been guilty of repeated misrepresenting or
'inappropriately' misappropriating the specimen other. Key informants and
friends in the filed and fictive kinship and appointed official or semi-official
representatives do not necessarily stand as the best or only voices possible or
available in the ethnographic description and ethnological explanation of entire
cultures, traditions or even smaller groupings. The voice of anthropology has
always been a partial and imperfectly selected and limited voice--it has been
more of a whimper or a whisper that a loud scream or call to a common humanity.
All too often, anthropologists have become the self appointed spokesperson for
voiceless, peoples whose lives before the anthropologist arrived to save the
day, were effectively outside of history. A critique of anthropology can also
come from those who are the potential or virtual audience--the readership and
consumers of anthropological industries. Also, perhaps most important, the
critique of anthropology may come from within academic anthropologia itself, the
voice of informed anthropologists who raise a polemic against the voice of
anthropologia. Importantly too, it is useful to notice where the critique of
anthropology does not come from. A critique of anthropologia must necessarily
extend beyond the narrow boundaries of its many fields and becomes by extension
a critique of academician which it is situated and a critique of the cultural
tradition in which it is embedded, and a critique of the structure which
underlies it and ties it into a larger socio-structural framework.
The critique of anthropologia does not come from those
preachers, practitioners and power managers of anthropologia who remain for the
most part silent and unquestioning of their own activities, as well as not
coming from the many students who fill out its ranks in every department, as
these are the many who are in the least advantageous position in which to
proffer a valid attack.
The critique of anthropologia begins and ends upon its
academic doorsteps as one is just about to enter and exit its never never land
of human reality, as one looks both backwards and forwards at what one has left
behind and what is one headed for. At this moment, the critical moment,
anthropologia opens upon a wider and simultaneously becomes reflexive in its
transition to human reality to paper human reality. During this brief but
important moment of transformation, the would be anthropologist has the
opportunity to see anthropologia in the light of day, framed by its passage way,
reference against a larger world of the outside. Seen against a larger reality,
the interior of anthropologia seems small indeed. It becomes like the entrance
to Disneyland down main street, in which there is a progressive scaling down of
perspectival dimensionally to create an illusion of being 'larger than life' of
being more distant than it really is. This is a part of the abstractive process
of anthropologia when it recreates its make believe realities through the words
and voices of its master story tellers and in the ears and imaginations of its
gullible students, who, like Gulliver are intent upon exploring strange new
worlds. In abstracting the 'essence' of different human realities, it leaves
behind the substance of that reality--the result are the fragmentary remains of
many artifacts ripped from their provenience in time and space--the Tokenism of
reality behind a sterile display case in an anthropological museum. The original
crafters, users, artists are all, for the most part lost or forgotten--these
artifacts fashioned by anonymous hands, the jetsam and flotsam of voiceless
history. Unlike a Van Gogh, whose surviving works are and reanimated and
empowered, vested with value via the mythology of the creator's life, the
anonymous artifacts of anthropologia remain but token fossils, fossilized
remnants, forgotten fragments with the only animation coming from cultural
mythology of the anthropologia itself. Anthropologists are continuously
attempting to convince themselves and each other and their general audiences
that these 'things' have some kind of life and living 'outside of their
own'--recreation of this life where anthropologiastic mythology begins and
finally ends.
We are dealing with a mythology of culture--the stereotype of
archetype of an ideal baseline of what a culture is as a 'thing' or body of
'things and their interrelations' which is apart from both history and our
history of its understanding. Culture becomes an independent entity, a sense of
unity, a thing of its own which must therefore have some kind of life of its own
which is desirable, having definite limits, etc. This mythologization of the
cultural other is unavoidable as long as the anthropological self must define
itself as being 'cultural' as well. Culture whether it is the material antefacts
themselves, or the essence which is only 'to be inferred' from the presence of
such artifacts, takes on a nefarious existence of its own--it is presumed to
preexist a priori to its discovery by the anthropologist. This taken for granted
life of culture stands outside of history proper--it is largely a historical
without beginning or end, in its own mythological realm without real time. The
people behind the artifice of culture, become the anti-structural projections
and reflections of the anthropologists themselves, they are the embodiments, the
agents, the actors, the carriers, the servants, the prisoners, the wearers of
'culture' just as the anthropologist is the wearer and bearer of the mantle of
cultural authority themselves. They are no longer just people caught up
existentially in their throes of their historical birth and death--they become
token representatives of the mythology of culture, bound to reenact it, to
realize, materialize, to enliven its mythological prophecy.
All groups of people, all communities, which are organized
around a central core 'thing' have a mythology about that thing in which they
are busily acting out--it helps them to make 'sense' of their shared history.
The community of anthropologia is not to be discounted from this process of
mythologization of their own reality. Mythologization is one of the distinctive
features of being human which marks us off as sharing a common humanity--giving
us social identity to a world wide community of humankind, and which
distinguishes us as different from all other forms of life on earth. It renders
us unique and special, as well as dangerous in a way that no king of the jungle
can hope to be.
The mythologization behind anthropologia is the reification
of 'culture' with an upper class, capital 'C' as a rational ideal, as a
noumenal, categorical archetype--"all humans have culture'. This is a
common dialectical proclivity of the western rationalistic mentality and
materialistic value orientation. It leads s to a search for cultural El Dorado,
the hermetic utopia, the paradise upon earth. It leads us to hypothesis and
hypostatize the ideal cultural type, the universal rules, structure, reasons,
meaning of culture which can become summarized in so many words in a pat
dictionary type, positivistic definition. This misleads us into believing the
humans must have and share a culture into in order to be considered human.
Against this positivistic quest for the presumed, a priori, hypothetical
'culture', this noumenal reality of the rational ideal logos of culture, like
the logos of nature, all the empirical manifestations become minor versions,
imperfect and temporary versus absolute and eternal, and thus relativistic
versions of 'cultures' many little cultures in the lower case sense which are
but partial and imperfect approximations and manifestations of culture. It is a
concept employed somewhat similarly to the biological concept of species and
genus--species for boundaries beyond which its members cannot evolutionarily
stray and have distinctive features--there is thus a species holotype against
which all variations are referenced against a common theme. Similarly too, with
culture and many small cultures, each of which is presumed to have a species
archetype. These are arranged taxonomically into a tree which is supposed to
reconstruct the evolution of cultures, and from this tree of culture the
mechanism of cultural evolution, of culturation, can be inferred, and its
functional rules of operation explicitly defined--thus 'culture' can be then
scientifically defined as a universal set of propositions. Part of this
positivistic mythology is to put all 'cultures' in the relativistic sense into a
pan human framework of cross cultural comparison from which the scientific
evolutionary tree of culturation can be derived, and 'culture' can ultimately be
explained.
There is in this mythological dialectic two sets of
interacting dualities or analytical dichotomies of human reality--one is the
rational-relative dichotomy underlying rationalistic dialectical discourse of
the western mentality with its spiritualistic/materialistic value orientation,
and the other is the culture/nature dialectic. 'Culture' is the ideal/type sense
is held to be the dialectic of antithesis of nature--'human nature' is held to
be somehow underlying culture. Human reality is the dialectical synthesis of
this dichotomy. Culture becomes nature through the organic analogy and the
naturalistic fallacy--culture takes on the characteristics of nature--it evolves
like nature, it speciates, it has a taxonomy of differences and boundaries. It
functions according to certain organiismic principles.
Behind the ideal of 'culture' there are to be seen numerous
little 'culture' of the garden type variety--and if we even look a bit more
closely to the fabric of history, our mythological veil of Maya dissolves even
further, the molecule of culture dissolves into a group of people, the atoms of
human realities, which in themselves are reconstructable into the subatomic
'things and interrelationships'. All we find are people frozen in an instant
moment of time, a photography from history, interacting in seemingly typical
form.
The mythology of culture in anthropologia becomes translated
into the ideology of true, or positivistic scientology in its ritualistic, the
methodological praxis. There is a modicum of ritualized magic--incantation of
special numerological formulas, the carrying out of specific social ritual
performances of interviews, questionnaires and surveys--statistics becomes the
religious language of positivistic anthropologia which 'witnesses' or proves its
own mythological prophecies. It should be reiterated that this mythological
reality is a paper reality only--the natives of the triple canopy forests
are paper creatures of the anthropologist's imagination, living in a paper
wonderland of anthropologia.
This process of mythologization of human history and humanity
is carried to its absurd extreme in the biologization of human
reality--biologism and the fallacy of biological reductionism seeks to explain
all culture as purely the epi-phenomenal byproduct of human nature which is
merely anthropomorphize. Human nature follows the legal-jural dictates of Mother
Nature. But behind this façade of biologism is the ugly reality of social
racism and of perpetuation of capitalistic exploitation--mythology has an anchor
in human history, but not the same one in which engaging in it would lead us to
believe. It is mode of misinformation in reinforcement of a capitalistic mode of
production. It divides and conquers by creating a mythology of 'survival of the
fittest' and the anarchic law of the jungle 'all against all'. It is a
mythological vision of Malthusian world of limited good, a zero sum game in
which one person's gain is another's loss. This game justifies social nomothetic
systems of hierarchization and rank order of social value in the form of
achievement and intelligence tests.
In the process of normalization or 'paradigmaticization' of
anthropologia, of a consensus of consciousness, of common senseness, there
should be predicted a trend toward progressive biologization of anthropologia,
people who are preoccupied with social power and hierarchy will promote their
own narrowly defined self interests via anthropologia in the form of the
'naturalization' of mankind. These people will tend to predominate in many
departments of anthropologia, and will begin defining and redefining the
standards of anthropological discourse, the norms and success ethics of belief
and behavior in anthropologia. Thus anthropologia will crystallize and
hyper-compartmentalize into a pyramidal hierarchy of social structural relations
with a broad family platform in the fantasy paper gardens of bio-culturalogy,
and its heads in the computer driven illusions of mentalization of nature.
The anthropological mythologization of humankind and the
historical stream of humanity has no other course set for itself as long as it
continues to define and belong to a larger system of civilization which insists
upon the domination , control and destruction of nature by the means of cultural
creation. This is the future of the dialectic of anthropologia as it learns to
define itself more paradigmatically as a science. But the circle of its own
ideology of belief and behavioral belonging will not be broken as long as the
history of its own making has been denied.
As long as anthropologia leaves itself no other alternative
avenues for being and becoming anthropological it will have no on other
possibility than this process of bureaucratic 'banalization'. There will be
several characteristics of this banalization process.
There will be a growing complex of fear and fear motivated
routine behaviors, which amounts to little more than a form of magic in the name
of science. This fear will be the result of the cultural repression of
fear--being afraid of fear, to admit and show fear. Fear is a natural response
to change, a trigger for adaptive response. Fear which becomes repressed because
in the competition, the social war of all against all, one cannot allow oneself
to show one's enemies that one is afraid, because then one will admit defeat.
Courage then is not longer learning to live with fear and overcome it by
creative adjustments, but becomes a fear complex, the neurotic Angst which is
the Geist of being modern and making it modern in a modern sense, it becomes the
hubris of ego and ethnocentrism--the demonstration of superiority that one is
genuinely not afraid of one's competitors--courage becomes the servant and
master of fear--the complex of fear. It is no longer the courage to face one's
fears and admit one is genuinely afraid, but becomes the disguise and cause of
fear, the superficial mask of repression, hidden fears. Fear of death, fear of
loss, failure, become the fear of the unknown, become the masters of life, the
preoccupation with success, the Weberian dissonance that one is 'chosen'
naturally and supernaturally in one's 'calling'. The complex of fear results in
a pathology of social relations, a complex of control of fear--a false ego
consciousness, and collective conscience, in which people become channels,
controlled by the invisible marionette strings of the existential anxieties.
People become very expectable, predictable, manipulable when they can be played
upon and managed by their overriding fears. The result of this fear complex and
its social crystallization is the destructiveness of an overemphasis upon
critical deconstructivism of the significant other--a wish to destroy the
humpty-dumpty other who sits upon one's own territorial fence. It becomes the
frustration and resistance of genuine creativity and creativeness, the
discouragement of creative activities because it is a sign of genuine courage
and strength which cannot be controlled by existential fears, rather than a
token acknowledgment of weakness and fear, a ritual act of submission to the
authority of fear and its dominance. Certain authoritarian, sadomasochistic
archetypes of hierarchy become 'empowered' and enacted in the demonstration,
repetitive obsessive compulsive demonstration of its activities. There is an
unconscious fascination of the tokenism of death and dying, the destructiveness
of dissectivism, heurisci Haruspication of internal dynamics in order to divine
the truth. Thus the magical of anthropological mythologization turns into the
black magic of witchcraft and its divination.
There occurs in the development of this fear complex a
hyper-compartmentalization of the self, of the individual personality, a radical
dichotomic monopolarization between the public and private domains--there is
something of a split personality, a double alter ego of the
'participant-observer', between the domains of the private and the public. The
individual becomes his own traitor, his own double agent, the spy upon his own
soul. This double hyphenated identity is essentially paranoia. Guilt and blame
go hand in hand, the fear of control and the control of fear, form the basis of
the manipulation of guilt and dependency in neurotic interrelationships which
become essentially paranoia. It is not abnormal to become paranoid in a paranoid
society. The paranoiac and the culture of the cult of paranoia, become the
bounds of anthropologia, who screws and then murders his informers, in the
battle between good and evil. In our ethics we become preoccupied with the
exorcism of evil, the battle between God and the Devil, and in its exorcism, we
fail to come to terms with the ethical, existential possibility of our own evil,
of the devil who is hidden within, the monster of our own self. In the
compartmentalization between public and private, there is a dichotomization
between 'professional' and personal--there is a disintegration between work and
play, between front region of masks and illusions of power and a back region of
secret fantasies and play. Our children, our students, become somehow strangely,
the mythical recreation of our own unconscious, the embodiment of the
anthropologist as much as the adult anthropologist behaves as a 'child' of the
people he/she is studying. In rebellion and reaction, 'children' evince the
devilish play which is repressed and denied within ourselves. They become the
enactment, the living embodiment, of the antithesis of out own positivistic
mythologization of our realities. They realize the alternative, opposite
possibility within us, and by their reaction, are not better than us. They are
neurotically attached in ties of psychological, unconscious, mythological
dependency. The prophecy of mythologization comes full circle in its
realization.
Creative integration involves making work play and play work,
it involves a growing up to accept the adult responsibility for one's own
existential uncertainty. It no longer involves an attack and defense against the
threat of the Unknown, but learn and explore and live within the twilight realm
between the light of the known and the darkness of the 'before unapprehended
relationship between things'. It involves the loss of innocence and of
ignorance. Creative integration involves learning how to genuinely play and
genuinely work--work is no longer a task to make money, a dirty job to be gotten
through--it becomes playful, enjoyable. There is no longer a split in the
personality between professional and personal, front or back, face and hidden,
public and private--there is one self, one integrity, which goes everywhere,
which presents one genuine person. It involves honestly and sincerely the
weaknesses and fears within the self and the strengths and courage of the other.
This is done creatively, recreatively through fostering and expression of
creativity. There is no longer a dichotomy between independence/dependence or
self/other, but becomes an integrity of interrelationship, interdependency, of
we, of us, of many egos.
To the extent that anthropologia is a function of this fear
complex, the mythologization of culture, and its own cultural anthropologia,
will tend to be ingenuine and spurious--a preoccupation with making money to
secure mythological security against existential uncertainty. It will tend
towards spurious, ingenuine, inauthentic presentations of self and social
relations with a mythologized significant other, with social relations based
upon usefulness, convenience, to be manipulated, and relations of
hierarchy--parent-child kinds of interaction of fictive kinship, of mutual but
uneven reciprocity and obligation. Such spuriousness of its culture will lead to
a promotion of anthropologia, a separate way of life of its own in which its
relationships with the outside world are privileged and usurped in specially
defined ways.
Anthropologia and its cultural mythologization becomes a part
of a larger culture of narcissism, of selfish childishness which cannot see
beyond itself, which is only reflective of its own system of believe and
belonging. It is tied to itself. It cannot know what lies beyond its own image,
its narrow circular horizon. The other becomes a reflection of the self, a
reflection and projection of one's own existential needs, of one's own
mythological consciousness. The other becomes a token vehicle only for the
realization, the materialization of one's own utilitarian happiness and success.
The culture of the narcissism is self reflective but not reflexive, it does not
apperceptively recognize or apprehend its own self in relation to others and to
a wider reality. The media fosters this narcissism of self, of promotion of self
interest at any cost, of becoming 'better' and being the 'best'--we become so
busy at being good that we forget how to be real people. The mythological other
stands as the aggrandizement, the apotheosis, of the anthropological self who is
caught up in its own narcissistic charade. It becomes like children who fight
over nonsensical things while playing silly games of make believe. We are all
children of history. The narcissistic self cannot move beyond an I-it
relationship of self love--cannot genuinely love, nor therefore understand the
other in any but purely, practically spurious and ingenuine way. In being unable
to genuinely relate to or understand another human being, the narcissistic ego
cannot extend its realm of knowledge beyond itself, it is a lonely, isolated
self surrounded by a vast unknown realm. Beyond the mirror or narcissistic
consciousness is only the silence, the emptiness of meaning beyond one's own
becoming, believing and belonging. We remain as children who fail to grow up in
the face of the possibility of making it and losing it.
There is an important language of the narcissistic ego which
is entirely self reflexive--it achieves no communication with other in any
genuine sense, but communicates only ameaningful, spurious trivia which is
regarded by the ego as important, critical information of mythological
significance. There is effective a boundary maintenance mechanism of the
instrumentalization of language to create mythological space and distance
between the self and the other. One of the mechanisms of language employed is
jargon of professionalese, which marks off the boundary of conscious identity
between insider and outsider. Another mechanism is that of euphemism--the
deployment of an arsenal of words without any precise definition, words whose
meanings are kept hidden, presumed only, connotational, words which mean
everything and anything in general but nothing in particular or specifically.
Culture is a euphemism of anthropologia, there are many more such euphemisms.
Such words are left up to the prerogative of the user to define as it seems fit.
These are framing metaphors, or organizational metaphors which provide a sense
of closure to an otherwise disjoint mythological reality--they allow
inter-translation between ideal and real, between inside and outside, as well as
being the mechanism of information control-selective 'passing'. Language is
deployed non-verbally as well--things not said, people who are deliberately,
consciously ignored or spoken to, people who are denied entry by silence, or who
are spoken about behind one's back or at a distance--the connotation is always
present and immediate, but the direct determination, the direct denotation,
admission of the other, is always 'absent'. A sign of a problem, is never being
able to look one directly in the eyes while talking or of never being able to
give one a direct response or answer to a question. Narcissistic defenses are
up. There are other non-verbal body languages--scape-goating, witch hunting,
systematic exclusion, signs of dominance submission--putting one's feet upon the
table to show that the other's presence is not important,, butting into private
conversations, brushing deliberately past another, sitting facing away from
another person. I have experienced, all of these childish reactions from many
adult like 'professionals' in my year in this department. Echosim is another
trick, using another only as a sounding board of one's own monologue, only
hearing and not really listening to the responses of the other, misconstruing
this in one's own frame of reference. Professional pontification is another
mechanism, tried and true tradition of academia. Information becomes dictated
from professor to the students as a set of unquestioned propositions which are
reinforced by rhetorical verbiage.
This critique of the culture of narcissism with an archetype
of the narcissistic child, is the beginning basis of departure for a critique of
anthropologia but this critique begins here, but does not end here, except when
it comes full circle in the exercise of its own restrictive imagination. But the
critique of anthropologia does not step outside of the mythological circle of
anthropological consciousness, it is only in this sense spurious itself. But it
does provide an important dialectical stepping stone, a chunk of leverage, from
which one might swing oneself, passing out of the realm of anthropologia, to
firmer, more secure ground just beyond the horizon. The critique of
anthropologia carries us to the borders of its realm and forces us to look back
with a critical eye, but it fails to encompass beyond this realm and to enter or
engage in a new kind of dialectic. At the edge of anthropologia, it becomes self
entrapped, in a never ending regress of meaning, a labyrinth of mirrors, in
which the self becomes so schizoidally fragmented that there is no longer any
center at all. The path beyond anthropologia does not necessarily lead
indirectly away or against it, but leads through it and around it.
The reflectiveness of the narcissistic ego is not the same as
the reflexiveness of the critique of anthropologia--one begins as antithesis of
the other, where the other leaves off. There occurs in the critique of
anthropologia a critical dialectic between scientific and anti-scientific
humanistic anthropologia, and between reflective and reflexive forms of
anthropological dialogue.
'Reflective' is a related but distinguishable term, referring
also to a kind of thinking about ourselves, showing ourselves to ourselves, but
without the requirement of explicit awareness of the implications of our
display. With the acute understanding the detachment from the process in which
one is engaged, reflexivity does not occur. Merely holding up a single mirror is
not adequate to achieve this attitude. The mirrors must be doubled, creating the
endless regress of possibilities, opening out into infinity, dissolving the
clear boundaries of a 'real world'. Babcock refers to this as 'identity with a
difference'. (ibid.:2)
Narcissus tragedy then is that he is not narcissistic enough,
or rather that he does not reflect long enough to effect a transformation. He is
reflection, but he is not reflexive--that is, he is conscious of himself as an
other, but he is not conscious of being self conscious of himself as an other
and hence not able to detach himself from, understand, survive, or even laugh at
the initial experience of alienation. (Ruby; 1982: 3)
As a critique of the narcissism of un-reflexive
anthropologia, reflexive anthropology moves beyond the initial self
reflectiveness of the anthropologically defined relationship. It is defined as
the basis of understanding the other engaged in a reflexive dialogue with the
self:
Though reflexivity takes on different shades in various
disciplines and contexts, a core is detectable. Reflexive, as we use it,
describes the capacity of any system of signification to turn back upon itself,
to make itself its own object be referring to itself; subject and object fuse. A
long tradition exists in which thought has been distinguished from unconscious
experience; where life is not merely lived naively without being pondered but
regarded with detachment, crating an awareness that finally separates the one
who lives from his history, society, from other people. Within the self,
detachment occurs between self and experience, self and other, witness and
actor, hero and hero's story. We become at once both subject and object.
Reflexive knowledge, then, contains not only messages, but also information as
to how it came into being, the process by which it was obtained. It demonstrates
the human capacity to generate second order symbols or
meta-levels--significations about signification. The withdrawal from the world,
a bending back toward thought process itself, is necessary for what we consider
a fully reflexive mode of thought. To paraphrase Babcock (1980), in order to
know itself, to constitute itself, as an object for itself, the self must be
absent from itself; it must be a sign. Once this operation of consciousness has
been made, consciousness itself is altered; a person or society thinks about
itself differently merely by seeing itself in this light. (Ruby; 1982: 3)
The reflexive critique stems from the apperceptive
recognition of the before unapprehended self reflectivity of the anthropological
system of mythologization. It stems from the realization of the inherent
potentiality of any human system of signification to be tautological, to close
upon itself, the inherent, inescapableness of the tautological basis of any
language which defines itself in its own terms. But the reflexive critique does
not go beyond this recognition. It deconstructs Humpty Dumpty but is unable to
put the fragile reality of Humpty Dumpty back together again. Reflexive
deconstruction is attached to the very thing it destroys, the self, thus
inevitably results in the self destruction of the infinite regress, the fall
into the meaningless chasm of the mise enabyme. It suggests an infinity of
alternative possibilities but provides none. Reflexive criticism is the first
antithetical step outside the anthropological thesis, but it does not by itself
constitute an alternative version, or a new synthesis. Thus it becomes what it
denies, its strength becomes its own greatest weakness. It interposes, in its
criticism a barrier of reflexiveness which itself it cannot then overcome--there
is then an absolute distance between self and other, in which the other and self
are reduced to a solipsistic nothingness, to meaningless. There can be no
communication beyond self communication.
An alternative system goes beyond reflexive critique in two
ways. First it becomes a system of seeing alternative possibilities vis-à-vis
the self/other relationship--it does this through focuses introspection,
retrospection, prospection, extrospection in the sense of an artist who paints a
self portrait or a portrait of another in which there is always a reminder, a
hint of the face of the creator. This way goes beyond the mere use of light and
lens and mirrors, and becomes a system of context independent interpretation or
translation, created by the artist. It is not a mere photography, it is a
creation. It is a system of coming to know, of learning how to understand
self/other in reference to one another which transcends and in the process,
integrates the reflective and the reflexive into a new re-synthesis of Humpty
Dumpty, of human reality, a new reconstruction, which utilizing both, goes
beyond them, beyond the limits of either. It simultaneously involves a momentary
suspension of the system of credibility, of unbelief in the system. The whole
system becomes suspended, opening its doors and windows to a wider larger
reality outside, such that what remains or becomes exclusive finds re-entry into
the system and runs into the pattern, disrupting it. This is the process of
frame elicitation, frame disruption, frame reevaluation which centrally underlie
genuine anthropological praxis. The integration of the two become the vehicle
for its own systems transcendence and suspension, the leftover fragments of the
system are not discarded, but are reincorporated into a new sense of order.
Reconstruction takes place which is no longer tied to the old contextual
framework, but is itself relatively context independent. At this point the old
language, taken so seriously and personally, becomes merely a world play, a
language game, which becomes seriously played--the seriousness is no longer
invested in the products, the results, but in the process itself. There is a
delight in apparent disorder which then yields itself to a new sense of order,
an alternative arrangement. The old relationship, surviving rearrangement,
withstands the test of time, and become more genuine in the most human of senses
possible--in terms of the greater realization of human possibility.
Introspection, or retrospection transcends mere reflexive
reflections or apperceptive recognition in using this as a vehicle, a means, for
a search for a new reality, a new reconstruction from the leftover fragments of
the deconstruction. It involves a lapse of reality, a replacement of old for
new, a suspension of a system of belief, behavior and belonging, in order to
reconsider the genuine reality behind such a system. It is the artist who learns
not egotistical self conceit through the painting of numerous self portraits,
but realizes the many alternative faces of his own humanness of being, the many
possibilities of humanness within the self and the other--it can be, in all its
vicariousness, a trading place with another, a momentary stepping into another's
shoes, seeing things through another's eyes, an understanding of walking a short
distance in another's path. It is another self and another other, an alternative
other hitherto unapprehended, unrecognized. Through such self portraiture the
artist comes upon deeper wisdom of understanding, greater insight into human
reality, and learns a greater humility of the self in relation to the divine
unknown. The self, in growing, shrinks in relation to the whole, and the paradox
of both opening and closing the door of the mise abyme become clearer and more
mysterious. Real existential reality in all its greyness of local color, is not
embraced, but not denied or obfuscated or clarified but is embraced more fully.
The ego bows to the human responsibility of history and knowledge.
ALICE LOST AND FOUND IN THE ACADEMIC WILDERNESS
on relearning the humanities in meta-anthropologia
reconsidered
The paramount themes of this work has been that anthropologia
has somehow stood outside of human history. It seems fitting in the
reconstruction of the Humpty Dumpty of anthropologically defined human reality
to define how anthropologia can be brought back into history, or how the history
of humanity as process and event can be brought back into the realm of
anthropologia, in the process bringing into the mainstream of history as well
those portions of humanity which have been represented almost exclusively by an
anthropological voice. Also it is important to take a step back from the details
of anthropologia to see the broadest strokes of anthropology as embodying
implicit a form of philosophy about human reality. By and large anthropology as
remained both a historical and a philosophical in its theory and praxis.
Anthropologia stands in need of reification vis-à-vis the humanities of
philosophy and history--as long as it continues to define itself
paradigmatically as a science this will have certain implications towards its
relation to these fields of inquiry into human reality.
In order to embrace and reawaken to the consciousness of
humanity, anthropology must go beyond itself, transcend itself, to become a
meta-anthropological dialectic which comprehends philosophy, history, religion
and the arts, not just western philosophy or history or art but all forms of
philosophy and all histories of humanity. History is the collective
consciousness of humanity. Anthropology must come to terms with its own
historical dialectic, its own stream of historical consciousness such that it
can better understand itself as a part of a larger framework of humanity. But it
is argued that this is the project and purpose of true science--science
transcends its own history in the making--science steps outside of the
reiteration of time and embraces timeless eternity--physical natural laws stand
forever--universally valid. This presumption of universality of science is
really quite bold and unproven for a field of sub-conscious endeavor barely a
few centuries in age. But science has come to stand for something else,
something more fundamentally evil and problematic. It has stood for those forces
of humankind which have attempted to put humanity outside of nature, to
predominate and control nature--through understanding its principles of
functioning to attempt to predict and master it, in the name of human
civilization. It would seem than that the real dialectic of humankind is a
fundamental dialectic between human history and nature. In the past twenty
thousand years or more, nature has experienced a mass, global extinction, a
dying off, at the hands of human culture. Culture has rapidly come to transgress
and supplant nature. The historical pace, the tempo of this mass extinction
process of nature has been quickening in pace up until the very present, and
there have been very few in the way of braking actions applied to halt or
reverse the overall tempo trend--in fact it is only accelerating much more
rapidly today than it has at any time in the past. This leads me to a very
pessimistic prospect of the role and future of humankind in relation to its
natural substratum and to a highly skeptical place of anthropologia in such a
process as a 'science of mankind'. The pure scientists standing apart from the
mainstream of history, acknowledge in their criticism the work and misdeeds of
the applied scientists, and yet they do not share immunity or impunity in the
overall process by their insulation in their laboratories. We are confronting
here in contemporary times a most central and fundamental existential issue of
the predicament of humankind, one which should not be allowed to be naively pass
to the winds. If humankind indeed represents an evolutionary aberration of
natural process one which is essentially 'anti-life' then it seems that the only
destiny reserved for human history is that of eventual extinction. The human
species has become the most 'biologically successful' species probably
unparalleled in the annals of evolutionary history--its proliferates upon the
shrinking globe today as no mammalian species has done in the past, in the
process displacing, replacing and destroying a great proportion of the natural
habitat. And there is a certain kind of irreversibility of this process of the
mainstream of human history--not so much coming from the irreversibility of the
temporal process itself, as much as from a certain kind of historical
momentum of the mainstream currents, always converging towards a common
central ground which has gained such force and power that it becomes well nigh
impossible to stop or change its course. This momentum has both centrifugal and
centripetal forces, pulling in and throwing off. This is indeed, the historical
structure of the long run which humankind today, in all its pride and hubris of
its modern scientific technological civilization tend to forget. Once set in
motion and allowed to gather enough speed, this kind of momentum takes on a life
force of its own (or a death force) which both promises to propel humankind
towards the stars, and to eject it into the empty oblivion of space. Or does
human history represent a new epoch in the natural evolutionary history of the
earth--a new kind of creature which is no longer just a mammalian animal, but
the new representatives of a whole new expansive biological radiation on earth.
In this view, culture is not so much antithetical to nature as an adaptive
extension of nature, the human epi-phenomenon of natural forces--in Spencerian
evolutionism terms the new, natural, highest expression of the universal
principle of evolution.
It would seem as if the real answer lies somewhere in the
indeterminate middle ground between these two extremes of paradise on earth or
apocalypse. It is indeed difficult to pay attention to the many epi-cycles of
historical development and not to expect their recursive reiteration into the
long term future. Cities rise and fall, civilizations come and go, cultures
flourish and perish, all to become eventually forgotten beneath the sands of
time. We, the children of history, with out proud new science, attempt to
reverse this irreversible process, to stand outside of the circle of history and
yet is all this in vain to our future glory. Will our science learn how to solve
all of the problems created by our history, to remedy all of the ills and
growing pains of the civilization of humanity as it has come to conquer nature
and upon spaceship earth, or are we not sowing the seeds of our own fate.
The process of evolution is itself circumscribe in natural
history--it exhibits in the structure of the long run a fortuitous blindness of
chance which belies the diagnostic explanation of evolutionary theory and the
logos of biological principles. There is a proclivity to search for an order or
pattern of evolutionary process, a sense of progressive purpose behind its
developmental cycles, a process of reason which somehow defies entropy and
creates the symmetrical designs replete in natural manifestations. We expect a
rationality of evolutionary process, only to find evolution itself framed within
a larger sense of history.
History, in its envisioning and enactment, in the
understanding of it, is always and only mythological. But historical process
itself, of the unfolding of Chaonos, is in the making always blind and
fortuitous, without reason, without purpose, without myth. The only way we can
understand our experience of history is mythologically, but out experience
itself, existentially and phenomenological confronted, remains always
un-mythical. How then are we able to overcome this paradox of human
understanding in the dialectic between history and nature, between history in
the past tense, and history in the making in the present tense. This opens the
chasm of the mise enabyme, the groundless ground of our own phenomenal
existentiality. History in the making is the unexpected collocation, the
perchance fortuitousness of the blind collision of eve forces, the convergence
of events with unpredictable and unintended consequences. Convergency explains
historical momentousness and emergency--it is the paradox of two 'thing'
occupying the same space simultaneously--it is the synchronicity of history
which explains the mythological paradox of the groundless ground--of
simultaneous being and non-being of more than one future ward possibility.
History is the collision of streams of events phenomenal streams of events and
the mythological consciousness of their apperceptive recognition--a class of
opinions, interests, interference patterns which creates its own moiré'
effect--it is collocation of arrangement of discontinuous beings, the
collocation of the dialectic of opposites which results--there occurs a
synthesis of history of historical process--the making of history, which arises
from the collisiveness of its convergent tendencies.
This is the meta-logic of historical process which in the
differences forces into being new identities. Divergent histories lead t a
disintegrative process--a process of differentiation which eventuates in a
culture sac, a petering out of historical momentum. History slows to a stop, no
longer being living history, but the natural history of the dead.
Differentiation and assimilation are the two dialectical meta-themes of history,
being the processual forces of divergence on one hand and convergence on the
other. Divergence is based upon the principle of entropy while convergence is
the principle of anti-entropy. Change, destructive and constructive is the
epi-phenomenal manifestation and experience of these dialectical processes.
These processes are metalogical because they stand beyond, before, outside of
the logic of humanity, outside of the power of human logic to comprehend them.
They must be, therefore, taken upon the grounds of a grand leap of faith, the
will to believe in their priori synthetic existence--our a posteriori analytic
dichotomization of reality between similarities and differences is the only
manner in which we may rationally, logically apprehend this initial unity of
opposites--the undifferentiated whole, the dao of the universe of human reality.
But they are understood mythologically, as a posteriori history, as a
resynthesis of the whole. Phenomenal change, possible, unpredictable,
inevitable, is our experience of historical process. The human consciousness, in
its historical dialectic, must analytically tear apart in order to build back
again--the process of defining and naming is the first analytical step in this
dialectic of historical consciousness. But before this exists the first
undifferentiated experience of this phenomena, in which we experience this
change as ourselves belonging to the historical process itself, is always an
intuitive kind of understanding which evades description and defies adequate
explanation. It comes from being a part of the overall process, from immersion
within it unselfconsciously, unself reflectively. It is the process of full
involvement, complete commitment to the existential experience of historical
process. Our act of naming, out first act of conscious recognition of
experience, of perceptual reflection, is the first act of alienation from
historical process, deliberate rehabilitation of dichotomized reality, of
conceptual simplification, is the synthetic explanation which mythological
reattaches our identity to historical process, but it becomes 'identity with a
critical difference', a mythological difference. Our consciousness of history
comes full circle as we come to 'reunderstand' and reknow history in the 'way we
remember it'. This is an important second step in the process of mythological
alienation from history--in the distantiation from its essence of phenomenal
experience. This is the point at which consciousness, purely perceptively
reflective of reality, becomes conceptual reflexive about (??????????????)
We become transcendentally aware of history and its process,
as if we were apart from it, as if it were no longer purely subjective
involvement within it, but becomes objective relation, or distanciation, outside
of it. But this becomes hypothetical only, because we become aware of our own
possibilities for deception, for perpetration of a false history which stems
from the recognition of alternative possibilities for historical becoming. With
the recognition of the possibility of the false history, the misdeeds, the lie,
the accident, comes also the concomitant acknowledgment of the possibility for a
true history which is not mistaken, which is 'proven' which is intended and
deliberate--purposive is a deliberate, conscious sense--a sense of diachronic
order which is 'meant' historically. Thus, in the awakening of our mythological
historical consciousness, we are no longer merely the innocent, ignorant
children of history, but become adult like agents with existential
responsibility and guilt for 'making history happen' or not. And once our
consciousness has been historically awakened as to its possibilities, in a
collective way, there is no simple way of reversing its momentum--we cannot
simply take flight from history and return to naked innocence. We become bearers
of the burden of history, no matter how unwillingly or illusionistically. And
yet we can return to the embrace of history by our surrender and spiritual
emancipation from our own existential predicament within it--we can become again
childlike not childish in arrogance or irresponsibility, but childlike in the
complete involvement, the genuine engrossment of the primary experience
of historical process, as members of the human community. This is the only road
to our salvation as both children of history and adults of out own history. It
is the only clear middle way between paradise and paradox, between utopia and
oblivion. This involves no less than the spiritual rehumanization of history,
and the descientization of the world. It lies through philosophical
enlightenment of the existential predicament of humanity in the center of
historical process.
The pessimistic prospect of an aberrant humanity which has
embraced evil in the form of a science which is inherently 'anti-life' and
therefore self destructive in its own neurotic fulfillment, is not an acceptably
adequate answer to human history. The momentum of the wheel of history are great
indeed, and probably unstoppable,. But this does not abnegate a higher sense of
responsibility, of rational purpose, to affect a change in historical
directionality which may prevent the fulfillment of our own collective
mythology. We need new models of humanity and humankind, new ideal archetypes to
help us to act to resolve this pressing paradox. In part, anthropology can
provide an important part of this new model for understanding of humanity, but
it must in itself be carried beyond the boundaries of its own historical
consciousness as it has become the brainchild of science. Genuine science, is
not the solution to humankind's predicament, it is a part of the problem.
Science poses the basic questions which it is unable to satisfactorily answer.
Standing upon the existential edge of history, we feed the winds of time blowing
into our faces. In the twilight of our horizon, we cannot yet be sure whether we
are witnessing a sunset or a sunrise to a new age of humanity. We are still left
with a final choice, however small, or however much reduced, but which in the
cumulativeness of its common collectivity, can become a turning point a decisive
moment in history. We must more fully come to apprehend our possibilities for
becoming. If we slam the breaks upon the wheels of progress, it will still be
too late to save many things from happening, and in the process we will suffer a
severe shock of sudden reversal, of sudden immobilization. We have the
understanding of what and how to do this, but not the wisdom to make it happen,
we lack the immediacy and the sense of involvement in the entire process--we
have become existentially alienated from the responsibility of our own
involvement in historical process. To stop the clocks is to affect a radical
revolution in reverse--progress to a higher plane of technological civilization
from which we will regain our ultimate salvation is not the correct nor most
adaptable response to the long term history, but it is the most likely. There
needs to be a dramatic return to basics, a grassroots resistance to the
conspiracy of artificial, contrived developmental change. our strivings must
become day to day instead of year to year, our luxuries must be found in the
genuine experience of phenomenological nature rather then in the convenience of
an all consuming materialism. Poverty must not be any longer seen as the
existential plight from which to seek vicarious escape, but as a necessity of
survival, a law of nature, from which the only escape is spiritual not material.
We do not need a brave new world through which to reach a plane of ameaningful
existence, but we need the revitalization of a courageous old word in which
highs and lows are sought after for their tragi-comic sense of high drama.
Poverty is like an unwanted orphan child of history, a stray kitten, that no
matter how far it is taken to be gotten rid off, always manages to find its way
home again. The model of home must be revitalized with original conception. The
orphan of history, the children of history who have become the refugees, have to
find again a home, a sense of home, a sense of common family in a common
humankind. Home is more genuine in a slum, in a homeless family that remains
together, than in a mansion upon a hill. The home cannot be a castle, a fort
from which to seek refuge and build defenses from the existential vagaries of
the world, but a harbor, a haven, a house open to a neighborhood which has its
own little world gemeinschaft community feeling. We must learn to realize the
project of humanity on earth is not building a bigger more grandiose city on the
hill, but to build a safer, more stable home upon the earth, a pioneer
settlement in the wilds of nature, upon firmer more common existential ground,
however poor.
SOME FINAL REFLECTIONS
on learning to fall gracefully from anthropologia
'I engage with the Snark--every night after dark--
In a dreamy delirious fight;
I serve it with greens in these shadowy scenes
And I use it for striking a light;
'But if I ever met with a Boojou, that day,
In a moment (of this I am sure),
I shall softly and suddenly vanish away--
And the notion I cannot endure!'
…Zen presupposes that the ordinary person caught up in a maze of
crisscrossing ideas, theories, reflections, prejudices, feelings and emotions
such that his every experience is cut up into a variety of segments. These
segments are then taken as parts of experience which can be synthesized into a
whole. Thus the ordinary person does not really experience reality, but only the
network of ideas and feelings he has about reality. These ideas and feelings
always stand between the individual and the reality he confronts, mediating the
experience…(Koller; 1970: 184)
As the absolutely first principle of existence, Tao is
completely without characteristics. It is itself uncharacterized, being the very
source and condition of all characteristics. In this sense is non-being. But it
is not simply nothing, for it is the source of everything. It is a priori to all
the existing things, giving them life and function, constituting the oneness
underlying all the diversity and multiplicity of the world. Lao Tzu says,
"The Tao that can be told of is not the eternal Tao; the name
that can be named is not the eternal name. The nameless is the origin of Heaven
and Earth; the named is the mother of all things."
The reason Tao cannot be named is that it is without
divisions, distinctions or characteristics. It is unified, like an uncarved
block, being without change, knowing neither beginning nor end. But if Tao
cannot be named, what is named, what is named by 'Tao'? Lao Tzu's point in
saying that the Tao is beyond all names is that the fundamental source
and principle cannot be named, for it is the very source of names and
descriptions. Consequently, 'Tao' is a non-name; it does not refer to any one
thing. Rather it points to what which enables things to be what they are; it is
that which gives them existence and allows them to pass into nonexistence. When
it is said that Tao is the source of all being, and non-being, the word 'Tao'
functions very much like the word 'that' when is said the 'that' from which
being and non-being proceed.
The importance of Tao lies in the recognition that
there is something which is prior and anterior to the various particular things
that exist in the world, something which gives unity to all the existing things
and which determined the very existence and function of everything that exists.
What that something is cannot, of course, be said, for whatever can be talked
about is limited and determined, for it is the very condition of limits and
determinations. (Koller; 1970: 236)
In the grey way of anthropology there is no preoccupation
with differences of black and white, these are differences which make no
difference. There is only afield of in-between grey made up of many colors.
I have long felt a need to face as directly as possible some
of the issues I have dealt to be critical disparities to the realm of
anthropologia. These are things which are not clearly visible from the outside
unless one is already well enough informed about the inside. They are things
felt and experienced from the insider but rarely if ever brought to conscious
recognition--it is trying to find the outlines of the forest by looking amidst
its many trees. Only an 'informed' outsider can be reasonably expected to
honestly face and trace its boundary observing participation, which yet does not
lack in the insider's intuitive sense of real life understanding. For the realm
of anthropologia does not have a critical boundary which demarcates its
territory as exclusive for a privileged few, and this boundary, though rarely
admitted but always evident, serves to separate and isolate the realm of
anthropologia from the rest of the human reality and humanity. The real inspite
of the fact that the realm of anthropologia has as its central raison d'être
the study and understanding of the wider human reality of humanity. This places
anthropology squarely between the horns of a disconcerting dilemma. For the same
distanciation which anthropology requires for the objective study of human
reality, creates the very barriers which anthropologists require of themselves
in order to be authentic and legitimate become the same set of social distancing
mechanisms which they must then somehow theoretically and methodologically break
down in order to get closer to the source of their primary interest. In setting
themselves apart as a community of scholars with a privilege authority of
knowledge about the rest of humanity, they also fall prey a sense of false
consciousness which prejudices their understanding about humanity.
This dilemma, this disparity between the ideal and the real,
fosters a need to prove themselves vis-à-vis significant others. The need to
prove oneself begins with the individual ego identity, and leads all the way up
to a positivistic science of anthropology.
There is one archetype which I have not previously
elucidated, which stems from a related separate culture tradition--the academic
tradition itself--and in its image presents us with a different philosophical
origin of being the model for becoming, a different kind of value orientation
which has much or more bearing upon the understanding of academic anthropologia
than the previous archetypes which are embedded within the socio-cultural matrix
which contextualizes American Academia. This is the archetype of the
Intellectual Scholar. This is a very implicit and explicit model behind the
professionalization process of becoming an anthropologist--it is the other side
of the coin of academic anthropological socialization. In a sense this archetype
contains a contradiction of the previous one, and in its contradiction could be
seen as comprising a reputation of what this critical polemic against
anthropology is all about. Its idealistic argument goes something like
this--"Students of Academia are learning how to be intellectual scholars of
high caliber--this is a process which is justifiable in its own rights."
This is granted. But it is important to see the community of intellectual
scholars as an ideal membership-role model which is complementary and mutually
reinforcing the others seemingly superficially contradicting models of the
American Hero, and as, in some sense itself being a kind of model which in the
fullest of its implications and process of realization, leaves a bit to be
desired. The reality lying behind the model does not necessarily, rarely ever,
lives up to the standards and idealistic value orientations set by the model
itself--indeed to attempt to resurrect such a model in one's professional career
may amount to a kind of academic suicide as realities undercutting and
crosscutting its realization would undermine and render maladaptive any design
on its behalf.
Part of this problem with such an ideal role model is its
instillation of a false sense of perfectionism which is symptomatic of low self
esteem. This kind of deficiency motivation is adaptively neurotic and becomes a
self-frustrating vicious cycle as one is inevitably unable to live up to or
match the set of standards one sets for oneself in terms of academic performance
and progress. It leads to an unconscious pattern of 'choking'--of carrying a
project to near completion and then, out of frustration, leaving it without
complete or final closure upon it. This type of problem catches up people in the
waiting up stage of their socialization process--when what they and do will
become seen and recognized and possibly criticized by significant others.
Choking behavior leads to creative blocks, a track record of projects near
finished, begun but left unfinished, and of virtual 'failures' because they were
never allowed to succeed in the first place.
The other side of this Janus face model of the intellectual
scholar are those infrequent exceptions to the rule who do perchance achieve
high visibility within and without their own community. The myth behind these
are their veritable, proven, unquestioned 'perfection'--they become models of
emulation--something of a secular academic apotheosis of a human being in an
unusual set of circumstances into an unusual human being in a normal
surroundings. Our naïve, ideologically rewritten histories are full of such
Hero-myths of the professions. It becomes important to see Kant or Nietsche or
Sartre not as men of real history, who perhaps made the most of their times, but
as somehow isolated in a vacuum of history--internally only in the sense of
their philosophical contributions--their nationalistic 'coherence' and not how
these philosophers were the by-product of a human being within a very particular
historical epoch. This is done with the naïve apotheosis of a Margaret Mead of
a Bronislaw Malinowski--it becomes a shame with the 'other' side of their lives
becomes 'exposed' they are anthropological heroes 'fallen from grace' and thus
suffering the nemesis of fallen idols. But it is important to recognize that
this happens only because they are allowed to become false, superhuman idols in
the first place. There is always an 'anti-type' for any archetype. And those who
fall from grace do so, not because they were just human beings like other
people, but because, as with the pantheon of Greek Gods and Goddess, they had
'internal' character flaws which become their destiny. The more normal, rule
bound expression of this myth is the young field researcher who aims to fly so
bear to the sun, that the wax of their makeshift feathers melt, falling to their
doom in a vast anonymous sea.
But in order to see this kind of archetype as mutually
complementary in function with the American Hero Archetype it is important to
see if in function as a convenient and misleading system of rationalization, an
ideology of false consciousness, if one pays more attention to what the
academics say they are doing than to what they are actually doing, which becomes
by and large trying to convince and prove to themselves that they really are
doing what they say they are. It complements the other archetypes because it
symbolically reifies and therefore justifies the promotion of a privilege way of
life--it serves as the vehicle of true truth--the basis of proof. This is why
anthropology is full to the gills with rhetorical verbiage but has few definite
answers.
Even more important though, it is necessary to see the deeper
underlying process, one which I have used as the fundamental thematic thesis of
this polemic against academic anthropologia, is that it involves an artificial
but prerequisite dichotomization of human reality--analytically and a subsequent
need to synthetically reintegrate the reality, which accounts for the sense of
fundamental disparity and dilemma which belies the perpetuation of the myth. In
the possibility for progress, for truth, perfection, lies also the possibility
for ideological falsification, weakness, failure. This dichotomization is that
of the objective-subjective bifurcation of reality. It is the prerequisite sense
of objectivity which the anthropological scholar must bring to his presentation
of self via professional vehicles of expression and symbols, which entails the
deployment of distancing mechanisms and distanciation from the
subjective--especially as the subjective is embodied or represented by the
significant other. It becomes necessary to separate ourselves from the field to
'write up' the thesis 'objectively' it becomes necessary to separate ourselves
academically in our ivory tower armchair from our wider audience of the history
of humanity--the privilege of this contrived separation is a concomitant
bifurcation of reality--in our thinking, belief systems and systems of behavior.
All objectification requires distanciation--automatically
implying some sense of distancing. Distancing is, it is my central thesis, based
upon the emphasis of differences and the ignorance of similarities.
It results in social and spatial boundaries of all sorts. In the dichotomization
of human reality between self and other--there is in effect the creation of two
separate realities which articulate and interrelated in very controlled and
limited ways. Anthropologists have a fundamentally split personality--part of
the neurosis of their condition. They live in two worlds which are artificially
separated, and only synthetically reintegrated in 'biological' or mythological
ways. It is necessary to do this, because this is being what it is all about
being an intellectual scholar. It is the need to maintain the sense of objective
difference, the consciously significant difference which fosters and gives birth
to academic reality in the first place.
Objectification/subjectification of human reality leads to an
overemphasis upon the former and an under emphasis upon the latter. The
consequences are both positive and negative, good and bad, progressive and
regressive, if seen in the wider circle of its historical development, both
personally and culturally. But in the need to reintegrate the larger reality, to
achieve a sense of closure, there is a tendency to misconstrue the one for the
other. We look at successful scholarship in a very objective sense of internal
coherence, as truth separated from reality in a platonic rational ideal or
Kantian noumenal sense, so we see systems of theory very--as products of
universally held standards of internal order, which are but arbitrary and simple
minded, rules of belief and behavior, ignoring human creativity--failing to see
them as the historical byproduct-epiphenomena of human activity, or else we see
their human makers, originators as 'natural' talents, geniuses, differences
which are subjectively innate, ignoring historical preconditioning,
circumstances, etc.
There is created then, two separate realities. The first is
the reality of primary experience--the reality of feelings, perceptions, of
history. It is the existential reality of everyday human experience. The second
reality is in a sense parallel and coincidental with the first--it is a
propositional reality of the anthropological mentality. This reality takes its
life in dialogical discourse between those who identify themselves as
anthropologists and the other. This dialogical discourse is characteristically
in an anthropological idiom made up of 'jargot' and professionalese--the former
being loosely defined, context independent in terms and meanings, like
'culture', 'nature', 'universal', 'particular' which are used as organizational
metaphors--significant boundary markers framing 'differences'--identification
metaphors framing meaning in a general anthropological sense. This looser idiom
of anthropological jargot is a boundary maintenance mechanism, its knowledge and
fluency forms a threshold in passing between the ranks and the whole--forming a
boundary between the anthropologists and the significant/insignificant others.
This second reality becomes more restrictively defined in anthropological
professionalese. Its function is similar to the first, but it is concerned with
more internal cohesion than with boundary maintenance from without--a
descriptive language matching names and meanings in a definitive sense to things
and relations in a 'different' sense. Through academic literature, especially
journals, this professionalese precipitates a reification of the first, or proto
reality of human experience--the 'really realistic ' model--a sense of
anthropological realism which anthropologically symbolizes the first reality via
the second. Anthropological realism has its artificial existence in the first
reality in terms of the literature generated in the dialogical discourse. It has
concrete form in the first reality but it derives its meaning ultimately from
the second. This precipitated reality is a 'cultural' reality distilled from a
'natural' reality and has grown in the volume and reams of its literature. It is
a paper reality, and in the structure of academic anthropologia fosters
obtuseness and sophistry of names and meanings which serve as boundary
maintenance mechanisms. This 'concretized' anthropological reality overlays the
former and legitimates the latter, but it remains a context dependent reality.
This context dependency has, as a social basis, self sustaining and self
perpetuating and self determining implications--in the sense that 'all
distancing is self distancing' which is largely independent from the primary
reality, anchored to it only via methodological praxis of belief and behavior.
There is a cybernetic feedback between the two realities--a positive
regenerative or negative degenerative cycle which are between the first and the
second realities which are complementary and interdependent upon one another for
their expression and growth or inhibition. The two realities form complex
interactive dialectical cycle which precipitates anthropologia as a reified,
semi-paradigmatic scientific reality. This reality has become a cultural
historical reality upon a particular 'subjective/objective' dimensionally of
human reality. Its central concerns are boundary maintenance, self
identification and internal cohesiveness and external legitimization and
consistency within its own community as it becomes dialectically determined
along this central dimension.
Emphasis upon differences entails ignoring similarities.
Ignoring similarities is a simple process of selective perception--of choosing
to see as important, as significant, what we want to see. Emphasis upon
differences is based upon a dialectical dichotomization of reality--it is
analytical and a posteriori, based upon the principle of opposites or
non-identification--for any single entity there is an hypothetical non-entity
which is its dialectical antithesis--whether there are any 'in fact' they are an
implicit principle necessary for the system to work. It translates
scientifically into a system of biological falsification and
verification--'either a or not a'--the dichotomic logic of the excluded middle
ground underlying western rationalism.
So what is seen as the enlightened march of progress of a
semi-paradigmatic science of humankind, becomes an ongoing toward paradigmatic
closure with a certain dimensionally of human reality, becomes actually an
historical dialectic of development about a central dualism of human reality set
of dualisms about human reality. As it develops it accumulates in its wisdom,
theories become replaced by other theories, only to come full circle to replace
those theories in a modified form. And this is essential for paradigmatic
progress of anthropologia.
It is important to recognize beneath this traditional
academic archetype a traditional alternative possibility--education as a form of
social mobility across class and socio structural boundaries. For myself, a
large part of the academic socialization experience has had to do with coming to
terms with the social implications of my own class position, and of learning how
to re-negotiate this identity in order to facilitate crossing thresholds,
boundaries of others perception. Prejudice, discrimination, structural bias, are
all base upon simple ignorance which is based upon repression of self and
projection of certain 'social models' or archetypes. In a sense we are dealing
with 'class models or archetypes' which serve to position people vis-à-vis
others. These models form the bottom line and the baseline of social
reinforced vale orientations and systems of signification. They are the
historical horizon of our preconscious pre-understandings, beyond which we
cannot see. They 'frame' our reality and can be found to be rooted in our
language, everyday dialectical language as a social system of signification or
communication, especially of social differences. We can speak in a sense of a
kind of 'class subconscious' which preconditions, predetermines and 'structures'
or 'frames' our social interactions with others. It is the implicit
preconception of the status of another, which forms the baseline of meaning
behind anything and everything said of that person. It determines that whether
we over or under emphasize social difference, it will make no difference. It is
a bank teller, knowing how low your bank account is, who already has a preset
stereotype in which you are framed, who says to you, "if your checks
bounce, we know where to find you", however friendly and smiling. People
'frame' other people--pigeon holing them while not knowing or ignoring who these
people really are--by and large class difference is a false
difference--artificial ranking of social race. Once 'framed' by someone else who
remains ignorant in either an innocent sense or a deliberate sense of 'choosing
to ignore' then no matter what one may do, it is difficult to break out of this
pre-conceptual framework of understanding. Differences which do not fit the
framework are interpreted negatively because they threaten the coherent reality
of the other, no matter how false or contrived or ignorant. Part of education is
learning how to re-negotiate this 'frame' pre-conceptioning with socially
significant others. But it must be remembered that this works both ways. Failure
to re-negotiate one's personal frame, or context, in academia will result in
failed social mobility in the larger world, but success in academia does not
guarantee success in the larger world--this success depends upon other bases of
social class position. Academic successes who fail to achieve social mobility
because of low class background, 'fall from grace' within academia, as having
'personal flaws' which are defined outside of the academic system itself.
'In the field' one's bottom baseline of social class, which
may show like a see through garment, like the King's new apparel, no matter how
nice we dress--we carry it around upon our shoulders, heads and faces like an
invisible aura people sense and feel but fail to recognize--largely via the
nuances of language, including nonverbal body language we do not consciously
recognize. In the field, this framework falls away in reference our counter
reference to a significantly different system of framing. The anthropologist, in
the anti-structure of the field, can enact myths, vicarious fantasies, realize
dreams in the field, which become a subconscious driving force in the field 'a
dumping ground' for one's repressed wish, neurotic hang-ups. This 'framework' is
re-negotiated in someone else's terms. But this is, vis-à-vis, one's own
structural framework, dialectical 'anti-structure' it is a privileged 'becoming
the other'. When one returns from the field, to academia, one's previous
structural framework, one' class position, becomes 'reinstated' in albeit a
transformed way. Snobbery results when one's expectations of transformation are
not met with by the realization of one's actual baseline class status--the way
you tend to be publicly treated in a stereotypical fashion by others 'of your
own kind'. In academia, one does not escape the implications of one's status
identity like one can in the field by reconstruction. These implications of
status identity, the bottom line of one's ego, forms also the horizon of one's
ability to understand and to tolerate others who come within your academic
purview of signification. They become the unseen and unquestioned preconditions,
preconceptions, the boundaries, limitations of one's ego consciousness within
academic anthropologia, which one can then only escape by 'going to the field'
or going home 'on holiday'.
Re-negotiating the framework in the field, allow us to
re-negotiate the framework in academia, if we allow ourselves to step outside of
it enough, to shed our 'American' clothes and to 'go native' or become
'un-American'. It allows us to better objectify what before we could only
understand subjectively, and thus allows us to redefine it upon another set of
terms. But this does not always happen, as some people go to the field like
foreign diplomats upon a mission of scientific importance or of mercy for the
downtrodden other, or as a tourist upon an ethnographic sightseeing tour. But
they do not shed that American veil, those clothes of their own value
orientations. They experience alternative social structures, but only an
'anti-structure' of their own academic American home base. In essence, it makes
little difference whether one is in the field or in academia, or still sees in a
way preconceptual, selective way in which one existentially chooses to see in.
Thus in this, dialectic between self and counter reference other and academia as
structure and field as 'anti-structure' rite of passage 'to be endured' they are
differences which make no essential difference. They mutually reinforce the
fulfillment of an ideology, very American and very academia, but in a genuine
sense very un-anthropological. One gets what one wants, and the mythological
models become fulfilled in the acting out--they become the differences which
make no difference, instead of the non-differences which should make a
difference.
I think back, at the end of this work, to reconsider the
reasons which motivates me to do this in the first place--no matter how hard I
may have tried, I have consistently failed to re-negotiate my own lower class
status--this has made further academic progress difficult if not impossible,
where it remains relative facile and flexible for different peoples with better
class backgrounds. Academia does not escape class differences, it reinforces and
perpetuates them, but in its comparison between the name and the thing, the
symbol and the substance behind the symbol--it both fails and succeed in its
designs and functions.
This study was done because of a growing sense of
dissatisfaction, existentially based, between what is 'passed' as 'genuine' in
name and what seems to myself more genuine in substance. Anthropology is no
longer the 'science' it was once for me, which promised so much but delivered so
little. It was my own fault for putting most of my eggs in one basket and I
blame no one else. I have subsequently moved on, for what is for me at least,
bigger and better things.
But history is directing me to continue to define my ego
reality academically as an 'anthropologist' and so I must take a critical look
back upon the world I left behind, to see if I can salvage from my own personal
experience of it, anything of genuine value which might assist me in my reentry
into anthropologia. If it is a marriage, it is not a whole hearted one, or one
embraced freely with full commitment. If it will continue to be a marriage, it
will not be a smooth one, but will always be very rocky. If others can recognize
in their own personal experiences anything with anthropologia anything similar
to my own, then maybe this study has some residual social value. I will always
continue to define my anthropological ego identity as long as I continue to
choose to do so, very skeptically and self critically. I will always be as
cautious of academic 'professionalism' and authoritarianism as much as I have
learned to be cautious with any kind of 'ism' or authority. I cannot, any
longer, be an anthropological true believer. But in giving up my anthropological
naiveté's and human innocence, I may have gained something even more
valuable--and that is perhaps a sense of self respect in other people's eyes,
and a sense of the dignity of others in my own eyes.
The projective power of anthropology has a history linked to
the western expansion and dominion of the entire globe. This can be awe aspiring
in its scope and power but it can be blinding and frightening in its blindness.
'Anthropological blindness' is what I have been and will continue to be,
concerned with, as long as I must call myself an anthropologist. Anthropology
could not have come into being as it is now today unless it had the money and
power via its relation to a first world power structure. Money makes the
difference. It creates the constitutions which makes 'field work' possible. Our
'field' is another's home. Our backyard for play is another's front yard for
respect. Our front yard for laboratory work, is another's sanctum of
tranquillity. But this does not mean that anthropology cannot possibly become
something else altogether--a bridge or path to a new humanity and a new history.
As long as I remain attached to anthropology as some kind of basis for my social
status and ego identity, I will remain critical, I will as a 'humanistic
anthropologist' always remain skeptical of the anthropological mission as long
as it strives to define itself paradigmatically as a 'science of mankind'.
It is indeed difficult to do an 'anthropology of
anthropology' if only because, as I sincerely believe, the anthropological
community is not entirely open and receptive to other anthropologists studying
them as they expect others to be. If I were a newspaper reporter wanting to
interview a community of anthropologists, I am certain that 90% of the doors
would be wide open and the welcome mats would be out. But as an anthropologist
among anthropologists it is difficult to remain open about it--the doors are
closed, the 'busy' signs is out--'please do not disturb'--they look at their
watches. One cannot find the walls of academia because wherever one reaches for
them, they fall away very conveniently for the person behind. One cannot hook
onto the gossip network, because the gossip always flow around you and about
you, but never to you or through you. One ends y up choosing between doing
nothing important at all or becoming a spy, and in a sense, a double spy,
treasonous and treacherous, among one's own kind. You become a policeman among
police--a Gestapo agent, a squealer. One must bug or plant a bugs or ears to
hear what is said. Anthropologists well informed of your presence, know what you
are about, and erect the appropriate mechanisms to put and keep you under
control. Making the anthropological academic 'home' the field, bring the field
too close to home, is violating the taboos of separating personal from
professional life, polluting the purity of the public self with the impurities
of the private other 'alter ego'. 'Something might be revealed.' 'Something
might be seen'--it opens up these possibilities. Where one sees smoke there is
usually a fire. This is a privilege of private protection which we rarely, if
ever, completely and absolutely extend to the other in the field. What we
extend to them is token but empty gesture of brotherhood and
friendship--protection in name only. We give beads and trinkets for truth and
wisdom. We decide to pay in cash or kind, in pots and pans for help, for what we
want the other to give us, but not the other way around. We set the terms, make
and eventually break the contract with the other in the field which they have
not existential option but to accept or reject, a set of terms which we must
negotiate in academia. You make a contract to study other anthropologists, which
you cannot break without some kind of retributive karma.
But like Nargarjuna, who saw his karma in battle with his own
kind, I must strive for a higher ethical wisdom which transcends the 'ethos' and
'pathos' of the everyday existential existence in anthropologia. I never
intended to drag reputations through the mud, or to sling mud in professional
faces. I set out to see anthropology for what it really seems to be, rather than
merely what it claims to be. If egos get dirtied in the process, there is always
the possibility that they were meant to be. It is hard to clean laundry which is
not dirty. It is impossible to clean linen which is not dirty. I seek to
understand in my own alternative way this existential reality of academic
anthropology, not to emphasize differences which make no important difference. I
do not seek to change things which are beyond my means or ability to change. I
seek merely to learn to live within my own means to cope with these things. No
one needs to read this who might be adversely affected by it. It is the higher
ethical wisdom, that in the historical structure of the long run, differences
will make no net difference.
There is a need to see anthropology as ultimately a form and
function, philosophy and praxis, a humanistic system of belief and behavior, of
human history. History has its own human dialectic which no science can divine.
History has its own karma which no human which stands outside of its stream can
predict. Embracing history is the only of bringing anthropology back to the
ground.
I do not know why there is no focus of critical attention of
the reflexive lens of the anthropological panopitic eye, upon the essentially
creative task of writing anthropology. For as with the writing and rewriting of
history it has its own dialectical logic which science cannot understand. It
would be great to formalize the process, to come up with a cookbook recipe or a
secret special formula "How to Write Anthropology'. A few have actually
tried! But like a book on how to paint or how to make a table, the results will
inevitably be mundane and as mediocre as any cookie cutter can produce. Now we
are busily preoccupied with making the ideal computer program that will solve
this 'puzzle'. The field is only a place to gather data and defecate.
Anthropology is made in the academic think tank. Unfortunately for many, but not
for myself, all these efforts and expectations are doomed to failure. To be
buried by history. Fortunately for myself, human creativity and the historical,
existential fact of human creation, remains a divine mystery. Good luck, boys,
when you can figure this one out without in the process destroying it. Human
history is born from human creativity. Fortunately I am a fairly creative
person, so there is still a little hope left for me.
I wake up at night with two conflicting visions. The first is
one in which anthropologia suddenly perishes in the splinters of modern
civilization and then being miraculously reborn in the ashes and embers in a new
configuration. The second sees a paradise on earth, a world full of amateur
anthropologists too busy studying one another to be concerned with destroying
each other, trying to understand one another, to make sense of each other.
Somehow, neither vision seems to fit my own understanding of anthropology.
Scientific and humanistic anthropology are engaged in perpetual dialectical
combat--from this struggle perhaps a new set of dialectical struggles will
begin.
…It is temptingly easy for man to mistake the world he has
created in his knowledge which is merely a world of names and forms, for reality
itself. When he succumbs to the temptation he fixes on the name and form self,
that he has created in his knowledge, as his own self. He identifies his own
being with this construction of name and form. Then the real self, burdened by
the ignorance resulting from mistaking the self of the real world, gets
overlooked in the struggle that ensues between the false self of name and the
false world of name and form. The resulting bifurcation which underlies this
inauthentic existence, in this inauthentic world, is responsible for the
disease--the Dukkha--that Buddhism wishes to overcome.
Distinguishing between reality and views of reality,
Nagarjuna apparently desired to show the dangers inherent in regarding any one's
view of reality as being absolutely true. Views are conceptual constructions of
name and form, and to claim any view as absolutely true is to refuse to
recognize the insights of other views and thus to rule out possible avenues of
illumination. (Kollar; 1970: 167-8)
"There is a Thingamabob shouting!" the Bellman
said,
"He is shouting like mad, only hark!"
He is waving his hands, he is wagging his head,
He has certainly found a Snark!
"It's a Snark!" was the sound that first came to
their ears,
And seemed almost too good to be true
Then followed a torrent of laughter and cheers;
Then the ominous words, "It's a Boo--"
Blanket Copyright, Hugh M. Lewis, © 2005. Use of
this text governed by fair use policy--permission to make copies of this text is
granted for purposes of research and non-profit instruction only.
Last Updated: 08/25/06