Babas and Nonyas
A Study of Sino-Malay Ethnoculture
A
bare barb
stinging touch
thorn among roses
blooming in all seasons
hearts always open to the world
enduring, happy and sad, everlasting
ever inviting, enticing, romancing
your patience long lasting
through rain and sun
yet blossoming
then wilting
falling
and
fallen
one by one
from off the hip
petals stir in the breeze
colorful flames float upon the water
perfumed clouds drift between heaven and earth
blowing with the leaves across mountains and valleys
lost within the lengthening shadows of the twilight
beneath the evening moon and morning stars
ephemeral moments so enchanting
brief spell finally broken
simple serenity
and beauty
all gone
but
tell me
if you can
where are they now
my daughters of the soil?
For my two little Nonyas
Hugh M. Lewis
1994
Babas & Nonyas Contents:
Preface
Introduction:
The "Peranakan Problem"
I:
The Overseas Chinese
II:
The Birth of the Babas
III:
Nonya Culture
IV:
Peranakan People
V:
The Social World of the Straits Chinese
An
Annotated, Comprehensive Bibliography
Preface
by
Hugh M. Lewis
I first wrote the book I entitled Peranakan
in 1992, based upon extensive bibliographic research and a modicum first-hand
experience in a Malaysian setting. The challenge of the Peranakan was to
demonstrate alternative ethnocultural identities that are possible when
political interests and other communalistic cleavages serving to segregate and
divide people in the world are contraposed. Political changes can often create
long lasting boundaries and conflicts where none may needed to have existed in
the first place.
There are two wonderful and at least
superficially contradictory processes that occur in the historical development
of any cultural grouping of people who are situated trans-generationally in a
place, or that become transplanted, in relation to other, alternative groupings
with whom they may come into contact on some limited but regular basis. The
first, natural tendency is for the development of isolating variations and
differences, as demonstrated for instance in dialectical variation, that serves
to partition people into ever more local and well defined geo-historical
configurations. All languages, and all cultures, tend toward this process of
increasing differentiation, and it is analogous very much to the process of
speciation in evolution. The apparently contraposed tendency is the process of
homogenization that frequently accompanies related structural processes of
centralization, functional integration and the superimposition of a set of
cultural standards or norms in the daily lives of the complex constituency of
the state. Thus we end up historically with very large nation states, like the
USSR for instance, that may encompass and span a vast range of different peoples
under a common umbrella of a central governmental administration.
It is evident that what makes culture different
from genetics is that, unlike species that allopatrically divide into two or
more reproductively isolated groupings, cultures offer us the historical
possibility of horizontal dissemination, of individuals passing between
cultures, and of two or more cultures coming together in time or place with a
fusion of elements from alternative cultural orientations, sometimes even
leading to production of entirely new cultural patterns. This process may be the
consequence of some colonial framework that tends to cast people from different
groups into a common pot for the purposes of the organization of production, or
it may happen in a vacuum of any larger historical framework as the result of
interchange and exchange between people. Of course, colonial apparatus can
offer forces that serve to overcome the kinds of isolating boundaries that have
served to separate ethnocultural groupings as distinctive entities.
In the modern period, the rise of new
nationalisms in underdeveloped nation states has often been accomplished at the
expense of one or more other groups in favor of those who have gained the upper
hand of power and control in society. In such contexts, the promulgation of
national integration, as in Malaysia, can proceed on a separatist basis that
serves to identify some minority group as an "out-group." It is
possible to imagine that in a more democratic and less authoritarian context,
the relations between the main minorities in Malaysia might have proceeded along
another set of lines than what appears to have happened. There is a sense, on a
very basic level of personality inventories and behavioral observations, that
different kinds of Malaysians, whether they are Malay, Chinese or Indian, share
as much in common, as Malaysians with a shared national heritage and culture, as
they share in differences in terms of religion, social values and other basic
cleavages. National policies, promulgated by Mahathir under the aegis of control
of his UMNO party, appear to have served two sets of competing and basically
contradictory interests at the same time. In one sense it has forged a strong
national identity among most Malaysians, but in another way it has structurally
embedded and perpetuated those "racial" distinctions between the
different ethnocultural groupings through systematic affirmative action policies
that has drawn an official line between what it means to be a Malay on one hand,
and what it means to have be Chinese or Indian, on the other.
To apply this example to one closer to my own
homeland, I must wonder how much 30 odd years of systematic efforts of the US
government in affirmative action, that has served primarily minority interests,
has served also and equally as much to maintain the basic racial cleavages and
boundaries between ethnocultural groupings than to tear these kinds of
boundaries down. In this we can see a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy and the
social construction of ethno-cultural differences along racial lines in a kind
of ethno-schismogenesis. If we look beneath the superficial aspects of
skin color, one will find that black Americans and white Americans, on average,
share greater cultural affinities than they share differences, except where
issues of class and history have served to demarcate and segregate these
communities unevenly. Most black Americans would find, for instance, that they
share more in common with their white counterparts in the US, than they would
share with Kenyans or Ugandans from the African Continent. We can look back the
other way, as for instance it was quite obvious that my Malaysian Chinese wife
would get along much more smoothly with Muslim Malays from her own homeland,
that she could with mainland Chinese, even though her own ancestor's once came
from China.
At any rate, in a Malay dominated Malaysia that
draws a strict socio-structural boundary between Chinese and Malay, inbetween
ethnocultural orientations as represented by the creolized Peranakan
orientation, are no longer allowed to exist or possible. All relations between
ethnocultural groupings that would permit this possibility are sundered by
bureaucratically reinforced separation between the groups. An analogy of this
exists in US history in the schism separating the Native Americans from the
white communities that followed the trailblazers to the west. It is evident that
upon the plains and prairies of the US, a full generation or two before the
coming of white farmers and the US cavalry to protect them, there was an
extensive, full-blown Metis cultural orientation that was well developed with
horse and cattle road-ranches throughout the west, long before any states were
formally recognized or organized.
This orientation was not based only upon the
amalgamation between French fur traders and their squaw wives, as almost fifty
percent of the fur traders were not French, but of Scottish and American and
even black American extraction as well. These people had forged a unique
ethnocultural orientation on the plains that was represented by several
generations of offspring who were fully involved in the cultural amalgamation,
including calico dresses, square dances, horse rearing and Indian trading.
Subsequent events associated with the appropriation of Indian lands for white
settlement, gold, and the internal colonization of Indians upon reservation
lands, led to the demise and fracturing of the basis of this inbetween
ethnocultural orientation, which, if allowed to thrive, might have resulted in
an entirely different history of relations between Indians and the whites.
But of course, the rise of the Peranakan in the
Straits settlements, like the rise of the North American Metis on the central
plains of North America where once only bison roamed, was part of a larger
episode of history, in the former case, the British colonization of Malaysia,
and in the latter, the penetration of the West by the great fur trade companies.
When these larger structures of history passed away, so too did those groupings
of people who were most closely attached to these frameworks.
In presenting these texts in these web-pages, I
have sought to present the "Peranakan problem" as one that is
intrinsically interesting from a theoretical and anthropological point of view,
not only because of the unusual processes of amalgamation that are so important
to these patterns, but also for the case of exemplifying basic and distinctive
ethnocultural models. From this standpoint, these studies fit clearly within an
ethnocultural methodology that attempts to relate the life-experiences and daily
events and attitudes of culture bearers to the larger historical and cultural
contexts that unfold more gradually and imperceptibly in the background of their
lives. I first attempted this approach in studying and seeking to understand the
predicament of Vietnamese boatpeople who had eventually found themselves washed
up on the shores of a distant and very different homeland that was not
traditionally their own. Relating the large, regional and general frames of
reference to the immediate, concrete, little everyday events, and trying to make
sense of the systemic relationships and patterns involved in the articulation of
the lives of these people, invoked an additional requirement of attempting to
understand in a comprehensive manner the knowledge, or the social construction
of information, relating to these people. Thus, doing ethnocultural fieldwork
was more than merely doing ethnographic fieldwork, which usually involved
hanging out with people for extended periods of time. It became like
ethnohistory, the full detailed hermeneutic and philological excoriation of all
evidence, textual and otherwise, surrounding and relating to and serving to
demarcate the identity of a group of people as somehow a distinctive culture.
Subsequent to the first work with the Vietnamese
refugees, which culminated successfully I believe in a fairly well integrated
ethnocultural approach, I have had and made for myself the opportunity to
conduct similar research with the Hokkien Chinese of Malaysia, with Modern
Malaysians, the Peranakans, and later, the Metis of North America. Each
presented unique challenges to the technical and formal problem of the
ethnocultural study of people. Each presented new forms of understanding about
ethnocultural studies in both a larger and more general sense and in terms of
detailed operational approaches.
This work was a significant part of that effort.
It is presented here in two sets, an earlier version which was done in
requirement for an Ethnohistory seminar I had taken with Dr. Ray Wood, and
the second version that was rewritten to fulfill requirements for another
Technical writing seminar I had undertaken with the same professor the following
year.
I present both first and second editions together
in these pages because web-publishing makes it easy to do so, and to demonstrate
the progression of the development of ideas relating to ethnocultural studies
that are associated with this research upon the Peranakan peoples as well as
upon other peoples in the world.
Its order and presentation originally was
intended to reflect the methodological organization and operationalization of
formal ethnocultural studies as a distinctive and well defined form of
anthropological inquiry that is both theoretically interesting and
methodologically rewarding. I hope in the future that I will have further
opportunities to conduct similar ethnocultural studies upon other interesting
groups of people in the world, and to thereby further refine and develop the
systematic study of ethnoculture as a valuable contribution to world
scholarship.
An updating of these works is in order by
subsequent works undertaken by European scholars and by Malaysian Chinese
scholars, namely Felix Chia, Ho Ming Wing and Tan Che Beng, now head of the
Anthropology program at Hong Kong National University. Peranakan studies is now
fairly well defined in outline, when in 1994 it remained only very vague in
form. These recent developments speak of the remarkable progress and growth of
knowledge, both as an industry in itself, and as a function of advancing
scholarship and publishing in the world. I am glad that Peranakan studies have
come of age now in the appropriate academic departments of the world as a
legitimate area of inquiry.
Introduction
The "Peranakan Problem"
by
Hugh M. Lewis
"The Baba, a product of an accident of history, is a
time-traveler; he has come and he must go." (Felix Chia, The Baba
1980:193)
"Peranakan" is a Malay term designating a particular Creole
culture of partly assimilated Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia. To an unknown
extent, these peoples' distinctive identities were the by-products of
political-economic and culture historical forces of social integration within a
colonial Southeast Asian context which arrested pre-colonial "mosaic"
processes of amalgamation and assimilation, and tended to foster social
isolation and structural separateness between the main groups--Europeans, ethnic
Overseas Chinese, and Indigenous peoples.
With modernization dating from the turn of the twentieth century, and with
the subsequent advent of new nationalisms in Southeast Asia, this sense of
difference has resulted in systematic segregation, discrimination, cultural
erosion and eventual disintegration of Peranakans and their cultural life-ways,
who have been forced to redefine their identities in relation to dominant
reference groups in more adaptive ways.
In certain places during the colonial era, especially in the so-called
Straits
Settlements; of Penang, Malacca and Singapore, the "Peranakans"
emerged as a distinctive, fully crystallized ethno-cultural orientation with its
own sense of cultural focus and elaboration of distinctive, ethnically defined
traits. This became the highly stylistic culture of the "Babas and
Nyonyas."
This culture is remarkable from an anthropological standpoint because it is
predominantly "Nonya" in focal orientation--featuring the
elaboration of basic traits, dress, housing patterns, residence, kinship,
marriage, arts, religion, beliefs and values, entertainment and cooking, which
were the principle prerogative of nearly completely domesticated womenfolk. The
men, the "Babas," active in outside, worldly affairs, were left
relatively unconstrained to define their identities vis a' vis dominant and
traditional reference groups, ie, the European colonial culture and
traditional Overseas Chinese culture. On the wane, we are left to
ethno-historically account for this somewhat unusual cultural development,
especially when we consider that it emerged from a basic Chinese cultural
orientation which has always been strongly patriarchal and patrilineal in
tradition.
This is only part of a more complex paradox in trying to account for the
origins, influences, factors, and dimensions of an "inbetween"
ethnocultural grouping, whose fundamental identity has remained somewhat
ambiguous in outline, and especially when we must account for its identity in
"ethnic" terms which comprised seemed to comprise the basic
organizational "ethos" of the people.
The entire problem is complicated by the relative paucity of substantial
information about this group--the majority of ethnographic and historiographic
studies of this group have been done only since World War II, within a context
of modern Nationalisms--well after the time of its heyday in the nineteenth
century and well into the period of its social disintegration.
The "Peranakan Problem" is defined in the course of this work
as a number of different dimensions and themes which intersect to create certain
central foci--different arguments are elucidated, not so much for the sake of
creating a consensus, as for revealing contradiction. The "Peranakan
Problem" exists at several different levels of theoretical generality and
methodological analysis, and is not one primary issue or hypothesis. It is as
much a "problem" of the researcher's definition and terms of
description and explanation than it is anything that is, or was, ever "out
there" in the human world.
Like the human reality it is held to represent, it is many different things,
with many different possibilities. And yet, all the theoretical and hypothetical
diatribe notwithstanding, the "Peranakan Problem" can perhaps best be
exemplified in the statements of a single person who is peranakan by birth and
cultural heritage.
What does the understanding of Peranakan ethnoculture and ethnohistory
have to contribute to general theoretical interests in cultural anthropology? What does general anthropology have to contribute to the
understanding of the Babas? Such questions serve as a fulcrum point for the
movement and articulation of basic research in the world--it is a question meant
to be asked but never finally answered.
The Babas represent something unusual and therefore interesting in the world,
but not something that was to be unexpected, given the social conditions and
historical contexts in which they emerged to define themselves as distinct and
separate from all other people. They are not to be facilely dismissed as but one
more of many sub-groupings of the Chinese nation, but another minor variant upon
a dominant theme of sinicization, because they stand clearly apart from all
other Chinese in Southeast Asia--their cultural orientation ran somewhat across
the Chinese grain.
They represent a dynamic aspect of Chinese cultural character which would be
considered uncommon in terms of the patriarchal and xenophobic sinitic
stereotypes--a synthetic and syncretistic capacity of Chinese to readily
incorporate and assimilate foreign elements in a creative way when given the
context and opportunity, and incentive, to do so, and to redefine their own
identity in a way which does not always fall beneath the umbra of their
Ancestor's Shadow.
But the Babas also stand for something else which is perhaps more interesting
from an anthropological standpoint--the study of their provenience in time and
place, their emergence, historical elaboration, and subsequent submergence
beneath the tides of modern historical developments, allow us to ask critical
questions about some of foundational concepts concerning culture, ethnicity,
social structure, historical patterning, and even evolutionary processes of
change.
They represented an interstitial, as opposed to marginal, sub-grouping of a
wider stream of humanity. Their lifeways straddled the entire rural-urban
continuum, and was as much a product of the city-scape as it was of the
countryside. They were not a "band," or "tribe," or peasant
village--they were not a ghetto, an ethnic enclave, a colony, a cult or sect, a
caste, a class, a party or a corporate institution, and still, as an enduring
yet ephemeral historical phenomena, they were as real and distinctive as any
grouping on earth. Uncommon as they have been, they did not stand completely
alone in the annals of history--there have been other similar kinds of groups in
other parts of the world.
To claim that the Baba Chinese were a residuum of a colonial era is only
a biased part of the whole picture--the emergence of their kind is to be
expected any time there has been prolonged, organized, and creative contact
between different cultures, different civilizations, different
"races", and different streams of history--such groups form like
swirling eddies in the confluence of great rivers.
They are not so much '"transitional cultures" as they are "cultures
of transition"--new and emergent possibilities of cultural patterning
created as a result of acculturative interchange and historical transition. They
are "cultures of convergence" that are only possible when
different groups of people are forced to live together in some degree of mutual
symbiosis and tolerance.
From the standpoint of the study of cultural transmission and change, the
case of the Baba's represent an interesting model of an evolutionary process of
cultural "speciation" that occurs as the consequence of
acculturation--the
fundamental reconfiguration of basic cultural patternings as the direct result
of such processes of acculturation, and the emergence of a new and viable
cultural orientation with its own distinctive sense of cultural value and
historical tradition.
This process of cultural convergence and speciation affects virtually
every aspect of the cultural configuration--evidence for the basic changes are
to be found in language, religion, arts, social structure, values, world view,
dietary patterns, ethnic identity, etc. The patternings produced by the
convergence of two or more separate cultural configurations form something of a
moire' which contains elements of both configurations but in a new arrangement.
With the Babas, we get a glimpse of "culture history in the
making"--if not actually on the level of individual actors and their
decision-making, then on the next higher level of primary social groups and
communities acting in concert and in a directed manner to fashion a sense of
history.
We can also see, in the momentous and inevitable turn of the wheels of
history, the larger historical structures which remain always in the background,
like the hour hand of a clock, slow and imperceptible in its movement, yet
inexorable in its constraint and imperative for human action. We can clearly see
how new cultural possibilities can be created, and then taken away, by larger
mitigating historical structures--if the conditions are not appropriate for the
germination of culture, as for the germination of seedlings in the earth after a
long and severe winter, then no amount of growth can be expected.
With the example of the Babas, the general framework of culture history can
be articulated with the narrower focus upon the ethnohistories of particular
peoples of particular periods and places. With the Babas, we can get a
partial picture of how cultural dynamics intermesh with historical process. We
can write, and rewrite, the story of the Baba's in such a way that combines the
narrative frame of historical explanation with the descriptive frame of
ethnographic exemplification.
"Ethnos" is the study or knowledge of the life-ways of a group
of people--it comes from the Greek meaning "Nation," "race"
or "people." From it are derived many of the terms central to
anthropological method and theory--ethnography, ethnology, ethno-history,
ethnocentrism, ethnogeny, ethnicity, ethno-nation, ethno-linguistics,
ethno-musicology, ethnoscience, ethnosemantics, ethnomedicine, ethnobotany. The
central conceptual importance of 'ethnos' to the field of anthropology should go
without saying, and yet its centrality and significance has been left largely
taken for granted--as something adjectival and dependent upon some other
conceptual preoccupation.
Ethnos names a basic operative principle in the definition of human identity
and difference in a social world--human history has largely been a narrative of
the formation, conflict and resolution of human identities and differences
between different groups of people across time and space.
Ethnos also marks off a central principle in the study of the human condition
in the world, of its many variations, its 'grand arc' of possibility, and its
basic structures of pan-humanness. Basic human identity is constituted socially
and historically in the world--it is "constructed"--and then, in turn,
becomes the central organizing principle for the construction of the world. We
make the world in terms of how we see ourselves in it in relation to other
people, and we make our own identity in terms of how we see the world of others.
"Ethnoculture" is my designation for the distinctive identity
and difference of a people that is defined both socially in relation to other
groupings, and historically in terms of its origin, development and direction,
in terms which are emically salient for the people who are so defined.
The objective of the study of ethnoculture is to discover and derive the basic
principle of ethnos as it is culturally and historically elaborated and
operative in the world, as well as the factors which constrain and influence its
development.
Ethnoculture is the notion of the distinctive symbolic identity that is
shared and elaborated by a particular cultural grouping. It shares with
ethnohistory a common ground in the idea of the base-line as the point of
departure and final reference in our constructions of the symbolisms and group
identities of a people. For the student of ethnohistory the concept of the
baseline is rooted in the "ideal Past."
as a fossilized origin point and source. For the student of ethnoculture the
baseline becomes translated as the "eternal present" that focuses upon
the core continuities that remain traditionally conservative and fundamentally
definitive of a groups worldview and distinctive identity.
Ethnoculture inevitably involves the inseparable problems of the construction
and "re-presentation" of reality, and the construction of
"reconstructions" as well as the problem of defining the
subjective/objective basis of group integration and the influences of change.
Thus, both ethnoculture and ethnohistory centrally deal with the dilemmas of
"historicity" and "facticity" in seeking primary sources and
questioning the political and ideological foundations of knowledge and the
tautological conundrums of theories, and hence both are a needed antidote to
fast and nonreflexive explanations about human experiences.
The ethnoculture of the Baba's is exemplary, and problematic, for a number of
important anthropological reasons. In seeking to establish a "base-line"
for "traditional" Baba Chinese culture, it will be discovered that
such a "base-line" is at best only a model, an ethnohistorical
construction, which we need elaborate only in order to subsequently amend or
refute by the discovery of contrary, alternative or supportive evidence.
The ethnocultural continuum of the Peranakan Chinese of Malaysia, Singapore, and
Indonesia manifests several significant dimensions which
can be referred to as social structure and process, language, religion and
ethnicity. Though the most visible Babas and Nonya's were the upper class
merchants of the port cities of the Straits, and were thus very much fixtures of
the urban city-scape, we can probably correctly claim that the
"average" peranakan was a petty merchant trader who was "in the
middle" in a variety of senses, and also we cannot ignore a substantial
number of rural Peranakans who were agricultural pioneers and entrepreneurs, or
who were long settled in small village colonies that dotted the countryside.
We must therefore take into account a fairly broad range of social
stratification and occupational differentiation within Peranakan communities--to
be Peranakan was not to be only one kind of person, and peranakan cultural
orientation did not imply simply one set of acquired traits--it consisted more
of local and regional variations upon a common theme, and even thematic
variation upon a common, polythetic set of cultural features. Peranakan social
realities varied widely over both period and place--what it may have been in
pre-contact Malacca, versus what it apparently had been in Nineteenth Century
Singapore, to what it was to become in Indonesia or Penang in the modern,
post-colonial era, may well be quite different sorts of things only somewhat
spuriously subsumed under the same basic epithet.
Of course, from an ethnocultural point of view, we must assume at least one
basic chain of continuity between the distant past and the immediate present and
that is the linkage of cultural, if not biological, heredity--of people who are
the direct descendants, whatever the number of generations removed or diluted,
from those who first were known as or eventually came to be called
"Peranakan," and who have retained some minimal sense of what it is to
be a Peranakan. And in this sense of familial inheritance, early childhood
socializations, primary social networks and corporate institutions, and
important life experiences which become played out in the relative presence or
absence of the most significant others, critically influence and shape the
nature and culture of this kind of ethnocultural identity.
And in this regard, both ethnos and culture become very real and very
significant social and historical forces to be reckoned with, as both come to
have a molding influence upon the subjectively felt, lived experiences of the
individual "culture bearer," and both come to have a massive, basic
shaping and constraining effect upon experience and interaction in the world, as
both subjectively internalized and externally objectivated, and as both a
realizing agency of potentiality and a mediating mechanism in dealing with
change and difference.
This speaks for a much deeper and more basically rooted connection between
ethnos and culture than many scholars of ethnicity, who stress the
communicative, social, economic and political aspects of ethnicity, seem willing
to acknowledge. A pri-mordialist view of the relation between ethnos and culture
holds that such an identity is more foundational and less easily alterable than
other kinds of identities--national, religious, social--and that these other
identities might achieve some sense of ingrained embedding by their
primoridialist connections with a peoples shared ethnoculture.
There are two theoretical implications of this primordialist view of
ethnoculture. First, the basic ethnocultural continuities--the common core of a
shared identity--cannot be simply negotiated away, transacted, traded in or
changed "for a new suit of clothes." Though boundaries between groups
are negotiated, these boundaries are always fuzzy and always encompass a more
conservative "prototypical" core. Second, the outward aspects of
ethnoculture are largely historically determined, and thus the actual
significances of ethnocultural identity are quite variable across space and
time--the combination of the core traits are likely to be lost or added,
variably mixed and interchanged.
A third implication forthcoming from the first two is that ethnocultural
identity tends always to draw from the past, from its traditions, its styles,
customs, habits, lessons and myths, for purposes of the present, and to
appropriate elements and aspects of the present for the sake of reconstructing
and overcoming the "lost sense" of the past. This makes ethnoculture
both very functionally adaptive and very conservative. This always creates a
dialectical tension about ethnocultural identity that is never without some
contradiction and some interesting conflicts.
Another significant dimension of the problem of peranakan
"Ethnoculture" are the social distances, contradictions and obstacles,
spanned between traditional Chinese cultural foci, on the one hand, and becoming
a part of the Malay cultural tradition, on the other. Peranakan culture was not
just intermediate in the socio-structural sense of being comprised of
"pariah" merchant middlemen, but they also were an in-between
socio-cultural phenomena as a "transitional culture" or a "culture
of transition" arrested somewhere along the process of assimilation of a
minority Chinese group into the social ethos of the dominant Malay host culture.
On top of being such a culture defined somewhere along a continuum of
assimilation, the Peranakans also came to constitute a "culture of
amalgamation" that was defined by some modicum of ethnic intermarriage
and intercultural integration. Even more problematic, we must also take into
account its orientation as a "culture of acculturation", subject
as it was to strong foreign influences.
And, to top all this sociological jargon off, we may speak of peranakans as
being commonly also a "culture of accommodation" in that its basis
was formed in a context which promoted mutual interaction, basic reciprocities,
and mutual adjustments to social differences during different historical
periods. So we must again ask ourselves, what, and where, is Peranakan
ethnoculture?
In this regard it is commonly assumed that the principle barrier to full
assimilation of the Peranakan Chinese into the dominant Malay or Indonesian
societies has been the Islamic faith which prohibits intermarriage
without conversion--but evidence supports the contention that Islam was not
everywhere equally the same kind of barrier to intermarriage that it has more
recently and commonly become. It is also commonly contended that Malay culture
and ethnic identity has been founded centrally upon the principle of being a
good "fundamentalist" Muslim. This is a legal prejudice that has
become predominant in modern nation-states that failed to effectively separate
church and state--but being Malay has long been something more, or else, than
only being Moslem. Conversely, it is often argued that traditional Chinese
cultural identity has been founded upon the principle of ethnos that is
relatively independent of any religious components. Traditional Chinese
religious orientation is held to reflect the openness and syncretistic character
of the Chinese social world, and the synthesizing qualities of the Chinese mind.
But evidence also suggests that there is something fundamental to the core of
"Chineseness" which has basic religious overtones, that the Chinese
world and worldview may not always be as open as it is represented to be much of
the literature, and that Islam may not provide the only barrier to the
assimilation
of the "Peranakans" into the host society--"Chinese Religionists" frequently seem to present as great a barrier to passing
between Chinese and Malay worlds as anything Islam has been purported to do.
Regarding intermarriage, it is evident that interethnic social integration and
cultural amalgamation can effectively proceed without the
requirements of members of contraposed groups being wed, and that intermarriage
is also a sociocultural possibility whether or not other processes of social
integration and assimilation are occurring. What it seems to require most is the
tolerance and willing acceptance of the different families, and communities,
that are thus united--and nothing can so divide brothers and families against
one another as relatively remote, and frequently self-serving, political
interests.
It is worthwhile to briefly speculate on the "ethnogenesis" of
Peranakan ethno-culture, especially the focal and elaborate kind of
"Baba and Nonya" culture which apparently developed during the
Nineteenth Century in the Straits Settlements.
A romantic model would be a story of the original "Nonya" who set
the entire Nonya culture snow-balling in its development through the many
successive generations, from mother to daughter in an unending chain. Was she a
Chinese woman, the daughter of an Imperial emperor of China, sent to Malacca to
take the hand the Malay Sultan, adopting Malay dress, Malay speech, Malay
beliefs, but remaining basically Chinese to the core? Or was she but a young
outcast of a Malay Kampong, a debt-slave or a concubine of a rich Chinese
Kapitan, basically Malay in most aspects but constrained in fundamental ways by
a patriarchal Chinese tradition? Are the Nonya’s basically Chinese or Malay?
It is not too far fetched to imagine a relatively small group of original
Nonyas of Malacca, somewhere in the Sixteenth Century, who found themselves in a
unique situation to create a whole new cultural patterning and style, and to
subsequently elaborate and hand this culture down through their daughters,
essentially unchanged, until the twentieth century.
In this regard, it would do well to remember the subservient role of the
woman in traditional Chinese society. Only as a mother and matriarch of a
domestic household does a woman hope to have any power or influence, and only as
this power could be realized through a father, a husband or a son, or
alternatively, only through a separate status network-hierarchy of other women,
mothers and daughters.
The suffocating love of the mother for the son is a fundamental cultural
psychological theme of Chinese tradition and ethos. In an almost exclusively
male community--male dominated in every way--in the early trading outposts of
the Nanyang, an empty niche would have been created in a displaced and makeshift
Chinese cosmos--a niche that would have had symbolic, social, structural and
psychological components, by the dearth of Chinese women and "mothers"
that could not be simply filled by the services of a few prostitutes. This niche
would not have been an unattractive one to fill, as it had the promise of some
wealth and advantage among tradition bound people who would not have otherwise
realized such things. This empty niche left an opening in the traditional
Chinese cosmos for the incorporation of foreign elements.
We must seriously ask why it was almost exclusively domestic and female Malay
elements which came to so strongly define what was distinctive about Nonya
culture, and we are left with a kind of proposition that there may be basic
dimensions to its culture which were defined along lines of female and male
identity respectively. A useful kind of distinction to make is between
ethno-political symbols that are primarily concerned with external boundary
maintenance and ethno-religious symbolisms which involve domestic relations
and conceptions of sacredness, and the association with these kinds of symbols
to male and masculine domains and features, and feminine and female traits,
respectively. In the case of the Babas and Nonyas, what fell away from the
tradition-bound Chinese Confucian orientation was the whole female side of its
cultural orientation, to become infused, ethno-culturally, if not quite
racially, with many Malay elements.
The second alternative was that while Baba fathers and sons were left to fill
play the part of "reality culture" bearers--to use Alfred Kroeber's
distinction--in networks which were externally oriented to culture brokerage and
the mediation of differences, Nonya mothers and daughters were left separately
to play a role the construction and elaboration of an almost exclusive
"value culture" which was almost entire a feminine prerogative. Within
domesticated social spheres, women were left to claim and compete with one
another for status.
When we consider the religious orientation of the Babas and the Nonyas, we
are faced with another paradox--though incorporating many Malay elements
involving trance, superstition, animistic spirituality, spirit possession and
ritual, the Peranakan pantheon of deities remains basically Chinese in
character. We must confront the possibility that no religion or religious
system, as it is lived by an ethno-cultural grouping of people, is a purely
unitary phenomena. We only have to look to the incorporation of local deities,
beliefs and cults, all over the world, into the sainthood of a strictly
monotheistic Catholic orthodoxy to see a similar kind of "lived"
religion in action.
The alleged matrilocality of the Babas and Nonyas, as a persistent and
pervasive social institution, also demands some sort of explanation in terms of
origins and primary causes. Though their’s was not a culture characterized by
chronic warfare which demanded the long term absence of the males, they were a
settlement of "sojourner-traders" in which the economic interests of
the males demanded long periods of absence, and they were also a group which may
have always been defined by some kind of interethnic stress or tension, if not
always outright conflict and competition. It is also apparent that though the
traditional Nonyas may have held the keys to the home, even the shop, as well as
to whatever domestic wealth possessed by the family, they were not themselves
involved in any forms of primary production or external economic activity.
Unlike many other Southeast Asian women, they were not themselves petty
traders or producers. Thus we are left to explain an apparent exception to the
cross-cultural rule of matrilocality, in terms of origins and causal factors
which stress the "rarity-value" of women who were in every respect a
minority, based upon their reproductive role as the principle providers and
care-takers of children who were brought up to think of themselves and call
themselves Chinese even though they often acted and talked like Malays, and in
terms of the elaboration of a strictly domestic, female-centered culture which
was transmitted through processes of both primary and secondary socialization
through the daughters.
The daughters became the principle culture-bearers, and inheritors of values,
attitudes, characteristics that were distinctively Nonya. And if the mothers
were the principle arrangers in their children’s marriages, then they must
have taken much care in finding suitable partners who would contribute to,
rather than take from, their domestically oriented, female-focused culture.
Another paradox is that though in relation to their male relatives the Nonya
women were always in a subordinate position, at least within the interior world
of their domestic household, the differences of age came to override those
differences based upon gender. Within their own internal world, the Nonya’s
came to control resources, power, prestige and privilege which sometimes matched
that of the Babas in the outside world. It is even more of a paradox when we
consider that young Nonya daughters still had inferior value compared to that of
Baba sons--though they were the principle agents and carriers in the
transmission of Nonya lifeways, they did not gain ascendant status except
through marriage, motherhood and the subsequent marriage of their own sons and
daughters. The Baba boys were clearly privileged, even though from a strictly
cultural point of view they would always remain peripheral, because they still
were under the penumbra of the Ancestor’s shadow--it was still the Confucian
thing to do.
Peranakan ethnoculture, especially the distinctive form that came to
bloom in the Straits Settlements during the Nineteenth and early Twentieth
Centuries, was clearly something more than just a by-product of colonial
political economy within a plural society. In fact, its occurrence may have been
quite separate and independent of the colonial setting, and some evidence at
least suggests that the colonial framework may have actually hindered and
limited its development and florescence in fundamental ways.
European colonialism did clearly serve to highlight it, to underscore its
ethnocultural distinctiveness and difference in ways which it may not have
otherwise been emphasized. The fortunes of the Babas and Nonyas within a foreign
administrative structure were only indirect results of this contact and
acculturation--the effect rather than the cause of such contact and
acculturation. It was the very inbetweenness of Straits Chinese society which
permitted them the latitude to serve the critical role of "culture
brokers" and as articulatory intermediaries within a colonial social
system, a role which was effectively not available to the members of other, more
tradition-bound groups. And with their increasing wealth and structurally
defined privilege and opportunity within the colonial framework, their
visibility , distinctiveness, status and prestige also increased.
If the Babas and Nonyas were not directly the by-product of a somewhat
superficial colonial arrangement, then they must be understood in another set of
terms. If they weren’t primarily "colonial," then they were
preeminently "traditional"--and what has been pulling them apart today
have been larger forces of modernization which have been wearing away the fabric
of many different peoples’ cultural traditions. What is
"tradition" from a modern, secular point of view? Values and
orientations of family, lineage, respect for and preservation of the authority
and legitimacy the past, as central place in one’s world for religion, the
primacy of the family as the principle agent of socialization and cultural
transmission, values of nurturance and interdependency rather than independence
and personal dominance. "Tradition" defines the principle domain of
ethno-culture.
The very factors which fostered their structural fortune in the colonial era,
led to their structural misfortune, their social disintegration, their loss of
visibility and status in the post-colonial era which as to define itself along
new lines, imported from the West, of modernization, development and
nationalism. As the Overseas Chinese have come to face increasing ethnic
segregation and discrimination in most modern Southeast Asian nation-states, the
splitting apart of splintered ethnic segments of society and the widening gulf
between indigenous majorities and Chinese minorities, has tended to pull apart
and distintegrate the Peranakans who were structurally inbetween.
Each new generation of Baba and Nonya is left with fewer alternatives other
than to attempt passing into one or another of the segments of modern
society--less and less of their own culture and their own people are left over
by which to continue to construct and maintain a separate, distinctive peranakan
identity. Because passing downhill and out of a contexts defined by
overpopulation and fierce social circumscription and competition for very
limited resources, is much easier than passing uphill, most
Peranakans have been undergoing resinification.
For some reason, becoming a Moslem in order to pass into Malay society has
never been a viable option open to most peranakans--the losses in social status
and individual identity in both Chinese and Muslim worlds would have been much
greater than the few gains in social security and acceptability. Though the
Malays are in a structurally predominant and superior position to the Chinese,
their place is by no means an enviable one. Few Chinese would undergo
circumcision in order to trade places with their Malay counterparts, neither in
politics and especially not in business.
The only other alternative seems to be one of escape from the Southeast Asian
setting--to Singapore, or better yet, to the common wealth countries or to the
United States. English language, Western education, the acquisition of money,
material wealth, and Christianity are all efficacious vehicles for such escape.
With the disintegration of peranakan ethnoculture, we are witnessing
a kind of socio-cultural atomization of peranakans into smaller and smaller
groupings--ultimately to become enclosed as separate family units, or even as
lone individuals culturally astray in the wider social stream. With fewer and
fewer social basis available for interaction in the wider world in purely
peranakan fashion, more and more peranakans are feeling themselves cut off from
their roots, from the tradition in which they themselves were raised, adrift
upon the tides of change.
I
The Overseas
Chinese
by
Hugh M. Lewis
The peranakan problem cannot be
finally resolved if it is not sufficiently situated within a larger
setting--ultimately within the framework of traditional and colonial Southeast
Asian civilization. Many of the basic structural features which underlie the
formation and ordering of the Peranakan world are features basic to the
patterning and developmental processes of much of the Southeast Asian world--the
maritime openness and outward-looking orientation, the natural, tropical
environment, the role of rivers in the integration and incorporation of diverse
and different ecologies within a single "interregional system,"
the recurrent structural theme of the "organization of diversity",
that like the supernatural percussive melody of gamelan, reverberates in every
ritual, in every myth, in every language.
Foremost of the themes which have united Southeast Asia as a region and which
help to contextualize the "Peranakan problem" is the influence which
diverse, foreign cultures have had in the stylistic and structural development
of what can be referred to as a typically "Southeast Asian civilization." Acculturation--religious, political, economic,
social--has long been a perennial influence in the region, and different culture
historical phases of acculturation can be used, almost in the manner of
archaeological stratigraphy or stylistic seriation, to uncover the many layers
of culture that have become embedded one on top of the other throughout
Southeast Asia. Each phase contributed to the development of Southeast Asia upon
a new level of socio-cultural integration and structural articulation. The
incorporation of foreign elements, ideas, things, and people, served as a common
catalyst, a common stimulus, to the endogenous elaboration and development of
Southeast Asian civilization.
Inextricably entangled with the problem of such acculturation and the
incorporation of diversity, is the problem of "ethnos" as a
central organizational principle of Southeast Asian civilization. Ethnicity as
the study of ethnic identity and ethnogenesis as the study of ethnic origins,
are intrinsic and basic dimensions of Southeast Asian studies in general.
"...ethnic diversity is so fundamental in Southeast Asia that it is one of
the great laboratories for the study of ethnicity." (D. E. Brown, 1976: 99) It was in general reference to Southeast Asia, and in specific relation
to the pervasiveness of the Overseas Chinese there, that had led J. S. Furnival to formulate his now classic theory of "radical
pluralism"--the social integration of people of many cultures in a common
market place and under the aegis of a common political structure.
Because the Peranakan were basically Chinese, members of the so-called
Nanyang,
the centrality of the principle of ethnos is especially important in their
study, such that we may refer to a basic Chinese cultural "ethos of ethnos" that was part of the openness, organizational refinement and
intricacy, and adaptability of the Overseas Chinese social system.
This brings out the central dilemma of the study of ethno-culture--the
problem of determining the appropriate criteria for drawing the line between
what constitutes an ethnic group, or an ethnic phenomena, or an ethnic category
or identity, and what is constitutive of genuinely cultural ethos
and difference, cultural traits, orientation and tradition.
Anthropologists have typically treated culture in a nominal manner as if it
were some kind of boundable entity, a group, an organization of meaning and
value that endures through time and that evolves according to its own internal
logic--while ethnicity has remained somewhat of a sociological aspect, a process
of intergroup identification and ascription, reference and boundary-maintenance.
Ethnicity is commonly associated with a chauvinistic kind of pride--the
ethnocentric pride in the superiority of one's own way of life over others, and,
as well is commonly conflated with fallacious and fictitious ideologies of
racial origins and biological difference. Culture is typically treated as
something which is more fundamental, and basic to humankind--it is social, it is
universal, it is pervasive in all we do, it is largely out of awareness, and
thus mostly transparent and invisible within ourselves. And yet ethnos and
culture cannot be effectively separated in our analysis of human reality, as
neither can we teeth out what are psychological variables, historical changes
and continuities, and our own shared constructions of reality.
Ethnos and Culture coexists along a common continuum, a continuum which is
multidimensional and which is itself constituted by a complex relational
dialectic between many mutually constraining factors and forces. This
ethno-cultural continuum exists through real historical time, across real social space--it
only exists because all people, as actors upon the same stage, face a common
dilemma in transacting and negotiating the boundaries and areas of their
realities with other, different peoples.
Ethnoculture then, is the study of how people, their identity, their
social positionality, their consciousness and outlook upon the world, are
critically conditioned and constrained by their inevitable relationships with
other peoples. It is a study of human difference, of how such difference can be
constitutive of both unity and diversity, cooperativeness and conflict, in the
world.
Ethnoculture is also a study in how we become shaped by the many influences
of the social world that we live within, and how, in turn, we come to shape that
world. Finally, Ethnoculture is also a critically reflexive study of the
relative limits of our knowledge of both others and of ourselves in the social
world--just as we cannot clearly disentangle where the study of ethnos ends and
the understanding of culture begins, so too we cannot finally say where ends the
problematic understanding of ourselves and where begins the unproblematic study
of others.
The understanding of Peranakan ethnoculture cannot be had outside of its
broader 'traditional' Southeast Asian context. It shares many of the
continuities that are distinctive of Southeast Asian civilization. Civilization
is here taken to be a trans-cultural and pan-human process of historical
development--a process which is socially and culturally integrative and
interregional in scope. Certain general cultural style-patterns are associated
with particular instances of civilization, as are particular incidences of
"Great Men" or genius whose innovativeness and spirit serve to
characterize the style-patterning of the age. The civilizing process
consists of a structural dialectic of emergent complexity in interregional
systems, a dialectic involving social, political, economic, religious and
psychological factors. It involves increasing levels and areas of integration
and increasing heterogeneity of socio-cultural transmission from local to
regional and interregional to even global contexts, which result in stimulus
generation of modified patterns at all levels of human organization. Processes
of both exogenous, or external, acculturative influences of change, as well as
internal, endogenous enculturative influences are involved in the construction
and transmission of ethnoculture.
Peranakan ethnoculture as both part of a wider confluence of Southeast
Asian Civilization and as constituting a particular culture historical instance
of typical, and in some ways, prototypical, Southeast Asian civilization, is the
product of many diverse extraneous influences. Thus, Peranakan culture has its
place within broader cultural and historical streams of the human world which
deserve closer study and understanding.
The Making of "Southeast Asia"
Southeast Asia remains one of the most heterogeneous, long settled, and most
culturally, ethically, racially, linguistically and historically complicated
regions in the World. Geographically, it has been conventionally divided between
insular, or "Island Southeast Asia"-- including Malaysia, Borneo,
Singapore, Brunei, and the vast arc of island archipelagos including Indonesia
and the Philippines--and peninsular, or Mainland Southeast Asia--including
Thailand, Burma, Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam--reflecting another important
contrast in the region between the maritime orientation of the many miles of
shoreline and the 'mountain' orientation of the highlands. Strong culture
historical reasons are sometimes given for including Sri Lanka, the Andamans,
the Nicobars, Assam, Yunnan, Hainan, Formosa and even New Guinea and Madagascar,
although these political entities are conventionally peripheral to the region
circumscribed by the designation of Southeast Asia.
There is a sense that words like Southeast Asia name both more and less
than the reality they are held to designate--more are the hidden implications of
power and asymmetry between the namer and the named ; the less is the sense of
"science fiction" that is created by the labeling process, the
metaphorical allusions of exoticism, strangeness, and romance that accrete to
such distant toponyms. "Thus in East and West alike the word
"Asia" is really an equivoque. It has no fixed meaning--no clear-cut
denotation--but it is extraordinarily rich in emotional conotations. Though
these make it the despair of the logician, they enhance its value for the poet,
the artist--and the politician." (J. Steadman, The Myth of Asia,
1969: 35)
The term "Southeast Asia" leads to a reification and projection of
a spurious sense of homogeneity, unity and boundedness onto the region it
delimits on the globe, one that is actually as culturally diverse and
complicated as it is historically entangled and unbounded--the cross-roads of
the orient has long been a meeting place, and a region of cultural
intermingling, between many different kinds of people, such that one will find
anywhere one travels in Southeast Asia a profusion of different religions,
ethnic identities, and cultural orientations within the same marketplace, within
the same city limits, even under the same roof. Southeast Asia, from a regional
perspective, becomes a veritable mosaic of human difference and variation.
There are common themes in Southeast Asian life which confer an overall unity
to the diversity of life found there. "Unity in diversity" is the
predominant theme of Southeast Asian Studies. A vegetable culture, a bamboo
culture, a rice and fish culture, a monsoon culture, a riverine
culture--Southeast Asia can be characterized by its commonly shared
characteristics which have helped to shape its lifeways. But also recurrent in
the region are other general themes--the importance of maritime trade, the
Chameleonness of identity, the relatively high status of women, the dialectical
tension between the peoples of the highlands and the peoples of the lowlands,
the role that great religions and indigenous spirituality has always played in
the daily life of its peoples, the proximity and cultural appreciation of the
natural world, the unifying role that the rivers and streams have long played in
the integration of its areas, the outward looking orientation of its peoples,
the periodic waves of acculturative change that have occasionally swept through
the region, and the autochthonous origins and deep sense of cyclical, rhythmical
time of ancient, traditional civilizations.
Such common themes amount to no more than the reiteration of trite truisms
whose substantive basis is not apparent until one has lived and traveled within
Southeast Asia among Southeast Asians. In claiming that the Southeast Asian
setting, its nature, its geography, its climate, has had an important shaping
influence upon Southeast Asian culture and character is to risk falling back
into an old argument about environmental determinism.
But the influence is there, and has been remarked upon in reference to the
use of space and geographical orientation among the Balinese; the ritual
ecologies of New Guinea highlanders or the Rhade of the Vietnamese highlands;
the thematic recurrence of nature symbolism in Vietnamese literature and poetry,
art and music; the spiritual animism of the Dayaks of Borneo; in the cultural
ecology of highlanders throughout the region; in the ecology of rice among the
Thais and the Javanese, etc. Many other examples can be found to attest to the
direct symbolic role and value that nature and the natural environment has
played in influencing the aesthetic sensitivities and religious sensibilities of
the peoples of Southeast Asia.
Perhaps it is because nature in this tropical setting is so intrusive in
virtually every part of one's life--whether it is a morning parade of ants
through the halls of one's home, a resident "chi chak" in one's
kitchen sink or six inch long centipede in one's outhouse sink, the encroaching
jungle growth that appears in every crack of the sidewalk, the torrents of rain
that fall endlessly from the high clouds, the monitor lizard in the parking lot
of a major university. One cannot easily escape the direct contact with nature
that living in a Southeast Asian setting brings.
Not all Southeast Asians are equally and unequivocally lovers of nature or
conscientious conservationists of the region's natural resources--irreversible
destruction of many primeval forest habitats continues at a ceaseless and
alarming rate. Many people in their daily activities and attitudes evince little
concern or appreciation of their natural environment. And yet many of the most
basic cultural patterns which predominate in Southeast Asia can be found to have
direct linkages with the natural tropical habitat.
What is commonly referred to in the literature as the traditional,
interregional system of Southeast Asian civilization, must be seen as a structurally and
socially persistent patterning, constrained by its ball and chain
mountain, maritime and tropical cultural geography, of the organization of
diversity--diversity that is ecological, economic and ethnic. The principle
of ethnos lies at the base of Southeast Asian cultural identity. Social
organization based upon such a principle of ethnos, is characteristically of
a "plural" and culturally heterogeneous society. Indeed, the ethnic
concept of "pluralism" was coined by J. S. Furnival in
reference to Southeast Asia.
.i.D. E. Brown; (Principles of Social Structure, 1976) notes seven
conditions necessary for the maintenance of radically plural societies which are
typical of Southeast Asian settings: 1. continuity of stable economic and
ecological conditions (ibid., pp. 82); 2. Relative isolation of the radically
plural society from other similar sized but differently structured societies
(ibid., p. 85-6); Demographic ratios between ruling and rule should be
maintained or change in favor of the ruling elite (ibid., p. 86); Social
identities and boundaries are maintained by generalizing differences across all
spheres--religious, familial, educational, occupational, economic, etc.--thus
restricting inter-group acculturation and mobility (ibid., p 87); Symbiotic
relations offering primary compensations for the subordinate minority and
religious or ideological orientations offering deferred compensations are
encouraged (ibid., p. 88); The corporate exclusiveness, superior organization,
solidarity and cohesion of the ruling group should be systematically promoted
(ibid., p. 88); Authority should be sacralized and legitimated by an inclusive
cult offering compensation in another life or advocating withdrawal from worldly
affairs. (ibid., p. 90).
The basic model of corporate social structure based upon the principle of
ethnos implied by this formal paradigm is held to characterize the
developmental dynamics of typically Southeast Asian civilization from its
first prehistoric inception perhaps as long ago as several thousands of years
until today. It is a model in which numerous, relatively homogenous, local
groups came into increasing contact with one another, and with extra-regional
peoples, and in the resulting processes of intercultural contact and
transmission, there developed increasing levels of heterogeneity and
socio-structural complexity. This model is held to be critically linked to the
development of the economic exploitation of the entire region, and the emergence
of an increasingly complex interregional system, based upon
commerce and hinterland exploitation, in which local peoples were to become
increasingly integrated and more culturally sophisticated and cosmopolitan.
Civilization is thus also held to be a developmental process
of interregional integration, represented by increasing levels of complexity of
socio-political organization, increasing economic integration and exploitation,
and the increasing influence of religious ideas and orientations upon the social
organization.
The Nanyang Network
Of course, the history of the so-called "Straits Settlements
in which the Baba's are mostly associated, is but one small chapter, one small
part of the total Southeast Asian tapestry. These settlements, including
Singapore, Malacca, Penang, as well as the major port and inland cities of Java,
are the principle centers for the development of Baba and Peranakan
culture, which spread outwardly into the hinterland regions of the various
provinces of peninsular Malaysia and insular Indonesia.
The Chinese presence in Southeast Asia, or what is known among the Chinese as
the South Sea, or Nanyang, dates back to before Christ. Long
present in the Southeast Asian setting, they have always been there as
merchants, travelers, ex-patriots seeking refuge. The Chinese of the Nanyang
have long been the classic "sojourning entrepreneurs" seeking
their fortunes in foreign lands. Sojourning involves migration of men and the
remittances of money back to the homeland--the Overseas Chinese, no matter how
far the traveled or how long away, never really forgot their original ties back
in their homeland--among the Nanyang Chinese it also involved local, overseas
organization for the mobilization of men, resources, capital and money.
"The sojourning pattern is found centuries back in Asia within China,
between China and Southeast Asia, and within Southeast Asia..." (John
T. Omohundro, "Trading Pattern of Philippine Chinese: Strategies of
Sojourning Middlemen, in Economic Exchange and Social Interaction
inSoutheastAsia1977:113-4). Long present in Southeast Asia, perhaps as early
as the first century A.D., and certainly by the fifth, the early Chinese
communities were considered 'transient' and not well organized. Early Nanyang
contacts in Southeast Asia were primarily colonial, mercantile and maritime.
Undoubtedly many of these first sojourners were 'pirate-traders' issuing from
the sea coasts of southeastern China, as well as part of the regular Southward
bound excess of human population thrown off by perennial political turmoil in
the Great Agrarian State.
Political and social pressures beginning far to the North in China had long
had a rippling effect that stimulated an ever southward movement of Chinese and
their civilization. When during their march south reached the South China Sea,
they found land routes cut off to their advance, these same peoples took to the
seas in expanding economic, versus territorial, frontiers. The closing of the
southern borders with the newly won independence of Vietnam in the Ninth
Century, and the gradual shift of commerce from Haiphong to the major port
cities of Southeastern China, led to a growing maritime exodus and exchange of
Chinese peoples over the whole of the Nanyang. Subsequent periods of migration
of Nanyang Chinese are considered like 'waves' that fanned out from Southeastern
China and swept across the entire Southeast Asian region and beyond.
From the Tang and Sung Dynastic periods, circa the Seventh through the Tenth
Centuries, in which foreign trade in China became a more important source of
revenue, there is an emergence of a somewhat separate and distinct merchant
class--a successful and wealthy bourgeoisie that did not fit into the
traditional Chinese Mandarin system.
The design and construction of more sea-worthy, deep-draft junks allowed the
Chinese to venture further a field from the coastlines to which they previously
clung so closely. This phase represented the early "tribute-bearing/junk-trade"
missions that helped to establish Chinese political authority, as distant as it
was, as well as to secure much prized exotic trade goods. This period most
notably climaxed with the voyages of Imperial Eunoch Cheng Ho, who in
command of a fleet of more than sixty large junks carrying more than
thirty-thousand soldiers, resulted in the conquest of many kingdoms,
establishment of Imperial Chinese influence and presence in the Nanyang, as well
as in the founding of the trading port of Malacca in 1408.
The next phase of Chinese activity in the Nanyang is linked to the political
ascendancy of the Manchus over the Ming Dynasty--the "contact period"
is marked by the introduction of European interests in the region, inaugurated
by the capture of Malacca by the Portuguese only one hundred years after its
founding, and cumulatively increasing competition for control over the region.
Official Chinese interest in the Nanyang was withdrawn, and Chinese immigration
to the Nanyang was even banned under penalty of execution. Thus, Chinese
subsequently migrating to the Nanyang, from the mid-seventeenth until the early
nineteenth centuries, were those who were politically oriented away from Manchu
China, and who sought refuge in the Chinese communities of the Nanyang.
Though European domination in Southeast Asia subordinated the role of the
Chinese, it opened up new and lucrative niches for economic development in
expanding colonial markets, and stimulated new waves of economic migration to
the Nanyang which the Europeans hardly controlled, and in some cases even
promoted.
The Chinese, as a pariah class, provided an important linkage in the
articulation of the colonial system of resource exploitation--they became the
inveterate merchant-middlemen/money-lenders. They became agricultural
pioneers of the tropical frontiers, miners, small planters, and overseers. They
came to occupy the middle positions of the colonial administrative apparatus.
They were also the source of a bottomless supply of cheap coolie labor, easily
mobilizable, transportable, extremely adaptable to adverse environments and
difficult circumstances.
Among the Chinese, a veritable Nanyang empire developed--a vast network
through which the movement of labor, finance, capital and commerce was
facilitated by a wide range of interlinked exchange agencies and agents at every
level and in every niche of the Southeast Asian setting. The relative mobility
of "capital and labor increases Chinese responsiveness to market
fluctuations, allowing them to bail out quickly from failures and capitalize
fully on fleeting opportunities." (John T. Omohundro, 1977:117)
The Nanyang of this period continued to prosper in the area of trade and
finance to the point that it gained virtual monopolies over many sectors and
areas of the Southeast Asian interregional economy--particularly rice and metal.
Many of their practices were extremely exploitative, and their success at the
hands of European colonists was often strongly resented by indigenous peoples.
As Nanyang civilization developed and grew more economically integrated,
its agents grew increasingly situated by and entangled within local arrangements
and became increasingly unable to uproot themselves in order to return to China.
The line between sojournership and actual colonization was thus thin--as the
ties to the homeland grew distant and were severed the Chinese who found
themselves locally and regionally entangled within the Nanyang network,
reoriented their outlook and attitude toward their local Southeast Asian
context. The first thing they did was to send for their wives and children from
China. First, brothers joined brothers, then "sisters" began
increasingly to come and settle in Southeast Asia.
The sex ratios of the Chinese communities, always male-biased, became
stabilized by the late 19th Century, and this tended to stabilize the community,
its Chinese identity and the 'transience' within it. The increasing presence of
Chinese women in the Nanyang reversed the trend toward intermarriage with
local people and led to the formation of a Chinese community which maintained
its separate biological and cultural identity--Nanyang civilization, as a
typically "Overseas Chinese" cultural orientation, became more
"complete" (Yen Ching-Hwang, 1986)
The Twentieth Century, modernization, and especially World War II, brought a
change in the position of the Nanyang in Southeast Asia, but not an end to its
Empire. New Nationalisms throughout Southeast Asia supported structural
policies of enforced assimilation, systematic discrimination, ethnization,
and even political persecution of the Chinese minorities of the Nanyang. In some
aspects the Nanyang empire has been slowly melting, or eroding under the
gradual, long term impetus of these policies. But the Chinese, and their
position in the Southeast Asian economy, has proven difficult to replace.
Crucial to the historical background of the Straits Settlements has been
the larger context of the so-called "Nanyang"--the Overseas
"Imperio im Imperium", or "Empire within an Empire," that extended Southeastward from the Southeast Coastline of China, throughout
Southeast Asia, stretching across the Polynesian Pacific to eventually encompass
the New World, the Imperial pathways of the British Commonwealth, spreading its
net even into the Caribbean.
The extensiveness of this economic empire is to be matched only by its
subterrannium character, the entrepreneurial efficacy and savvy of its agents,
and the strength of social ties which have so effectively held it together
through more than a century and a half of persecution, discrimination, hardship
and struggle. A gigantic iceberg--it rears its tiny head above the surface of
the Pacific only in Singapore and Hong Kong. Long a two-headed dragon, it is
soon to become only a single entity--Singapore--a strange feudalistic
anachronism in a modern age of political capitalism and economic imperialism; a
mercantile city-state; an island unto itself at the very tip of the Eurasian
continent. But its influence is still strongly felt in almost every country
bordering the Pacific, and in many beyond.
In many respects representative of the unique cultural stylizations of the
Nanyang world, the place and rise of the Babas as a distinctive cultural
orientation, must be, more than any other single factor, fit within the
framework of the development of Nanyang civilization--in many respects
representative of the unique cultural stylizations of the Nanyang world. However
Malayized the Babas might have become, they remained importantly, and
distinctively, Chinese in orientation.
It would serve well to briefly compare and contrast Nanyang culture and
ethnicity with Baba ethnoculture. As an empire, the Nanyang is interregional,
and incorporates a wide arc of humanity beneath its broad umbrella. Singapore
has become the exclusive capital city of this empire, the central core of its
civilization, and Singapore has also always been one of the principle places
of the Straits Settlements.
The Baba's, with their Western orientation, were the original founders of
Singapore. They became the traditional ruling elite of the capital of the
Nanyang, and it is in this way that the Baba culture has come to serve, somewhat
ambivalently and ambiguously as an indirect cultural model for Nanyang
civilization.
But not all citizens of the Nanyang are or were Babas--most were not--and the
Baba has been in the contemporary epoch a dying breed though important remnants
of the Baba orientation remain with a strong Chinese identity, a Western outlook
focused upon the British model, and strong ties to a local Southeast Asia
cultural setting. What has been lost most from this orientation has been the
Malayanized aspects that gave it a distinctive flavor and style.
A model of the function of ethnos in the decision-making process of
migration, identity and development that goes into the history of the making of
Nanyang civilization is evident from the consideration of Baba culture in the
larger context of the Nanyang--the Babas were a kind of pariah class created
through cultural integration, acculturation, and amalgamation between
Muslim Malays and Buddhist Chinese, in which basic differences in religious
tenets precluded the kind of complete cultural assimilation that was possible in
Thailand.
Post-Independence Malaysia fostered strict policies of structural
discrimination and segregation between the Malays and the Chinese--these
policies led to the disintegration of the basis of Baba culture. Singapore,
a Chinese city, gained its own independence from Malaysia, and, in the
definition of its newfound national identity, excluded all that was Malay from
its own identity. Those aspects of Baba culture which were Malay were cast out,
leaving a gulf in its identity between the East and the West. At first it
strongly oriented itself to the British model, and later has gone through a
period of resinicization in renewing trade contacts with Taiwan.
The situation for the Baba's of Malacca was just the reverse. The
oldest Baba community, and in many respects the most Malayized, these people
found themselves symbolically appropriated and at the same time enclaved as the
museum pieces of Malaysian national heritage. They have since come to represent
the archetypical Babas, though they were but a variant of a more general theme.
These Babas had no option in the matter but to submit to their own cultural
cooption by the Malays.
In Penang, the next oldest Baba settlement, which remains more than 90%
Chinese in composition, the pathway taken by the Baba communities was a bit more
tragic. These Baba's strongly identified with the British, and were less
Malayized than the Malacca Chinese. They initiated a separatist movement for
Penang's status, similar to Singapore, but failed, not receiving the backing by
the British.
Ethnos can be seen as a principle determinant factor in the decisions and
opportunities open to people in the course of their lives. People attempt to
optimize their prospects, given alternative sets of possibilities, but these
possibilities themselves are constrained within a larger, ethnically defined
context, such that choices made are not unlimited, and vary considerably for
different peoples.
The Nanyang can be seen as a vast network of cris-crossing pathways
which allow labor, resources and capital to move in different, frequently
shifting, directions. Against systematic discrimination or persecution, Chinese
are faced with a range of alternative choices--they can either opt to assimilate
completely into the local population, become enclaved and ghettoized, segregated
and discriminated against, migrate back to china or seek a new homeland in
another part of the Nanyang. The flight of Capital from Hong Kong to the U.S.,
the Nanyang and the Commonwealth, is but one more example of this social
historical movement of people, wealth, resources and culture.
Which directions Chinese take will depend partly upon the dialect
group--Cantonese will take Cantonese pathways, and Hokkiens will follow Hokkien
roads. Not all Chinese of the Nanyang hold Singaporean culture to be the model
or principle orientation of their lives. The Singaporeans have, by and large,
been cut from their roots to the Chinese homeland, but many Chinese throughout
the Nanyang, Malaysia included, have maintained these Ancestral ties for
generations. Chinese may see Singapore symbolically as a success story, as a
financial capital and trade center of the Nanyang, but they do not identify with
the Anglicized, modernized Baba orientation of the Singaporean people--they
look elsewhere for their models of Chineseness.
The principle virtue and limitation of the Baba people are that they no
longer live directly under their Ancestor's shadow. Singaporean culture is
native to Singapore and the Straits, this is their homeland to which they are
fixed. Chinese who have kept their ties to the mainland have other options open
to them, but do not see Singapore or Singaporean culture as the primary
alternative for their lives.
The virtue of the larger Nanyang identity that depends upon its old
identification with the mainland is that this permits the Chinese a relatively
wide access to a number of possible alternatives--Chinese become united under a
broader umbrella of pan-Chineseness which encompasses different dialect groups.
Such Chinese are permitted to work together and even trust one another in
contexts in which the only common bond may be a superficial knowledge of
Mandarin. This latitude is an advantage of maintaining a Nanyang orientation
not permitted to the Babas.
The principle of the cultural models of ethnos in providing
options and in constraining the directions of decision-making in peoples' lives
is an important one. We can see that such ethnos is always defined vis-a' vis
reference or counter-reference groups--for the Singaporeans, the Malays are a
counter-reference other, and constitute the greatest threat to their separate
identity. On the other hand, the British model has served as the principle
reference group for these peoples. Other models are available to other
Chinese--some may still look to the mainland, others to the Nationalist
Government of Taiwan. Many undoubtedly see their successful cousins in the
United States and the Commonwealth. Many are likely to follow those who came
before them.
Perhaps the greatest illusion that a Westerner could entertain with regard to
the Chinese is that they are all basically the same. The very basis of ethnic
Chinese identity is its cross-cutting "nesting" of identities
within a larger network of social distinctions on the basis of village, clan,
kin-group, dialect, class, age, etc. Every Chinese has a place within the vast
theater, and every Chinese is supposed to know this place. Indeed, ethnos, or
ethnicity, for the ethnic Chinese is the primary organizational principle of
their society. Chinese typically draw fine distinctions between other Chinese
which are invisible to Non-Chinese eyes.
Intra-ethnic Chinese distinctions have been referred to as
"subethnic" identities based upon local-linguistic-ethnic
distinctions. It is highly ascriptive in character, being linked to the strong
patrilineal reckoning of Chinese kinship.
Chinese successfully exploited this organizational ethos of ethnos in
navigating and negotiating several different status-role identities within more
than one organizational structure. They thrive on a fundamental status
ambiguity, inter-positionality between structures, and a kind of Chameleoness of
code-switching, which would befuddle others.
Chinese may well be one big family, but it is a family divided under one
roof. The terminological distinctions made in kinship reckoning are fine and of
massive detail. It is fitting that both Chinese Heaven and Hell are vast
multi-tiered bureaucratic structures occupied by greater and lesser gods. Clan
organization and a segmentary lineage structure facilitates mobilization as well
as fine-tuning of internal differentiations. Trade associations, secret
societies, Kong si's, all cross cut Clan and lineage structures to weave Chinese
into a closely knit social cloth.
Mestizo Chinese
The formation of the Baba culture may have been unique in Southeast Asian
History, but cultural correlates are to be found in other places and other
periods of the Nanyang. The mestizo Chinese of the Philippines,
distinguishable there since the eighteenth century, have made important
contributions to the historical development of the Philippines--being
principally implicated in the Philippine Revolution against the Spanish, serving
as a major catalyst in social change and economic development of the
Philippines, and a leading component in the hispanization and creation of a
distinctive Filipino culture. Structurally similar to the Baba's, they
constituted a pariah group situated between the ethnically stronger Chinese and
the indigenous Philippinos. "....in most parts of Southeast Asia the
Chinese mestizos (to use the Philippine term for persons of mixed
Chinese-native ancestry) have not been formally or legally recognized as a
separate group--one whose membership is strictly defined by genealogical
considerations rather than by place of birth, and one which, by its possession
of a unique combination of cultural characteristics, could be easily
distinguished from both the Chinese and native communities." (E. Wickberg, "The Chinese Mestizo in Philippine History", in Journal
of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 5, no 1, 1964) These Chinese mestizos had
become prominent in land-holding, whole-sale merchant activities, and in the
professions. They grew in wealth as a middle-man pariah class, concentrating and
virtually monopolizing on the internal trade of the Philippines.
The Chinese mestizo of the Philippines was strongly hispanicized,
politically, in the adoption of Catholicism, in the adoption of Philippine
versions of Hispanic culture. Their dress was unique in this
regard--"models of what the urbanized Filipino of the late nineteenth
century would wear." (ibid. p. ?) Their culture was an urbanized one, and
the maternal influence hispanicized, catholicized mothers in the rearing and
socialization of the children, were important factors in the development of the
cultural distinctiveness of the Chinese mestizo.
Me’tis Chinois'
The Chinese presence in Cambodia and Cochin China, or what later became South
Vietnam, has been very old. Early evidence from the eleventh and twelfth
centuries A.D. mention the presence of a small Chinese community in Anghor Thom,
merchants and carpenters who came by sea and who married local women. By the
thirteenth century, a substantial Chinese settlement in Phnom-Penh is noted, and
the emergence of this center from a locally oriented one to a major foreign
trade entrepot, coincides with this settlement. Chinese communities were found
there by the Spanish and later by the Portuguese in the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth centuries. Cantonese mercenaries in the service of the Annamese
emperor established a fort at Mytho along the Mekong.
After more than a century of occupation, these Chinese were later forced to
abandon this settlement and migrated to the location near Saigon that later
became known as Cholon, "...and soon established a trading town that
soon became the centre of Chinese trade for the whole of Indochina. Many of
these Chinese adventurers married Annamese women and produced the Minh-Huong, the
Sino-Annamese who were treated as a separate minority
group throughout the nineteenth century in Annam and Cochinchina, and who, for a
short period, constituted a separate legal group in Cambodia as
well." (W. E. Willmott;, "History and Sociology of the Chinese in
Cambodia Prior to the French Protectorate", in The Journal of Southeast
Asian History ,Vol. 7, no. 1, 1966)
By the time of the arrival of French and British explorers, Phnom-Penh was
mostly a Chinese city, composed primarily of immigrants from Cholon, and who had
tied up the local trade in fish and rice. These Chinese were probably mostly
Cantonese and Hainanese, the descendants of Ming patriots.
Reference is made in the legal code of the Khmer Kingdom to granting of
positions of authority over the Chinese community to
"me'tis-chinois" (Lecle're, 1898:115). Chinese were not subject to
the legal marriage prohibitions between Cambodian Buddhists and
foreigners--perhaps because they were Buddhist as well, and because it was
relatively easy for a Chinese to assimilate, if he so desired, into Cambodian
society--"Any Chinese born in Cambodia was considered a Cambodian if he
adopted Khmer customs and dress...Sino-Khmer were automatically
Cambodians" (ibid, pg. 31)
Thai-Chinese
The Chinese in Thailand represent another instance of partial
assimilation and the formation of an important pariah group. Constituting
perhaps an eighth of the total population, they are small traders and merchant
middlemen--"virtually any article bought or sold in Thailand passes through
the hands of one or more Chinese middlemen." (Richard Coughlin, Double-Identity
1960: 2). Chinese traders in Thailand date back at least to the thirteenth
century. A French account from 1687 reports about 3,000 Chinese at Ayuthia. By
this time, the Chinese controlled most of the trade in the country. A Teochiu
Chinese, Taksin, rose to power as the King of Siam after expelling Burmese
invaders who had destroyed the capital. The predominant presence of Teochiu
Chinese in Thailand is probably related to this important historical
episode. Taksin was assassinated by his son-in-law, Chao Phya Chakkri, who
founded the present Bangkok Dynasty. The royal palace was established in the old
Chinese quarter of the city, "ruled by a rich Chinese merchant with the
noble rank of Phraya."
Continual warfare with Burma and Cambodia had decimated the Thai population,
and thus Chinese immigration was welcome--"Meanwhile a war-surplus of
females became available to the bachelor (or otherwise) Chinese immigrants, and
Chinese blood was literally fused with both the royal and common blood of the
Thai people" (Joseph P. L. Jiang, "The Chinese in Thailand: Past
and Present", in The Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 7, no.
1, 1966:42)
Chinese figured prominently in the economic development of Thailand--they
held many 'tax-farms' and controlled the junk trade which was held by a royal
monopoly on foreign commerce. They constituted artisans, craftsmen, metal
smiths, builders, as well as mining, planting and timber.
Chinese-Thai intermarriage was great in old Siam, and there seems to have
been no boundaries or discrimination against such amalgamation. The net effect
seems to have been near complete assimilation of Chinese by the third or fourth
generation, with only some Chinese cultural elements, such as ancestor worship,
remaining. "Since the earliest times prominent Chinese were often recruited
to governmental, especially diplomatic service. The majority of these were
second generation, and were more than half assimilated...(ibid, pg. 51)
The status of the Nanyang Chinese in Thailand was directly tied to Thai
tributary tutelage to Mainland China, and to their usefulness to both the Thai
royalty and to the Thai people in economic activities. The Chinese were not
discriminated against, and were given virtually free and ungoverned reign in
their own spheres of activity, and yet the Chinese were clearly made politically
subordinate to the Royalty.
They filled a critical, intermediary niche as a pariah group that was
not traditionally a part of Thai social structure, but which was necessary and
vital to the economic development of old Siam. With the encroachment of Western
domination over China, its loss of status to the Thai Royalty signaled a
reversal in the status of the Chinese in Thailand, so much so that by the
early 20th Century we find mention of the Chinese of Thailand as "Asian
Jewry" and the promotion of Thai nationalism, an orientation inherited
from the West, is closely linked to growing anti-sinicism. Policies of enforced
assimilation of the ethnic Chinese into Thai
culture--"Thai-ification"--and of systematic discrimination against
the Chinese in business and public life, have grown and continue unabated until
today.
Burmese-Chinese
The Chinese in Burma; are not outstanding in the History of the Nanyang.
Burma shares a common border with Mainland China, and this has constrained
status of the overseas Chinese there in important ways that the Chinese of Burma
have not been ignorant in taking advantage. Though highly visible in many
sectors of the economy, they were never as economically predominant there as
elsewhere in Southeast Asia, in part because they had close competition with
Indian merchants. Victor Purcell notes that intermarriage between Chinese
men and Burmese women was not uncommon, and that the male offspring of such
unions remained identified as Chinese, while the female offspring become
identified as Burmese. He goes on to remark that Chinese there become almost
completely assimilated by the second or third generation, losing all their
Chineseness--thus, despite a continual influx of new Chinese immigrants into
Burma, the total number of people identified as Chinese there remains
effectively stable.
"Borneo" Chinese
Evidence supports the possible presence of Chinese upon the island of
Borneo from as early as the 7th Century, and possibly even earlier, with
archaeological evidence dating to 117B.C., upon an old site in the region now
occupied by Brunei and Sarawak. (Victor Purcell, 1966:11) Early Chinese
Chronicles of the Liang(502-566) and Sui(589-618) Dynasties mention
"P'oli", known since the Tang(618-907) Dynasty onwards as
"P'oni" and thought to be the early name for Brunei, had given a
description of its direction and of it's inhabitants which fit well that of
Borneo. Later Chronicles mention the same kingdom comprising fourteen provinces
extending along the northern Borneo coastline and as far as the Philippines.
(John Chin, The Sarawak Chinese 1981:1-2)
Assimilation of Chinese, of ulu-traders, in Borneo has been held to have been
widespread. Rates of intermarriage with native Dusun and Sulu peoples were
probably high. The Chinese have long figured in the "ulu" trade
and resource exploitation of Borneo, as well as in its mining and
agricultural pioneering. An Early Kong Si system provided the organizational
base for the mobilization of labor and resources in the development of trade and
resource production in Borneo. Trade networks with indigenous peoples brought
them into continuous contacts and interactions with these peoples, as these
people grew accustomed to their goods and their presence. Chinese now comprise a
significant minority in Borneo, comprising most of the ethnic-dialect groups
representing the Overseas Chinese. Intermarriage with local wives was
frequent, especially in the earlier periods, in part because of the male-biased
sex ratio among the Chinese, and because such conjugal unions facilitated
economic relations with the indigenous peoples. More recently, such
intermarriage is virtually nonexistent, in either urban or rural segments of
Chinese society, and "Peranakans" of means are remarrying back
into "pure" Chinese society. "When it does occur it reflects the
low status of the individual involved and his difficulty in finding an
acceptable mate within the bounds of his own ethnic group." (David Fortier, "The Chinese in North Borneo", 1957:16-7)
Peranakans/Babas
The Peranakan Chinese of Indonesia, "Peranakan" meaning
literally "mixed blood", are the group most closely related to the
Baba's. They are virtually identical in many cultural aspects, and yet they have
had different histories and different trajectories of development. Both groups
are principally Hokkien Chinese, both groups have assimilated similar elements
of Malayo-Indonesian culture, and yet both groups looked to different European
Colonial masters for their primary orientation in the modern world. The
demographic profiles of the .Peranakans of Indonesian; and the Babas of
Malaysia are substantially different--while the Nanyang Chinese of Malaysia
constitute about 40% of the national population, being the largest group of
overseas Chinese, the Baba's represent only a small minority of the Chinese. On
the other hand, the Chinese of Indonesia, while almost as numerous as the
Malaysian Chinese, constitute only about 3% of the total population of
Indonesia. But on the Island of Java, where the Nanyang Chinese are most
numerous, the Peranakans constitute over 50% of the overseas Chinese. Enforced
segregation, a policy begun with the Dutch, has long served to mark off and
isolate the Chinese communities in Indonesia. The principle division there is
between the Totok or Singkeh Chinese, and the
Peranakan, or "mixed-blood" or "Indonesian born" Chinese.
More than 85% of the Peranakans are to be found in Java, concentrated in the
main urban centers. The Peranakans were Hokkien descent, while the Totoks who
came later were primarily Cantonese.
II
The Birth of the Babas
by
Hugh M. Lewis
The Babas of Malaysia and Singapore and
the Peranakans of Indonesia share a common kind of Creole orientation in a
local and regional context. Their communities constitute local variations upon a
shared cultural continuum, the limits and dimensionality of
which are, broadly speaking, the function of a style of accommodation and a
kind of broader acculturation. These communities all share basic, derivative
and distinctive cultural correlates within a similar, regionally defined
culture-historical framework, which can be treated in a comparative manner and
can be used as a relative index of acculturative influence, cultural change and
continuity, as well as the basis for the construction of a hypothetical,
prototypical ethnocultural and ethnohistorical baseline by which a broader,
deeper culture historical understanding can be derived.
Issues of ethnoculture and ethnohistory cannot be clearly separated,
especially in regard to such groups as the Babas and Nonyas whose social
organization, ethnic identity, history, and culture appear to be inextricably
interrelated in such a way that we cannot analytical separate out for study one
dimension without becoming entangled in all the other dimensions of study.
An attempt to write an ethno-historiography in recognition of
these inherent complexities constitutes an attempt to combine stylistic elements
of ethnographic description and ethnological explanation with other stylistic
elements of historiographic narrative and chronology, as well as an attempt to
effectively integrate macroscopic dimensions of culture historical and
political economic proportions with microscopic dimensions of human participants
making human decisions and mistakes in everyday situations. In this regard, the
key linkage is held to be the effective context of the small group network --at
which level of analysis individual decision-making becomes bound to and
critically constrained by small group-dynamics, values, group incentives and
cultural constraints.
Such small, sub-cultural groupings are not strictly molecular in their
structural organization--they are cellular in possessing semi-permeable
boundaries and osmotic qualities which allow a certain amount and kind of
crossing over. These boundaries are defined, refined and revised in relation to
other such groupings, to individuals' reference points, and to larger social
contexts of participation and historical events.
They are symbolic as well, being more the nature of maze-ways and maps,
passageways, doors and keys, defined by elements of language, nonverbal
communication, social positionality, world-view, cultural orientation and
models, which individuals learn to navigate their relationships with different
people. Such boundaries are rarely static and are always socially,
psychologically and culture historically dynamic. They are negotiated,
transformed, maintained, etc., through our ongoing interrelatedness with others.
Ethnicity has come to encompass a variety of different meanings--ethnos,
ethnic identity, classification, ethnic studies, ethnogeny, the nexus of
"race, culture, ethnic groupings and nationalities", as structuralist
"ethnic boundaries" rooted in "eco-niches", competitive
exclusion for resources, social or material, social stratification,
ethno-religious
value orientation, and ethno-political ideology and ethnic group organization
and mobilization.
There is intrinsic to the understanding of ethnicity created in plural social
settings, the notion of ethnarchy, the ethnic stratification of
communally ordered societies involving unequal "majority/minority"
relations and internal/external colonization of groups, social and structural
discrimination, of interregional or world systems framework which defines
structural and social asymmetries between core, semi-periphery and peripheral
regions. There are also acculturation perspectives that deal with analytical
problems of social integration, amalgamation, assimilation, accommodation as well
as problems of transmission, mobility, and stratification.
Then there is labeling theory, which focuses upon the foundation and effects
of ethnic stereotyping and labeling in maintaining social distance, thresholds
and barriers between groups. A symbolic approach views the ethno-historical
repository and revitalization of symbols of ethnic identity and ethnic group
solidarity, which may be used differentially in different periods and places to
configure and reconfigure identities of difference and sameness.
A Marxist theory of "ethnikos" defines an ethnic community,
"or ethos in a narrow sense of the word", "as a historically
formed aggregate of people who share common, relatively stable specific features
of culture (including language) and psychology, realization of their unity and
distinctiveness from other similar aggregates of people as well as the self-nomination."
(Yu
V. Bromley, On the Typology of Ethnic Communities,1978:18) Ethnikos is
not an isolated phenomena, but occurs in a nexus of several levels of social
institutionalization "from family to state". "The combination of
ethnic properties with social properties as such depends, to a certain extent,
on the spatial parameters of ethnikos, on a compact or scattered distribution of
the bearers of ethnic properties themselves." (ibid., pg. 18)
This definition of ethnikos fits the general problem of ethnicity within a
larger political economic and social systems framework. Immanuel Wallerstein
does not distinguish between "nations, nationalities, peoples, ethnic
groups,", but all these terms "denote variants of a single
phenomenon" which he refers to as "ethno-nations" which are
identifiable by their articulatory function within the world economy as a whole.
We may extend and modify this thesis somewhat to say that such ethnikos
fits within variable levels of familial, local, provincial, state, regional,
interregional and global systems, all of which are interrelated. Ethnikos
must always be framed within a larger structure of social interaction--ethnic
analysis must take into account the relative positioning, and
inter-positionality
of both individuals and communities within these different systemic levels.
Immanuel Wallerstein distinguishes between ranges of interest and interaction
within the core, periphery and semi-periphery. "The meaning of ethnic
consciousness in a core area is considerably different from that of ethnic
consciousness in a peripheral area precisely because of the different class
positions such ethnic groups have in a world economy." (I. Wallerstein, The
Capitalist World Economy, 1979:pg. 24-5)
The ethnic identity of the Overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia is within a
semi-peripheral social position, in which consciousness is
"inter-class" and therefore inherently ambiguous in its relative
juxtapositioning between core and periphery. From the perspective of the
periphery, it shares features of the core. From the standpoint of the core, it
shares aspects of the periphery. Structurally and socially, therefore, the
ethnic status identity of the Chinese of the Nanyang is inherently ambivalent
and problematic, an ambiguity which reverberates upon all levels of its
articulatory functioning.
The problematic function and dilemma of this ethnic consciousness is to span
and effectively resolve this dilemma. We may refer to this as a process of
ethnization---as a mode of social production, as an ideological
mode of information, and as a dialectical mode of "ethnic
realization."--it is an open-ended historical process in its extension,
reapplication to historically situated and particular phenomena, and thus
accretes new meanings and a transformational base for its growth and development
as a distinctive ethno-cultural phenomena. It becomes a referential and
organizational metaphor as well--realities and issues become ethnicized
when cast in the terminology of an "ethnical language game". Ethnic
groups, boundaries, identities and categories become, to some extent, phenomena
of reification which the researcher takes part in reinforcing--such reified
ideas and words then take a life and history of their own.
We must also refer to an ethnic style or stylization which is distinctive
and culture historically unique, and which may also be quite adaptive in
functional integration within a given social context.
We must see the process of ethnization and stylization from both an etic
and emic point of view, as dialectically interdependent and systematic, and
involving processes which are both endogenous and exogenous, internal and
external, in origin and orientation.
Ethnarchy carries the connotation of hierarchy within a communalistic
framework--stratification which has structurally variable social, psychological,
political, economic, religious and cultural dimensions--which may be expressed
or emphasized differentially in the process of ethnization. Furthermore,
ethnarchy in ethnization also implies a process of colonial
institutionalization, or 'colonization'--implying the function of "social
distance" in the political control of identity and practice primarily
for economic interests and intentions. Social distance as a mechanism for
ethnic stratification also involves the notion of group 'boundary' maintenance.
Interethnic conflict in Malaysia between Chinese and Malays can be seen
as an effective smoke-screen for the maintenance of intra-group vertical
stratification, and for the protection and promotion of the interests and
prerogatives of an exclusive elite. There is a hidden 'elite-mass' dimension to
the communal policies and politics of ethnic difference. Economically, as
defined by the class relations of a common market place, a hierarchy of
interests is effectively masked by ethnic stratification. The existential
realities of both Chinese and Malays are rooted in the same economic
dilemmas of underdevelopment and structural poverty.
Political power and economic advantage exist in a socio-structural
dialect--access to resources, opportunities, skills and incentives underly
empowerment and political organization--and political legitimacy and
mobilization in turn decisively determines and critically conditions economic
change, development and differential access to resources.
In Nanyang social structure, the path to leadership lay through social
influence obtained through economic achievement and acquisition. Political
privilege in turn increases wealth and prestige. "The circle was
complete..." (John Chin;, 1981: 79) From the standpoint of the structural
efficacy of power, ethnic labels "conceal the underlying struggle for the
appropriation of certain economic, political, and social advantages among the
different racial and status groups in the wider Malaysian society...(Lawrence
K. L. Siaw, The Legacy of Malaysian Chinese Social Structure)
As merchant middlemen, the Chinese were focused upon the Southeast Asian
marketplace and market economy. They came to depend upon what Max Weber has
called the critical market "moment" of class advantage in the buying
and selling of commodities. As such, they were a marginal minority, articulating
and mediating different levels of the political-economic structure of Southeast
Asian society.
Their place within a developing Southeast Asian context was pivotal--existing
for purposes of social stability and for buffering in conflict-laden tensions
between core and periphery, elite and masses. It is bought off from the top, and
becomes the scape-goat for tension from the bottom--it is therefore caught in
the classic dilemma of the double-bind, depending for its very ethnic identity
on structural processes and positions which threaten that identity. It becomes
both exploiter and exploited, without political legitimacy or independence, a
commercial-urban middle-stratum containing social pressures towards social
integration and homogenization, in a marginally discontinuous position rendering
them constantly vulnerable to conflict or confiscation.
Baba Beginnings
The Babas of Malaysia commonly referred to themselves as Peranakan,
and even though among Malays this may have had derogative connotations of
"mixed" or impure blood, the Baba's were proud of their heritage and
of their name. John Clammer notes that Peranakan "is the Malay designation
for 'local-born people'"(1980:3) According to Tan Giok-San who wrote the
first comprehensive ethnography of the Peranakans of Indonesia, the word
"peranakan" is derived from the Malayo-Indonesian root
"anak", meaning child, with the prefix "per" and suffix
"an", rendering the meaning "born of"(1963:pg. 11). In
modern medical terminology, "peranakan" is the part of the female
anatomy closely describing the uterus. (Wazir Jahan Karim, "Prelude to
Madness: The Language of Emotion in Courtship and Early Marriage" in Emotions
of Culture: A Malay Perspective, edited by Wazir Jahan Karim, 1990:49)
"Malay midwives describe it as the place in the abdomen where 'the foetus
clings' and the baby begins to grow. Hence it is closely associated with blood,
semen and fertilization, in the sense that a foetus is recognized to develop
from a clot of blood after fertilization takes place." (ibid. pg. 49-50)
Peranakan Indonesia or Peranakan Malaysia refers to "born of
Indonesia" or "born of Malaysia" respectively. It came to have
the euphemistic connotation of "mixed-blood" and was applied to any
native-born who were of mixed descent--Arab Peranakan, Chinese Peranakan, Dutch
Peranakan, Jawi Peranakan, etc. It seems as though the Chinese Peranakan, always
a significant, if not a preponderant, minority, appropriated the term as their
own.
The terms Baba and Nonya, or Nyonya or Nona, are often applied to the
Peranakans, particularly of the Straits Settlements. These terms mean
"Man" or "mister" and "Woman" or "Mrs."
or "Miss," and carry the connotation of "Gentleman" and
"Lady." Again, according to Tan, Indonesian kin-terms used by elderly
women, referring to Child's spouse, were sexually marked-- "Babah
mantu" (Daughter's husband) and "Njonja mantu" (Son's
wife) (Tan Giok-lan, 1963:pg. 125). One can only speculate whether the terms
Baba and Nonya became marked for those of mixed marriage between Chinese and
Malayo-Indonesians, and thus appropriated by the Peranakans to refer to the male
and female spouses of such marriages.
J. D. Vaughn, in his early work The Manners and Customs of the Chinese
of the Straits Settlements(1879) traces the etymology of the word Baba;
as the a term used by Bengali descendents to designate European children,
"and it is probable that the word was applied by the Indian convicts at
Pinang to Chinese children and so came into general use." (reprint,1971: 2)
R. J. Wilkinson held that Baba was a descriptive name for "European,
Eurasian and Chinese males to distinguish them from men born in Europe and
China", and "Descriptive name applied to male Straits-born Chinese."(R. J. Wilkinson, A Malay-English Dictionary, 1959: 50)
Kobayashi
Shinsaku; has speculated that Baba may have been a corruption of the Malay word
for father, Bapa, employed as an honorific for the peranakans of Java.
(Kobayashi Shinsaku, Shina Minzoku no Kaigai Hatten Kakyo no Kenkyo,
1931:93) John Clammer cites speculation that "Baba" should be
rendered as "ba-ba", indicating ignorance of Chinese language and
customs. "If this is at all true, it would account for many Straits Chinese
disliking the term when it is applied to them!"(1980, footnote, pg. 5) On
the other hand, Png Poh-Seng notes that "In the heyday of Straits Chinese
prestige and influence, it was an advantage to be a Baba, and it is not
far-fetched to assume that all Straits-born Chinese then liked to be known as
Babas." ("The Straits Chinese In Singapore" in The Journal of
Southeast Asian History, 1969:pg. 97) Png Poh-Seng concurs with the
early definition provided by the Rev. Carstairs Douglas, "as it is
fairly certain from accounts of Sino-Malay marriages in Malacca that the
term was introduced to describe the progeny of such mixed parentage."
(ibid.,
pg. 96)
.i.Png Poh-Seng; notes that "It was also not uncommon for families,
especially local-born Tiechius, to name their sons Tua-ba..., Ji-ba...,
San-ba..., Si-ba..., and their daughters Tua-nya..., Ji-nya..., San-nya..., and
Si-nya..., in order of age." (ibid. pg. 98)
My wife, a direct descendent of the Nyonyas from Penang, sometimes sings
to our baby girl "Noni, noni keng, Ah pek jeep pang keng, pang keng mui bey
key so, Ah pek long toe" (translated, it reads "Noni, noni keng, old
man goes into the bedroom, forgot bedroom door is not locked, the old man pushes
it down") I ask her what the terms "Noni, noni keng" stand for,
and where she first learned it, and she says she doesn't know, it just rhymes
with the rest of the song, and it is something she had been singing since she
was a child.
Excessive ink spilt over the speculative etymology of such words as Baba and
Nyonya and Peranakan is not mere equivocation, as it points up a fundamental
dimension of ambiguity of such primary terms of reference--an ambiguity that is
carried over into the other apellatives. "Straits-Born" and "Straits
Chinese" which is frequently used synonymously. The British Rev.
Carstairs Douglas;, in his dictionary of spoken Amoy Hokkien, notes that the
term "Baba" carried over into the Hokkien language to refer to "a
half-caste Chinese from the Straits." In the Straits, however, the term is
applied to all Chinese born there, half-caste or not." (J. D. Vaughn;,
1879:pg. 2) John Clammer; again comments that "there was from a very
early date a distinction between the Straits Chinese, who were culturally
distinct, and the other immigrant Chinese in the Straits Settlements"(pg. 4).
The fundamental ambiguity found in all three
sets of terms, Peranakan, Baba and Nyonya, and Straits Chinese, is one of the
implicit denotative/connotative significance of 'local born/mixed-blood',
respectively. Not all local born Chinese were half-caste or half-breed even though they may or may not have been called
"peranakan", Baba, or Straits Chinese, and, at least for the
Indonesian Peranakans, about three-quarters were of mixed parentage.
This ambiguity is essential to understanding the identity of the Peranakans
and Babas, because they constituted an interstitial group situated somewhere
between the Chinese and the Malayo-Indonesians, along two separate but
convergent dimensions--racial and kinship identity, on the one hand, and, on the
other, cultural identity. It was just this inbetweenness, so important in group
and individual reference, which became linguistically "marked" by such
special apellatives and that connote ethnic pride or dysphemistically in a derogative way to register
cultural/racial inferiority. The connotation of 'native' or local-born is more
positively salient than the meaning of 'half-breed' which carries a negative
connotation.
Some of the earliest evidence for the Chinese in the Nanyang comes from
archaeological sites in Java, Sumatra, and Borneo, including Chinese
sepulchral pottery vessels, that date to the second and first centuries B. C.
"From these finds, De Flines inferred, no doubt correctly, that Chinese
colonists or merchants must have lived in Indonesia; as early as the Han
period." (Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, 1951:
pg. 11)
There can be little doubt that the Chinese had been in Java for a long time.
No doubt that in these long settled communities, Chinese took local wives and
established families. There was in these Islamic societies a barrier to the
local assimilation of the Chinese. It is apparent that the Chinese took wives
from the lowest social classes, or slaves, from non-Islamic groups or the
Balinese. The inferior status of these women precluded their capacity to
culturally assimilate the offspring of these marriages "so decisively in
favour of native culture as did Thai wives. Furthermore, if sons and daughters
remained within the Chinese community, after a few generations, native-Chinese
intermarriage
would decline, as the Chinese community provided its own wives. We know that the
first headmen or kapitans of the Chinese in seventeenth century Batavia had
Balinese wives, but by the eighteenth century their successors were marrying
daughters of other Chinese officers." (Mary F. Somers-Heidhues, Chinese
Minorities in Southeast Asia, pg. 36-7)
Dutch policies legally prohibited intermarriage of the Chinese (1717) and
their assimilation to native status. They were quartered off in their own
colonies, required to wear typically Chinese dress and were not permitted
freedom of movement outside of these except when in service of the Dutch
interests. Later, in 1854, they were set into a separate, higher tax category.
Later influx of Chinese Totoks, and especially Chinese women, even further
discouraged assimilation and acculturation of this group, and even resulted in
some degree of resinification into the new Chinese communities.
It appears that the Peranakans of Java, and perhaps Baba communities of
Malacca, became effectively stabilized sometime between the seventeenth and
nineteenth centuries, as effectively closed and self-perpetuating communities
which had their own cultural orientation. Coincidental with this period were
Imperial Edicts beginning in the early eighteenth century and in effect until
the early nineteenth century which effectively prevented further emigration from
Southeastern China and which strongly discouraged the repatriation of those
Chinese abroad, under penalty of punishment. It was then, during this period
that the Chinese communities could no longer look back to China with the hope of
some day returning to be buried there. This must have provided a strong
incentive for these Chinese to reorient themselves to their local context, to
effectively break off their ties to the homeland, and to cultivate a sense of a
local cultural orientation which involved some degree of indigenous
acculturation and assimilation. Once formed, these separate and isolated Chinese
communities, with their peranakan cultural practices and orientation, remained
effectively segregated up until their eventual disintegration and demise under
the modern policies of the new Indonesian and Malay Nationalisms.
The earliest evidence for Chinese communities in the Straits must be taken to
date from Eunoch Cheng Ho's founding of Malacca in 1408. It can be
safely assumed that from the time of its founding, Chinese must have had a
regular, if not continuous, residence there. It is likely that the earliest
Chinese settlement had more of the character of a transient camp or a small
trading colony than of a settled, internally organized community. "From the
available Chinese, Malay and Portuguese sources, it seems certain that there was
a Chinese trading community in the port-city of Malacca before the fall of the
Sultanate in 1511. But whether these Chinese represented a permanent or a fluid
society, that kept coming and going with the monsoons, is still uncertain. The
size of the Chinese trading community was probably small and insignificant.
However, it laid the foundation for the development of a permanent Chinese
community in Malacca." (Yeh Hua Fen, Historical Guide of Malacca,
1936)
There is not uniform agreement on this score of the early Chinese
settlement of Malacca. Victor Purcell is somewhat skeptical stating that
permanent Chinese communities were not established of any significant size until
the coming of the Europeans. It is apparent that Chinese had formed settlements
in some of the port cities of Java prior to the European contact, and these
perhaps constituted some of the earliest Chinese settlements in the Straits.
Mention in the early Portuguese references is only of Chinese junks whose crew
and traders remained on board. A "Campon China" is given on the
map in Eredias history of Malacca, 1613, but this settlement is only of a
very small size. The paucity of reference to the Chinese in the early Portuguese
texts on Malacca may not be an indication of the lack of Chinese inhabitants
there so much as an indication of the lack of Portuguese attention or interest
in such details.
There is a story of Sultan Mansur Shah, from 1462, to whom the Emperor of
China's daughter, Hong Li-po, was sent for their hands in marriage. The
Emperor sent a fleet of one hundred "pilus" bearing 500 daughters of
his paramantris as handmaidens to the Princess.
The well mentioned in this reference has long been the source of drinking
water famous for its taste, and perhaps its curative properties as well, so much
so that its waters have been transported to neighboring countries, as far as
Sumatra, during times of drought and pestilence. The location of the later Bukit
China, of the Princess Hung Li-po's dwelling, on this hill, and the digging of a
well at its base, may have been, from the standpoint of Chinese Geomancy, a
propitious place.
It seems likely that, sometime between Cheng Ho's first visit, in 1403,
Alfonso
d' Albuquerque's conquest of Malacca in 1511, and the Dutch conquest in
1641, Chinese sojournership at some point crossed the thin line to colonial
settlement. Evidence of grave inscriptions at the Chinese cemetery, Bukit China, the oldest of which date to the sixteenth century, and the next set
which date to the beginning of the Ching Dynasty in the 1644, have some bearing
on the early Malacca Chinese. "One of them is that of the husband and
wife of a certain Ng by surname...The tombstone of the right one shows that the
dead was a Kapitan, surnamed Tay, while that of the left, the Kapitan Nya, or
Lady Kapitan or the Kapitan's wife, probably a native woman...." (Yeh Hua
Fen, Historical Guide of Malacca, 1936:pg. 79). The oldest family
lineages of Malacca Chinese, the Tans, Tays and Li traditions, do not go back
further than the first half of the seventeenth century. (Victor Purcell,
"Chinese Settlement in Malacca. Journal of the Malayan Branch of the
Royal Asiatic Socity, Vol. XX, Part I, pg. 122-3)
The Dutch give reference to a Chinese community--"The 300 or 400 Chinese
shopkeepers, craftsmen and farmers could be allowed to settle down at their own
convenience, provided they cultivate the gardens within their territory. They
can hire or occupy those empty houses which can be saved from collapse or
destruction....The ruined gardens between the river Boekit Tjina and the
southern suburbs should be lent to Netherlanders, Portuguese, Malaccans, and
Chinese to be cultivated....For these some 800 to 1,000 Chinese settlers would
be very useful." (Justus Schouten, "Report of 1641 to the Dutch East
India Company") The Dutch appointed "Kapitans China" to
manage the Chinese community of Malacca, much as they did in Java and Batavia.
"The Chinese living at Basar on the north of the city have their own
Captain Notchin who lives on small merchandise." Thus we get the beginning
of a succession of "at least" eleven Kapitans China. These were
Hokkiens,
and their descendants, who had fled the Manchus and who maintained strong
loyalty to the old Ming Dynasty.
By 1678, Governor Balthasar Bort gave a census figure of 892 Chinese in
Malacca out of a total of 4, 884 people. "The Chinese had 81 brick and 51
atap houses with 127 men, 140 women, 159 children, 93 male slaves, 137 female
slaves, and 60 children of slaves inside the city limit." (Victor Purcell, 1947:pg. 124)
By 1750 the Chinese population was 2,161, dropping to 1,390 in 1760, which
remained stable until the British occupation in 1795.
Most of the Hokkien of this early period were merchants, but this
community became joined by a large Hakka contingent of farmers who pioneered
into the hinterlands and played an important role in the opening of the interior
states. "The famous pioneer of Kuala Lumpur, Yap Ah Loi, a Fui-Chiu Hakka,
was one of them..." (ibid., pg. 83)
With the onset of British rule in the Straits Settlements, the Chinese
population increased greatly there. The British found the Chinese useful, and
did not discourage the Chinese from developing the coolie system, or the "credit-ticket"
or "Kheh-tau" system, of immigrating indentured Chinese
laborers in massive numbers. Within seven years of the British acquisition of
Penang
in 1786 and the founding of its fort there in their effort against the French,
the Chinese population had increased to over three thousand. Sir Francis Light,
the British Founder of Penang, encouraged the Chinese to immigrate there,
"whom he held to be 'the only people of the East from whom a revenue may be
raised without expense or extraordinary efforts of government.'" (T.
Braddel, 'Notices of Penang", Journal of the Indian Archipelago ,
1850:641)
The first Chinese to establish themselves in Penang came from a Chinese
community in Kedah, and the first Kapitan China was a baba from there named
Koh Lay Huan. He settled there as a merchant, planter and tax farmer, and
maintained one family in Kedah and another in Penang. His son by his Penang wife
accompanied Sir Stanford Raffles to Singapore in its opening in 1819. The other
most influential Chinese families were the Khoos and the Kohs, who were
interrelated by marriage. The Khoo Kong Si is an old historical monument to be
found in Penang today. My wife's father's family may have been descended from
this lineage. "In the former days long-settled Chinese families in Kedah
and Penang had intermarried with Malays, but with increased immigration from
China from the middle of the nineteenth century, this mixed Chinese-Malay or
Baba stock tried to marry pure-blooded Chinese."("An Immigrant
Society", pg. 10-11)
It seems apparent that some of the first Chinese there were also the Baba
business men from Malacca, who rapidly took advantage of the opportunities
that were the result of British colonization.
A similar pattern began in Singapore with its founding in 1819, at which
time there were no Chinese present, but the Chinese population of which grew to
several thousand within a year. "Many of the principal Chinese families of
Malacca took part in the opening up and growth of Singapore and Penang, but
continued to keep their families and the family houses in Malacca..." (Yeh
Hua Fen, Historical Guide of Malacca, 1936, pg. 16) Thereafter, the
Chinese population in the Straits Settlements grew steadily. "In 1840, 5,063
of them arrived, and by 1865, twenty-five years later, the number had increased
threefold to 17,439. However, the formation of large and more permanent Chinese
communities in Malaya did not take place until the 1880's when large-scale
Chinese immigration began.
The influx of Chinese immigrants by the thousands was mainly the result of
the establishment of British political control over the Malay states after 1874.
The economic development and the law and order brought about by the British
served as a great stimulus to immigration, and hence the Chinese population in
Singapore and Malaya increased substantially." (Yen Ching-Hwang; The
Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pg. 4)
A census figure for the Chinese of Singapore in 1848 lists 1,000
"Malacca Chinese" versus 9,000 Hokkiens, 19,000 Tiuchius, 6,000
Cantonese, 4,000 Hakkas and 700 Hainanese. (Siah U Chin, "The Chinese in
Singapore", Journal of the Indian Archipelago, Vo. 11, 1848:pg. 290)
An 1881 census recorded in Singapore 4,513 "Straits-born" men out of a
total Chinese male population of 72,571, and 5,014 "Straits-born"
women of a total of 14,195 Chinese females.
It is apparent that during this early era of British colonization, the Baba
Chinese held an exclusive advantage over the new "singkeh" Chinese.
Maurice Freedman writes that "When Singapore was founded as a British
settlement in 1819 Babas were among its first inhabitants, and they occupied
throughout the nineteenth century a prominent position in local Chinese society,
maintaining leadership within it by virtue of their commercial success and by
absorbing ambitious immigrants from China into their ranks." ("Chinese
Kinship and Marriage in Singapore" in The Journal of Southeast Asian
History)
It is apparent that these Baba's also held a kind of monopoly over the
institution of marriage among the Chinese of the Straits. "The Chinese who
congregate here are a mixed mass from all parts: the unmarried ones among them
are very numerous and the married ones very few....upon a general calculation I
should suppose there were about 2000 married Chinese." (Siah U Chin,
"The Chinese In Singapore", ibid., pg. 284) The same author notes that
the greatest number of married Chinese men are "found among the Malacca
born Chinese; next to them among the Hok-kien shop keepers, then the
Tio-Chin....As for common laborers and coolies and those who have no fixed
employment very few among them get married."(pg. 284)
It was apparent that the local orientation and settled state of the Baba
communities in the Straits resulted in the need to establish and maintain a
local system of marriage and kinship. With increasing immigration of Chinese
into the Straits Settlements, this community soon became a minority of about
10 percent of the Chinese population in Singapore. Most of the Chinese born
in the Straits Settlements during this era were Baba by birth. Before the turn
of the Twentieth century, very few Chinese women immigrated into the
Straits, and the ratio of men to women in these communities was very imbalanced.
"Originally the inhabitants of Malacca, the Babas later spread to the
Malay States and other British settlements. With increased immigration,
half-caste Sino-Malay girls married immigrants from China as their fathers
were reluctant to marry them to Malays, and their progeny would have less
Malay and more Chinese blood. In time mixed parentage almost disappeared, but
the descendants of the Sino-Malays continued to be known as Babas. Then by the
time the Straits Settlements came into being in 1826 there were few Babas
who were actually Sino-Malays." (Png Poh-Seng, pg. 96-7)
With the turning of the 20th Century, the Straits Settlements; are well
established within a Nanyang network which extended across the Straits to
include the Peranakan communities of Java, as well as hinterland communities in
the interior states of Malaya. Penang, Malacca and Singapore had all developed
into Baba communities along divergent lines--those of Penang being more
Chinese, the Malacca more traditionally Sino-Malay, and the Singaporeans, more strongly oriented towards the English due to the role of
English in education, modernization, urbanization and development.
The Twentieth century brought with it a basic change in the status and
position of the Baba and Peranakan communities of the Straits. Modernization, the importation of Western-styled nationalisms in the form of
new political parties and movements, both in China, in many Southeast Asian
nations, as well as in the Nanyang, tended to increasingly exclude the
participation of the traditionally and colonially oriented Babas. The Babas
lacked the socio-political organization of their Chinese cousins, and came into
increasing competition with these organizations. This lack of internal
organization had its advantages for entrepreneurship and acculturation to the
British colonial system, but it had critical disadvantages in the lack of mutual
support, political-economic mobilization and organization, etc.
The Baba's tended to lack the political conscience which begun to spring up
among both the indigenous Malays and the singkeh and
"Totok" communities--having defined their identity primarily in
relation to the British administrative authority. Indeed, in many occasions,
their self-professed loyalty to the Queen was more British than the British.
Thus the beginning of the Twentieth century marked the beginning of the end
of the traditional Baba way of life. Baba culture continued to sustain itself as
a community, but with increasing adversity and difficulty. It is likely that
socially and culturally it became increasingly atomized and disintegrated,
becoming a kind of home-bound family orientation which had less and less to do
with the changing outside world. They persisted with what became increasingly
ethnocentric, snobbish airs of cultural superiority based upon their
predecessorial claims, but this was in the face of decreasing relevance and
credibility within a modernizing world.
Invasion by the Japanese marked the end of Baba supremacy in the Straits
settlements. Many Baba leaders were executed by the Japanese. After the war, the
Baba community retained much of its wealth, but lost most of its privilege. In
Singapore, they were effectively absorbed by the larger Chinese component, and
"The result of these processes was to make the Singapore Babas less
easily distinguishable--especially from the English-educated Chinese; who not
only abound but are on the increase." (Clammer, pg. 8) In Malaysia, the
Straits Chinese developed their own political associations, later known as the
"Peranakan Association," from about 1900. In Indonesia, the Peranakan were relatively late in forming their own political
organizations, remaining politically disinterested and neutral as long as
possible, until increasing discrimination encouraged the formation of
"Baperki" in the late 1950's.
In Penang, Straits Chinese leaders began the Penang Secession movement which
lasted from 1948-1951, and which was defeated by the joint efforts of the
British and Malay parties. The failure of this movement sealed the fate of the
Penang Straits Chinese to determine their own political, economic and social
future in relation to the newly emerging nation of Malaysia.
Since the independence period of Malaysia and Indonesia, the Babas and
Peranakans have been considered a dying breed and a cultural anachronism of a
bygone colonial era. Peranakan status in Indonesia, subsequent to the riots and
political upheavals and anti-communist reaction of 1963 and 1965-6, has declined
as a segregated community, and the Peranakans seem to have undergone systematic
'ethnocide'.
In post-independence Singapore, the Peranakan community was resinified and
became increasingly modernized and westernized. Singapore national culture
effectively absorbed its Baba basis, using its western orientation as a basic
cultural model for its modernization--in the process Baba culture in Singapore
has become a thing of the past without much relevance to a nation preoccupied
with modern development.
Old Chinese sections of the city, a nostalgic reminder of the Chinese
colonial past, have been nearly completely razed to make room for modern
business buildings, malls and tenement flats. In modernizing Malaysia, the
Chinese community in general, including the Babas, has been on one hand
effectively segregated through structural and social discrimination, and has
endured under policies designed to enforce cultural assimilation to the Malay
national culture which remains traditionally Muslim in orientation.
The Babas of Malacca have been more or less symbolically appropriated as an
anachronistic model of Sino-Malay cultural assimilation. The Babas of Penang and
elsewhere have seen their community basically split apart--some becoming
reabsorbed by Hokkien and Tieu Chiu Chinese communities, others more inclined to
the English language and British culture, being left furthest out on the limb,
with many who could afford the cost migrating to the Common Wealth countries.
Ethnic revitalization can only happen in a dominant society which honors
its cultural heritage and traditions--and yet this can prove to be almost as
ethno-historically revisionist as a society which seeks to hide or erase its
past. Past cultural forms and models can be adopted by an emerging middle and
upper-middle class, which is defined by its standardized national cultural
orientation, as almost a kind of national mythology and as a form of elaborate
play which mediates the new and old in the transformations of the past into the
present. As an intermediate, somewhat transitional cultural model, Sino-Malay Baba culture can and has been appropriated by both Singaporean
and Malay societies to legitimate a larger range of national cultural
interests--different elements of the original culture have been highlighted and
emphasized, and other, contradictory aspects, conveniently ignored or even
forgotten.
"The Baba is thus faced with a terribly difficult identity problem--he
has a culture, but one for which the sustaining conditions have vanished; yet he
is encouraged to think of his culture as an important contribution to the
Singapore ethnographic scene. Indeed, I have even heard it said that the Baba
culture is the only 'true' Singaporean culture. Mutiracialism as a
policy may well therefore have the (presumably unintended) consequence of
artificially supporting minority cultures which in the normal course of events
would probably pass naturally away.' (John Clammer;, 1980: 139) Yet the
contradiction was not a part of the original culture, but a part of the current
conflict of competing identities, interests and trajectories.
III
Nonya Culture
by
Hugh M. Lewis
An old theory of cultural dynamics (Melville
Herskovits, 1948) maintains that any culture has a central focus within which it
highly develops certain attributes, the elaboration and variation of which leads
to a directional development of the culture along certain distinctive
pathways--a culture drifts in these directions. The socialization of
children combines with the sanctioning of habituated, acquired adult behavior,
to perpetuate a cultural patterning and its transmission through time.
Possibilities of deviation and alteration exist in the socialization process, in
adults who willing go against the sanctioned norms, and in the process of
cultural elaboration itself. This theoretical orientation is important in
understanding the culture of the Babas and Nonyas, as a certain complex of
cultural attributes were highly elaborated, which provide a sense of center and
focus for its cultural orientation.
It has been argued that the Baba's did not in fact possess their own culture.
Rather, they possessed a distinctive ethnicity that became translated
in certain specific ways. "....The term 'Baba Chinese' is commonly used as
an ethnic label and it should not be assumed that since there is such a thing as
an ethnic group there must therefore be a Baba Chinese culture which is shared
by all Baba Chinese and entirely distinct from other ethnic groups....What can
be derived is that there was and is such a thing as a Baba Chinese ethnic group
who used some cultural traits to distinguish themselves ethnically; we cannot,
however, conclude from such scanty data that there is a distinctively Baba
Chinese culture....(Cecilia Ng Siew Hua, 1983:pg. 98-9)
Such an argument begs the critical question of where we should draw the line
between an ethnic group and a genuine culture, and how we should define both
culture or ethnicity in contrast to one another. In this regard, the Babas
had shared with the rest of the Nanyang, albeit not as strongly, in the basic
Chinese organizational principles, an ethos of ethnos--such that ethnic
identity and difference became the basis of a shared cultural orientation.
It seems that socio-cultural barriers of language, religion, custom and
belief were great enough to have caused an effective separation, isolation and
emergent distinctiveness of cultural orientation among the Baba's and
Peranakans. Barriers to marriage and mobility by Chinese in Islamic society,
unless proclaiming faith in Islam and foregoing one's own, usually cherished
Chinese cultural identity, were strong enough to prevent rapid or complete
assimilation of the Chinese merchant communities. These communities also
maintained some modicum of contact with the Chinese mainland and with other
Chinese communities, as well as with a broader, outside world. These Chinese had
an Imperial civilization several thousand years old to look back to as a source
of ethnic pride, identity and solace--a civilization that was quite developed
and sophisticated for its time. Chinese have long been notoriously Sino-centric
in their value orientation and world view, where ever they may be found. They
never give up completely a core of Chineseness. Furthermore, these communities
were likely to have received periodic injections of new immigrants, sojourners,
or refugees who were navigating the Nanyang, even during its era of Imperial
ostracism and isolation from China.
Thus, community separateness of these early Chinese in Java and Malacca was
defined as much from without as from within. Once these communities had grown to
a sufficient size, say several thousand, they were stable enough to be both
racially and culturally self-perpetuating, and the two or three hundred year
period of their early pre-modern development was certainly long enough for the
emergence of a unique cultural orientation to be well-formed and virtually
complete in most aspects. In this regard we only have to look back upon our own
shallow sense of American history to see how quickly, and firmly, a typically
'American' character and culture formed in the world, and what its consequences
may have been in the world.
It is possible that the base of this cultural orientation developed
relatively early in its basic form, and once having come into being, grew in
size and elaborateness, but remained basically the same to be perpetuated via
'ethno-endogamy' through the many generations.
It is difficult to refute, and to interpret, the material evidence for Baba
culture. Silverwork, Chinaware, styles of dress, cuisine, marriage customs,
speech, all suggest a basic difference and shared uniqueness of the Babas from
either more traditionally oriented Chinese on the one hand, and the Muslim Malay
culture on the other.
To attempt to triangulate Baba ethno-culture, we can sense a convergence of
the evidence toward support for the idea of a distinctive cultural
orientation--distinctive aspects of Baba culture emerge in language, religion,
material culture, social structure and organization, in values, world-view, in
literature, as well as in self-professed aspects of personal identity and group
affiliation.
Furthermore, if the Babas and their Peranakan cousins in Java in fact
constituted a unique cultural grouping in the world, then there is a need to
find some sense of focus and center for such an orientation, as well as a sense
of its own self-styled 'raison d'etre' and basic understanding in relation to
the world.
The cultural focus of Baba and Peranakan culture was upon the
domestic life of its womenfolk. Virtually every material artifact that is
identified as distinctively Baba is related to the personal dress, adornment,
cooking, and marriage of the women. It is something of a paradox that we should
choose to call it "Baba" culture as opposed to Nyonya
culture.
This focus fits the historical picture of the origin of the culture-women had
central value and status, as they were relatively few in a immigrant colony
context that was heavily male-biased. John Clammer speaks of the
"rarity-value" of girls in such a society, which accounts for the
seclusion imposed upon younger women, especially unmarried Nyonyas, as well as
for the relatively high status of Nyonyas, and even for the frequent occurrence
of female heads of households--"A woman, particularly an elderly one, would
on the death of her husband become household head, rather than allowing such a
position to fall to her eldest son. This is not so surprising when one recognizes
that she would already have been exercising considerable (if informal) social
power in her household."(1980:38)
It seems likely that the Nyonya wives of the Chinese were the principle
elaborators of its distinctive cultural traits. They were not the silver smiths,
potters and craftsmen who made these artifacts, but they must have been the
mothers of the craftsmen, as well as the principle buyers of the wares. It also
seems as if the cultural orientation was set up, from early on, to secure its
reproductive base, to confer upon its women a special, privileged status which
made them symbolically and socially attractive in lucrative marriage
arrangements, and to promote a social structure that is based upon 'marrying in'
to the community rather than marrying out, and to 'marry up' the social ladder
rather than across or down.
If the original wives of the original Babas were in fact low status or slaves
or concubines, ("In addition to such voluntary unions, it was possible for
the Baba community to purchase Malay girls who were debt slaves or to marry
those who were partial outcasts because of their social behaviour." L.A.P.
Gosling,1964:216) then these wives must have from early on formed their own
sense of anti-structural communitas, within the context of which they elaborated
their own symbolic system which they subsequently bequeathed to their children
and grandchildren.
This female orientation of Baba culture would explain the relatively
a-political nature of its orientation, and the freedom which the Baba male had
in defining his own identity as either Chinese "Towkay" or Western
"Orang Pute". The male was involved almost exclusively in mercantile
activities which accrued material wealth to the household and the community. If
perchance he became a leader, a "Kapitan China" or a Towkay, then this
was done so on a model that was more appropriately, prototypically Nanyang
Chinese. It is noteworthy in this regard that the Babas wore either western
dress or Chinese costume, but rarely the Malay sarong. On the other hand, the
customary dress for the Nonya was the Malay sarong and kebaya, adorned with
jewelry distinctively peranakan in style. The Baba was quick and emphatic in
stressing his Chinese identity--the Nonya was persistent in cultivating a more
Malay style of life.
If this is the case, then the apolitical character of Baba culture allowed
the male the freedom and capacity to acculturate and accommodate different
political symbol systems--either Western or Chinese or Malay, without his
cultural identity as Baba being threatened or compromised. It was
not that the Baba could not deal politically in life. Indeed he often did so
with unusual talent--rather his cultural orientation allowed him the freedom to
engage politically or not without cultural constraint. Notions of territoriality
and boundary were negotiable. About the only real political boundary firmly in
place being that boundary which secured the domestic life of the culture.
The domestic life of the women, perhaps being more religiously oriented
rather than political, constituted the core of the Baba culture. It is noteworthy
in this regard that the Nyonya women were rarely themselves engaged in petty
trade--a not uncommon preoccupation among Southeast Asian women in general.
Rather, they were engaged in domestic management, and perhaps as well, in their
husband's bookkeeping. Furthermore, they were renowned as inveterate gamblers,
with their own style of card game. It can be expected that the religious
patterns of the Nyonyas were distinctive in several ways which helped to
reinforce and reflect this somewhat exaggerated domesticity and female
orientation of the culture.
Nyonya women had eventually achieved, within their cultural universe, a
degree of independence, autonomy and status which was not characteristic of
their more traditional Chinese or Malay sisters. "A change came over our
people. With good intentions, certain people relaxed the old rules and gradually
the old restrictions became impossible, and almost all at once our Nyonyas
insisted on their rights....All the evils complained of against the
Nyonyas may be traced to the pernicious bondage under which they have been
brought up...."("Our Nyonyas" Straits Chinese Magazine;
Vol. VII, No. 4, Dec. 1904) They were not marked off as an inferior caste, but
came to claim for themselves the principle prerogatives of their culture.
Uxorilocal residence patterns has long remained a curiously anomalous
feature of Baba culture--institutional arrangements which have persisted
historically in spite of the loss of its original cause and reason. The wife's
spouse married into and lived in the mother's household. The senior Nonya in
such a situation would come to have a degree of influence, especially when her
husband was away on business, which would make their status and position in
society enviable. The wife would retain a measure of respect and familial
support she would not have if she had moved into the husband's parent's
household. The husband would find himself in a peculiar position, especially for
a more traditional male not brought up in such a household, in which he would
have to compromise some of his male prerogatives, and in which he would find
himself compelled to achieve in ways he may not otherwise have done.
The male, and the son, probably retained much of his privileged, paternal
Chinese status--but was more compelled to define that identity exclusively in
terms that was outside the household, and, furthermore, basically outside of the
central bounds of the culture of which he was attached, if not by birth, then by
marriage. His only cultural obligation was to protect and support his domestic
base of support, but not necessarily to dominate it or to be a central part of
its domestic orientation.
According to my wife who is a direct descendant of Nonyas, the male child
would be taken out into the male world by the father, while the female child
would remain in the female world of the mother.
The following is a a summary of most of the cultural traits which are
identified as distinctly Baba and Nonya. It is worth reiterating that these
traits are all related to the world of the Nonya.
Straits Silverwork
A long tradition of local handiwork by Chinese silversmiths dating back to at
least the sixteenth or seventeenth century, and which became obsolete in the
early 20th century, produced many kinds of objects now quite rare that belonged
to a distinctive style tradition. Silver and silver-gilt articles were long
regarded by Nonyas as status symbols (Ho Wing Meng, 1976:38) They
commissioned or bought from local silversmiths mostly fine items of jewelry for
personal adornment, ornamental articles and "utensils specifically to give
that added touch of luxury and ostentation to their ornately furnished
homes." (Ibid. pg. 38) These articles were not the large size of similar
European goods, but were confined to "personal ornaments, objects of vertue,
occasional pieces of trophies, decorative bowls with matching saucers and
spoons, little tea-cups, teapots, wine-ewers, pillow and bolster plates, incense
burners, curtain hooks, ornamental plaques, little vases and betel nut or sireh
boxes."(ibid. pg. 38)
Extant pieces of antique Straits silverwork are generally small, fine and
noted for their intricate workmanship. Their decorative motifs first present to
the eye a chaotic confusion lacking unity of theme. Phoenixes, Dragons, Lions,
dogs, against a floral background of prunus blossoms, chrysanthemums, lotuses
and peonies, occasionally interspersed by Buddhist-Taoist symbols. This
heterogeneous assortment of motifs made such silverwork unappealing to early
connoisseurs as compared to the more elegant and simple designs of Malay
silverwork which presented only geometric or arabesque floral motifs. The bulk
of this silverwork was intended as wedding gifts, and the symbolisms portrayed
carried Chinese cultural-religious significance for the recipient of the gift.
The style, though cluttered and thematically ununified, is exuberant with energy
and is so clean and clear in relief that it conveys a sense of three
dimensionality.
Not all Straits silver is this fussy, some is of quite simple design, and
some is done with an eye for patterned symmetry. Overall, the conception of
design of Straits silver is held to be simple and recognizable clear--for its
ornateness and intricacy its patterns are rarely distorted or ornamentally
overburdened. Chinese silversmiths preserved the original form and integrity of
the basic utensil no matter what the design--the designs is exclusively relief
as opposed to chased or engraved works, ornate and varied.
Buntal pillow plates for embellishing bridal pillows were adopted from
ancient Hindu-Javanese civilization of Palembang and Kedah. Other kinds of
articles include bracelets, Nonya hairpins, sireh boxes, curtain hooks,
ornamental bells, caskets or "ganchu ranjang", and talismans for the
bridal bed, distinctive belts and buckles worn by Nyonyas, ladies purses, key
holders, brooches, "kerosangs" or buttons for the front of the kebaya
blouses, necklaces and chains, earrings, finger rings, anklets, hairpins, or
"kerok kuping chuckuk sanggul" which means to "scratch the ear,
pierce through the hair", as well as other miscellaneous items such as
chopsticks, pocket plaques, buttons, "and other types of ornamental
accessories for the bridal troussseau." (ibid., pg. 89)
"....The majority of Straits Silverworks......may generally be dated
back to the nineteenth century; for it was during this period that the baba
community reached its zenith of prosperity; so that large quantities of silver
ornaments, jewelery and other objects of vertu were turned out to meet the
requirements of the nonyas whose love of ostentatious display was
proverbial....by the 'twenties or the 'thirties Straits silverworks had
virtually become a thing of the past." (ibid, pg. 95)
Nonya Ware
The Nonya's were renowned for the elaborate and richly decorated porcelain--"....in
the days gone by, the wealthier babas spared no expenses or trouble to procure
direct from the famous porcelain-centre of Ching-te'-chen, Kiangsi Province,
grandiloquent vases, ornamental jars, gold-fish bowls, flower pots with matching
stands, ceremonial basins and complete dinner services and tea sets sometimes
running into thousands of pieces specially designed and decorated to their own
specifications." (ibid., pg. 38) The designs of these pieces are noted for
their multiple colors, their variety and richness of design, and for the
presence of design patterns on the inside of bowls and plates.
My wife's mother owned a collection of these dinner ware handed down from her
grandmother, which she would have inherited were they not destroyed in the
container in which they had been packed away. According to my wife, they
consisted of plates and bowls of various sizes, spoons, a big porcelain soup
ladle. The designs were deep, muted blue in color, of an indistinct wavy floral
pattern--brushed on designs which were undefined.
Nonya Costume
The "baju panjang", a long sleeved, knee length, thin
transparent blouse, with scalloped edges, worn with an inner white undershirt,
held together by the "kerosangs", a set of "three round
silver-gilt or gold brooches studded with pearls and other precious stones..
Underneath a sarong was worn. They tie their hair into a top bun, tied with
three pins. For special occasions, cloth slippers are worn, "often richly
embroidered with silk or gold threads, sequins, beads and gilded
ornaments" (Png Poh-Seng,1969:110) "Except for young girls, a large
handkerchief folded diagonally into a triangular shape was usually draped over
the right shoulder as part of their outfit. This was fastened to the baju
with a jeweled brooch from which might dangle a bunch of gold lucky
charms." (ibid, pg.110)
The style of Nyonya dress has seemed to change over the generations. From about
the "baju panjang" gave way to the sarong and kebaya, introduced by
the Javanese peranakans and adapted from the Malay "baju kurong"
similar to the "baju panjang" worn by elderly Nyonyas. The Kebaya
was adopted by younger Nonyas, a shorter version of the "baju panjang" made of muslin-like or voile fabric and much more elegant in
appearance. The Nyonyas used a great deal of fine floral or foliage lace in
their kebayas, the best embroidery coming from Javanese Chinese tailors. This
was worn over an inner vest-coat. The Nyonya kebaya differs somewhat from
the Malay or Indonesian forms by being more loose fitting, whereas the latter
are typically body-hugging "V" shaped "tapering towards the waist
and then flaring downwards to emphasize the women's narrow waist-lines.
"(ibid., pg.27) The tighter fitting form has been adopted by the younger
Nyonyas--the grand-children of the Nyonyas of a half-century ago who wore the
more traditional "baju panjang".
The Nonyas adopted their own style of hair-dressing from the Indonesian and
Malay customs of combing their hair backwards in long tresses which are twisted
and turned into a large loose knot, shaped like a donut, at the back of the
head, which is secured by clips and pins. The Nonyas combed their hair very
tightly back in the form of a long plait held together by the application of a
water glue, and twisted into a small, tight top-knot called "sanggul siput,"
that means literally "sea shell." "The top-knot,
in the old days, was usually embellished by three remarkable-looking, silver
hair-pins of various sizes; the largest being about seven inches long, with a
bolt-like crown, is inserted right through the knot, while a second and shorter
one, more delicately designed to look like a spray of leaves set with pearls or
semi-precious stones, is inserted crosswise into the base of the top-knot; and
finally, the third and smallest hairpin, similarly designed, is inserted into
the stem of the knot. Like their Malay and Indonesian counterparts, the Nonyas
sometimes inserted jasmines and other highly scented flowers into their hair
buns." (Ho Ming Weng, 1976: 27-8)
Nyonya women were noteworthy for their over-dressing and ornamental
ostentation of jewelry. "It has been suggested that many wives pestered
their husbands to buy them valuable jewels to enhance their security; others
found in diamonds a salve for the trials and tribulations of domestic life"
(Png Poh-Seng, 1969:111)
Nonya Beadwork and Embroidery
Nonyas made in their homes colorful beadwork and embroidery. They embroidered
their kerbayas in colorful, lacy floral patterns. They made cloth shoes,
slippers, vases, purses, spectacle holders, jewelry containers, wedding
ornaments out of colorful beads--items which resemble in both design and form
both the silverwork and the ceramics. Mothers taught their daughters and the
work was mostly domestic.
Nonya Cuisine
Spicy, using a lot of tamarind, coconut milk, chili, banana leaves for
wrapping and balachan, a fermented shrimp paste, "petai" and
"jering", a kind of seed, "gulai" curry, and Kueh, small
cakes using a lot of coconut milk, gula malacca, or brown sugar, screw-pine
leaf, or "daun-pandan", "bunga telang", giving the Kueh
coloring, wrapped in banana leaves and steamed. Chinese dishes would be added
variations of fragrant seasonings to give an extra tang to the
dishes--"Food which is neither hot nor spicy is considered unsavory to
peranakan palate." Nonya cuisine has largely passed away, except for a
revived interest and taste in it as an "ethnic food". Among the
Hainese of Singapore, Nonya food became a part of their own style of cooking.
"Until recently the Hainanese cake-vendor popularly known as the
"Otah" man was a familiar sight in Singapore. His daily visit was
welcomed by most Straits Chinese women and children." (Png Poh-Seng, foot
note, pg. 100)
While residing several months in Penang, our street would be visited daily by
an Indian man on a bicycle peddling Nonya "kueh," sweet cakes and
curry puffs. My wife always delighted in his coming, and thereby first
introduced me to the blue-green sweet rice cakes of the Nonyas. "The
preparation of food in nonya style, it should be noted in passing, is a complex
and laborious process, and it may be for this reason too, that this
sophisticated art might be irretrievably lost when the last surviving generation
of elderly nonyas passes from the scene." (Ho Wing Meng, 1976:30)
Nyonya cuisine is said to have been similar to that of the Peranakans
of Java. According to the ethnography of the Peranakans of Sukabumi by Tan
Giok-Lan, the Peranakans preferred food basically Javanese in style--dry boiled
rice, sate, goat, chicken, beef, pork, vegetables, especially "pete"
and "djengko", a sourish vegetable soup called "sajur
assem", a kind of salad called "gado-gado" served with fried bean
curd or "tempe" and peanut-cake or "ontjom". My wife on
occasion has made for me "gado-gado", served with
"krupuk" or fried shrimp chips. "The popularity of this dish is
indicated by the fact that it appears at the table of even the elaborate parties
of wealthy Peranakans. (Tan Giok-Lan, 1963:42-5)
Chinese elements incorporated into this menu include Chinese noodles, or
"Mie", or "Hokkien Mi" or "mee", bean-curd,
"tao hu" or "tahu", bean sprouts, or "taoge", bean
sauce, or "taotjio", soya sauce called "ketjap", and dried
shrimp called "hebi". All these imported items are known by terms
derived from Hokkien--an indication of the Hokkien origins of the Peranakans of
Java. "As with most of he food of Chinese origin, a Peranakan noodle dish
looks and tastes different from a Totok one." (ibid, pg. 44)
Sireh Chewing, Tea and Cards
The chewing of sireh, or betel-nut, is a common Southeast Asian trait
adopted by the Nonyas, who are alone among the Nanyang Chinese in practicing
this custom. A thin layer of quicklime paste was applied over the sireh leaf,
along with a sprinkle of the astringent 'gambier' and thin slices of areca nut.
The leave is folded into a small square and then chewed. Chewing the leaf has a
slight narcotic effect, is bitter in taste, and stains the mouth a reddish
color.
It was customary politeness to offer sireh to guests, and the sireh service,
"tepak sireh" was a standard accoutrement of the Nonya household.
My wife remembers these sireh sets, simple lacquered pieces not as ornate as
the fancier silver ones found in the picture books. The set consisted of a small
lidless box with four smaller caskets and cups on a tray. "No important
social function went by without the presences of that ubiquitous 'tepak
sireh'" (ibid. pg. 29) The exchange of betel nut was an important part of
the prenuptial ceremonies of a nonya wedding. For the most part, sireh chewing
was mostly a Nonya habit rarely adopted by men.
Sireh-serving was typically accompanied by tea, a typically Chinese and
un-Malay aspect of the practice--steeped in fine porcelain tea-pots and served
in small, dainty tea-cups. The Malays customarily served coffee instead of tea.
My wife remembers that her mother would brew up both coffee and tea for her
guests.
Nyonya women were noted for the frequency with which they were brought before
British courts on charges of gambling. They played a card game called "chap-ji-ki"
or "Cherki," that required four players. The games would last a
long time, several hours running. Nonyas would pay little children to shuffle
the deck. My wife mentions the long narrow cards that they would play with, and
their special style of handling these cards. They would gamble with money, or
even jewelry. One court case involved eleven nonyas, reported by a husband of
one of players who had lost $50,ooo in jewelry and had attempted to replace this
by cheap imitations. "The other event was known as the
"Wong-tye-sin" case. Wong-tye-sin was a god of fortune which had come
into prominence by prescribing medicine during an outbreak of the plague in
Canton some fifteen years before. This god had been brought to Singapore and
four
shrines had been opened, whither a large number of nyonyas went for
advice as to lottery tickets..." (Song Ong Siang, 1967440-1)
Architecture
Some evidence suggests that in some cases, an architectural variant in
interior house design, and in the design of business fronts, existed among the
peranakans--incorporating both Malay, Chinese and European styles and designs.
The interior usually contains a large central hall, for receiving guests and for
the location of an ancestral altar. The altar is on the far side, facing the
front doors and the steps up to the house. "While the staircase of the
house is a cultural feature of the Malays, it is treated as if it were the main
entrance of a traditional Chinese house and is built at the position which fits
into Chinese architectural thinking." (Tan Chee-Beng,1982 pg.34-8)
Usually built on stilts, they are raised off the ground, and the spot on
which they are built are also raised slightly. These houses vary slightly
depending upon the affluence of the families living in them. But such adherence
to traditional building styles is also uncharacteristic of either the Malays or
the urban dwelling Chinese. Windows are small and barred, and the interior is
dimly lit. Bedrooms lead off to either side of the central hall, flanking it.
The kitchen may be located on either side or to the back of the house.
My wife drew me a floor plan of her Grandmother's house. The floor plan is
remarkably similar to that mentioned above, complete with the central hall,
flanking bedrooms, front door and stairway, ancestral altar and kitchen. Like
most of these rural homes, it was built up upon stilts, and had an atap and
corrugated tin roof.
Nineteenth and early twentieth century architectural design in Singapore
and Penang, especially of the shop houses of Chinese businesses, suggest a
distinctive "Straits" style that incorporates elements of an English
tradition with those of a Chinese. It was a style sometimes referred to as
"Chinese Baroque;" or "Chinese Palladian"--"that
unique neo-classical European architecture, characterised Greco-Roman columns,
and the Peranakan-Chinese style originating in Malacca" (Ilsa Sharp, The
Straits Times, April 28,1979.) The facades of these houses often presented
a smallish appearance which belied the multi-floored spaciousness within.
Interiors of wealthy Straits Chinese homes also showed traits typically Baba.
"A whole new culture, reflected in quite unique forms, including the
domestic interior, had grown out of the amalgam of Chinese, Malay, and European
ways. Certainly in their desire to identify with their British overlords, the
Straits Chinese were the first to enthusiastically embrace Western fashions internally
and externally." (Norman Edwards, 1990:122-3) Generally, in Straits
Chinese terrace houses, guests were entertained in a front hall containing the
principle altar of the household, "dedicated to the Goddess of Mercy, Kwan
Yin, and the God of Wealth. Set behind the altar was a wall or screen to
deflect the path of evil spirits and to demarcate the first hall from the
second, immediately behind. Views beyond this screen of the interior of the
house--its succession of courts and interior spaces--were only admitted
gradually and under privilege. Distant acquaintances and visitors were allowed
into the first hall only. Friends and closer colleagues were taken into the
second hall. In the truly traditional Peranakan household, close relatives and
other members of the family and lifelong friends were granted admission to the
third or the fourth halls." (ibid., pg. 154)
Furniture
Closely related to the architecture was the distinctive design of the
furniture which completed the interior--ornately carved, inlaid wooden pieces
were common in the homes of the wealthy, and simply but similar pieces could be
found in the more humble homes. The "tu kacha" or glass cupboard, black and white wooden sofas and chairs, or "hup soo ee", a
movable screen, the "kepong angin" or "blocking of the
wind", a Nonya dressing table, or "mega sanggol rambot", and the
reclining armchair or "krosi sandah," jewelry boxes, and the
elaborate, grand "ranjang kemantin" or "the bride's bed."
Birth Customs
Nonya women were strict adherents of traditional Chinese customs and beliefs
relating to child-birth. They observed taboos relating to the killing of
animals, moving furniture in the home, digging gardens or repairs, "for
fear that the baby might be born with disfiguring marks" (Png Poh-Seng;,
1969:pg. 114).
Women who had given birth were ritually confined for a month, and those who
visited her risked "contamination". Medicinal foods were given during
this time for the healing of the mother. At one month, food is given out,
including nasi kyunit, curry chicken, red eggs, Chinese koay--the rice and curry
are customs which other Chinese seem to have picked up from the Nonyas.
Marriage Customs
Baba and Nonya customs of marriage are in some respects unique, and have both
Malay and Chinese elements incorporated into an elaborate ritual ceremony. This
ceremony, as well as the institution of marriage among the Babas, has been a
central topic in the discourse about their cultural uniqueness. Chinese marriage
practices are dominant. Both newlyweds adorn traditional Chinese marriage
costumes. Match making was Malay in style, except for the exchange of horoscopes
which was traditionally Chinese. The "lap-chai" ceremony held
three days before the wedding. The groom's family would send twelve attendants
bearing gifts to the brides family's home, or "rumpah abu" to the
accompany of Chinese trumpets.
These presents were carried on brass or red lacquered trays, and were all of
Malay origin or which bore Malay names--"kian songket" (embroidered
sarong), "belanja kalwin" (marriage expenses), which included several
"ang pows" or red packets of money, the first "wang tetok"
containing 12 dollars and called "nursing money", the second called
"wang belinja" and called "expense allowance" and a third
called "wang sireh" or "betel nut money", and "pinang
mas" (golden betel nuts) and "pisang rajah" or "a comb of a
species of bananas known as "royal bananas" (Ho Wing Meng,1976:31).
There is also a tray containing the marriage agreement called "surat
kahwin", written in Chinese characters. The bridegroom's attendant, the
"Pak chindek" was dressed in Malay costume. Otherwise, there were no
striking differences in marriage customs from those of the Hokkien Chinese.
My wife mentions that in the wedding ceremonies of very wealthy Nonyas,
Indian servants would be hired to carry large trays of the bride wealth along
the streets, and that this was a big occasion attended by many spectators. The
payment of bride price included a sum of money, or "pien kim",
which ranged in the mid-nineteenth century from 60 to 100 dollars.
"Business was frequently brought to a stop in Penang while traders and
others craned their necks from upper windows to see the procession of a wedded
couple's gifts. On large and nicely decorated carts were placed furniture,
washstands, plates, other household utensils, jewelry, and so forth. Behind and
in front marched the musicians, in all kinds of uniform with a variety of
instruments, principal among tem being the ubiquitous drum...(John Balibain, Hail
Penang! 1932:pg. 131)
For a complete description of a traditional peranakan wedding, the reader
is referred to the excellent account by Ruth Ho (Rainbow Round My
Shoulder, 1975:pgs. 6-28), and, somewhat surprisingly, by .i.J. D. Vaughn; (The
Manners and Customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements, 1879:pgs
22-29)
The more modern Babas and peranakans have dropped many of the paraphernalia,
and costs, of such elaborate wedding rituals. They have often adopted
western style wedding dress, which can be seen in many wedding photos. Tan
Giok-lan writes "One of the most radical changes that occurred was the
discarding of the elaborate and heavy traditional Chinese robes; they were
exchanged for the western white dress and veil for the bride and the dark or
light suit for the groom. The wearing of western apparel was already taking
place around 1920. The writer was informed that the last time a bridal couple
was dress in traditional Chinese style in Sukabumi was around 1930, but this was
only for the ceremony; thereafter they put on western style dress." (pg. 86)
Tan goes on to note that wedding ceremony is one of the best examples of the
incorporation of elements from all three cultural backgrounds--there are
apparently no rigid rules and no strong consensus about correctness.
A wide range of selection is possible, and no social criticism is attached to
such selection. Selection of wedding elements tends to follow the amount of
modernization, westernization, or Chineseness or Indonesian acculturation of the
newly weds and their families. "There is one ritual, however, which is never
omitted, except in families converted to Christianity. This is the honoring of
the groom's ancestors by both the bride and groom, which is essentially the
traditional Chinese ceremony of presentation of the bride to the groom's
ancestors, thereby incorporating her in his lineage." (ibid., pg. 87)
Matrilocality is a typically and distinctively Baba cultural trait which
is noted by many authors. The husband of the newlywed usually goes to live in
the home of the bride. This is a rather uncommon pattern among more traditional
Chinese which became more prevalent among the Straits Chinese and that deserves some explanation. Surname exogamy, except for marriage between kin of
different ranks, and tolerance of marriage between maternal first cousins were
all Chinese practices which were in general carried on by the traditional Babas,
but not as strictly adhered to.
Matrilocality also sometimes became uxorilocality and matriarchy, especially
when the brides lineage had no agnatic issue and thus depended upon bringing in
a son-in-law to adopt the paternal surname of the bride. This type of matrilocal
marriage was not an unknown practice among the more traditional Chinese.
"But among the latter it is regarded shameful for a man to enter into such
a marriage as in Hokkien colloquial he is said to "sell his
lantern" (Boe toa-teng) and in Tiechiu to "have his ribs trampled
upon" (thiam phian-li)." (Maurice Freedman, 1962) Freedman in fact
referred to such a kind of husband as "as sort of male daughter-in-law." A more common form of matrilocal marriage was
chin-tsin, in which a man on being married lived in his wife's home without
prejudice to his rights as a father." (Png Poh-Seng, pg. 112)
Freedman notes that the practice of uxorilocality had persisted until
recent times. The children of such marriages take the father's surname and
inherit property from him, but "are raised mainly among their matrilateral
kin (people related to them on their mother's side) and in houses which tend to
pass down the generations through women.
My wife's sister's husband, whose family came from Singapore, and who did
not have money, moved into the Nyonya mother's household in Penang, the mother
having paid for all the wedding arrangements as well as the bridewealth. The
mother helped the children, and the grandchildren, financially as well as
caretaking, and treated the son-in-law quite well. The husband stayed with the
household until the mother broke up with the father.
Among the Peranakans of Sukabumi, Tan Giok-Lan notes that the ideal of
patrilocality is strictly observed, except upon numerous occasions in which
availability of accommodations or lack of money mitigate the arrangements. (pg.
88)
It is interesting that in Ruth Ho's account of the wedding
ceremonies, that if during the ceremony the bride managed to step on the
bridegroom's toes, "it meant that she would be the more aggressive partner.
It seems that some brides' mothers made it a point to tell their daughters to be
sure to step on HIS toes!" (pg. 20) She also notes that throughout the
Peranakan wedding, "one is struck most forcibly not only by the dependence
on astrology, symbolism or what some people might call plain superstitition, but
also by the great importance attached to virtue, filial piety, respect for
elders and familial ties..."(pg. 26). G. Minchin, in another classic
description of the Peranakan wedding,( Notes and Queries on China and Japan,
Vol. 4, no. 6, 1870, pg. 85) writes "It is a strange fact, that when any
real Chinaman is married in Malacca or Singapore, he is obliged to talk Malay to
his wife in order to be understood."
IV
Peranakan People
by
Hugh M. Lewis
Ethnoculture exists within an historical
stream, a human confluence of social change in the world. It is defined from
without in interrelationship with a wider world as much as it is generated and
defined from within by the people who compose and continuously reconfigure its
patterning. The possibilities for development of this patterning always exists
across time and space in a wider field of possibilities.
We search for a so-called base-line called "Nonya culture"--some
normative or ideal sense of a conventional, traditional center, and find only a
continuous stream of variation upon a few basic themes--themes which are defined
as much by the exceptions as by the rule. We then arrive at the conclusion that
such a base-line conceptioning of an ideal cultural orientation possessing some
kind of "center" is at best a statistical statement of averages,
likelihood, and central tendencies, and at worst someone's reified, factitious
fiction--a projection of our own superficial sense of reality.
In searching for the external outlines of Peranakan social reality, there are
four sets of variables which appear salient, and which may be upon a more
general level of understanding somehow interrelated with one another in
rendering the conception of Peranakan social reality significant within a larger
world. These four variables include: social patterning, religious orientation,
language, and, finally, what has become known as ethnicity.
In a more general sense, the convergence of these four salient aspects of
peranakan culture is upon what has been referred to as the social
construction of reality. It is a glimpse into the daily dynamics of the
Peranakan
world, and how its members interact to produce, individually and collectively, a
socially constructed reality. Part of this process has to do with social praxis
and performance--with the sense of presentation of self in the everyday
world. Part of it has to do with the process of social
production--externalization and objectification of a
shared stock of knowledge, symbolisms and values, and part deals with the
dialectically complementary process of social reproduction--with the problem of
socio-cultural transmission of these externalized forms, and their
internalizations, or subjectification, into the individual personality.
These processes can be seen to be 'functioning' dialectically at several
levels--the infra-structural level of economic adaptation, the social structural
level of social interaction and integration, and the super-structural level of
ideology--and these three levels themselves constitute a sort of
parallel-processing dialectical system, a 'complex' self-organizing system with
a robust sense of historical structure which involves numerous interacting and
mutually limiting variables.
It is important to see that this set of social processes is also occurring
and impinging upon a larger stream of social reality. The social construction of
human reality is also, concomitantly, the psychological construction of human
reality. Social definition of self and the psychological definition of society
are also part of larger processes of human civilization, processes which involve
boundary identification, projection, psycho-social reference, accommodation,
acculturation, assimilation, etc. Both self and society are defined in mutual
interrelation with one another, and with a larger world of otherness that has
both psychological and sociological components.
Peranakan society, wherever it had taken root and flourished, wherever it
had spread its seed, always had its own sense of order, organization, purpose
and outlook upon the world. It has always had some kind of class structure
within which each member's status-role identity has been shaped and measured. It
has long had its hopes for the future espoused in its own way of bringing up its
youngest generation, and a sense of present importance with the generation that
has come of age in the world, and an orientation toward the past that is passing
away with the oldest. If we look closely, we find that Peranakan society has
always been composed of a seamless web of people caught up in the trials and
tribulations of daily living, in the throes of larger events that shape the
world around them, and in the fortunes and misfortunes of the grand game of
life. This web of people stretches in time through many periods as well as
across many places, and each person has some sense of what it means to be
Peranakan in the world, each person carries a part of the Peranakan present,
past and future, upon their shoulders.
As a social phenomenon, Peranakan society stretches across many boundaries
and zones, social and ecological, and includes many different habitats and
niches. Its centers can be found in different city-scapes, and its tendrils can
be found stretching out into the remotest of countrysides. Peranakan society may
be a finite phenomenon, but its finiteness is too vast to calculate, too
confusingly complex to neatly separate.
If we take as our prototypical representative of Peranakan Society, the
wealthy, spoiled, elderly Nyonya who has an incurable passion for gambling,
chewing sireh, and hen-pecking her son-in-law, then we are leaving out too much
of other peranakan social realities--too much of its range of human variation
and historical possibility. The Babas of the seventeenth century were clearly
not the same as those of the nineteenth century, and these were not the same as
those who claim to be so today. And the urban elite of the Baba pyramid were
only the somewhat ostentatious pinnacle of a larger social base--what of its
more anonymous base? No History is purely a Great Man narrative--of Towkays,
Kapitans, Bankers and Prime Ministers--but social history is also told of the
many whose names are now forgotten, seldom remembered, but without whose
combined efforts history would not have been made at all, Great or small--not
even Chinese history.
Before we seek to explain Peranakan society in jargonistic terms like
"political economy,", "social structure,"
"ethnicity," "pluralism," "acculturation," "assimilation," it is important to highlight several dimensions of
their world which seem problematic and interesting from the standpoint of social
science--first is the amazing apparent capacity for the Peranakans to adapt to
their local environment, and to take full advantage of the opportunities within
this setting. Secondly, there is the Chinese standpoint, the somewhat
exceptional openness and syncretic orientation of the Peranakan culture which
made of itself a curious amalgamation of different, and often contradictory,
cultural models. Finally, related to the first two points, is the somewhat
ambiguous and indeterminate status of Peranakan society within a larger
pluralistic world.
Peranakan society, fit within a larger framework, must be seen as both a
"transitional culture" in a larger stream of cultural assimilation,
and a "culture of transition" that emerged as a self-sustaining social
pattern in the interstitial regions between different cultural orientations.
Peranakan culture and character emerged as a distinctive configuration where
ever and when ever the processes of assimilation which were occurring in the
passing of Chinese into Malay or Indonesian society was systematically
arrested--incorporation into the larger, predominant host society remained
incomplete and partial and was, for the most part, a relatively gradual process.
It is likely that this happened more than once, in more than one place, and
that therefore the reasons for its happening were not a matter of historical
happenstance, but were more structurally basic and therefore stable, such that
when circumstances were ripe, the emergence of a Peranakan orientation was a
little more than likely. "The whole process must, moreover, have varied
greatly between different areas in Malaya, and it is theoretically possible that
in some areas, depending on such factors as the supply of land, type of crop,
and relative geographical isolation, some Chinese may have assimilated Malay
women to their community."
With its repeated occurrence, it was more than likely that these people would
form distinctive communities with their own separate orientation, and that these
separate communities would eventually become interlinked and interrelated to
form a larger region-wide socio-cultural phenomena.
G. William Skinner; speaks of a socio-historical continuum; in which
different Chinese communities of Indonesia; "can be ranged along a
gradient according to the degree of indigenous influence in their synthesized
culture." (1963:104) Position along this continuum is held to have been a
function of the length of time that elapsed between the social formation of the
community and the "arrival of significant numbers of immigrant China-born
women. Among the many other relevant factors one must note the comparative
cultural level of the indigenous population. The Chinese found much that was
attractive and valuable in a highly differentiated, rich, complex and literate
culture such as that of the Javanese, considerably less in the simpler local
culture of the Bangaka,.... and still less in the relatively impoverished,
non-literate cultures of the Borneo aborigines." (ibid.: 105)
According to Skinner, this process began in the sixteenth century in Java,
the culture of which was stabilized by the eighteenth century. In Borneo and
Bangka it began later in the eighteenth century, and a culturally distinctive
local society was formed only by the mid-1800's. In other communities, such as
Bagan Siapi-api, the process began "as late as the last decade of the
nineteenth century and cultural stability is only now being achieved." (pg.
104)
In another study, Skinner compared the differential rates of assimilation
between the Chinese of Thailand and Java, who have been in both countries for
similar lengths of time and who came from similar regions in China--in Thailand
the rate of assimilation was three times more rapid than in Java, and Chinese in
Thailand were incorporated fully into the Thai social world by the second or
third generation, and it is uncommon to find a Chinese who can trace their
lineage for more than four generations, while it was not uncommon in Java to
find Chinese going back twelve generations. Skinner isolated six factors
contributing to such a differential in rates of assimilation: cultural vigor, in
which the unconquered Thai did not share the same "cultural
inferiority" complex as did the Javanese; The Thai defined themselves by
culture, whereas the Javanese defined themselves by race and descent; The Thai
elite were indigenous and local, the elite of Java were outsiders and the
Javanese upper class was deprived of any real power; There was much less ethnic
stratification in Thailand than in Java, in which Dutch policies ethnically
stereotyped occupational categories which put the Chinese above the Javanese in
socio-economic status; In Thailand the Chinese were relatively unrestricted in
their activities, while in Java the Dutch put restrictions on their residence
and mobility; Finally, in Thailand there was a recognized mechanism available to
Chinese for passing from Chinese to Thai identities, in which a person, coming
of age, would declare himself either under Chinese or Thai administrative
control--no such mechanism for passing was available to the Chinese in Java.
According to D. E. Brown, (1976) differential rates of Chinese assimilation
varied directly with rates of upward social mobility--such vertical mobility was
relatively open and available to the Chinese in Thailand, making the incentive
to assimilate into Thai society much greater, while in Java the ethnic hierarchy
was relatively closed and fixed. He combines this with the promotion of
"false ethnic origin stories" which perpetuate ethnic pluralism and
difference, to create a general proposition that "Ethnic diversity varies
with the hereditary closure of ranking systems."
More generally, in the structural processes of Southeast Asian civilization
the formation of ethnic diversity and the establishment of a fixed hierarchy
were complementary and dialectical processes--"If enhancing ethnic
differences promotes the stability of the radically plural society, why
couldn't Southeast Asia's indigenous radically plural societies have been
created by fabricating 'ethnic' differentiation to complement a hierarchy which
was established among essentially homogenous peoples?" (D. E. Brown;,
1976:94)
Another study by Juliet Edmunds (1968) of the relationship between Islam,
intermarriage and rates of assimilation between the Chinese and the
Malays, notes that though Islam has been widely regarded as a significant
barrier to the assimilation of the Chinese, as compared, say to Theravada
Buddhism in Thailand, conversion to Islam was a process which varied
historically and socially "according to the state of relations between the
two groups concerned as to any theological dictates". (1968, pg. 57), as
well as to the degree to which such conversion imposed other conditions of
assimilation upon the convert.
Intermarriage is the key element of the process of assimilation.
"The effects of intermarriage on the relationships between the communities
depend not only on how frequently it occurs, but also on the type of
relationship and how the children of the unions are defined." (ibid., page
58) Formal marriage institutionalizes the "movement of individuals from one
group to another. Alternatively, they can result in the growth of some
intermediate category of persons. In general it must be the host society which
imposes the rules on this as well as other spheres of social life, though this
does not mean that the minority, in this case the Chinese, have been entirely
without a say in the process." (ibid: pg. 58) In sociological jargon,
intermarriage is known as the process of "amalgamation", a part of
the more general processes of acculturation and social/structural assimilation.
From this standpoint, Peranakan society, constituting both a transitional
category in the assimilation process as well as a pariah culture of transition,
may be fittingly referred to as a "culture of amalgamation;".
Historically, intermarriage between Buddhist Chinese and Muslim Malays has
always been infrequent, though the demographic pattern of such intermarriage has
been difficult to reconstruct for a number of reasons.
Somewhat paradoxically, Peranakan society, as a culture of amalgamation,
has been centrally defined by such intermarriage--"In every case, the
formative period for the locally rooted society began when immigrants settled on
the land, formed alliances with indigenous women--Chinese women almost never
immigrated over-seas prior to this century--and reared children who were taught
to identify themselves as Chinese.
Marriage among these mixed-blood descendants of immigrants led eventually to
the development of a fairly stable society..." (G. William Skinner, 1963:pg.
104) Edmunds notes that with the coming of European colonial administration, and
especially with the rise of new ethnic nationalisms, the Islamic proscriptions
became enforced in counter-reference to the predominantly Christian conquerors,
and, combined with the emergence of strongly Nanyang immigrant Chinese
communities, as well as policies promoted by both British and Dutch
administrators, the barrier to intermarriage and thus assimilation of the
two communities became more rigid--thus a new pariah "peranakan"
identity became established that was less 'transitional' in status.
Not every scholar unanimously supports this thesis of intermarriage as being
the principle basis in the formation of Peranakan society and social identity in
the Straits. John Clammer; notes that lack of evidence for such intermarriage in the small pre-colonial Chinese community such as Malacca,
which were internally self-sufficient and intra-communally balanced in terms of
its sex-ratios. "In fact, there is no evidence at all that peranakan
culture emerged from a process of biological syncretism; rather, it is the
result of cultural assimilation and adaptation to the host country, a process
which did not begin in a systematic way until the nineteenth
century..."(John Clammer, 1980:46)
Clammer cites the near absolute negativity of the Islamic religion which
presented a strong barrier to such intermarriage, as well as the shallowness of
peranakan lineages which do not extend back before the nineteenth century. He
claims that peranakan culture did not become a cohesive, internally coherent
phenomena until this time, and attributes the principal basis for its emergence
as being the British colonial system which promoted their marginal pariah status.
The actual historical patterning and importance of such intermarriage has
remained unresolved. There is a romantic facticity about the peranakan origin
myth of low-status Malay women marrying higher status Chinese merchants and
traders and becoming the famous Nyonyas who minded the store in their husbands'
absence, cultivated strong domestic values and skills, nursed these values in
their daughters, as well as lovingly cared for and commanded their baba and
nyonya babies, and chewed sireh and gambled among themselves in their spare
time, all the while unknowing that they were sowing the seeds for what would
later develop into a full blown cultural configuration. Clammer refers to this
argument, and to the Malay/Minangkabau origin of Matrilocality, as
"folk arguments" which lack historical or social evidence. But this
dilemma does point up the inherent ambiguity of identity of the Peranakans, of
their inbetweenness, and of the possibilities, and impossibilities, of becoming
either Chinese or Malay.
What remains rather certain is that at some point such intermarriage
ceased fairly early, and from the standpoint of its Nyonya orientation, the
Peranakan society became a closed one. Chinese men and women, as well as some
Malays or others, were later incorporated into its ethos, through capitalizing
on the marriage market in the Straits, but the society remained otherwise
separate and distinct.
Another social historical dimension of Peranakan society that may help
to resolve this ambiguity of Peranakan identity is consideration of its
regional/local variations and, especially, of a kind of rural-urban continuum.
In the same work, John Clammer ;notes the hypothesis that the "frontier
conditions" of Straits society inhibited the formation of deep lineages by
requiring extensive cooperation between unrelated lineage fragments. Only where
such frontier conditions do not exist does patrilineal ideology and lineage
become predominant. Such lineages in the South of China are also correlated with
wet-rice agriculture. According to Clammer, the urban orientation of the
Peranakans as merchant men, and the frontier conditions of Peranakan society,
discouraged the development of patrilineal/patrifocal identity, and encouraged
the development of the distinctive matrilocal patterns which "bias was free
to flourish" (1980:pg. 39).
A number of studies have been done of rural based Peranakan communities in
both Indonesia and Malaysia, and these frontier oriented societies must be
taken into account in consideration of the origin and development of peranakan
social identity. Central in such pioneering development of the hinterland
regions was the Kong Si system within which the urban based Chinese
settlements financed and provided the organization and labor reserve, as well as
the middle-men function and markets for the interior pioneering communities
which depended upon a 'slash and burn' method of shifting cultivation and which
produced an expanding agricultural frontier.
Such a system depended upon establish trade and exchange relations and
partnership based upon an ethnic Chinese ethos of reciprocal trust and the
notion of dependability. Cross-cutting ties of dialect, lineage,
village association, tended to reinforce these bonds, but even more importantly,
kinship ties were the best available means of cementing a dependable network.
Networking is one of the most important
aspects of seeing how history and culture painted with a large brush articulates
with, and is moved by, the day to day interactions of individuals along their
many 'pathways of practice.'
We can see Straits societies, as the pioneering forerunners of the later
conglomerate Nanyang society, playing a pivotal role in the development of the
Nanyang civilization in Southeast Asia. A Russian study of the Nanyang by
Simoniya social structure reveals a vast financial- credit-market system
which extends throughout Southeast Asia, with Chinese merchant-middlemen, within
a colonial and neo-colonial framework, serving as the key articulators of the
entire regional political economy. Within this system there emerges a resolute
class structure in which plantation laborers and coolies are at the bottom,
small petty merchants and planters range somewhere in the middle, and urban
based professionals and financiers are at the apex.
As established "culture brokers" and as the first Chinese to
settle in the Straits, the Babas emerged on top of this developing Nanyang
social structure during the colonial era, and helped provide the impetus and
direction for its further development. They provided the leadership and local
models of adjustment and accommodation which allowed the system to work as
effectively as it had.
Winzeler notes a distinction in the Kelantan region between peranakan
"village Chinese" and "town Chinese" "who
perceive themselves as possessing a 'purer' model of Chinese culture. The
so-called village Chinese in general show more Malay and Thai influences in
their Chinese culture. The womenfolk, for example, wear sarong although girls do
wear all kinds of modern dress especially when they go to town. Like the Baba,
the women also wear the Malay-style blouse called kebaya;. The men folk
wear sarong most of the time and in the village they usually do not wear any
shirt. When they go to town they put on shirt and trousers. It is common for
both men and women to carry kain batik lepas....a long piece of cloth
which women use as head scarf while men tie it around their waist or use it as
head-cloth (semutar). As for food, the village Chinese eat both Malay and
Thai food as well as food prepared in Chinese style. Eating with fingers is
common among these chinese. (Tan Chee Beng, "Peranakan Chinese in Northeast
Kelantan" in Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society,
Vol. 55, 1982:pg. 28)
These "village Chinese" do not identify themselves as such, and,
while mostly rural, have spread into the local townships and, while retaining
many Malay traits, have become more urban in orientation.
Tan notes at some length the difficulty in finding a suitable label for these
"village Chinese" whose patterns of acculturation are not quite the
same as for the "Babas" of Malacca. Finally, he opts for the term
"PeranakE"....
Robert Winzeler (1983) emphasizes the difference between the
"rural Chinese" of Kelantan, whom he refers to as Peranakans on
the basis of acculturation, and the Babas of the Straights and the Peranakans of
Java. One important difference is the influence of Thai, and the intermarriage
between Chinese men and Thai women. According to Tan, early Chinese accounts of
the settlements in Kelantan mention that Chinese were not permitted to marry the
locals, but when they did marry, took Siamese wives. "The descendants of
those early Chinese settlers who married local women had close contact with
Siamese and Malays who were the majority people. This eventually led to the
acculturation of the Chinese and gave rise to the formation of Peranakan Chinese
society. The Peranakan Chinese culture once formed perpetuated itself until
today." (Tan Chee-Beng;,1981:32-3)
Another difference is linguistic--they do not speak the Baba-Malay of the
Straits, but are basically bi-lingual or tri-lingual. Finally, in terms of
kinship organization he notes that these communities tend to adhere toward a
partilineal/patrilocal system, observing principals of adherence to surnames and
surname exogamy--or 'avoidance of common surname marriage." Otherwise,
there is little evidence to suggest "extra-familial patrilineal descent
groups of a social, economic or even ritual nature." (pg. 19) He notices
that kin-groups establish themselves in proximity to one another, but do not
form corporate, patrilineal organizations. There is a bias towards a more
bilateral pattern.
Tan's conclusions are that "close interethnic interaction in northeast
Kelantan is the main factor for good interethnic relationship and the
acculturation of the Chinese. Interethnic socialization from childhood to
adulthood has fostered a greater interethnic understanding and respect. As a
result of such socialization, members of different ethnic groups have developed
certain common values and "cultural taste". At the group level, he
notes the persistence of '"structural" contradictions which tend to
maintain group boundaries between the rural Chinese and the Malays. Overtly, the
Peranakan Chinese appear more Malay than Chinese because of their dress and
language, "which are exhibited everyday, are very much acculturated"
(pg. 48), but on close scrutiny, they remain basically Chinese in orientation.
Interestingly, it is in the area of religious differences, and syncretisms, that
the strongest basis for difference and identity are to be found.
L. A. P. Gosling's study on the rural Chinese of Trengganu,(1964) whom he
calls "Baba Chinese" ("used in recognition of the popular
usage of the term to apply to all Chinese in Malaya displaying a significant
level of cultural and biological assimilation" (pg. 203)) focuses upon the
pattern of pioneering settlement; in the region by rural Chinese. Those
Chinese who remained behind in settlements and did not move on to greener
pastures, or those settlements that proved unsuccessful, were fully incorporated
by the Malays.
Gosling cites that among the rural Malays, there were few if any significant
barriers of Islam to intermarriage. "Malay marriage partners were
not difficult to obtain. The details of Islamic law were not well known to the
rural Malays, and prohibition on marriage between Muslim Malay women and pagan
Baba Chinese males does not seem to have been strictly applied." (pg. 215)
While most such intermarriage involved the incorporation of females into the
Baba community, there was also a lesser reverse flow of Chinese into the Malay
community, as households remained behind in the advance of the Chinese
settlements, and became incorporated by the local Malays who were more sedentary
in orientation. Babas could easily assimilate into the Malay communities because
they were already partly acculturated "in physical appearance, language,
costume, and behaviour." (pg. 217)
Furthermore, a premium may have been placed upon lighter coplected Chinese
Babas. In terms of physical appearance, which Gosling takes as primary evidence
for such biological assimilation, the Baba Chinese varied over a wide range
between Malay and Chinese. Older generation individuals looked more Malay in
appearance. He advanced the hypothesis that areas most visible to external
contact are the most acculturated, while the least visible areas show least
evidence of acculturation. Acculturation seems also to have been a function of
the relative isolation of the Chinese communities and members from other
Chinese--attenuated contacts in rural areas, promoted more contact with the
local, host society. On the other, the onward resettlement of some Chinese
tended to isolate these communities from contact with the Malays, thus reducing
the amount of assimilation. Gosling divides the history of these settlements
into three periods. The first, from 1820 until 1890, was a period of growth,
"and the process of acculturation and biological assimilation proceeded
rapidly" (pg. 215). The second period, between 1890 and 1920, is one marked
by declining population, during which Babas were increasingly assimilated into
surrounding Malay communities. From 1920 until the present, assimilation into
the Malay communities has been all but completely arrested, and the size of the
Baba community, identified as distinctly peranakan, has stabilized. There is
recent evidence to suggest a more recent trend of resinification by a larger
Chinese community.
Social stratification exists within,
defines, and is defined by, a continuum of social interaction, enduring
relations and interpersonal experience that exist throughout time and across
space. Social stratification is transmitted through the generations and between
different groupings and sub-groupings. It delimits group boundaries and
asymmetries of power, and, in the sense of transcending the lived experience of
any single individual, must be considered to be "corporate" in
structure.
Social stratification; can be seen to underlie ethnic stratification;,
boundaries, groups and identities. Just as social stratification varies through
time and across space, so too do ethnic differences vary continuously in a
corresponding way. Such continuous variation is the basis for speaking of an
ethno-cultural continuum of human experience. It sometimes happens, as in
the cases of radically plural societies, that ethnic stratification becomes the
defining principle of social stratification, with the resulting "ethos
of ethnos." In such cases, ethnic differences and ethnic identities come
to take on a social significance, and a real potency, which they might not
otherwise have had. Also, defining social ethos in primarily in terms of
"ethnos" tends to constrain and shape its patterning in ways which
it might not have otherwise been shaped.
Though perhaps inextricably interrelated, the two kinds of phenomena--social
stratification and ethnic stratification--are yet
separable and potentially independent processes. Socio-cultural homogeneity
within a society may preclude some of the organizational problems which
heterogeneity causes, and ethno-cultural differences also entail its own kinds
of dilemmas. Yet stratification occurs in either case, and in neither case does
such homogeneity or heterogeneity preclude the potential for competition and
conflict on the one hand, or cooperation and social integration on the other.
Within the colonial framework of a plural society, immigrant Chinese
communities were divided along subethnic lines in both cooperation and
competition--subethnic identity delimited the field of opportunities and actions
open to the immigrant. Although internal class distinctions existed, these were
of far less significance in daily life than ethnic solidarity. "In sum,
cleavages and alliances within Chinese immigrant society were both complex and
of daily significance, whereas for all but the elite, contacts between Malays
and with Europeans were few and relatively unimportant." (ibid, pg. 242)
In a landmark study in reference group theory, Alvin Rabushka's work Race
and Politics in Urban Malaya(1973) reveals some of the fundamental
differences between Chinese and Malay. Chinese tend to be more culturally
ethnocentric than the Malay. More cosmopolitan contexts, inducing social
extroversion, hence greater interracial social interaction, reduces such
ethnocentrism, while social introverts tend to be much more ethnocentric in
orientation. In terms of relative social distance, and the degree of tolerance
between these groups, "Penang Malays are more tolerant of the Chinese
than their Kuala Lumpur counterparts, but they are less tolerant on the question
of interracial marriage. But omitting eating and marriage, the two associations
affected by religion, we find (with one exception) that two-thirds of all Malay
respondents are not opposed to crossing racial boundaries in employment, social
activity or neighborhood of residence." (ibid., pg. 62)
In regard to Chinese attitudes, no religious obstacles interfere with Chinese
eating with Malays in the same eating houses. "Chinese in both Kuala Lumpur
and Penang are more tolerant of Malays than Malays are tolerant of them. In
greater degree, they are willing to eat, work, joining and live with members of
the Malay race." The study holds that racial stereotypes have little or not
role in promoting social or political harmony, and that positive or negative
attitudes are relatively independent of such stereotypes.
Malay stereotypes of the Chinese; are that they are intelligent,
ambitious, active, honest, thrifty, industrious and hardworking, yet ritually
unclean and impure. The Chinese tend to see the Malays as clean, and yet lacking
ambition, while "Intelligence, thrift, activity, and honesty are given
approximately equal point values... and fall significantly below the scores
registered for cleanliness and (lack of) ambition." (Alvin
Rabushka,1973:67)
Rabushka considers such stereotypes as economical means for storing large
amounts of information, which might otherwise be costly. Stereotypes do not
vary in relation with social introversion/extroversion and are not
correlated with expressed attitudes of willingness to interact. "....the
holding of narrow stereotyped views in Malaya has no visible impact on either
social interchange or political unity." (ibid.,pg. 67)
From these findings, a conclusion is drawn, among others, that
"multi-racial living experiences do not necessarily promote racial
tolerance or political unity" (ibid., pg. 101) The data tended to support a
"transaction hypothesis" that higher levels of daily social
interaction tended to promote higher levels of positive effect. On the other
hand, evidence points out that social integration does not necessarily correlate
with "democratic political stability"--"the transaction model
does not clearly distinguish the political and nonpolitical aspects of
"integration." Living in multiracial neighborhoods increases
affect, whereas ethnic enclaves reduces it. Education enhances interethnic
interaction, while age, religious and sexual differences have little impact
"on the extent of racial integration." (ibid., pg. 124-5) Non-Baba
Chinese look down upon Babas because they do not speak well the Chinese
language--they are perceived "as not quite Chinese", and as "like
Malay", which for the Non-Baba Chinese, is a counter-reference group. Those
who speak English, the language of an ascendant reference group, are more
acceptable--this category cross-cuts the Baba-Non-Baba distinction. Outside of
the Baba areas, there is not a great deal of understanding of their ethnic
culture--when seen buying pork in the market, they are frequently mistaken for
being Malay. (Tan Chee-Beng,; 1979:21) Non-Baba Chinese may call them
"Baba siau"--a derogatory name meaning "Baba semen"--and
"Baba kia" meaning "Baba kids." Babas often experience
direct insults by Non-Babas in many social contexts. Babas complain that
they are looked down upon by the Non-Babas.
Baba Chinese, on the other hand, have traditionally looked down upon the
Singkehs, or newcomers, who in an earlier period were generally poor
coolie laborers. "Cinageh" is heard among Babas when they talk
unfavorably of non-Baba Chinese.
Nevertheless, in reference to a host Malay community, both Babas and
non-Baba's share a common sense of Chineseness, a common Chinese cultural core,
a common religious orientation, and a common ethnic and existential context of
structural and social discrimination. "Now the common perception of
discrimination unites the Babas and the non-Baba Chinese in a common political
sentiment." (Tan Chee Beng 1979:22)
They also share as certain degree of social relatedness--marriage across
these subethnic boundaries is quite common and normally unconstrained, in which
extended kinship alliances can be cultivated. Such kinship linkages extend to
"ritual kinship"--adoption of a child by a God-mother or God-father.
My wife took me to see her God-mum, whom she called "Lau Mak" which
means "old Mom", an old Cantonese woman who was her amah as a
child--she was the only person who gave us an-pao and ritual offerings for our
wedding. Religious ceremonies and rituals are an important means and locus of
such subethnic interaction which helps to define and reinforce a common
"Chinese" identity.
Non-Baba Chinese frequently disdain Malays, and completely avoid them.
They are seen as untrustworthy and are not extended credit. They feel Malays
"are decidedly different from themselves in ways of thinking and feeling--xinli
butong--and the assumption seems to be that the differences are
irreconcilable." (Judith Strauch;, 1981: 254)
Chinese tend to see Malay behavior in the local context as childlike, with a
lack of ambition--"traits that can be smiled on with some condescension" (ibid. pg. 254) These attitudes are somewhat separate from
feelings of structural discrimination as "second class citizens".
"Government officials, by contrast, may be viewed as heavy-handed tyrants
spoon-feeding the Malay peasant on the one hand and constricting natural Chinese
rights on the other." (ibid., pg. 254)
According to Judith Nagata, though there
is a great deal of irregular subethnic diversity, the most salient element of
Malay ethnic identity is cultural--a Malay is a Muslim, habitually speaks
the Malay language, and follows Malay adat, or customary law (Nagata,
1974:335) Malay Muslims, whether Malay, Arabic or Indian, situationally defines
themselves according to different reference groups varying along three
dimensions: simple comparison of social distance and solidarity; immediate
expediency; and normative statements regarding comparative values of social
status. (Nagata, 1974:340, In Judith Strauch, 1979:256) Individuals may
oscillate flexibly between identities without negative psychological or social
consequences--such oscillation may be both personally and socially adaptive.
In terms of interaction between Babas and Malays;, the same perceptual
categories of inferiority do not hold--rather stereotypes are common which
contain negative and positive attributes. From the standpoint of Non-Baba
Chinese, both Babas who are "like Malays," and Malays, are often seen
as less hard working or industrious as the Chinese--a core value of Chineseness.
Neither are Malays seen as trustworthy--such trust in business interaction being
another central tenet in the economic underpinnings of ethnic Chinese identity.
For the Baba community, if they identify more strongly with the Chinese, then
they are apt to view the Malay in similar terms--if they identify more with a
separate Baba identity, they are apt to distinguish themselves from the Chinese
and identify more strongly with the Malays. (Tan Chee-Beng, 1979:25)
"Malays, when questioned about their perception of the identity of the
Babas, will often reply that "They are just like us".(John
Clammer,1980:133) Babas interact more closely and frequently with Malays, than
do other Chinese, and yet they are separate in the spheres of kinship and
religion from the Malay--spheres which they share with other Chinese. Malays
perceive the Babas as easier to interact with than the Non-Baba Chinese.
On the other hand, many peranakans have picked up many values and views which
can be considered traditionally Malay, such as the distinction between refined,
"alus" or "halus" and rough or crude, or
"kasar"--a distinction that is brought out in the way that a
peranakan may speak to another depending upon the social category that the
peranakan identifies the person with. Also, Nonyas have picked up many of the
superstitions that were Malay--I have frequently heard my wife say under her
breath "I 'pantang' that" only to learn later that it meant a
strong "dislike," and specifically, an omen of ill-fortune. In spite
of the structural differences between the two communities, there still exist
many interethnic social ties between the them--people are customarily invited to
and attend friends weddings, parties, and ceremonies as a token of interethnic
solidarity. In such situations, discussion of issues of structural
discrimination or difference may be avoided or else joked about. "This
points to the fact that where there is structural conflict between two ethnic
groups in a multi-ethnic country, the interaction between individuals of the two
ethnic groups need not necessarily manifest conflict." (Tan Chee-Beng,
1979: 27) In such multi-ethnic conflicts, certain norms, of avoidance, of not
offering pork for instance, are mutually worked out to smooth interpersonal
social interaction in the wake of structural difference and inequality. To some
extent, personal identity is separate and independent of ethnic-group identity.
We are left to consider "ethnos" as a function of
"reference" and as such subject to an intrinsic kind of
psychological and social relativity of our self-awareness in relation to others.
Identity is built up from enduring social interrelation and frequent social
interaction. In this sense, the psychological awareness of the self and the
social perception of others are inextricably entangled, and overlap in an
intermediate region which is not quite internal and not completely external. In
this sense, relative deprivation, cognitive dissonance, social difference and
distance, are all phenomena which have both psychological and sociological
facets in experience. In this regard, status-role ascription, identification, projection of "collective representations"--all
symbolic processes-- and labeling serve to reinforce and articulate this
region of interethnic, psycho-social consciousness.
V
The Social World of the Straits Chinese
by
Hugh M. Lewis
The center of Baba and Peranakan culture must be found somewhere along a
continuum of possibilities between what it has meant to be traditionally
Chinese, on one hand, and traditional Malay or Indonesian on the other; between
being a sub-cultural and inter-ethnic orientation barely distinguishable in its
basic components from the dominant cultures in which it was born and became
situated, and being its own, fully grown Creole culture with its own distinctive
orientation to the world; its own basic patterning of cultural sanctions, views
and values, and characteristics of personality which are enculturated and
transmitted with each subsequent generation.
There is another corresponding continuum of language in which the speech of
the Babas and Peranakans lies along a continuum between spoken Amoy Hokkien, on
one hand, and vernacular Malay, on the other, as well as between Chinese/Malay
and English. Baba and Peranakan culture has also existed along a continuum of
traditional versus modern, as well as along a continuum of urban versus rural.
In all, we can distinguish these basic dimensions which intersect somewhere in
the center that we would define as the locus of Baba/peranakan culture.
If we can refer to the social construction of reality, in which processes of
externalization, objectification, reification, subjectification and
internalization are, in that order, dialectically interdependent and convergent
in the critical moment of social reproduction and transmission, attendant
especially upon the processes of primary and secondary socialization and
discourse, we can also talk about an antithetical "psychological
reconstruction of reality" which, from an historical point of view, becomes
somewhat independent and primary in the ongoing patterning and processes of
cultural development and social history. Once internalized in the form of such
cognitive models, psycho-cultural orientations become in a sense
"naturalized", "habitualized", "subconscious" and
also, most importantly, self-fulfilling in rebounding back upon the social
processes which led to their original constitution and constraint in the first
place.
There is a sense in which ethos and ethnos represents an internalized frame
of mind of the participant, and that though there is a wide range of divergence
and variability between individuals, there is also some form of convergence upon
common ground in core values, cognitive and normative orientations and
collective symbolic representations upon which a consensus of shared ethnos is
based.
To a great extent, a person's attitudes and outlook is a function of that
person's social and structural positionality and situational context within this
continuum, as well as a function of that person's capacity to negotiate and
intermediate between alternative positions--people commonly adopt and
internalize status symbolisms which reflect not so much the reality of their
status positionality within a society, but the ideal direction and expression of
where that person ideally wants to be, as well as where that person may somewhat
fictitiously believe him/herself to be. But cognitive orientation and
positionality also become dialectical in the articulation of social action and
historical happenstance--to a large extent, given the appropriate circumstances,
such values and orientations do become 'self-fulfilling,' albeit in ways that
most participants may not anticipate.
Furthermore, in entertaining the possibility of a variety of alternative
positions within the cultural continuum, some of which may be mutually
incompatible or contradictory, the ability to negotiate new positions and
intermediate between them is a function of a person's past experience in doing
so, as well as a function of that person's capacity to effectively mediate the
boundaries between different positions, status-identities, roles, and
internalized states of being. Past experience with diversity results in an
openness to new varieties of experience, whereas an 'introverted' orientation to
one or a few positions results in decreased capacity to integrate or deal
effectively with a wide range of plurality. Furthermore, the ability to
negotiate boundaries demands the mastery of certain social skills--the ability
to linguistically, emotively, cognitively and behaviorally code-switch and
code-mix; the ability to function along a number of parallel continuums of
cognitive orientation, and to adopt the "other's" point of view.
In this sense we must see psycho-cultural identity as a function of a kind of
"cognitive pluralism" in which an individual is able to maintain a
number of different cognitive orientations in relation to one another within a
single universe of experience, and we may properly refer to an "ethno-psychology"
of social experience. There is a suggestion for a weak form of the linguistic
relativity hypothesis in that code-switching between Malay, English and Hokkien
requires the adoption of different conceptual codes and cognitive orientations
which have different foci, different dimensions of significance and salience,
and which exclude some elements that are central in other cognitive
orientations.
Though the basic cognitive structure may remain the same in each of the
cases, the "cognitive style" of orientation and operation between
orientations may be quite different, and even contradictory. Furthermore, the
internalization of code-switching/mixing in complex social situations to
accommodate for diversity acquires a mode of social functioning that becomes
habitual and automatic, based on a wide latitude of "native
speaker/hearer intuition" which must not only fill in the many gaps, but
cross-over the many switching points.
There is in this sense that such a complex, heterogeneous orientation, is
based upon a kind of minimal structure, like a pidgin or creole, which is in
many of its features reduced in the amount of constraint or redundancy it
requires. Code-switching/mixing discourse must have a structure which is open to
many variables and quite flexible in its applicability. And what is true on a
linguistic level, is reflective and representative of a deeper symbolic and
culturally encoded level of cognition and experience--people are not only
switching and mixing codes in a quasi-regular but informal way on a linguistic
level, but also upon meta-lingusitic and cultural levels as well.
Language, religious orientation in both values and world-view, and ethnic
identity are all interrelated in certain important ways. Language comes to
reflect our symbolic universe of understanding, and our language becomes a
primary vehicle for the expression and realization of such symbolic
understanding. Who we are and what we are become defined by the words we use,
and the words we use become framed within the compass of our social knowledge
and the kind of social understandings with which we approach the world.
Ethnicity
and ethnic consciousness; are a kind of relative psycho-social identity
that falls somewhere within the dialectic between the spoken and textual
realities of the lanuage we use, and the social and symbolic contexts of
relation in which we use that language.
The problematic understanding of Ethnoculture comes to rest upon the
nexus of relations between language, religious beliefs and values, and ethnic
identity. Language has a tremendous internal consistency and order. It has its
own separate sense of history, change and directionality of development.
Religious orientation is also a kind of living, performed symbolic system. It has a traditional momentum which, through processes of socialization, shape and
reshape human character and culture in a constraining and conservative way.
Ethnicity, and ethnic stereotypes, reemerges time and again with amazing
persistence in spite of the social processes and historical forces which always
threaten to disintegrate them, despite ideological prejudices which seek always
to deny them, stigmatize or euphemize them, or even efface or eradicate them.
Baba Malay
One of the most visible aspects of any society is the language.
"Even more striking than Malay physical appearance is the Baba's general
Malay behavior: hence they not only look like Malays, but they walk,
gesticulate, shake hands, eat, chew betel, sit, squat, expectorate, defecate,
laugh and talk like Malays." (L. A. P. Gosling;,1964:pg. 212)
Malay, particularly the bazar or "pasar" Malay, has been the
primary lingua franca, or "business language" of the Malay peninsula
and Indonesia between the many different ethnic groups. Before the coming of the
British, Dutch and Japanese, each of whom promoted their own language
curriculum, Malay was the preferred language of choice in doing business with
other people outside of one's own community. It is therefore reasonable to
expect that this language, as a primary index of acculturation and assimilation,
should be spoken by any community which has achieved some degree of successful
adaptation and accommodation within the larger Malay social world. Tan Che-Beng, in his study of the "rural
Chinese" of Kelantan, notes.
Part of the reason for this assimilation has been the proximity and
convenience of Malay schools and the lack of availability of Chinese or
English-medium schools. But linguistic acculturation is also a normal and
expected aspect of accommodation to a host society--children acquire the
socially predominant language quite naturally through indirect means, whether it
is spoken in the home as a primary language or not.
The early article by Chia Cheng Sit ("The Language of the Babas" in
"The Straits Chinese Magazine" Vol. II, 1898) notes that though
in religion, manners, customs and though the Babas remain Chinese, for the most
part they speak Baba Malay with little Chinese infusion, except for the Penang
Babas. The article claims that the Baba speaks a "patois" of Malay
adulterated with many borrowed idioms and words. The grammar is greatly reduced,
dropping the many particles of proper Malay speech, and, similar to Chinese,
without prefixation or affixation and with the syntactical significance of words
defined by their relative positioning. In somewhat condescending manner, Chia
notes that the patois was sufficient for everyday business and practical
matters, though insufficient for the expression of ideas on social, ethical and
philosophical subjects.
A more informed linguistic analysis by Sonny Lim (1982 Baba Malay: The
Language of the Straits Born Chinese Master's Thesis, Australia: Monash
University), comparing Baba Malay to Pasar Malay Chitty and Portuguese Malay,
places it along a continuum bridging the gap between Baba Malay and Standard
Malay. Baba Malay is primarily used intra-communally--i.e., spoken between
themselves. It is defined situationally by a number of elements, including
accommodation, and is variably mixed with English and Chinese. Literacy and
illiteracy has been an important factor in the history of the language.
"The Rising Star" was an awkward Baba attempt at standard Malay. The
rise of Baba Malay as a lingua franca in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries
reflected the economic importance of the Chinese. It represented the growth of a
pidginized Malay to a Creole Malay featuring a syntactic reduction and
simplification. Thus Baba Malay is a special creolized form of the wider form of
Bazaar Malay, arising from the latter as an early pidgin or pidginized variety.
According to Lim's analysis, Baba Malay has a reduced topic-comment structure
featuring the "Punya" article meaning literally to "possess"
and is semantically related to the Hokkien form "e". This particle has
three functions, as a possessive marker, as a marker of temporal and locative
modifiers and as a relativizer, all of which correspond exactly to the Hokkien
word "e" but which are foreign to standard Malay. Similarly the
particle "kasi" or "to give" is related to the Hokkien
"ho" and has the same functions of benefactive, causative-benefactive,
causative and passive marker. Also "kena" corresponds almost exactly
to the Hokkien "tio?" with overlapping semantic fields. Similar
particles include "Mau" (intention), "Pigi" (to go),
"Nanti" (to wait) and the sentence final "la" which is
originally a Hokkien form and which is an emphatic marker signaling
"rapport, solidarity, familiarity and solidarity between speakers."
The word order of Baba Malay is Hokkien, in which noun phrases preceded by a
marker will embed a sentence with an obligatory "punya" relativizer.
Lim summarizes the admixture of Malay and Hokkien as strictly syntactic-semantic
in nature--meanings and syntactic functions have been borrowed from Hokkien but
not the forms, and mostly constitute direct substitutes for parallel and
convergent Malay forms. Lexicon is mostly Malay with Hokkien elements borrowed
which cover those Chinese aspects of Baba culture--kinship, marriage, religion,
birth, death and some moral precepts. The pronomial system has also been
modified by Hokkien.
"Baba Malay is essentially the Malay language pared down to the minimum,
with the expected morphological and some syntactical features of Malay altered or
missing, and with radically modified phonology" (Lim, 1982:p. 11) The
sentence structure of Baba Malay reflects the pascification or topicalization,
or a "topic-comment" structure of Standard Malay--in which information
"is arranged such that the part of the information that is given, or the
part that is already familiar, is placed at the front of the sentence (and
thereby highlighting it as well)" (ibid., p. 116)
Robert Winzeler, in his study of the village-Chinese in Kelantan, notes
that these communities never completely lost use of their Chinese dialects as
the Baba and Peranakan communities of the Straits and Java had, but usually
became bilingual or even trilingual. Code-switching and code-mixing is a common
pattern in radically plural societies. In Penang, fused and independent
bilinguals with competence in three or more languages are not unusual, but, on
the contrary, are to be expected. Ann Pakir's linguistic study of the
natural discourse patterns of members of a Baba community in Singapore
reveals a pattern of code-switching between Malay, Hokkien and English in
which speakers attempt to negotiate "a collective social identity" and
accommodate to other speaker/hearers. I have observed extensively a similar
pattern among Penang Chinese--many speakers being quite expert in
code-switching/mixing between several different languages. Such linguistic
skills seem to be acquired quite early and remain permanent part of speakers
linguistic facility.
Several brief studies on "Baba Malay" are extant. There seems
to be about as much linguistic variation across peranakan societies as anything
else, and in general a "Peranakan" dialect can be said to rest along a
continuum of creolization between mainly Hokkien, Malay or Indonesian, as well
as a third or more languages, whether English, Dutch or another Chinese dialect
or another regional language--for instance Siamese, or Dayak. It appears that
the degree to which Chinese or Malay is the predominant language of discourse is
a measure of the extent of acculturation of the particular peranakan community.
But for the majority of Hokkien peranakans of Java and Malacca and Singapore,
Malay appears to be the base language--"Baba Malay" is
structurally and lexically the same as other vernacular dialects of Malay, with
only a few phonological dialectical variations in the form of
glottal stops, dipthongs, final alveolars and fricatives.
There are numerous Hokkien loan words, associated with Chinese-derived
institutions, which has had otherwise relatively little effect on the
phonological system (Anne Pakir, 1986) According to Pakir, Baba Malay stands
as a unique dialect of Malay, in which the influence of Hokkien has been
overestimated by other scholars. Hokkien borrowings are present in extent
limited to certain semantic and cultural fields, including value judgments and
emotive terms. Though other Malay dialects have incorporated Hokkien terms, the
way that Baba Malay uses Hokkien is unique.
According to Tan Chee-Beng, Penang Hokkien is also unique due to its
Baba cultural influence, by its incorporation of many Malay words. Baba Malay
spoken in Penang is also held to be different from the variety spoken in Malacca
and elsewhere because of the greater influence of Hokkien and English. The
Hokkien of Kelantan that is spoken by the "village Chinese" is also
dialectically distinct in intonational patterns, due to the alleged influence of
Malay and Siamese.
Victor Purcell, in his book The Chinese in Malaya(1948), declares
that Baba Malay is different from Malay in many important respects, and is
"practically a different language". He states that a great many Malay
words are unknown to the Babas, as well as the "more polished syntax of the
Malay. They are ignorant of the words connected with the Mohammedan religion.
Also they mispronounce many Malay words..." (pg. 294)
He goes on to state that the greatest divergence between Baba Malay and Malay
is in its construction, in which the former follows the Chinese pattern in a
reduced form. It is possible that the sources of data between Ann Pakir's
analysis and that of Victor Purcell, or Rev. Shellabear's, are different,
reflecting substantial areal variations in the pattern of the 'patois' as
different speakers range along different parts of the continuum. If Purcell's
interpretation is accurate, it would reflect speakers who are using Chinese as
the basolect, and Malay as the mesolect. On the other hand, Pakir's source
suggests just the reverse--Malay remains the base language only slightly
modified by the superimposition of Hokkien lexicon.
It is evident that Purcell based part of his study on the earlier study made
by Reverend W. G. Shellebear, published in the Journal of the Straits
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, (Vol. 65, 1913), which was reprinted as
an appendix in John Clammer's work Straits Chinese Society(1980).
Shellabear emphasizes the influence of the Chinese idiom, and the
distinctiveness of Baba Malay from either the High Malay of the literature of
the Malay peninsula, or the low Malay spoken in Indonesia. "It is true that
the number of Chinese words which have become assimilated with this dialect is
not very large, and that many words have been borrowed from English, Portuguese,
Dutch and Tamil, and from other neighbouring tongues, but it is rightly called
"Baba Malay", for it is largely the creation of the Baba Chinese,
and is their mother tongue, so that it belongs to them in a sense that no other
people can or do claim it as their own. " (ibid., pg. 156)
Tan Chee-Beng; takes a more restrictive definition of Baba Malay as that
dialectic spoken by the Baba's of Malacca, that became the 'business dialect' of
the three Straits Settlements--Penang, Malacca and Singapore. The Malay
learned by members of each of these settlements was dialectically different--and
the bazaar Malay, or "Melayu pasar" from which Baba Malay developed
was a lingua franca for commerce.
Hokkien loan words are more salient in areas of customs, religion and
kinship, for things related to the house, furniture, food, utensils, personal
effects and other things. "In general it may be said that Chinese loanwords are used mostly for things and concepts which are of Chinese origin
or which have no Malay equivalents." (Tan Chee-Beng,1980:156)
Maurice Freedman, who made an important study of the kin terms in Baba
Malay, states that "in general, Malay words were used for junior relative
and Hokkien-derived terms for senior. And this usage appears to correspond with
that of the analogues of the Babas across the water in Java, the Peranakans,
among whom both Malay and Javanese terms come into play for junior
relatives." ("Chinese Kinship and Marriage in Singapore," 1962)
Tan Chee Beng concludes by noting that "Linguistic acculturation
does not necessarily mean that a people have to speak the same dialect or
language of the "host" group. In fact, a new dialect may develop,
giving the people a distinct dialect which also serves as a crucial symbol of
ethnic identity..."(1980:165)
Language serves as one of the most important agents and vehicles social
integration. In a plural context, it can be both a barrier and a
facilitator to interethnic interactions. Racial, ethnic, and class differences
are all reflected in linguistic differences, and linguistic difference is an
important indicator of an individual's social status, orientation toward the
larger social world, background, and ability to successfully interact in the
world.
The contribution of a unique genre of Peranakan literature from Java is
noteworthy--it is a genre of fictional novels, poems and plays which has not
been well studied. The Baba's of Singapore made their own contribution to
Peranakan literary development in the form of stories translated from the
Chinese and English in Baba Malay, newspaper and journal articles, as well as a
few original works in English. "Baba Malay literature continued to be
printed in Singapore until about the Second World War." (Maurice
Freedman,1962)
John Clammer points to several interrelated social factors in the
relative paucity of this literature. Many Peranakans up until the turn of the
century were basically illiterate. Furthermore, as an interstitial community,
there was a fundamental ambivalence of cultural identity that precluded any such
great literary florescence--even what language to primarily publish in Chinese,
Baba Malay or English, remained a critical trilemma. Due to the basic ambiguity
of their cultural identity "at the nexus of three civilizations" and
their lack of any clear political culture, except that framed by the colonial
administration, the Peranakans lacked the appropriate developmental or cultural
context conducive to the cultivation of a refined literature. "The
mutual reinforcement of socio-political-cultural and literary values of this
kind was absent from Straits Chinese society at its outset. Indeed, what
peranakan culture had to do was to find or create precisely such a nexus of
interrelated influences.." (John Clammer,1980: 68)
Baba Religion
Religious orientation has always been an important factor in the
Southeast Asian setting, especially to the extent that religion becomes
implicated in the mediation of cultural and ethnic boundaries.
"Religion is one of the main mechanisms that defines and maintains
ethnic boundaries in Southeast Asian societies." (John Clammer,1980: 45)
The negativity of the boundary to intermarriage and cultural assimilation
which Islam has maintained, the fundamental incompatibility with basic
Islamic values and Buddhist values, as well as basic differences between a
Muslim cultural orientation and a traditional Chinese one, have all been
pointed out as contributing to the maintenance of a separate Peranakan
community. In this regard, religious conversion can be a mechanism of
assimilation, just as religious orthodoxy can be a mechanism of
boundary-maintenance.
A survey conducted in Malacca in 1976 (John Clammer, 1980) revealed that
70 percent of the Babas professed faith in the traditional Chinese Religious
orientation. Twenty percent comprised a "no-religion/free thinker"
category, eight percent were nominally Christian, and the remaining two percent
"being members of minority religious movements." There were no
Muslims. Of course, people who would have professed their faith in Islam would
probably have become fully incorporated into the Malay community. One basic
difference between the Peranakan communities of Java and the Baba communities of
the Straits Settlements was the number of the former who were Muslim, in part
constituting the basis of their peranakan identity. In L.A.P. Gosling's study
of the assimilation and migration of rural Chinese of Trengganu, movement by
Baba Chinese into the Malay community posed no real problem, as outwardly they
were already very assimilated, genetically they were mixed. Because of their
general social positioning at an attenuated and tenuous distance from their own
Chinese cultural tradition, the geniality and general acceptance of the Baba's
by the Malays, the rather simple process of conversion by professment of faith,
the relaxed and secure pace of life among the Malays, all contributed to the
pull of peranakans into the mainstream of the host society. "The major
element in the loss of population was the increased assimilation of Babas into
the Malay community.
Rates of assimilation between different religious communities vary--it is
greater between Chinese and Christian, Hindu and especially for Theravada
Buddhists, than it has been between Chinese and Muslims, or between any of the
other faiths and Islam. Perhaps the most important difference is that in order
for a Muslim to marry a person who is non-Muslim, then that partner must convert
to the faith, even if only nominally. This alone creates a barrier around Islam
such as does not exist for other religions. In this regard must also be noted
the great degree of mutual tolerance, even respect, for the deities, temples and
ritual practices of people of different faiths within the plural societies of
Southeast Asia--people may be nominally one faith or another, and regular attend
its ceremonies, and yet also frequently pay homage or attend ceremonies of other
faiths. The degree of religious syncretism; commonly found in Southeast Asia
is unusual in the World. In such religiously plural contexts, religiosity,
holiness, spirituality and sacredness are common values recognized in the
deities, icons, beliefs, and ritual practices of many different faiths. A local
spirit, a kramat, or whether a deity that is in origin Hindu or Theravada
Buddhist or Mahayana Buddhist or Taoist, is given the same degree of passing
respect as any other.
The prevalence of new religious movements and minority religious cults, and
their popularity in Malaysia, is another indication of the basically syncretic
religious orientation to be found there. The only exception to this rule is the
Mosque, which remains effectively closed off to outsiders participation or
visitation. "Islam....has two leading characteristics which contrast
with this--it is exclusivistic (as opposed to syncretic and eclectic), and it is
closely tied to a particular social structure, so much so that in Malaysia the
idea of a non-Muslim Malay is quite unthinkable." (John Clammer,1980:47)
Evidence of this syncretic orientation among the Peranakans is also
available--part of what it means to become a good Malay and a good Moslem is in
a sense to accept only one god, and to close the doors of one's imagination
other possibilities. Traditional Chinese religious orientation can be defined by
the "Conflation of the Three Teachings." Tan Giok-Lan, in her
ethnography of the Perankan Sukabumi (1963, records an important peranakan
religious organization --"Sam Kauw Hee"--one which is predominantly
composed of peranakan Chinese families.
"Sam Kauw" means literally "Three Religions"--referring to
Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism. This organization was oriented towards the
promotion traditional Chinese religious values. (Tan Giok-Lan 1963:158) A
strong syncretic religious movement in Singapore, one of many organizations
there, was called the "Red Swastika Society."
Baba religious orientation shares with other Chinese religious orientations
its tolerance and syncretism, often under the same roof, of many, competing,
often Non-Chinese religious orientations. Babas observe, but in general do not
adhere as strictly to, the Chinese festival calendar, and they also regularly
participate in other traditional magico-religious systems, such as temple
worship, ancestor worship, consultation of the Chinese horoscope, geomancy, etc.
They have also adopted a number of more indigenous Malay magico-religious
beliefs and customs--worship of kramats or local deities, Dato Kramats, or
spirit-mediums, consultation of Malay bomohs, or traditional medical
practictioners, use of magical charms, etc. Malay elements, such as the offering
of satay, sireh or lime, are also incorporated into Chinese religious rituals.
The first Chinese temple built in Malaya was the Cheng Hoon Teng Temple in
Bukit China in Malacca. In 1704 Chan Li Lock built the main hall of the temple
and placed there the figure of the Goddess of Mercy, or "Kwan yin" or "padma-pani."
(Yeh Jen Fen; Historical Guide to
Malacca, pg. 81-2) The preeminence of the Goddess of Mercy in the Straits
settlements is important to a consideration of early Chinese religion in
Malaysia. J. D. Vaughn details the design of the Goddess of Mercy temple in Pitt
St. in Penang, which dates to 1848, still the principle and most active temple
of worship by the Chinese in Penang. We had offering made during our wedding day
there by my wife's God Mom, her old Amah who cared for her when she was a child.
Victor Purcell, in his work The Chinese in Malaya, gives the
following account of Kwan Yin as " one of the most popular goddesses in the
Chinese pantheon. "
The Chinese of the Straits must not be mistaken as taking their religion
lightly or unseriously--the pragmatism of their religious devotions has
fundamental spiritual, moral and utilitarian efficacy which is taken quite
seriously by the Chinese.
In an uncertain world, conversion to Christianity has been increasingly
seen as a viable option for many Straits Chinese. Conversion to Christianity
actually "promotes interethnic marriage or inter-communal marriage, in the
former case between Chinese and Eurasian, and in latter case between Baba and
non-Baba." (John Clammer, pg. 55)
The religious component is separate from other components of language,
culture, race in the ethno-cultural identity of the Chinese. Among the Malay,
being Muslim is central to that identity."...the religious factor, far from
being a peripheral one, is actually central to the study of the assimilation,
integration or lack of assimilation of Chinese minorities to their "host
cultures" throughout Southeast Asia. (ibid., pg.59)
Another aspect of religious syncretism notable among the Peranakans are
particular beliefs, ritual-religious practices and ceremonies. A striking
example is the use of water with flower petals and cut lime as a purfying or
cleansing agent. A friend wanted to give us this ceremony while in Malaysia
because of a small streak of misfortunes we had been having. My wife gave me a
variant of the same bath during a later period in which we were having a run of
hard times. She mixed the flower petals from seven different kinds of flowers,
and cut half a lime, and poured the water over my head three times. "The
client or the person on whose behalf the client sought the spirit medium's help,
has to have a bath including a hair wash before taking a ritual bath. The lime
is squeezed and the juice is then poured over the body of the person. The spirit
medium stresses that the pulp of the lime must be thrown away after the ritual
bath. (Cecilia Ng Siew Hua, "The Sam Poh Neo Neo Keramat: A Study
of a Baba Chinese Temple", pg. 118) Ritual baths with water only are a
common part of Malay animism--water is interpreted as a 'boundary weakener,
which, therefore allows passage from one state to another. (J. Endicott,
1970)
The Chinese believe that the lime, petal and water concoction clean
impurities from the body. Lime is seen also as a cleansing agent--the impurities
becoming concentrated in the lime pulp. Lime is also used for divination by a
spirit-medium in trance. In this case, seven lime pieces are cut, just as the
petals of seven flowers are used--seven "transcends distinctions based on
differences in colour" (Endicott 1970:pg. 137) It too, becomes a boundary
weakener. "Though the Malays seem to have no unified symbolic
classification based on colour, differences of colours are often used to
establish or indicate particular boundaries between significant
categories." (ibid.: pg. 137)
Cecilia Ng, in her analysis of the practices of a Baba temple, notes that the
spirit deities of the temple are "ethnically ambiguous" which
parallels the ethnic ambiguity of the Baba Chinese. "The consultation,
however, is conducted in both the ways of the Malay Animist and the Chinese
Religionist ritual paraphernalia limes, petals and benzoin are often used in
Malay animism while the red dye, charm papers and the seal of the deities are
characteristic of Chinese Religion. The Peranakans have accepted the
"keramats" who "can be either people, animals or inanimate
things which have supernatural powers" (pg. 124), but in the case of this
particular study they are not inclined to seek the services of
"bomohs" or healers, "who they perceive to be evil sorcerers
conjuring spells and creating trouble." (pg. 124) Ng compares her study of
the Baba temple with an earlier study, the only of its kind, by Rosie Tan of
a spirit medium who was probably a peranakan and who served the Baba community.
Rosie Tan's study deals with "kramats" as local shrines dedicated
to honored spirit deities, marking often the graves of local holy men or founding
fathers, and the more popular of which attract a great many pilgrims and
supplicants. Private "kramats" do not have a "Datu Kramat"
and therefore require a spirit medium to call upon and intercede with the
spirits on behalf of the worshippers. Worshippers beseech the advice and aid of
the Datu Kramats for a variety of reasons--for husbands, for children, for
health, or for information.
Ng concludes her study by stating that while the Datuk Shaik Ismail shrine
had more overt Malay elements, the Sam Poh Neo Neo temple was Chinese
religionist at the structural level, at the periphery of the Chinese
religious system, with many borrowings from Malay animism--"the religious
system under study is not syncretic, but borrows certain elements from Malay
Animism and incorporates these into an essentially Chinese religious
system." (ibid., pg.129)
The Baba's choose Malay rather than Chinese religious elements, because the
important reference group against which they must distinguish themselves is not
the Malay, but the Chinese. "It is therefore logical that Malay elements
were used as emblems to accentuate their differences from the ethnic
Chinese." (ibid., pg. 129) The earlier study of the more Malay shrine
differed from the later example of the Sam Poh Neo Neo temple because "the
Baba Chinese no longer enjoy the favoured position of social brokers and indeed
with the multi-racial ideology which was widely publicised in recent years, the
Baba Chinese are faced with either not fitting into the publicly accepted model
of society or alternatively to redefine their ethnic boundaries and identify
themselves with the Chinese." (pg. 129) The fact that the Baba's of the
temple "bai" all the deities as if of the same "Chinese"
pantheon is not convincing counterevidence against the thesis of the inherent
syncretism of Chinese religious orientation--in fact if anything, it is a
demonstration of just such syncretism that the Chinese would treat all deities
as if their own. "It would appear that these Malay elements are but
emblems to distinguish the ethnic Baba Chinese; from the ethnic Chinese....In
more general terms it can be said that a section of the Baba Chinese population
practice a religion which is the religion of many Chinese in
Singapore." (ibid.:130)
While living in Penang, I attended with my wife and her friends a
"Birthday Party" for a local Malay deity. The party went for three
days straight and was attended by numerous Chinese, many of whom were quite
respectable and well-off. The spirit medium was a Chinese man dressed in the
outfit of a Malay bomoh. It was conducted in a Chinese home in which the
Shrine had been erected. The Birthday was given for the benefit of children who
had been born with handicaps. Many Chinese attended and gave offerings of
donations in exchange for talismans. Food was served freely--nasi kunyit,
chicken curry, bee hoon. No pork was served--the food was cooked in brand new
pots and pans for purity. The Datuk smoked "Cheerot" a heavy
Malay cigar, and went into a trance, danced the "ronggeng" with
Malay dancing girls as well as with Chinese. There was a Malay band. He
performed "automatic writing" on the ground--giving numbers which
people kept note of what he would mark upon the ground--the number spreading
through the crowd like wildfire. An older Chinese matron went into a trance and
began dancing--becoming the focal point for the audience. The show would last
from evening until 12:00. In the morning there were prayer sessions which people
would randomly visit. Not all of these people were Peranakan--many were very
traditionally Chinese, yet the Malay elements-- the structure of the whole
ceremony, and the syncretism of the event, its spiritual importance for a larger
urban community-- could not be ignored.
Tan Chee-Beng, in his description of the peranakan Chinese from the same
area (1982), describes the same kind of celebration, but as a Hokkien ceremony,
which, like with the Penang Hokkien, refer to the ceremony as "Ang Kong su" or "The Affairs of the Deities." The patron god of the local
town has no temple, but is taken care of by different families in rotation. The
ceremony takes place in the compound of the home that holds the altar. Each year
divination is employed to select a committee to take care of the deities altar.
"The celebration usually lasts for three or four days. Part of the
celebration involves a spirit-medium going into trance. In the evening, menora
drama is staged. This is a kind of Thai dance-drama in which songs are presented
in Kelantan Thai but comic verses are usually presented in Kelantan
Malay...."(ibid.,pg. 42)
The menora, or "Nora Chatri," is a local Thai-Malay folk
dance form that derived from the Sudhana-Manohra tale of the Jatakas. Its
features and associated beliefs are strongly linked to animistic and shamanistic
orientations "upon which the Sudhana-Manohara" story has been
planted." (Ghulam-Sarwar Yousof;, "Nora Chatri in Kedah: A
Preliminary Report", JMBRAS Vol. 55, no. 1, 1982:pg. 53) The dance
lasts for three consecutive nights, and is performed for ritual occasions as
well as for entertainment. Part of the performance involves an opening trance
session in which performers and non-performers participate to the rhythms of the
Gamelan music which slowly and steadily increases its tempo. The trancer is
possessed by a local spirit who descends to take possession of the trancers
body. The trance state involves a noticeable change in behaviour--shivering,
sometimes violent behavior, and the name of the possessing spirit is revealed.
Following the trance session are the presentations of sets of Lakons, or plays,
by the manora dancers. My wife had attended one of these dances in Penang,
taken by her mother, held by Peranakans in a local town. She went every year.
Mostly Chinese, except for a Malay man who had married a Chinese. They would
attend all three days. The musical instruments would begin around 10:00 in the
morning, breaking only for lunch and dinner, and quitting late, after 12:00.
Everyday the "Gaku" in charge would go into trance, in the morning,
and again in the evening, everyday of the performance. He would sit on the floor
cross-legged, to enter the trance. This is a typical Malay way. He would wear a
Malay shawl, chew sireh, and put Malay tobacco into his mouth. People would
consult him for their problems. Donations were given voluntarily outside in a
box. Different deities would possess him--speaking Thai or Malay for the
respective deities. An older brother always acted as the interpreter. The last
spirit to enter him would be a tiger--crawling around the floor, picking up food
that is given as offerings, and pointing at people to give the food to--so that
everyone who is related to him gets something.
Tan Chee-Beng also notes the presence of a "Chinese bomoh"--a spirit-doctor and magical practitioners who learned their art
from the traditional Malay or Thai religious specialists. Tan expresses the
conviction that "Perhaps the component of Peranakan Chinese culture which
best expresses the Chineseness of the Peranakan is their Chinese
religion." (ibid.,pg. 42)
Tan maintains that Chinese religion draws an ethnic boundary between the
Peranakan Chinese and the Malays. Between the Chinese and the local Thai's,
there is no such boundary between religions--"thus religion does not act as
a barrier of interaction between the Chinese and the Thai." (pg. 49)
It is interesting in this regard that Tan Giok-Lan's study of the Peranakan Chinese of Sukabumi;, in Java, supports the thesis for the
basically Chinese religious orientation of the peranakans in general. There,
patrilineal descent and patrilocality; are still predominate, if flexible to
local circumstances. No where among the peranakans are there deep lineage trees.
How much Chinese culture or religion presents a barrier to crossing ethnic
lines, or Malay, or both, seems to be a matter of some conjecture--as well as
what constitutes a genuinely syncretic orientation, versus a
"non-exclusive" openness to incorporate diverse elements while
preserving a traditional base in belief and ritual.
The study of trance and spirit possession within the Malaysian
social context reveals the differential expression of states based upon a kind
of "cognitive pluralism." Stereotypes help to maintain role
expectations in the performance and reactions of actors within an interethnic
context--stereotypes and categories facilitate the process of communication of
intention and significance. Cognitive diversity reflects ethnic diversity.
"Social actors can respond appropriately and predictably to each other
without sharing the same meanings and interpretation of events. Complementary,
reciprocal expectations of behavior--what Wallace has termed "equivalence
structures"--emerge over time despite cognitive
heterogeneity." (Susan K. Ackerman and Raymond Lee,
"Communication and Cognitive Pluralism in a Spirit Possession Event in
Malaysia", 1981:790) "All societies are, in a radical sense, plural
societies." (A.F.C.Wallace, Culture and Personality 1970:109-110)
The organization of cognitive diversity into stable role behaviors becomes
problematic, and there is no necessary correspondence between collective
representations and equivalence structures--participants with a diverse range of
motives and orientations share equivalence structures, and a potentially
unlimited number of such equivalence structures can be 'mapped' onto collective
representations.
At one level of communication, the anticipation of role behavior implies that
individuals create for themselves a model of common group structure which is
based upon a conception of a generalized other. Participants can locate each
other's position on a behavioral map. Although the behavioral gestures are
mutually predictable, they do not require the participants to hold the same
motivations, intentions or definitions of the behaviors performed. Upon another
level, people internalize these enactments and evaluate them variously and
differentially, giving rise to the cognitive diversity. Conversation between
actors further modifies retrospective and on-going responses and role behaviors.
"The sequences of complementary interaction performed on the primary level
are continuously reconstructed through ongoing conversation between the
participants. This reconstruction of accounts is the major mechanism by which
primary-level interactions are objectified or made real, and it
extends secondary-level communication indefinitely through time. Such events as
spirit possession, and their social significance, emerge as ongoing
possibilities of social action from this process of communication of
"retrospective interpretations." (ibid. pg. 791)
Spirit possession in Malaysia has been interpreted as a traditional, and
culturally elaborated style of stress-management. Such spirit-possession, a
popular form of entertainment in Northern Malaysia, is viewed as a symbolic
representation of personality and polity that connects illness and possession to
other power-laden contexts. The symbolic language of spirit possession can be
regarded as a conceptual system through which abstract power relationships
(related to Malay royalty) are represented. (Kessler ,1977)
There are a number of reactions which belong to a broad category of
spirit-possession in Malaysia which are not as contextually well-defined or
formalized as the main puteri seance. Latah, running amok, Malay hysteria and mass hysteria are common instances of relatively
spontaneous and uncontrolled possession which emerges suddenly in response to
some discrete stimulus and involves the enactment of normally intolerable
aggressive behavior "that can range from uncontrolled verbal abuse to
physical violence." (Susan K. Ackerman and Raymond Lee, 1981:792)
Ethnic stereotypes emerge as inter-group equivalence structures in complex events of multi-ethnic spirit possession, which
enable a degree of management and mutual adjustment to such events--they can be
seen to function as self-fulfilling prophecies which mutually
reinforce, and implicitly legitimize, such events. They do not direct
decision-making, except perhaps indirectly, nor are they "instrumental in
shaping the rules of the implicit contract." Whatever direction social
process would take, alternative equivalence structures would emerge which allow
for the mutual behavioral accommodation of the different groups--different
sets of equivalence structures would emerge from the social interactive
process.
We are left to consider the role of symbols, and their linguistic expression,
in the articulation and mediation of experience upon several parallel levels of
social reality--an internal dialectic of consciousness, meaning and affect, an
internal/external dialectic between internalized frames and
externally derived experience, and the dialectic between self and other in the
construction and maintenance of psycho-social identity. Religious symbols
largely mediate the boundaries between these different levels of experience, and
provide an adaptive mechanism for the resolution of conflict and contradiction,
in social relations, in phenomenologically derived experience, in one’s own
internalized frames of reference/inference. In this regard, ethnic symbols, and
the ascriptive labels which articulate these symbols, can be appropriated
psychologically and culturally for service of maintenance of a sense of ego
reality. Face-to-face discourse, and the discourse functions of code
switching/mixing, serve to maintain and reinforced internalized/external
frames, to bolster ones subjective orientation in the world, bringing this into
alignment with the objective social world. Such symbol systems serve the
function of the transmission and mediation of cultural forms, values and
orientations. In the social construction of reality;, we can speak of primary
and secondary socializations, and of possible discrepancies between these two
levels of "basic" and derived experience--disjunction creates
dissonance and potential conflict. We can see in this regard ethnicity and
culture working simultaneously, culture in terms of primary identity, and
ethnicity in the form of secondary and derivative forms of socialization that nevertheless become internalized and have a shaping influence upon one’s
primary identity. It can be seen that several alternate, even contradictory
secondary forms can become partially internalized without the concomitant level
of commitment or affective, subjective identification which accompanies the
"subjective inevitability" of primary socialization--allowing an
individual to manipulate and alternate between different status-role identities
and social realities. Also, it is important to understand that the socialization
process itself is always open-ended, partial and never complete--only
complementary cultural closure can provide a measure of completeness and
unequivocal finality to one’s subjective sense of the world. It is this
fundamental unfinishedness and partiality of socialization and
identification which makes secondary processes influential upon the development
of personality--allowing for the possibility of both adaptive change and
regressive pathology. Finally, it is the very fact of its psychological
internalization that confers such power and strength to the process. It has
great realizing potency that it tends to be realized in the process
of becoming internalized. Identification is likely to accompany closely
internalization, and internalization is likely to accompany identification. The
social construction of reality, via symbol systems which are
normatively religious, ethnically referential, and linguistically encoded,
becomes the psychological reconstruction of reality which is
experiential, affective, perceptual, cognitive and normative in expression, and
vice versa.
A Comprehensive, Annotated
Bibliography on Peranakan Studies
Copyright © 2000, by Hugh M. Lewis
February 19, 2000
(This bibliography may be printed and used for research and
classroom purposes only)
Ackerman, S E & Raymond M Lee
1981 "Communication and Cognitive Pluralism in a Spirit Possession Event
in Malaysia"
American Ethnologist
Outlines spirit possession events in northern Malaysia, specifically
instances of mass hysteria involving Malay factory women, comparing
these to ritually ordered trance, and discusses how these events are
managed, manipulated, and mediated through ethnic stereotypes and
interethnic expectations in ongoing communication
1988 Heaven in Transition: Non-Muslim Religious Identity and Ethnic
Identity in Malaysia
Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press
A brief descriptive study dealing with contemporary religious
movements in modern Malaysia, and the relation of ethnicity in
participants involvement with these social phenomena
Balibain, John
1932 Hail, Penang! ?
An old work by a British administrator. It contains an interesting
description of Chinese courtship and marriage customs, and is
interesting from the standpoint of the colonial history of Penang
Bastin, John; & R Roolvink, editors
1964 Malayan and Indonesian Studies: Essays Presented to Sir Richard
Winstedt on his Eighty-Fifth Birthday
Oxford: Clarendon Press
Blumberg, Paul, editor
1972 The Impact of Social Class
New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co.
Bonacich, Edna
1980 "Middleman Minorities and Advanced Capitalism"
Ethnic Groups Vol. 2: 211-219
Braddel, T
1850a "Notices of Penang"
Journal of the Indian Archipelago
1851b "Notices of Penang"
Journal of the Indian Archipelago
1852c "Notices of Penang"
Journal of the Indian Archipelago
1857d "Notices of Penang"
Journal of the Indian Archipelago
1855e "Notes on the Chinese of the Straits"
Journal of the Indian Archipelago.
1856f "Notes on Malacca"
Journal of the Indian Archipelago, n.s. 1
Brown, D E
1976a Principles of Social Structure: Southeast Asia
Westview Press, Inc.
An insightful and well written social anthropological study of a
theory of corporate social organization based upon alternative
"principles" such as ethnicity, kinship, occupation, etc.,
using case studies drawn from Southeast Asia
1964b Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development
New York, N.Y.: McGraw Hill Book Co.
Clammer, John
1979a The Ambiguity of Identity: Ethnicity Maintenance and Change
Among the Straits Chinese Community of Malaysia and Singapore
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Occasional Paper, #54
Singapore: University of Singapore Press
1980b Straits Chinese Society
Singapore: Singapore Univ. Press
A key reference text treating the sociology of the Straits Chinese,
based in part upon statistical studies done in Malacca, contesting
some of the common "folk-stories" of matrilocality and
intermarriage among the Babas and Malays. Contains an excellent,
exhaustive bibliographic review of literature relating to the
Peranakans, a study of Peranakan Literature, as well as a reprint of
the 1914 article by Rev. Shellebear on the Baba Malay dialect
1983 "Studies in Chinese Folk Religion in Singapore and
Malaysia"
Contributions to Southeast Asian Ethnography, Editor, No.
2, August. Singapore: National University of Singapore
Coedes, George
1968 The Indianized States of Southeast Asia
Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center Press
Coppel, Charles A
1983 Indonesian Chinese in Crisis
Kuala Lumpur Malaysia: Oxford Univ. Press
Coughlin, Richard J
1960 Double Identity: The Chinese in Modern Thailand
Hong Kong: Hong Kong Univ. Press
Cowan, C D, & O W Wolters, editors
1976 Southeast Asian History and Historiography: Essays Presented
to D.G.E. Hall
Cornell, New York: Cornell Univ. Press
An important collection of studies treating a wide range of subjects in
Southeast Asian studies
Chia, Felix
1980 The Babas
Singapore: Times Books International
A well written descriptive study of Baba culture which has an
excellent chapter on Baba Malay, on wedding customs, on the game
"Cherki" as well as illustrations of Nonya-ware and Nonya
furniture.
1983 Ala Sayang!: A Social History of the Babas & Nyonyas
Singapore: Eastern Universities Press Sdn. Bhd.
Cultural aspects and customs, language and social patterns of the
Baba and Nyonyas
1994 The Babas Revisited
Singapore: Heinemann Asia
A revised edition of his earlier work The Babas, focusing
mainly upon the Sinaporean Babas
Chin, John M
1981a The Sarawak Chinese
London: Oxford Univ. Press
1988b The Nonya
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Kementerian
Chew, Daniel
1990 Chinese Pioneers on the Sarawak Frontier: 1841-1941
Singapore: Oxford Univ. Press
Chew, Ernest C T, and Edwin Lee
1991 A History of Singapore
Singapore: Oxford Univ. Press
Crissman, Lawrence W
1967 "The Segmentary Structure of Urban Overseas Chinese
Communities."
Man: Vol. 2 (New Series) 185-204
Dawson, T R P
1969 Tan Siew San: The Man from Malacca
Singpapore: Donald Moore Press, Ltd.
de Moubray, G A de C
1931 Matriarchy in the Malay Peninsula and Neighbouring Countries
London: Routledge & Sons, Ltd.
Ding Choo Ming
1978 "An Introduction to the Indonesian Peranakan Literature in
the Library of the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia"
Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
Vol. 51
Edmonds, Juliet
1968 "Religion, Intermarriage and Assimilation: The Chinese in
Malaya"
Race, Vol. X, I: 57-67
Discusses the role of intermarriage in interethnic assimilation
among the Peranakans of Malaysia, the changing role of Islam in
imposing an obstacle on this process, and the changing socio-political
factors in colonial and post-colonial societies that have had an
effect upon this assimilation
Edwards, Norman
1990 The Singapore House and Residential Life: 1819-1939 Singapore:
Oxford University Press
A very interesting and valuable study of the architectural styles
and history of Singapore
Elliott, Allan J A
1955 Chinese Spirit-Medium Cults in Singapore
Monographs on Social Anthropology, No. 14, London: The London
School of Economic and Political Science
Emerson, Donald K
1986 "Southeast Asia": What's in a Name?"
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies Vol. 19: 1-21
Discusses the etymology and political implications of the
topographical and areal designation of "Southeast Asia"
Endicott, Kirk Michael
1970 An Analysis of Malay Magic
Oxford: Clarendon Press
Eng-Lee Seok Chee
1989 Festive Expression: Nonya Beadwork and Embroidery
Singapore: National Museum
Felix, Alfonso Jr., editor
1969 The Chinese in the Philippines, 1570-1770, Vol. I,
Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House
1969 The Chinese in the Philippines, 1770-1898, Vol. 2,
Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House
Fitzgerald, C P
1965 The Third China
Univ. of British Columbia
Fortier, David H
1957 "The Chinese in North Borneo"
Colloquium on Overseas Chinese, edited by Morton H. Fried,
New York, N.Y.: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific
Relations
Freedman, Maurice
1958a Lineage Organization in Southeastern China
Athlone Press
1959b "The Handling of Money: a Note on the Background to the
Economic Sophistication of Overseas Chinese"
Man: 56-7
1962c "Chinese Kinship and Marriage in Singapore"
Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 3, no. 2
Deals with the social anthropology of the Babas and overseas
Chinese in Singapore, their kinship structure, religious practices,
language, marriage practices, and the institution of matrilocality
1966d Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung
The University of London: The Anthlone Press
Freedman, Maurice & Marjorie Topley
1961 "Religion and Social Realignment among the Chinese in
Singapore"
Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 21: 3-23
Discusses the history of different Chinese religious movements in
Singapore
Freedman, Maurice & William E. Willmott
1961 "South-East Asia: With Special Reference to the Chinese" International
Social Science Journal Vol. 13: 245-270
Fried, Morton H
1958 Colloquium on Overseas Chinese
New York, N.Y.: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific
Relations
An early collection of articles about the Overseas Chinese in
Borneo, Indonesia, the Carribean, Peru, Burma, the United States
Gosling, L A P
1964 "Migration and Assimilation of Rural Chinese"
Malayan and Indonesian Studies, edited by John Bastin and R.
Roolvink, Oxford: Clarendon Press
A frequently cited reference that deals with the
assimilation and settlement patterns of the rural peranakan
Chinese in the pioneering and subsequent social history of the
state of Trengganu in Malaysia
1983 "Changing Chinese Identities in Southeast Asia"
The Chinese in Southeast Asia: Identity, Culture &
Politics edited by L. A. Peter Gosling & Linda Y. C.
Lim, Singapore: Maruzen Asia, Pte. Ltd.
Gosling, L A P & Linda Y C Lim, editors
1983 The Chinese in Southeast Asia: Ethnicity and Economic
Activity
Vol. I, Singapore: Maruzen Press, Pte. Ltd.
An important collection of studies about the Overseas Chinese in
many different nations of Southeast Asia, focusing upon important
theoretical points of their ethnicity, social patterning, and economic
orientation.
1983 The Chinese in Southeast Asia: Identity, Culture and Politics
Vol. II, Singapore: Maruzen Press, Pte. Ltd.
Gwee, William Thian Hock
1993 Mas Sepuloh: Baba Conversational Gems
Singapore: Armour Publishing, Pte. Ltd.
An excellent reference for Baba terms and idiomatic expressions
Hall, Kenneth & John K Whitmore
1976 Explorations in Early Southeast Asian History: The Origins of
Southeast Asian Statecraft
Michigan Papers on South and Southeast Asia, No. 11, Univ. of
Michigan Press
Hamilton, Gary
1978 "Pariah Capitalism: A Paradox of Power and Dependence" Ethnic
Groups, Vol. 2:1-15
Treats the political perspective in the creation and exploitation
of middlemen minority groups like the Jews of Europe and the Chinese
of Southeast Asia.
Harrison, Tom & Stanley J O 'Connor
1970 Gold and Megalithic Activity in Prehistoric and Recent West
Borneo,
Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell Univ. Southeast Asia Program
Ho, Ruth
1975 Rainbow Round My Shoulder
Singapore: Eastern Universities Press
A fast reading narrative of the author's past as a Nonya, with a
valuable description of a peranakan wedding
Ho, Wing Meng
1976 Straits Chinese Silver
Singapore: University Education Press
An authoritative and exhaustive guide to Straits Chinese silver,
showing its range of types and styles, and distinguishing it from
Malay silver. Has an interesting description of Baba culture as well.
The other books on Straits Chinese porcelain, beadwork and embroidery
are colorful, beautiful and interesting guides to Straits Chinese
material culture
The four books below are excellent and colorful authoritative
references to Nonya material culture.
1983 Straits Chinese Porcelain: A Collector's Guide
Singapore: Times Books International
1984 Straits Chinese Silver: A Collector's Guide
Singapore: Times Books International
1987 Straits Chinese Beadwork & Embroidery: A Collector's Guide
Singapore: Times Books International
1994 Straits Chinese Furniture: A Collector's Guide
Singapore: Times Books International
Holloman, Regina & Serghei A Arutiunov, editors
1978 Perspectives on Ethnicity
Mouton Publishers
Hutterer, Karl L, editor
1977 Economic Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast Asia:
Perspectives from Prehistory, History and Ethnography
Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, Michigan Papers on
South and Southeast Asia, No.13: University of Michigan Press.
An indispensable collection of studies about the prehistory and
development of traditional Southeast Asian civilization as an
"interregional system"
Hutton, Wendy
1995 The Food of Malaysia: Authentic Recipes from the Crossroads of
Asia
Singapore: Periplus, Pte, Ltd.
Jiang, Joseph P L
1966 "The Chinese in Thailand"
Journal of Southeast Asian History
Vol. 7, no. 1, March
Johns, A H
1976 "Islam in Southeast Asia: Problems of Perspective"
Southeast Asian History and Historiography: Essays Presented
to D. G. E. Hall edited by C. D. Cowan and O. W. Wolters.
Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell Univ. Press
Karim, Wazir Jahan
1990 Emotions of Culture: A Malay Perspective
Singapore: Oxford Univ. Press
Kennedy, Jean
1977 "From Stage to Development in Prehistoric Thailand: An
Exploration of the Origins of Growth, Exchange and Variability in
Southeast Asia"
Economic Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast Asia,
edited by Karl Hutterer, Michigan: Univ. Michigan Press
King, Sam
1992 Tiger Balm King: The Life and Times of Aw Boon Haw
Singapore: Times Books International
Khoo Kay Kim
1991 Malay Society: Transformaton & Democratization
Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Pelanduk Pub. Sdn. Berd
Khoo Su Nin, editor
1989-91 Pulau Pinang: A guide to the local way of life &
culture of Penang
A very rich and informative periodical published in Georgetown and
devoted largely to the Nonya heritage there
Kobayashi Shinzaku
1931 Shin Minzoku no Kaigai Hatten Kakyo no Kenkyo
Tokyo
Kroeber, A L
1957 Style and Civilization
New York: Cornell Univ. Press
Kuchler, Johannes
1965 "Penang's Chinese Population: A Preliminary Account of its
Origin and Social Geographic Pattern"
Asian Studies, Vol. 3, no. 3
Lee, Poh Sing
1978 Chinese Society in 19th Century Singapore
Melbourne: Oxford Univ. Press
Leonard, Jane Kate
1984 Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World
Harvard East Asian Monographs III: Council of East Asian Studies,
Harvard Univ.
Lim, Betty
1994 A Rose On My Pillow: Recollections of a Nonya
Singapore: Armour Publishing Pte Ltd
Autobiographical account spanning the pre and post war era in
Singapore, Malacca and Penang
Lim, Sonny
1982 Baba Malay: The Language of the Straits Born Chinese
Master's Thesis, Australia: Monash University
An excellent descriptive analysis of Baba and Pasar Malay
Lind, Andrew W
1974 Nanyang Perspective: Chinese Students in Multi-Racial Singapore
Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of Hawaii
Mackie, J A C editor
1976 The Chinese in Indonesia
Singapore: Heineman
McCloud, Donald G
1986 System and Process in Southeast Asia: The Evolution of a Region.
Westview Press
McVey, Ruth, editor
1963 Indonesia
Southeast Asian Studies: Yale Univ. Press
Milner, G B, editor
1978 Natural Symbols in South East Asia
London: School of Oriental and African Studies
An interesting study of the role of symbolisms of nature in
Southeast Asian culture
Minchin, G
1870 Notes and Queries on China and Japan,
n. s. 4, no. 6 Hong Kong
Moench, Richard
1961 "A Preliminary Report on Chinese Social and Economic
Organization in the Society Islands"
Paper presented at the Tenth Science Congress of the Pacific
Science Association: University of Hawaii
Nagata, Judith
1974 "'What is a Malay?' Situational Selection of Ethnic Identity in a
Plural Society"
American Ethnologist Vol. 1, no. 2:331-350
1979 Malaysian Mosiac: Perspectives from a Poly-ethnic Society
Canada: Univ. of British Columbia Press
Newell, William H
1962 Treacherous River
Kuala Lumpur: Univ. of Malaya Press
Ng Siew Hua, Cecilia
1983 "The Sam Poh Neo Neo Keramat: A Study of a Baba Chinese
Temple"
Contributions to Southeast Asian Ethnography, edited by
John R. Clammer, Singapore: National Univ. of Singapore
A valuable ethnographic and ethnological study of a Baba
Temple in Singapore, supporting the contention that the Baba's
are to be defined as an "ethnic group" rather than
as a culture.
Omohundro, John T
1977 "Trading Patterns of Philippine Chinese: Strategies of
Sojourning Middlemen"
in Economic Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast Asia,
edited by Karl Hutterer, The Univ. of Michigan Press
1981 Chinese Merchant Families in Iloilo
The Ohio Univ. Press
Oon, Violet
1978 Peranakan Cooking
Singapore: Times Publications
Pakir, Anne Geok-In Sim
1987a A Linguistic Investigation of Baba Malay
PhD. Dissertation, Ann Arbor, Mi.: Dissertation Abstracts
International, A: The Humanities and Social Sciences, 12(1), June
1988b "The Baba Malay Lexicon: Hokkien Loanwords in Baba
Malay"
Applied Linguistics Association of Australia: Occassional Papers,
10: 3-30
1989c "Linguistic Alternants and Code Selection in Baba Malay"
World Englishes, Vol. 8, no. 3, Winter : pages 379-388
1991d "The Range and Depth of English-knowing Bilinguals in
Singapore"
World Englishes Vol. 10, no. 2: 167-179
Png Poh-Seng
1969 "The Straits Chinese in Singapore: A Case of Local Identity
and Socio-Cultural Accommodation"
Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 10, no. 1
A much cited reference which deals with the basic aspects of Baba
Chinese culture in Singapore
Purcell, Victor
1947 "Chinese Settlement in Malacca"
Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
Vol. XX, part 1 : 115-125
1948 The Chinese in Malaya
London: Oxford Univ. Press
An important source talking about Chinese religion in Malaysia, and
its history, with an appendix treating Baba Malay
1956 The Chinese in Modern Malaya
Singapore: Donald More
1965 The Chinese in Southeast Asia
2nd Edition, London: Oxford Univ. Press
A comprehensive work to be considered a textbook about the Overseas
Chinese, their history, demography, and social patterning and
predicament in different Southeast Asian countries
Rabushka, Alvin
1973 Race and Politics in Urban Malaya
Hoover Institution Press
An important empirical study of urban Malays and Chinese in Kuala
Lumpur and Penang, Malaysia, treating their interethnic attitudes and
supporting a "transactional hypothesis"
Raybeck, Douglas
1980 "Ethnicity and Accommodation: Malay-Chinese Relations in
Kelantan, Malaysia"
Ethnic Groups Vol. 2: 241-268
1983 "Chinese Patterns of Adaptation in Southeast Asia"
The Chinese in Southeast Asia: Identity, Culture &
Politics Vol. 2, edited by L. A. Peter Gosling & Linda
Y. C. Lim, Singapore: Maruzen Asia, Pte. Ltd.
Roff, William R, editor
1974 Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State
Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press
Roth, H Ling
1966 Oriental Silverwork: Malay and Chinese; A Handbook for Connoisseurs,
Collectors, Students and Silversmiths
Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press
A reprint of an early work done in the twenties which shows clear
photos of Chinese and Malay silver work. An interesting introductory
chapter describes the traditional techniques and tools of such
silver-work
Seah Eu Chin
1848 "The Chinese in Singapore"
Journal of the Indian Archipelago
Shellabear, W G
1913 "Baba Malay: An Introduction to the Language of the Straits
Born Chinese"
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Straits Branch no. 65
Siaw, Lawrence
1981 "The Legacy of Chinese Social Structure"
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. XII, No. 2, Sept
1983 Chinese Society in Rural Malaysia: A Local History of the
Chinese in Titi Jelubu
Singapore: Oxford Univ. Press
Simoniya, N A
1961 Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia--A Russian Study
Cornell University
An important Marxist study of the political economy of the Nanyang
Chinese, their social structure and political history
Siow, Moli
1983 "The Problems of Ethnic Cohesion among the Chinese in
Peninsular Malaysia: Intraethnic Divisions and Interethnic
Accommodation"
The Chinese in Southeast Asia: Identity, Culture &
Politics Vol. 2, edited by L. A. Peter Gosling & Linda
Y. C. Lim, Singapore: Maruzen Asia, Pte. Ltd.
Skeat, Walter William
1984 Malay Magic: Being An Introduction to the Folklore and Popular
Religion of the Malay Peninsula
Singapore: Oxford Univ. Press
Skinner, G William
1957a "The Chinese of Java"
Colloquium on Overseas Chinese edited by Morton H. Fried,
New York, N Y: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific
Relations. pg. 1-10.
1963b "The Chinese Minority"
Indonesia, edited by Ruth McVey. New Haven: HRAF Press
Contains a key theoretical statement about the "peranakan
social continuum" in Java. Also see Skinner for comparative work
on differential assimilation between Chinese in Thailand and Java
Somers, Mary F
1965 Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia
Ph. D. Dissertation, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Indonesia Project
An early work that deals with the formation of a peranakan
political movement, called "Baperki" in modern
Indonesia
Somers-Heidhues, Mary F
1974 Southeast Asia's Chinese Minorities
Longman Press
A valuable overview of the Oversea's Chinese, with discussion of
the Baba and Peranakan communities in both Malaysia and Indonesia
Song Ong Siang
1967 One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore Singapore:
University of Malaya Press
Written by a Straits-Chinese, it contains many detailed tidbits
about Singapore's past, with referenct to the Babas. Contains reprints
of early articles by the Straits Chinese Magazine
Sopie, Mohd. Noordin
1973 "The Penang Secession Movement, 1948-51"
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 4
Southeast Asia Ceramic Society
1981 Nyonya Ware & Kitchen Ch'ing
Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press
Steadman, John
1969 The Myth of Asia
New York: Simon and Schuster
Steinberg, David Joel
1987 In Search of Southeast Asia
Honolulu, Hawaii: Univ. of Hawaii Press
Strauch, Judith
1980 The Chinese Exodus from Vietnam: Implications for the
Southeast Asian Chinese
Boston, Harvard Univ. Press
Judith Strauch has made important theoretical and empirical
contributions to the study of the Overseas Chinese, to their
structural ambiguity and discrimination by Southeast Asian host
societies. All her work is highly recommended.
1981 "Multiple Ethnicities in Malaysia: The Shifting Relevance of
Alternative Chinese Categories"
Modern Asian Studies Vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 235-60
1981 Chinese Village Politics in the Malaysian State
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press
Suryadinata, Leo
1981 Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, 1917-1942
Singapore: Singapore Univ. Press
Tan, Chee-Beng
1979a "Baba Chinese, Non-Baba Chinese and Malays: A Note on
Ethnic Interaction in Malacca"
Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, Vol. 7, Nos. 1-2:
19-28
1980b "Baba Malay Dialect"
Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
Vol. 53, Part 1: 150-166.
1982 "Peranakan Chinese in Northeast Kelantan"
Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
Vol. 55, part 1.
A study of the rural Chinese in Northeastern Malaysia,
comparable with a similar study by Robert Winzeler. A discussion
of the building style, the language differences, and the social
patterns of the rural Chinese compared to the Malays and the
"town Chinese"
1983 "Acculturation and the Chinese in Melaka: The Expression of
Baba Identity"
The Chinese in Southeast Asia: Identity, Culture & Politics,
Vol. 2 edited by L. A. Peter Gosling & Linda Y. C. Lim
Singapore: Maruzen Asia Pte. Ltd.
1993 Chinese Peranakan Heritage: In Malaysia and Singapore
Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Fajar Bakti Sdn. Bhd.
A short ethnological style work that highlights the some of the
intraethnic differences between the Straits settlements, especially of
the Babas of Penang
Tan, Giok-Lan
1963 The Chinese of Sukabumi: A Study in Social and Cultural Accommodation
Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univ. Modern Indonesia Project,
Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asia Studies
One of the first comprehensive ethnographic studies of
Peranakan Chinese, based in the town of Sukabumi, on Java. It is a
very accurate, detailed and reliable study, with substantial
appendics of Peranakan kin terms and loan words
Tan, Rosie Kim Neo
1958 The Straits Chinese in Singapore
Unpublished Dip. Soc. Studs. Dissertation, University of
Singapore
An ethnographic study of the Sinapore Babas, with an important
definition of baba identity
Tan, Terry
1981 Terry Tan's Straits Chinee Cookbook
Singapore: Times Books International
Tham Seong Chee
1977 Malays and Modernization
Singapore: Singapore University Press
Turnbull, C M
1972 The Straits Settlements: 1826-67: Indian Presidency to Crown Colony
University of London: The Athlone Press
Vaughn, J D
1854 "Notes on the Chinese of Penang"
Journal of the Indian Archipelago
1879 Manners and Customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements
1971 reprint, London: Oxford Univ. Press
A widely available, highly readable early account of the Babas and
Overseas Chinese in Penang and Singapore. Interesting from the
standpoint of colonial attitudes and views of the Chinese, as well as
nice descriptions of Chinese secret societies, wedding customs, games,
etc.
Wallerstein, Immanuel
1979 The Capitalist World Economy
Cambride: Cambridge University Press
Wallace, Anthony F C
1970 Culture and Personality
New York, N. Y.: Random House
Wang Tai Peng
1994 The Origins of the Chinese Kongsi
Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications Sdn. Bhd.
Wheatley, Paul
1966 The Golden Khersonese: Studies in the Historical Geography of
the Malay Peninsula Before A.D. 1500:
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: University of Malaya Press
An important study of the early documents of the colonization and
exploration of the Malay Peninsula
Williams, Lea E
1964 "Chinese Leadership in Early British Singapore"
Asian Studies, Vol. 2, no. 2
1966 The Future of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia
New York: McGraw Hill
Winzler, Robert L
1970 Malay Religion, Society and Politics in Kelantan
PhD. Dissertation, Chicago, Illinois
1983 "The Ethnic Status of the Rural Chinese of the Kelantan"
The Chinese in Southeast Asia: Identity, Culture & Politics
Vol. 2, edited by L. A. Peter Gosling & Linda Y. C. Lim.
Singapore: Maruzen Asia, Pte. Ltd.
1985 Ethnic Relations in Kelantan: A Study of the Chinese and Thai
as Minorities
Singapore: Oxford Univ. Press
Whitmore, J K
1977 "The Opening of Southeast Asia: Trading Patterns through
the Centuries"
Economic Exchange and Interaction in Southeast Asia
edited by Karl Hutterer. Michigan: The Univ. Michigan Press
Wickberg, Edgar
1964 "The Chinese Mestizo in Philippine History"
Journal of Southeast Asian History Vol. 5, no. 1, March
1965 The Chinese in Philippine Life: 1850-1898
Yale Univ. Press
Willetts, William
1964 "The Maritime Adventures of Grand Eunoch Ho"
Journal of Southeast Asian History Vol. 5, no. 2, Sept.
Willetts, William & Lim Suan Poh
1981 Nonya Ware and Kitchen Ch'ing
The Southeast Asian Ceramic Society West Malaysia Chapter
Oxford University Press
Willmott, W E
1960 The Chinese of Semarang: A Changing Minority Community
in Indonesia
Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell Univ. Press
1966 "The Chinese of Cambodia"
Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 7, no. 1, March
Willmott, W E, editor
1972 Economic Organization in Chinese Society
Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press
Win, Shein
? "The Chinese Community of Burma: Problems in Relations between
Different Ethnic Groups"
Winstedt, Richard
1961 The Malay Magician: Being Shaman, Saiva and Sufi London:
Routledge & Paul Kegan
Wolters, O W
1982 History, Culture and Religion in Southeast Asian Perspectives
?: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
An important theoretical contribution to the history of Southeast Asia
Wood, William, editor
1977 Cultural-Ecological Perspectives on Southeast Asia
Athens, Ohio: Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia
Series No. 41
Wu Yuan-li & Wu Chun-hsi
1980 Economic Development in Southeast Asia: The Chinese Dimension
Hoover Institution Press
Yeap Joo Kim
1993 The Patriarch
Singapore: Lee Teng Lay Pte. Ltd.
Yeh Hua Fen
1936 Historical Guide to Malacca
Singapore
A nice discussion of the early Chinese history of Malacca.
Yen Ching-Hwang
1976 The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special
Reference to Singapore and Malaya
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Oxford Univ. Press
1981 Ch'ing Changing Images of the Overseas Chinese (1644 -1912)
Modern Asian Studies Vol. 15, No. 2:261-285
1986 A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya:
1800-1911
London: Oxford Univ. Press
A valuable discussion of Overseas Chinese social structure and its
history, treating class, the Kong Si system, religious organization,
etc.
Yong, Paul
1994 A Dream of Freedom: The Early Sarawak Chinese
Petalying Jaya: Pelanduk Publications Sdn. Bhd.
Yousof, Ghulam-Sarwar
1982 "Nora Chatri in Kedah: A Preliminary Report"
Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
Vol. 55, Part 1:52-61
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Last Updated: 08/25/06