A CASE OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY

by Hugh M. Lewis

Relativism has been defined very broadly and loosely but its definition has not been systematically worked out in precise terms of its philosophical ramifications informing a theoretical paradigm of its own.

This has been an unfortunate state of affairs, because its very lack of precision and vagueness is a source of weakness and vulnerability to critique from a number of different direction. Most of these criticisms have been founded upon a mistaken identification of relativism as a philosophical doctrine. In general, its definition is conflated with the meaning of 'determinism' and as precluding the possibility of 'universal' knowledge.

As a consequence most intellectuals will pay lip service to the anti-ethnocentric ideals expressed by the uninformed notion of relativism, but will proceed to state their exceptions to its misplaced rule--exceptions which are considerable from a theoretical viewpoint.

Depending upon the source, there are any of a variety of kinds of relativism. This is symptomatic of its vagueness as an idea. 'Cultural relativism' or value relativism is the core doctrine within cultural anthropology. It has a history of ideas rooted in the German philological and culture historical tradition, including Gothe, Hegel and Nietsche. Humboldt was the originator of the idea. This tradition was transmitted to American anthropology by Franz Boaz, originally a geologist, who stressed cultural diffusionism and historical particularism, one form of 'historical relativism'. Boaz primary concern was the refutation of broad, unsubstantiated theoretical claims based upon an evolutionary orientation which were based upon ethnocentric beliefs. Students of Boaz, namely Ruth Benedict, Melville Herskovits, Alfred Kroeber and Edward Sapir, all went on to further elaborate this idea. Herskovits broadly interpreted cultural relativism as "in essence an approach to the question of the nature and role of values in culture." (1964: 49)

Ruth Benedict went on to elaborate the methodological and theoretical construction of 'culture pattern' which later came to be called 'culture and personality' or psychological anthropology. (Anthropology and the Abnormal 1932; Patterns of Culture 1934). This position regarded all human behavior as relative to the specific historical and cultural contexts in which it occurs and "states positively that no form of behavior is abnormal in all cultures." Melford Singer (1961) succinctly summarized Ruth Benedicts's paradigm:

According to Ruth Benedict, cross cultural surveys demonstrate that culturally integrated modes of behavior and adaptation widely vary in a range of different eco-niches and historical circumstances and together form a relatively broad spectrum of alternative variations far beyond the wide ranges of any specific culture bound formula. Our contemporary modern version of 'western civilization' becomes not a necessarily pinnacle of human achievement but only one entry in a long series of possible cultural configurations of behavior and pattering. Our customary categories of normality and abnormality which if not explicitly well defined, are at least suspect of ethnocentric culture bias when considered within the framework of this wider 'trans-cultural' spectrum. Ours is not the only civilization possible, and even though we may wish to deem it the best, nevertheless the fact remains that the total spectrum of possible human behavioral variations is just to large to be fully encompassed by any single instance of cultural configuration relative in space and time. The dynamic aspect of adaptation, determination and evolution of cultural patterning, and the essentially unpredictable character of human behavior renders a virtual infinitude of possible cultural configurations. Any psychology claiming universality of its definitions of 'normality' and the 'abnormality' is necessarily in error. The comprehensivity and relativity of the sources of these definitions must always be taken into account. Normality/abnormality is, according to Benedict, a value laden dichotomy, and only by understanding the inevitability of intrusion of cultural values upon the definition of this dichotomy 'can we ever hope to hypothesize a validly scientific and humanistic universal norm of human behavior.' According to Benedict …"the concept of the normal is properly a variant of the concept of the good…"

In her now classic The Patterns of Culture, Benedict borrowed directly from Nietsche the idea of 'archetypes' and in the process was borrowing from a long hermeneutical tradition of interpretation based upon analogical folk modes--the very tradition of ethnocentrism itself! She borrows Nietsche's notions of the Appollonian and the Dionysian:

Benedicts's brand of cultural relativism has been referred to as psychological and as 'ethical' relativism by Elvin Hatch (Culture and Morality 1983) who erroneously misinterprets the relativist doctrine as it was propounded by both Benedict and in particular Herskovits. Hatch mistakenly accuses Herskovits of deriving 'an ought from an is'. "In his view it is an indisputable fact turned up by anthropological study that peoples across the world have widely diverse value systems. Therefore, there are not absolute standards or fixed values. Evaluations are relative to the background out of which they rise." (1983: 3) If one closely rereads the above passages by Herskovits then it becomes quite clear that in no way does Herskovits imply that "that there are no absolute standards or fixed values." If anyone has derived an ought from a an is, it is Hatch, and not Herskovits, in the act of drawing such a conclusion from Herskovits theoretical treatment of relativistic doctrine. What Herskovits actually had to say is quite different. It is a significant difference which needs reiteration--"one seeks to understand the sanctions of behavior in terms of established relationships within the culture itself, and refrains from making interpretations that arise from a preconceived frame of reference."

Hatch himself notes, "Almost without exception, the philosophers are disapproving, for usually they mention ethical relativism only to criticize it while in the course of arguing some other history." (page 63) He then goes on to misinterpret what he considers to be 'historical relativism' as the doctrine that, because each culture is unique, and no regularities or generalities are to be derived from cross cultural comparison, anthropology is therefore relative to the historical context of a particular culture. Cross cultural comparison, in order to be scientifically valid, requires valid categories of thought, 'which transcend a given tradition and which apply to cultures in general.' Yet the only categories we may have are relative to our own particular cultural context and are therefore not validly applicable to other cultural contexts. Our own interpretations will change as out own culture's institutions and history changes along with our 'categories of thought.' "In the area of human affairs, no objective, detached observation is possible."

Herskovit's version is a variant of the 'historical relativist'. His entire theory of 'cultural dynamics' is a central thesis explaining how and why cultures change, based upon a very general conceptioning of relativism. Alfred Kroeber elaborated an historical relativist approach which stress the notion of culture patterns. The historical approach is synthetic, attempting 'descriptive integration' of parts in relation to larger wholes. It also seeks "to preserve as much as possible of the complexity of individual events." (1938, in 1952: 79) Historical phenomena are actual and unique in space and time. Science locates and isolates and analyzes process, but history locates patterns:

Elvin Hatch also distinguishes a form of methodological relativism, which one may hold without necessarily believing in cultural relativism, as "the thesis that one should shed one's own cultural point of view in visiting another culture in order to avoid misunderstanding what is being studied--one's own perspective may get in the way of accuracy and should be held in abeyance until the research is finished." This is quite similar to Herskovit's interpretation although quite a bit narrower. Hatch also distinguishes a 'functionalist' version of ethical relativism--that social institutions normally exist for good reason and "have unintended and beneficial effects" but this position "leads to the approval of practices that are patently inhumane."

Relativism has had another component, perhaps more interesting from a scientific and theoretical standpoint. This concerns the interrelationship between language and culture ('does culture influence language or does language influence culture') or what has been called the 'world view problem'. Edward Sapir, another student of Franz Boaz, elaborated what has become known as the 'weak' version of what has become known as 'the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis'. Though he believed that 'language and culture are each independent and there is no causal connection between the two' he believed that 'people who speak different languages segment their world differently.' (Carol Eastman, 1975: 75) Phrased another way, the weak form says that "language makes it easier for its speakers to think in some ways than in others, that it 'habituates' thought, and that different languages thus divide up the world differently. The weak version does not argue that thoughts expressed in one language are impossible to be expressed in another, but that some ways of thinking convenient in one language may be very difficult in terms of another language. This brings up the whole issue of the interpretation of reality and the translation of meaning between languages. Language defines experience for us by reason of its formal completeness and because of our unconscious projection of its implicit expectations into experience." (Sapir 1931: 578)

"Language is primarily a pre-rational function. It humbly works up to the thought that is latent in, that may eventually be read into, its classification and its forms; it is not, as is generally but naively assumed, the final label put upon the finished thought." (page 15)

Sapir also elaborated upon the concept of culture pattern. In his essay "Culture, Genuine and Spurious" (1924) he mentions the interpretation of the study of culture in relation to a normative understanding of how well they provide 'suitable environments for human existence.'

This has become a foundation stone to 'counter cultural' orientation within anthropology known as 'humanistic anthropology'. It expresses well the humanistic component of the relativist doctrine as its primary concern was with refuting and correcting the problems of ethnocentrism in science and culture. This humanistic orientation, shared by all of the relativists, identifies the enterprise of anthropology as a part of the humanities as much as a 'social science' and expresses a primary concern among these people with bettering the condition of humankind, and with understanding this condition with empathy and feeling. From a strictly scientific point of view, this orientation also exposes itself to critique as being an antithetical, a scientific approach, rooted in implicit normative preconceptions about cultural reality. This has become a central dilemma for relativist doctrine--a source of its weakness and vagueness.

Benjamin Lee Whorf, a student of Sapir, contributed to 'the world view problem' what has become known as the 'Whorf Hypothesis' referred to as the 'theory of Linguistic Determinism' or the 'strong' form of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis. Whorf carried Sapir's language argument to its logical extreme, or what is 'extreme linguistic relativity' . he reinserted the problem of 'culture' into the language and thought equation, believing that "the idea that language influences culture would enable researches to find out how peoples of various cultures think" (Eastman: 76) by investigating the grammars and lexicons of different languages. Implied in this belief is that language determines thought, which in turn influences cultural patterns. His classic example is Eskimo lexicon which distinguishes more categories of snow than English. "Does this mean that the Eskimo sees differences and similarities among snow that we are unable to see?…There is evidence to indicate that the speaker of English can classify snow as the Eskimo does…Whorf himself must have been able to see snow as Eskimos do since his article describes and pictures the referents for the words." (Roger Brown 1958: 234) Whorf notes where explicitly stated that "our language determines how we segment our world--though one statement in his book comes very close to implying this. It has been on the basis of this implication that the general inference has been subsequently made and built upon. Whorf was most concerned with elucidating the ways language, its grammar and lexicon may actually differently structure different cultural worlds, and in this regard he focused upon the actual differences between languages he studied, rather than upon formulating any systematic theoretical position. His beliefs have been summarized by Carol Eastman as "language structure structures thought":

The question must be asked, why the need to provide Whorf with a theoretical framework which Whorf himself did not feel the need to provide? Whorf was interested in a certain kind of paradoxical problematic in human reality and in exploring its dimensions, but not necessarily in providing any final statements about this problematic. And the problematic remains, though his 'theory' has been largely discredited. The implicit notion is that individual languages differ from each other in structure--'different structures for different languages'. This was a preoccupation with linguistic anthropologists who were most interested in describing languages 'such that their differences could be seen and compared.' This is regarded as a kind of 'linguistic particularism' which has become the sub-discipline of 'historical linguistics and socio-linguistics' as well as some aspects of anthropological linguistics. But 'today the trend is away from such particularism' and the predominant preoccupation has become a search for a universal structure underlying all languages--"tend toward the idea that reality is the same for all people but that some people segment reality differently." (Eastman: 78)

Subsequent contributions to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis have modified and elaborated it, which plays down the deterministic side and emphasizes the 'weaker' formula. "A perceptual category which is used by people more often than other is a category which is more 'available' than one which less frequently used. This modification is the basis of the received view of linguistic relativism--implying that one's world view is determined by one's language, but rather that one categorizes his world by using his language according to his need." (Eastman" 77)

In terms of Eskimo's words for snow, "The Eskimo's language does not force the Eskimo to perceive many different kinds of snow; the Eskimo, rather, uses his language to categorize snow according to his needs and uses he has for it." (Eastman: 77)

Central to the methodology of this weak dorm of linguistic relativism is the notion of 'codability of perceptual categories' following the Principle of Least Effort is the statement that 'the length of a word is negatively correlated with its frequency of usage. Low codability occurs when a phrase is needed to label a category but a category has high codability if only a word is needed. A category used more often is more 'available' than one used less frequently. Such differences occur in grammatical structure, phonology, morphology and syntax. Linguists have found a number of areas in which this principle holds, in terms of marked vs. unmarked (overt vs. covert) categories--frequently found in color, gender, age, mass and count, time, etc.

I have used Vietnamese language to illustrate this principle of linguistic relativism in another way. The structure of Vietnamese lends itself to word play, double punning and its phonological tonality lends itself to a sing song quality. Vietnamese poetry also reflects these qualities, containing a great deal of nature symbolism, double punning, and sonorousness. Folk poems are also folk songs. Vietnamese poems are very much like paintings, with intensive visual folk songs. Vietnamese poems are extremely difficult to translate, their precise meaning extremely elusive for western translators. Three or four very different interpretations for the same poem are not uncommonly found, and the precise meaning remains always hidden. I have further argued that this linguistic facility for word play and sound play in Vietnamese that mixes with visual metaphors correlates well with a kind of value norm, or a 'logic of love'--themes of sexuality, male and female, and erotica which are replete in Vietnamese literature time immemorial and which can be found to be a predominant theme of Vietnamese mythology, history and culture. The language and culture of the Vietnamese 'correlate' well along these lines, forming a complex of relations or a pattern which is like no other. Part of our difficulty in the Vietnamese conflict arose from our inability to understand and adequately cope with these fundamental differences in language, thought and cultural values. This instance, if it is valid, and I believe it is, illustrates well the principle of relativism in several of its different facets.

Analytically the 'world view problem' can be defined as the kinds of interrelationships co-occurring between domains of language, culture and cognition. The weak, relativist formulation says that the interrelationships are co-relational and that there is an interdependency between domains. The strong deterministic formulation posits a causal relationship in stating that language determines cognition and culture. Two other kinds of formulations are important in linguistics--the structuralist orientation posits that there is a universal deep structure underlying all languages which is rooted in cognition and which results in cultural orientations. Then there is what is known as a 'culture cognition' orientation in which language itself does not influence either culture or cognition, but that culture and cognition are separate and interrelated in that culture determines cognition. A simple schema can be set up illustrating these differences, when cognition and language are plotted against each other as being either relative or determined, neither or both.

THERE IS A DIAGRAM HERE.

This is only a simple schema which obscures some critical differences and important complexities, it collapses three domains, of culture, language and cognition, down into only two, language and cognition, the implication being that culture remains extraneous and contextual to the problem. But the schema does highlight the essential differences between 'world view' formulas, and show each in relation to the others. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis sits along a continuum between weak and strong forms. Culture cognition is a form of complete determinism and structuralism is a partially determined model based upon universality. Weak or strong may also be contrasted with structuralism or culture cognition. It is most important to note neither the weak nor strong forms are 'completely determined' models as is the cultural cognition model. Cultural cognition posits an absolute boundary between cultures which is impossible to cross--it is a false doctrine in its extreme form because cultures would be basically incommensurable, languages would be untranslatable and thoughts untranslatable--there would only be 'noise'. It is most interesting to note that linguistic determinism differs from structuralism in reversing the equation on the basis of a universal deep structure held to determine all language, but it is 'expressed' differently, relative to culture, versus there are relatively different structures for each language, but these strongly determine the form thought will take. In the weak formula, especially, relative can be read 'correlated with' and in the determined cases, it can be read 'caused' or determined by. Finally, it must be emphasized that most linguistic evidence supports no single formula completely or unreservedly, but that some evidence exists which supports all of the formulas to some extent. The reality seems to be some where near the center, as if a sphere were drawn about the middle including a portion of each.

This basically summarizes relativism as its been elaborated by anthropologists. The most important criticisms of this doctrine come in two interrelated forms, and have to do with its rootedness in a 'culture historical' tradition of thought. Both criticism come from within anthropology and concern theoretical, methodological and philosophical issues. Both criticisms are interrelated and bring out the basic paradoxical nature of relativism. Relativism entails a value neutrality from a scientific and methodological point of view, but is itself based upon a fundamentally normative conception of culture and human reality as 'evaluative'--as a problem of values. Theoretically and methodological relativism implies a cultural holism which if carried to its extreme precludes the possibility of commensurability between cultural realities. It is 'diametrically opposed to comparative, cross cultural theory and methodology. Science can be very well served if cultural realities are held to be fundamentally un-analyzable, irreducible and incommensurable with other cultural realities. "If a phenomenon were wholly unique, we could not possibly comprehend it. We are able to understand any phenomenon only because it bears some similarities to things we already know…pattern, order and meaning are violated if elements are abstracted for purposes of comparison…the cultural circle is self contained." On the other hand, comparativists, while supposedly acknowledging differences of cultures, as well as the functional integrity of each culture, but recognizes "that some parts are more interrelated than others" and that cross cultural comparison is "not only non-rapacious but is methodologically legitimate, heuristically suggestive, and scientifically fruitful". (Manners and Kaplan) A comparativist is more apt to accept both the doctrine of the 'psychic unity of mankind' as well as the comparability of similar cultural components. Accordingly, the 'relativist is concerned overwhelmingly with the differences.' The relativist is supposed to be aesthetically offended by the comparativists neglect of the unique, inherent qualities of cultural context and the comparativist is offended scientifically by the relativists obsession with differences…for while he knows that no two objects or events in nature are exactly alike, taxonomies, typologies and processes are defined and ordered through selection and abstraction, by a process in which the relevant is separated from the less relevant and the irrelevant. (Manners and Kaplan) While scientific investigation requires removal from its context, the question becomes 'to know how much of the phenomena's context one must take with it when one isolates it conceptually for purposes of analysis or study.'

This criticism is based upon an incomplete elucidation of relativist doctrine, and therefore a misconception of its implications. Perhaps Herskovits understood best this critical difference and thus most succinctly thought through the implications of relativism. Because it is not deterministic, it is held to be the basis of 'absolute' differences, a form of inverted 'cultural determinism' which sees cultural as 'cultural gardens', separate and unrelated, self contained universes of experience. Relativists may emphasize differences but do not ignore the importance of similarities. Thus the relativist doctrine states not that cultural realities are absolutely different, but only relatively different, and therefore only 'more or less' comparable. It makes the task of comparison more difficult than a deterministic model based upon a hypothesized universality, but not impossible in any absolute sense. This is its value, because most 'universalism' are a form of determinism which is usually all to easily and scientistically superimposed upon other cultural realities to provide a superficial sense of coherence, and usually hiding a disguised form of ethnocentrism--projection of collective representations of in-group/out-group boundary identification. Relativism prevents us from complacently presuming the cross cultural validity of our own 'Truths'.

The second critique, related to the first, brings in the problem of relativism from a philosophical standpoint, as this doctrine is held to undermine the rationalistic philosopher's quest for an absolute, universal, a-priori system of 'Truth, Beauty and the Good'. From the anthropologists ethical point of view, relativism as an ethical doctrine is held to promote tolerance for differences, misconstrued as 'absolute or deterministic tolerance' (justification of Genocide, Hitler, etc.) but is actually promoting only a 'relative tolerance'--more for some kinds of normative differences, less for other kinds. Again what is paradoxical is the confusion between a relative and a deterministic orientation.

This brings us to the philosophical problem of relativism. From a philosopher's versus an anthropologist's point of view, relativist doctrine can be divided between aesthetic relativism (a whole paper in itself), meta-ethical relativism, metaphysical relativism and epistemological relativism. Meta-ethical relativism as a doctrine has not been fully worked out in western philosophy, but it promotes a kind of 'ethical or value realism' saying, that if we look honestly at the record of human history, 'might foes not make right'. This can be used as support for cultural relativist doctrine. But the argument is that just because in a real sense 'might seems to make right' in an ideal sense, 'should might always make right.'

Metaphysical and epistemological relativism are more interesting issues, as they relate to the questions of truth and how we come to know the world. Not mentioned in this essay is a whole dialogue in anthropology over modalities of thinking, orality versus literacy, which deal with the problem of relativism from another angle, or 'egoism' which states that people tend to do what pleases them or is in their own interest or understanding, a doctrine tending to conflate artificially selfish motivations with self motivation. "Cultural relativism, in all cases, must be sharply distinguished from concepts of the relativity of individual behavior, which would negate all social controls over conduct." (Herskovits 1964: 63) Egoism leads into doctrines of ethical egoism and perhaps existential ethics. There is another direction in epistemological relativism, which leads to narrow solipsism of 'if I do not see it, it does not exist' which was worked out most fully in the British empiricist schools.

Yet one main goal of general normative ethics is to outline a system of moral norms applicable to everyone, independent of special contexts. Philosophers find relativism 'unconvincing' because it is 'irrelevant' to their central, absolutistic goal, 'and because the counter arguments appear to be at least as good as the arguments defending relativism. Furthermore, there are so many different notions subsumed under the rubric of relativism that the arguments often seem undirected and confused. So much for the philosophical maxim, 'divide and conquer'. According to this interpretation, cultural relativism is:

Thus the moral philosophers suspect a conspiracy of empirical evidence behind the usurpation of their traditional prerogative of absolutistic meta-ethics. Even they admit that the power of 'suggestion' is enough to undermine their rationalistic sense of universal order. Their arguments in defense of their meta-ethical position is to advance arguments, equally if not more suspect, of a 'universal structure' of human nature, or a psychic unity of humankind, or a 'deep structure' or 'at least a universal set of human needs, exist that leads to the adoption of similar or even identical principles of all cultures.' Further more, they advance the even more suspicious argument that even thought there might be cultural or individual variations of beliefs and values, this 'reveals nothing about whether people ultimately or fundamentally disagree about moral standards.' This counter argument is faulty for denying the very empirical base of cross cultural comparison of beliefs and values, in order to create an 'independent yet unprovable ideal conceptioning of meta-ethics'.

This philosophical argument against relativism interprets cultural relativism as a form of 'normative relativism' that 'anything is right or wrong whenever some individual or some group sincerely thinks it is right or wrong' and a 'person ought to obey a particular constitution because most people in that society believe it is morally right to do so.' There are known as individual normative relativism and group normative relativism, respectively. 'What does not seem attractive is to mix the two forms of normative relativism, for individual beliefs too often conflict with group beliefs.' The ultimate arguments against this version of relativism as interpreted by philosophers is that normative relativism implies or leads logically to seemingly universal norms of tolerance, or of equality, or at most a live and let live non-involvement, then the whole position is internally inconsistent:

In closing this over wrought essay, the paradox of relativism is that its ultimate refutation is the ground for its philosophical justification. It is beyond the scope of this paper to continue the argument, but only to suggest a few basic parameters. Relativism in all its facets, is in and of itself a central doctrine, which needs to be philosophically and theoretically elaborated by itself. Western philosophy is primarily rational--Eastern Religious-philosophy, which never separated philosophical justification from practical validation, elaborated a much more consistent if heterogeneous philosophy oriented around a central idea system of relativism. We can effectively compare the intellectual traditions to understand the fundamental differences between a rationalist and relativist orientation. Related to this agenda are several caveats. All relativist arguments, whatever their form, must be tied effectively to a form of psychological/epistemological relativism. This entails a notion of 'meta-logicality'. Relativism demands a 'context'--a contextuality. This contextuality means that a relativistic orientation is a problem of 'relation'. It also presents a related dilemma of interpretation which demands resolution. I believe that a relativist doctrine actually informs, if pursued consistently to its conclusion, a universal meta-ethical standard, as well as a universal aesthetic and a universal 'meta-logic'. If pushed it can lead to an alternative 'philosophy of science' and to an alternative 'science of human reality'--something very different and strange than what we have been used to in our culture which so values scientific understanding. To reiterate Herskovits: